Emotions in Plato

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Emotions in Plato

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INTRODUCTION

Why Plato Comes First

Laura Candiotto and Olivier Renaut

Emotions have become an important topic of research in Classics, merging historical, anthropological, literary, and philosophical approaches. The research on the so-called cognitive humanities is very promising nowadays, and the study of emotions in particular is one of the most fascinating topics in the field. Nevertheless, the study of the role of emotions in Plato's philosophy has not received until now the attention it deserves, despite the many books dedicated to emotions in Aristotle's philosophy, for example.[1] Moreover, it is still under debate the opportunity to ascribe to the ancient conceptualisation of πάθη our contemporary notion of "emotion".[2]

This is the first edited volume entirely dedicated to emotions in Plato's philosophy. The aim of *Emotions in Plato* is to address this topic through a scholarly analysis of the role of the πάθη in the dialogues in order to provide a consistent account of it, especially regarding Plato's epistemology, ethics, and political theory.

In this introduction, we will first discuss the contemporary debate on Plato's emotions in the fields of Classics and History of Ancient Greek Philosophy. Then, we will introduce the motivations which push us to promote such research, also highlighting the expected new venues of investigation for the contemporary field of philosophy of emotions. Finally, we will provide a summary of the volume.

1 What Do We Know about Plato's Emotions?

There is no such thing as a concept of emotion in Plato. The reader of the dialogues would look in vain after a clear-cut definition of what is now to us much a *class* of psychophysiological event. This difficulty has been, if not resolved,

1 Aristotle is often presented as the first theorist of emotions, esp. in regards with *Rh.* II.2–11 where he offers an extended analysis of the emotions used in rhetoric: anger and calm, friendship and hatred, shame and shamelessness, gratitude, fear and confidence, pity, indignation, envy and emulation. Numerous studies have focused on what appears to be rather a regional typology for the sake of rhetoric only, but as a consequence, Plato is too often presented as only having an "incomplete" theory of emotions.

2 For a summary of the problem see Konstan (2006), Chap. 1; Cairns (2008).

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lucidly exposed in studies of emotions in the archaic and classical period.[3] That being said, we find numerous hints in the dialogues which proves that Plato has a particular concern for some states in the agent that are best described with our own notion of "affectivity" or "emotions".[4] The best we could do, or perhaps the most instructive, is to use our broad notion of "emotion" covering the range of affects, sentiments, and feelings, to expose the importance of such states in the philosophical journey of the dialogues. Again, if there is no definition of what an "emotion" is in Plato, nor any full-fledged or consistent typology or theory of it, nevertheless we are left with a certain number of features of emotions that should lead us to reconsider a too sharp distinction between "passions" and more rational states or activities.

To begin with, emotions in Plato are often presented as πάθη, or παθήματα, "passions" or "affections", a genre which encompasses altogether physical affections and also things that a compound or a soul may suffer, from anger to thought. Why would we try, then, to isolate "emotions" among these πάθη? A first reason, and a first way of approaching emotions in Plato, is to consider the "lists" of emotions in the dialogues.[5] They typically include anger, fear, love, hope, envy, regret, and most of the time they come along with pleasure and pain, and desire. The lists are not always the same, and Plato probably does not mean to provide a comprehensive one; the lists often end up with a "and the like",[6] without necessarily hinting towards a natural kind. Indeed, they hardly form an autonomous class. Their relation to other genres of πάθη, sensation or perception on the one hand, pleasures and pains on the other, or lastly "motions", depends on the dialogical argument being brought in each dialogue. There is no *one* typology of the emotions but probably several attempts to sort out emotions depending on the criteria that are used for a precise argument.

What we can assert though, from the proximity of emotions with αἴσθησις, is that emotions amount to the sensible realm, are a certain kind of motion, and include the body to a certain extent. Moreover, they are always closely related to pleasure and pain, whether all emotions include a certain amount of mixed pleasure and pain, or *are* a species of them.[7] Lastly, they are tied with desires (ἐπιθυμία or ἔρως) which appear to be responsible for the conative element of

3 See recently Cairns and Nelis (2017).

4 On these distinctions, whether they are relevant in Plato's dialogues, see Zaborowski (2016).

5 Such lists are for example *Prt.* 352b3-c7, *Symp.* 207e3-6, *Phd.* 66c3-6, 83b5-c3, 94d5, *Tht.* 156b2-6, *Ti.* 42a3-b2, 69c5-d6, *Phlb.* 47e1-3, *Leg.* 632a2-5, 863e6-8, 934a4-5.

6 καὶ ἄλλαι (*Tht.* 156b6), πάντων τῶν τοιούτων (*Phlb.* 40e4), καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα (*Phlb.* 47e2).

7 The issue of pleasure and pain being the genre of some particular emotions must have been at least discussed in the Academy, as it is evident when Aristotle discusses some of these issues in his *Top.* On this point, see esp. Fortenbaugh [1975] (2002), Chap. 2.

emotions, even if it is not clear whether emotions and appetites should be put at the same level, or if desire as such is much more like a genre of emotions.[8] Some emotions, if not all, are tied with other faculties in Plato such as memory, anticipation, and opinion, but also seem to require, at some point, a non-verbal representation of the situation that causes them.[9] Some others are more explicitly presented as being specifically connected with "functions" of the soul; anger and shame, perhaps love and *philia*, are linked with θυμός, whereas some pleasures providing joy and satisfaction (or at least an image of it, and even false ones) are connected to the appetitive function of the soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν); probably, some specific pleasures of the wise man amount to his rational part. Many of the chapters hereafter develop some of these leads to define some emotions in Plato.

But lists are certainly not the sole path to follow for studying the emotions in Plato. Contrasting Plato's dialogues with Aristotle's description here is relevant: in Plato's dialogues, emotions are *embodied* in characters. Some of Plato's characters graciously or reluctantly try to describe them, so that emotions are, in a way, legitimately *parts* of the argument.[10] Let's recall Hippothales' love in the *Lysis*, Callicles' anger, shame and contempt in the *Gorgias*, Alcibiades' love and shame altogether at the end of the *Symposium*, Thrasymachus' violent eagerness to intervene in the course of the argument at the beginning of the *Republic;* but most of all, the peculiar tragic feeling of Phaedo at the beginning of the eponymous dialogue (*Phd.* 58e1-59b1), a mix of joy, despair and pity, whose nature does not fully square with better known emotional stage devices, being nonetheless very intense. Plato is not short on descriptions of the very symptoms of these characters overwhelmed with these emotions: blushing, veiling, sweating, the pounding and the heaviness of the heart. What we may call "positive" emotions are not absent either: joy, laughing, hope, pride, gaiety are all embodied in various characters. Socrates himself, even if he embodies in a very peculiar way some of these emotions or feelings (and in particular love, friendship, confidence, spirit, gratitude, serenity), may be the first character with which a philosophical survey of emotions in Plato should start.

8 On the importance of "desire" and conative attitude see Kamtekar (2006), whose conclusions may help in defining some emotions both as conative and cognitive attitudes in Plato.

9 On this particular topic, see esp. Moss (2012).

10 Anger and shame, in this respect, deserve close attention. On the importance of characters and emotions in the argument, see Hobbs (2000); Beversluis (2000); Brickhouse and Smith (2010); Candiotto (2012). On the employment of emotions within Plato's literary device, especially regarding Socrates' rhetoric, see Rossetti (2001).

How could we define emotions in Plato? This is a vexed question. Precisely because Plato himself does not consider “emotions” as a class, the definition and interpretation of emotions would probably not fit within a unified approach.[11] We can try to recall several paths of interpretations that have been proposed so far.

First, it is impossible not to be aware of the platonic dualist framework within which emotions are sometimes accounted for. Emotions such as fear, anger, envy, love, form a group which is contrasted with rational action and thinking. Together with pleasure and pain, sensation and perception, they are tied with the body and the sensible realm of human existence. They appear to be states in the agents, with which they sometimes struggle to master them, if ever they can.[12] Emotions are irrational bodily drives. Thus, a basic dualist approach would categorize emotions on the side either of the body, or the irrational part or function of the soul. Indeed, this dualistic approach is hard to deny in Plato’s dialogues, and this opposition between soul and body on the one hand, and between rational and irrational soul on the other hand, forms a conceptual framework in which we must account for emotions. This is why at first sight, Plato’s description of emotions, by contrast with Aristotle’s, seems hard to fit with our contemporary presuppositions of emotions being complex mental motives in our lives, presuppositions that are actually scarcely compatible with a strict dualism.[13] Nevertheless, emotions appear not solely as impediments: they could fit with a rational endeavour, help the action, as an auxiliary, being nicely performed, or even consists of the best behaviour one could expect. If it is true that one may not expect Socrates to be violently angry for example, one can scarcely say that the pleasures and joy of wise men are not good or even rational emotions. This means that a more moderate interpretation of the dualism between rational and irrational states, or even an account which looks at their interwoven functionality, deserve to be pursued for better understanding how to conceptualize the emotions in Plato.[14]

11 For a clear presentation of the interpretative issues concerning emotions, in regards with the evolution of Plato, see Price (2009).

12 Even if she clearly recognize the importance of emotions in Plato’s dialogues, and probably was one of the first to do it, Nussbaum [1986] (2001b) conducts a reductive interpretation in asserting that Plato is concerned with an ideal of invulnerability, positing, artificially, as a consequence, Aristotle as the first philosopher who regards emotions as positive means towards happiness.

13 This is precisely the presupposition that Fortenbaugh [1975] (2002) endorses, when he contrasts the way Aristotle delineates for the first time a “cognitive” approach of emotions, whereas Plato has an incomplete theory of emotions, being torn between a resolute cognitive understanding of some of these states, and a strong dualism which forces him to ascribe emotions to the irrational parts.

14 See on this Renaut (2015); Candiotto (2019a).

Moreover, dualism should not impair an interesting account of emotions in the dialogues. The cognitive approach that has been currently used by interpreters to account for emotions in the antiquity could still equally apply in a dualist framework. A first approach, then, is to account for distinct degrees of "cognition" in emotions. This has been, as a matter of fact, a widely shared assumption that the "partition" of the soul, whether bipartite or tripartite, leaves room for distinct degrees of cognition depending on the part at stake. Without being fully rational, emotions can, depending on which irrational "part" of the soul is responsible for it, display a certain amount of cognition.[15] It is not the place here to discuss to what extent we should attribute cognitive capacities to different parts of the soul, but it is true that, facing the diversity of emotions related to different parts of the soul, one might be tempted to ascribe different emotions to distinct parts.[16] But then, how could we account for the differences between characters whose emotions have the same name, but not the same content? This is true of love, fear, joy, emulation, wonder, and other desires that we should not deny even (or in some cases certainly not) to the philosopher.

Perhaps a more promising explanation is not to account for emotions within the framework of partition *per se*, as if the parts were seats of some emotions, but rather to acknowledge that emotions are complex events which require several faculties: bodily affections, perceptions, beliefs and judgement, even rational calculation.[17] The emotion of fear, for example, could be accounted for as a synthesis of diverse mental activities (an anticipation of risk, a judgement that the danger is unpleasant or bad), and bodily symptoms (shudders, pallor, cooling of the heart) in Plato. Feeling an emotion then, could be analytically explained maintaining a basic dualism that opposes body and soul, rational and irrational, and altogether clarifying how, in some cases, emotions are more or less "rational" or "justified". Of course, if it is so, the platonic account of emotions is not "cognitive" in the strict sense, for it does not assert that emotions are autonomous events in the agent with their cognitive power of their own.[18] Nevertheless, a multi-faceted functional account of emotions

15 This is the way *Resp.* VIII is often read, for example see Bobonich (2002), Chap. 4. For a more cautious approach, but altogether concluding with difficulties on the coherence of tripartition, see Lorenz (2006), esp. Ch. 4 and 7.

16 See again Price (2009), 126 on the possibility that θυμός could be defined as an "emotive part", which he rightly rejects, even if it does not mean that tripartition is not a useful tool to understand some key emotions like anger, shame, pride, and admiration.

17 This is the move recently made by Moss (2012); Lorenz (2012); Wilburn (2014) for example.

18 It is not to assume that partition should be, as it is often said, rejected or loosened in the late dialogues. See a stimulating analysis of some emotions in Jorgenson (2018).

could be an interesting path of worthwhile investigation. It is all the more justified that emotions can denote, in Plato, some "states" of appraisal whose rational "quality" differs from character to character, rather than mere psycho-physiological events.

So last, without putting too much weight on the question "what are emotions for Plato?", we can approach emotions by the function they perform in the ethical and political life. Indeed, if Plato is ever interested in emotions, it is because they are powerful drives and conative forces that threaten, question or promote a moral or political value. Sociological approaches to emotions have been important tools for better understanding their status in Antiquity. And so in Plato: the role of anger, love, shame, *philia*, pity, envy is obviously an important matter for the educator and the legislator so that they prove to be a "just" anger (if it is even possible), a "right" love, without denying that they are necessary levers. Again, the notion of θυμός has emerged in the platonic studies as being a central feature to educate emotions[19] and to give them a proper value, bearing in mind that their power is ambivalent and possibly dangerous. It may be argued that, at some point, Plato is much more interested in emotions being potentially "moral emotions" or "auxiliaries" than in emotions *per se*. If emotions form a class in Plato, it is perhaps in their being a desire that may become potentially moral, just, and means for reason to rule over one's life. And maybe that's why the emotions are always embodied in characters: manipulating the emotions, Plato's *paideia* works for a transformation of the way of living.

We believe that textual evidence and research on the topic show that investigating emotions in Plato deserve our attention. Not only does it merit consideration, but as our title says, "Plato comes first" as a valuable theorist of emotions. Of course the poets and the Presocratics before Plato are of invaluable importance to understand how the Greeks view sentiments, feelings and affective states;[20] and of course it is still possible that Aristotle provided a first step toward a philosophical theory of emotions in his *Rhetoric*.[21] However, we think we need to recognise that Plato's insights on emotions are philosophically profound, and his philosophical writing is full of references to the affective dimension of dialogical inquiry and existence. The great Aristotle came after him, and surely inherited parts of Plato's analysis on emotions.[22]

19 See among others Tarnopolsky (2010); Singpurwalla (2013); Wilburn (2013); Renaut (2014); Prauscello (2014); Candiotto (2014); Arruzza (2018).
20 See esp. Zaborowski (2008).
21 See Konstan, in his « Afterword » in this volume.
22 Frede (1996).

2 Nurturing the Research on Plato's Emotions

We believe that the study of Plato's emotions can be pursued in different ways. In the previous section, we discussed the main results achieved in the fields of Classics and History of Ancient Greek Philosophy. In this section, we want to highlight the contemporary relevance of this research, discussing Plato's emotions along with the contemporary field of philosophy of emotions. Our persuasion is that this is not only relevant to these fields, for example employing conceptual tools for better highlighting some features of Plato's emotions, but also to the contemporary debate in the philosophy of emotions. In fact, Plato's conceptualisation can provide unexpected insights to the contemporary discussion, for example regarding epistemic emotions or emotional valence.

Although the following list is not exhaustive (and we really hope that new venues of investigation will be pursued in the near future), we now present and discuss some core issues which can be addressed in this manner:

First. Emotions like anger, fear, hope, envy, jealousy, etc. appear as complex psycho-physiological states in the Platonic corpus, involving pleasure and pain, perception or, even, judgements. The status of these states remains unclear in the Platonic psycho-physiology, especially regarding their embodied dimension and intentional character.

The first issue deals with the notion of emotion, and its relevance for understanding Plato's epistemology. This investigation also challenges the employment of the word/concept of "emotion" for understanding the nature and functionality of Plato's πάθη, as we have already mentioned. This is not only a linguistic affair, but it requires to engage with many conceptual issues which are very much discussed nowadays. In our opinion, this issue should first be addressed along with the contemporary taxonomy on emotions. This means to study if the πάθη in Plato are primarily mental states, as for the cognitive theory of emotions (Nussbaum (2001a)), embodied processes and bodily feelings, as for the enactive theory by Clombetti (2011), quasi-perceptions (Tappolet (2016)) and the embodied appraisal theory (Prinz (2006)), volitional states, as for the Motivational Theory of Emotions (Fridja (1986)), or socially extended processes (Candiotto (2015)(2019b)). It is possible that none of these options is completely good for depicting the ancient characterizations of emotions (Rorty (2004)), or that a mix is required, maybe also contextualised to specific dialogues. But what is important to highlight here is that engaging with this issue would allow to discuss some important topics, such as the relationship among emotions, body, and soul; emotional valence (are Plato's emotions compounds of pleasure and pain?); the emotions' epistemic status (are they rational? How can an irrational state play an epistemic function? Do emotions

supervene on individual mental states?); the role of emotions in the epistemic practices (in which contexts – public or private – do emotions play their function? Are they required by the dialogical method of enquiry?).

Second. The Western philosophical tradition has defined emotions through their opposition to reason. This opposition may find its roots in Plato, since some πάθη are called irrational and they seem to obscure the operation of reason and disturb the soul. However, it should not be taken for granted that emotions in Plato are totally devoid of rationality, or that they do not play any important function in epistemology, ethics, and political theory. In fact, they may possess a very specific way of representing their object, as quasi-perceptions or intellectual insights, for example. Or, they may acquire a rational value if profitably associated with what is called a "rational desire", or if regulated by the rational part of the soul, as the famous myth of the *Phaedrus* may suggest (246a-249d).

Whether the epistemological role of emotions might be understood as a gateway to knowledge, or at least as an adjuvant to the ethical life, is still an open question, not only in the platonic scholarship, but also in the contemporary debate on emotions. In the interdisciplinary research on emotions, neuroscience has proven that the traditional dualism between emotions and reason should be overcome since emotions always play a role in our mental life. However, cognitive scientists and philosophers are working for discovering what are their functions, and if they are beneficial. There are different approaches, from the one that looks at the function of emotions in the theory of evolution (Griffiths & Scarantino (2008)) to the ones that ground it in a sentimentalist ethics (Slote (2007)), for example. Some of the questions which are discussed in the field are relevant to Plato's scholarship as well. For instance, we can explore the nature of Platonic πάθη in relation to reason and the philosophical method, and ask which is – if there is one – their epistemic marker, analysing how do they benefit or hinder the cognitive process of knowledge. These questions are not relevant to Plato's psychology and epistemology only, but also to his ethics. In fact, questioning the rational value of emotions also imply discussing their role in Socratic intellectualism, practical decision making, and rational choice, for example.

Third. The third issue therefore concerns with the moral and political agency, specifically the impact of emotions in judging, evaluating, and acting well or wrong. Some questions which can be asked in this regard are the following: How to define the role of emotions in the acquisition and exercise of virtue? Have emotions an exclusively negative function or, by contrast, are they necessary – and in which sense – for its exercise? Which are – if there are – Plato's moral and political emotions, and how do they work? Of course there

are many and different approaches in contemporary moral theory which aim to integrate emotion in the picture, but what is relevant here is that some of them refers directly to Plato, as for example virtue theory (Zagzebski (1996), Chappell (2014)). This field of studies is strictly related to the definition of the good life, wisdom and the philosophical way of living, and it has several implications to educational theory and practice too.

3 This Volume

This edited volume arises from the selection of the revised papers delivered at the joint workshops in Ancient Theories of Soul and Knowledge we organised at Paris-Nanterre University and Edinburgh University in 2017 and 2018. The workshops were made possible thanks to the generous funding of the Eidyn Research Centre (University of Edinburgh), The Scots Philosophical Society, the Doctoral School ED 139 and the Institut de Recherches Philosophiques (University of Paris-Nanterre) together with the Institut Universitaire de France. We would like to thank the colleagues and the public who attended the workshops, especially Douglas Cairns for his insightful questions and discussion in Edinburgh, and David Konstan for his important contribution to the debate in Paris.

The volume is divided into three parts which discuss the three issues, and related questions, we introduced in the previous section. The first part is thus dedicated to the taxonomy of Plato's emotions, the second to their rational or irrational status and the third to their relevance for the ethical and political theory and practice.

In the first part, we find four papers which centre around the very same notion of emotion in Plato. The first one, "Epistemic wonder and the beginning of the enquiry: Plato's *Theaetetus* 155d2-4 and its wider significance", co-authored by Laura Candiotto and Vasilis Politis, analyses wonder as a paradigmatic case of epistemic emotion in Plato. Through the study of wonder, this chapter discusses the epistemic significance of emotions in processes of inquiry, thus contextualizing emotions within Plato's philosophical method. Chapter 2, "The feel of the real. Perceptual encounters in Plato's critique of poetry", by Pia Campeggiani, and Chapter 3, "Why do itches itch? Bodily pain in the Socratic theory of motivation", by Freya Möbus, explore the relationship between emotions and the body, especially focusing on pleasure and pain and bodily desires. Chapter 2 employs the perceptual model of cognition for explaining the psychological experience of "transportation" driven by poetry. Chapter 3 explores Plato's Socratic dialogues for understanding pleasure and pain as felt

evaluations. “Emotions in context: “risk” as condition for emotion”, authored by Stefano Maso, provides a comprehensive understanding of Plato’s conceptualisation of emotion as what is triggered by risk. The chapter explores courage and love as case-studies for testing this interpretation.

The second part is composed of five chapters which discuss the irrational or rational status of emotions. Olivier Renaut, in the chapter titled “Emotions and rationality in the *Timaeus* (*Ti.* 42a-b, 69c-72e)”, provides a psychophysiological interpretation of the emotion as a compound of body and soul and argues that emotions possess a derivative “rationality”. Chapters 6 and 7, “On the desire for drink in Plato and the Platonist tradition” by Lidia Palumbo and Anna Motta, and “Plato’s seasick steersman: on (not) being overwhelmed by fear in Plato’s *Laws*” by Myrthe Bartels, both deal with the irrational or excessive behaviours brought on by emotions, and the consequent need of their regulation. Chapter 6 discusses the desire for drink and the emotional conflict in the context of Plato’s *Republic* IV; Chapter 7 analyses the characteristics which are required to a symposiarch and how emotions are ruled out by a more advanced *paideia* in the context of Plato’s *Laws*. Also Chapter 8, “The dialogue between the emotions in the platonic corpus”, by Karine Tordo-Rombaut, discusses the irrational or rational status of emotions in the light of their mastership. The author depicts the dynamic between a first irrational emotion and a second one which regulates it for showing how much Plato’s view of emotions leads to the need of self-control. Finally, Chapter 9 focuses on the role of emotions in the dialogical structure of the dialogues. Carla Francalanci in her “Love, speech and charm in the *Charmides*: reading the dialogue through emotions” directs attention to the rhetorical dimension of the *Charmides* for analysing the conversion of emotions (mostly love and erotic desire) operated by Socrates’ refutation.

The third and last section is dedicated to the ethical and political value of Plato’s emotions. This section comprises of 8 chapters, each one dedicated to the analysis of one specific emotion. Chapters 10 and 11 are dedicated to envy, Chapters 12, 13, and 14 to shame (but also erotic desire and fear), Chapter 15 to anger, Chapter 16 to pity, and Chapter 17 to friendship and love. “The Notion of φθόνος in Plato” by Luc Brisson, and “On mild envy as self-deceit. (*Philebus* 47d-50e)” by Beatriz Bossi investigate the nature and function of envy as a mixed emotion of pleasure and pain in the context of the *Philebus*. Brisson stresses how and why Plato condemned this emotion and provides a typology of objects and reasons for envy; Bossi focuses on Socrates’ appealing to comedy to focus on mild ordinary envy among friends. Both the authors share the view that envy should not have a place in the soul for Plato.

Chapters 12, 13, and 14 are dedicated to the positive role ascribed to shame by Plato in different dialogues. In “Αἰσχύνη and the λογιστικόν in Plato’s

Republic", Chiara Militello discusses the famous debate about the role of shame in the tripartite soul in the *Republic*, also establishing an important reference to Aristotle's *Topics* for discovering the function played by shame in helping reason. Chapter 13, "Shame and virtue in Plato's *Laws*: two kinds of fear and the drunken puppet", by Julia Pfefferkorn, discusses the fear of a bad reputation in the context of the education of citizens in Plato's *Laws*. Pfefferkorn argues that shame can play a beneficial function not only for acquiring virtue, but also for partaking in virtue. Simon Scott, in his "Loving and living well: the importance of shame in Plato's *Phaedrus*", examines the role of shame in the regulation of erotic desires. Through a reading of Plato's *Phaedrus*, in conjunction with the Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*, the chapter highlights the fundamental role played by shame for living well.

Marta Jimenez, in her "Plato on the role of anger in our intellectual and moral development", argues for a positive role of anger in our moral judgement. She claims that Plato pursued the goal of rechannelling destructive retaliatory anger into a more productive reformative anger. A reformative anger is the one which looks inside for a self-betterment in the context of philosophical conversations, and which cooperates with courage in the good citizen's moral development. Chapter 16, "Platonic pity", authored by Rachana Kamtekar, offers an alternative interpretation of the role of pity in Plato's philosophy. Differently from Woodruff, Nussbaum, and Konstan, the author argues that the virtuous person expresses pity, although for Plato pity is not a virtue. Love and erotic desire are explored by Frisbee Sheffield in her "Love and the city. *Eros* and *philia* in Plato's *Laws*" in the context of fostering bonds of connectedness in the city. This chapter offers an interpretation of *eros* and *philia* as civic virtues through an interpretation of Plato's *Laws*.

The volume ends with an afterword written by David Konstan which magisterially orchestrates a dialogue between Plato and Aristotle on what emotions are. In this way the volume comes back to the beginning, to the motivations which pushed us to undertake a research on emotions in Plato and promote workshops for discussing if Plato came first. Our auspice is that this volume can contribute to this debate.

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PART 1

For a Taxonomy of Plato's Emotions

CHAPTER 1

Epistemic Wonder and the Beginning of the Enquiry: Plato's *Theaetetus* (155d2-4) and Its Wider Significance

Laura Candiotto and Vasilis Politis

Abstract

The chapter analyses the famous lines about the beginning of philosophy from wonder in Plato's *Theaetetus* (155d2-4), and discusses the epistemic function that wonder plays in the process of enquiry, according to Plato both in the *Theaetetus* and more widely. The central claim is that, for Plato, the πάθος that is philosophical wonder is a state that is not simply cognitive, but affective-cum-desiderative; and that this πάθος is epistemic, in the sense of object-directed and knowledge-directed, if, and only if, it occurs in conjunction with the articulation of a particular ἀπορία and problem, that is, the kind of ἀπορία and problem that generates philosophical enquiry. Finally, the chapter depicts the pre-reflexive beginning of philosophy as epistemic suffering and epistemic desire.

Keywords

Plato – wonder – enquiry – *pathos* – *aporia* – *Theaetetus*

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> Now, for the first time,
> the everyday appears remarkable,
> as a problem.
> This is the true sign of the philosophical drive:
> the astonishment
> about that which lies before the eyes of everyone.
>
> FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, (1976) KGW II/4, p. 215–16[1]

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1 This quotation is from the course "Die vorplatonischen Philosophen" that Nietzsche delivered in the summer of 1872: 'Der freigewordene Intellekt schaut die Dinge an: und jetzt zum ersten

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1 Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyse the famous lines about the beginning of philosophy from wonder in Plato's *Theaetetus* (155d2-4), and discuss the epistemic function that wonder plays in the process of enquiry, according to Plato both in the *Theaetetus* and more widely. In doing so, we will also discuss the notion of wonder as a πάθος, depicting the pre-reflexive beginning of philosophy as epistemic suffering and epistemic desire.[2]

The diversity of offspring of these lines is remarkable, especially in the so-called Continental tradition. Not only Friedrich Nietzsche – as in our epigraph – for whom science and thinking had to begin with wonder and perplexity; but also Martin Heidegger, for whom wonder (*Erstaunen*) comes from the wondrous (*Erstaunliche*), and *Erstaunen* is conceived as the fundamental mood of the philosophical tradition.[3] However, we need to be careful. Very often wonder is understood as delighted astonishment, that is an aesthetic experience of something marvellous[4] or with the quality of greatness, and thus in relation to awe[5] and the sublime.[6] Indeed, in the Middle Ages, wonder acquired the meaning of "admiration" for something judged as excellent.[7] We might find this meaning in Plato too, especially in the *Symposium* regarding the vision of the idea of Beauty (*Symp.* 210e4-5; we shall return to this passage). Our aim is to disclose the meaning of wonder within Plato's *Theaetetus*, and beyond in Plato, trusting to its relevance both for our understanding of the character and place of wonder in Plato's account of knowledge and, especially, enquiry, but also for bringing some insights to the contemporary field of the philosophy of emotions.

Our central claim is that, for Plato, the πάθος that is philosophical wonder is a state that is not simply cognitive, but affective-cum-desiderative; and that

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Male erscheint ihm das Alltägliche beachtenswert, als ein Problem. Das ist das wahre Kennzeichen des philosophischen Triebs: die Verwunderung über das, was vor allen liegt'.

2 This chapter has been jointly conceived, written, and revised by the two authors. For academic reasons, we ascribe §§ 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 to Candiotto, and 4, 5 to Politis.

3 M. Heidegger, *Was ist das die Philosophie, GA* 1/11 in Heidegger (1976). Heidegger claimed that we should take "πάθος" as "Stimmung" for properly understand the θαυμάζειν. Pascal David has suggested to translate the πάθος-Stimmung as "affective tone". Cf. Cassin et al. (2014), 1061–062.

4 This meaning is detectable from the seventh century BC, notably in Homer. Cf. Hunziger (1994).

5 Roberts (2003), 269.

6 Kant [1794] (1960).

7 In the *Greek-English Lexicon* (Liddell – R. Scott) the verb θαυμάζω and its derivates are translated not only as "wonder, marvel", but also "admire" and "astonishment".

this πάθος is epistemic, in the sense of object-directed and knowledge-directed, if, and only if, it occurs in conjunction with the articulation of a particular ἀπορία and problem, that is, the kind of ἀπορία and problem that generates philosophical enquiry.

2 What Epistemic Wonder Is

> Socrates: My friend, it appears Theodorus' guess about your nature wasn't far wrong. This wondering of yours is very much the mark of a philosopher – philosophy starts nowhere else but with wondering (μάλα φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν: οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη), and the man who made Iris the offspring of Thaumas wasn't far off with his genealogy (καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἶριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν). (Pl., *Tht.* 155d2-d6, trans. Rowe (2015))

It is remarkable that the most established commentaries in the Anglo-Saxon scholarship (McDowell, Bostock, Rowe, Cornford, Burnyeat) do not provide any commentary on these lines. The critics might think that these lines are not part of the argument against Protagoras. Our thesis is that they should be included in the argument, because this kind of wonder is triggered by certain puzzles about change and becoming, and because it expresses the labour pains involved in the maieutic generation of enquiry and the search for knowledge. Sedley[8] and, recently, Brown[9] have highlighted the epistemic valence of the labour pains in maieutics. Here we want to add, and highlight, that the very same θαυμάζειν should be understood as a sort of labour pain, and that this kind of epistemic suffering is the beginning of the enquiry.

No less, we need to take care of the translation.[10] In these lines, Plato employed the verb θαυμάζειν for expressing a specific disposition to knowledge,

8 Sedley (2004), 28.

9 Brown (2017).

10 Other English translations: "T: No; indeed, it is extraordinary how they set me wondering whatever they can mean. Sometimes, I get quite dizzy with thinking of them. S: That shows that Theodorus was not wrong in his estimate of your nature. This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has not other origin, and he was a good genealogist who made Iris the daughter of Thaumas." (trans. Cornford).

"T: By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim. S: Theodorus seems to be a

which Rowe has translated as "wondering". Employing a verbal noun – τὸ θαυμάζειν – Plato is depicting a specific *epistemic action.* As when we desire to know something, not only because we are curious, but because we doubt whether this is the case or not. Therefore, wondering as epistemic action implies a hypothetical attitude, the one in which we are uncertain about our knowledge and thus we question it.[11] This disposition is coloured by an affective framework, which can be expressed in English with the words "surprise" or

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pretty good guesser about your nature. For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas made a good genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so, according to the doctrine we attribute to Protagoras, or do you not as yet?" (trans. Fowler).

"T: Oh yes, indeed, Socrates, I often wonder like mad what these things can mean; sometimes when I'm looking at them I begin to feel quite giddy. S: I dare say you do, my dear boy. It seems that Theodorus was not far from the truth when he guessed what kind of person you are. For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else. And the man who made Iris the child of Thaumas was perhaps no bad genealogist." (trans. Levett-Burnyeat)

French translation: "T: Et par le dieux, Socrate, à quel point je m'étonne de ce que ces choses-là peuvent bien être, cela dépasse les bornes; et quelquefois, pour dire le vrai, quand j'y porte le regard, j'ai la vue que s'obscurcit. S: C'est que Théodore, mon cher, paraît ne pas mal deviner au sujet de ta nature. Car c'est tout à fait de quelqu'un que aime à savoir, ce sentiment, s'étonner: il n'y a pas d'autre point de départ de la quête du savoir que celui-là, et celui qui a dit qu'Iris est née de Thaumas n'a pas mal dressé sa généalogie." (trans. Narcy).

Italian translation: "T: Per gli dèi, Socrate! Sono straordinariamente meravigliato della natura di tutto ciò, tanto che a volte, esaminando a fondo, mi vengono le vertigini. S: Pare davvero, amico mio, che Teodoro non abbia espresso un giudizio sbagliato sulla tua indole: ciò che provi – la meraviglia – è un sentimento assolutamente tipico del filosofo. La filosofia non ha altra origine che questa e, a quanto pare, chi ha definito Iride figlia di Taumante non ha tracciato una cattiva genealogia." (trans. Antonelli)

Spanish translation: "T: ¡Por todos los dioses! Sócrates, estoy absolutamente sorprendido con todo esto; y algunas veces cuando echo una mirada adelante, mi vista se turba enteramente. S: Mi querido amigo, me parece que Teodoro no ha formado un juicio falso sobre el carácter de tu espíritu. La turbación es un sentimiento propio del filósofo, y el primero que ha dicho, que Iris era hija de Taumas, no explicó mal la genealogía." (trans. de Azcárate)

German translation: "T: Wahrlich bei den Göttern, Sokrates, ich wundere mich ungemein, wie doch dieses wohl sein mag; ja bisweilen, wenn ich recht hineinsehe, schwindelt mir ordentlich. S: Denn gar sehr ist dies der Zustand eines Freundes der Weisheit, die Verwunderung; ja es gibt keinen andern Anfang der Philosophie als diesen, und wer gesagt hat, Iris sei die Tochter des Thaumas, scheint die Abstammung nicht übel getroffen zu haben." (trans. Schleiermacher).

11 "Wondering" can thus be considered as a synonym of "questioning" – we may wonder whether a thing is so, wonder why a thing is so, wonder at a thing being so. "Wondering" as "questioning" is certainly central in Plato's account on θαυμάζειν – and we will depict it

"amazement". However, these words – at least in ordinary language – do not sufficiently express the affective dimension that Plato is depicting here, the one related to restlessness and puzzlement. The words "τοῦτο τὸ πάθος" indicate the affective dimension related to the θαυμάζειν. That is why some other translations translate it as "wonder". Rowe and Cornford did not translate "τοῦτο τὸ πάθος", but Fowler did – as "feeling", Levett-Burnyeat as "experience", and Cornford as "sense of". We will come back to this important point later, when we discuss the relationship between wonder, aporetic states and suffering. For the moment, let us assume that θαυμάζειν is a disposition to knowledge coloured by an affective framework and assume Rowe's translation with some modifications: "This passion, namely, wonder is very much the mark of a philosopher – philosophy starts nowhere else but with wondering".

The epistemic function played by wonder is to initiate the process of enquiry: τὸ θαυμάζειν as ἀρχή, as its absolute starting point. But wonder is not the beginning of any type of enquiry, but of philosophical enquiry specifically. Indeed, Plato claims that wondering is the mark of the philosopher, and he cites Hesiod as source.[12]

3 Wondering as the Mark of the Philosopher

But why is wondering the mark of the philosopher?

For answering this question, we need to frame our lines in the context of the dialogue. The lines that come before our passage are significant in this regard:

> Socrates: These three things we've agreed on really are, I think, battling with themselves in our souls when we talk about what happens with the dice, or when we claim that I, being the age I am, without having grown or the opposite, will be within the same year now bigger, now smaller than your adolescent self, not because my size has been reduced at all but because yours has increased. In this case I actually am, later on, what I was not before, without having become so; for it's impossible for anything to have become something without its coming to be that thing, and I could never become smaller without my losing any size. And there are myriads upon myriads of other examples where the same is true, that is,

especially in relation to the ἀπορεῖν. However, this meaning should not minimize its affective valence and phenomenology.

12 Hes., *Theog.* 265. For the poet, Θαύμας, Wonder, gave birth to Iris, the messenger of the gods.

> if we're going to admit the cases mentioned. You follow me, I think, Theaetetus; at any rate you seem to me familiar enough with the sort of thing I'm referring to.
>
> Theaetetus: Yes, Socrates, and I perpetually wonder – by the gods I do! – how to make sense of it all; sometimes just looking at it makes me literally quite dizzy (καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῶ). (Pl., *Tht.* 155b5-d1; trans. Rowe (2015))

It is clear that our lines refer back to the articulation of an apparent inconsistency among three suppositions, all of which appear plausible:

1) "nothing will ever become greater or smaller, whether in size or in number, so long as it is equal to itself" (155a4-6)
2) "if a thing has nothing either added to it or taken away from it, it never grows or shrinks but is always equal" (155a8-10)
3) "it is impossible for a thing to be, later on, what it was not before, and for it to be this without having become it or becoming it" (155b1-3)

If we accept these propositions, then it is hard to explain how something can become without changing, and thus, apparently, ceasing to be what it is or was. We may surmise that, behind this particular ἀπορία (we shall consider presently its being a particular ἀπορία), there lurk Parmenides' more general objections against change, which in turn prompted Aristotle in the *Physics* to provide an account of change.[13] In the *Sophist* especially, Plato pointed to the difficulties implied by the Parmenidean notion of change, and made a particular effort to argue for the thesis that both change and changelessness belong to being and that which is.[14] Here, in the *Theaetetus,* Plato addresses the topic from the point of view of a mathematician, for whom change is adding or taking away something from something (155a8-10); and he articulates a less general ἀπορία about change, focused on the question of how a thing can change, as apparently it can, without anything being added or subtracted from it, hence without coming to be different from what it was.

More generally, Theaetetus has shown off his mathematical skills when examining a problem about lengths and powers (148d4-b5), but he acknowledged

13 Cf. Arist., *Ph.* 1.7.

14 "The philosopher – the person who values these things the most – absolutely has to refuse to accept the claim that everything is at rest, either from defenders of the one or from friends of the many forms. In addition, he has to refuse to listen to people who make that which is change in every way. He has to be like a child begging for both, and say that that which is – everything – is both the unchanging and that which changes." (Pl., *Soph.* 249 c10-d5, trans. White in Cooper (1997)).

early on that he is not able to find an answer to the question about knowledge (148b6-7) and what knowledge is; indeed, he acknowledged that he does not have anything adequate to say in response to this question (148e5). Socrates, as we shall see, said that those are Theaetetus' birth-pains (148e8) and Theaetetus, after having tried to provide a new answer (and coming up to our lines), again faced issues, feeling dizzy (155c10-11). It is exactly in response to his incapacity to make sense of change and becoming, or rather a certain kind of change, that Socrates says that τὸ θαυμάζειν is the beginning of philosophy.

Why did Theaetetus feel dizzy? And what is the relationship between dizziness and wonder?

Theaetetus is not able to provide a consistent account about becoming because becoming is not only adding or taking away something, as highlighted by Socrates, and it is such a process of becoming, of a peculiar sort, that Theaetetus cannot explain. We will come back to this later, when we discuss Brown's articulation of the 'labour pain ἀπορία', but what should be stressed here is that it is exactly this incapacity of providing an answer to a problem that makes Theaetetus dizzy. Theaetetus tried to provide an answer but faced a particular ἀπορία involving an apparent contradiction and inconsistency, as Socrates notes when he says that the three things, or propositions, are "battling with themselves in our souls" (155b5).

For Aristotle, notably, it is distinctive of philosophy to be engaged with and trying to resolve certain distinctive particular ἀπορίαι.[15] What is noteworthy is that he came to this account after having claimed, as Plato does, that wonder is the cause/beginning[16] of philosophy:

> For it is owing to their wonder (τὸ θαυμάζειν) that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who

15 "[…] with a view to the science we are seeking, it is necessary that we should first review the things about which we need, from the outset, to be puzzled (ἀπορῆσαι). […]. Now for those who wish to get rid of perplexities (δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι) it is a good plan to go into them thoroughly; for the subsequent certainty is a release (εὐπορία λύσις) from the previous perplexities (τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων), and release is impossible when we do not know the knot (τὸν δεσμόν). The perplexity of the mind (ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία) shows that there is a "knot" in the subject; for in its perplexity (ἀπορεῖ) it is in much the same condition as men who are fettered (τοῖς δεδεμένοις)." (Arist., *Metaph.* 995a24-34, tr. Treddenick (1933)).

16 Cf. Section 6.

> is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. (Aristotle, *Met.* A 982b11-21, tr. Ross in Barnes (1991))

For Aristotle, wonder is the mark of the philosopher because the philosopher is one who asks questions and tries to resolve puzzles. This desire is triggered by the recognition of ignorance and thus, principally, by the acknowledgement of puzzles. It is hard not to see here a reference to the Socratic ἔλεγχος, although with some differences,[17] especially to the epistemic value of the aporetic states.

4 Θαυμάζειν **Involves** ἀπορεῖν

As we have already introduced, our central claim is that, for Plato, the πάθος that is philosophical wonder is a state that is not simply cognitive, but affective-cum-desiderative; and that this πάθος is epistemic, in the sense of object-directed and knowledge-directed, if, and only if, it occurs in conjunction with the articulation of a particular ἀπορία and problem, that is, the kind of ἀπορία and problem that generates philosophical enquiry. Our immediate textual basis for this claim is that when, in the *Theaetetus* passage, Plato says that wonder is the πάθος distinctive of the philosopher and the philosopher's distinctive desire for knowledge, he does so in the context of having just articulated a particular ἀπορία and problem, and indeed the passage picks up on the state of mind produced by recognising that ἀπορία and problem, which is characterised as involving a sort of labour pains.

Let us spell out and explicate our claim and some of its various facets and implications; and consider some natural objections to it.

The one side of our claim says that, if one is experiencing the πάθος which is philosophical wonder, then one is engaged with a certain kind of question, the one at the basis of ἀπορία-based enquiry and ἀπορία-based argument. The implication is that there is a distinctive πάθος, in the sense of a state that is not

17 It is famous the disinterest of Socrates toward an investigation *peri physeos*, for privileging ethical matters (cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 987b). However, we should notice that the challenge about change/becoming faced by Theaetetus, although considered from the point of view of a mathematician, is triggered by the perception of becoming. In fact, Socrates introduced it as a consequence of the Protagorean answer provided by Theaetetus as a reply to the question "what is knowledge?" (*Tht.* 151d7-152a1).

simply cognitive, but affective-cum-desiderative, which can only be had if the person who has it is engaged with a certain kind of question, the one at the basis of ἀπορία-based enquiry and argument.[18] And this means that it is a specific feature of this kind of wonder to be associated with, and be at the root of, ἀπορία-based enquiry and argument.

The verb θαυμάζειν and the adjective θαυμαστόν are employed in other epistemic contexts in Plato, too. For example, at the beginning of the *Parmenides*, when Socrates says:

> And even if all things get a share of both, though they are opposites, and by partaking of them are both like and unlike themselves, what's astonishing about that (τί θαυμαστόν)? If someone showed that the likes themselves come to be unlike or the unlikes like – that, I think, would be a marvel; but if he shows that things that partake of both of these have both properties, there seems to me nothing strange about that, Zeno – not even if someone shows that all things are one by partaking of oneness, and that these same things are many by partaking also of multitude. But if he should demonstrate this thing itself, what one is, to be many, or, conversely, the many to be one – at this I'll be astonished (θαυμάσομαι). (*Prm.* 129b1-c1, tr. Gill and Ryan in Plato (1997))

Here, although employed in an epistemic context, it is not evident that these terms perform a specific epistemic function; apparently, they just express the surprise regarding something unusual or unexpected, as saying that many are one, and one is many.[19] Thus, when we characterise wonder as epistemic we mean that wonder serves an epistemic function, the one of activating the process of enquiry. And it is exactly in performing this function that wonder is linked to the aporetic states as "perplexity".[20] Indeed, θαυμάζειν, in this specific epistemic context, expresses a form of hypothetical thinking: wondering whether … .

18 For the notion of ἀπορία-based enquiry and argument, see Politis (2015).

19 Cf. also *Phlb.* 14c.

20 Napolitano Valditara (2014) has distinguished between the "meraviglia contemplante" (contemplating wonder) and the "meraviglia interrogante" (interrogating wonder). Contemplating wonder is triggered by the vision of the Ideas (cf. *Symp.* 210e4-5; *Phdr.* 247d). In this case, wonder expresses a very different situation, the one of the "aesthetic experience" of the Beauty – the more visible among the Forms. In this case, wonder means "admiration". We do not want to deny its epistemic valence, but our claim is that although expressed with the same word, Plato is depicting here a very different phenomenon from the one we are analysing.

The motivation for the enquiry is activated by the ἀπορεῖν (about change and becoming, in the *Theaetetus*). Aporetic states are those disruptive mental states where the epistemic agent faces issues that she does not know how to resolve, and so an epistemic doubt breaks the process of enquiry. Aporetic states are extra-ordinary sources for enquiry because they serve the function of motivating the epistemic agent to struggle for a better answer. But they can do this because the epistemic agent first experiences the incapacity to find a solution. Among the different feelings that are related to the ἀπορεῖν,[21] wonder seems to have a kind of primacy in initiating the process of enquiry. As it has been argued by MacLure, wonder is a "liminal condition, suspended in a threshold between knowing and unknowing".[22] As a limit between ignorance and knowledge, wonder is also experienced in the space in-between missing[23] and discovering.

The ἀπορεῖν is depicted in the *Theaetetus* in relation to maieutic (148e1-151d4).

> You can be sure, Socrates, that I've made numerous attempts to figure it out, on hearing the questions they said you were asking. But the fact is that I can't persuade myself that I've anything adequate to say myself, or that I'm hearing anyone else give the sort of account that you're insisting on. On the other hand, I can't stop worrying about it either. (148e1-7)

In response to Theaetetus' incapacity of finding an answer, Socrates replied that what he was feeling are birth-pains (148e8). The aporetic states experienced by Theaetetus are thus understood as a sort of pregnancy, and this lies at the beginning of the process of discovery, exactly as wonder. Wonder as a πάθος, far for being used loosely ("what happens to the philosopher"), picks up on labour pains. Here, we are referring to Brown's distinction between elenctic ἀπορία and labour pain ἀπορία (Brown 2017). In the elenctic ἀπορία, a self-confident respondent thinks he knows about a subject, and Socrates goes on to

21 For example, shame. Candiotto (2018) has depicted the function of shame in the aporetic states as the one of purifying the agent from false-beliefs. Cf. also Candiotto (2015) and Candiotto (2019b).

22 MacLure (2013), 228. Lugli (1986), 123 describes it in similar terms, as "an intermediate, highly particular state akin to a sort of suspension of the mind between ignorance and enlightenment that marks the end of unknowing and the beginning of knowing". Referring to Aristotle, Berti (2008) has depicted wonder as the desire that brings from ignorance to knowledge (Chapter 1).

23 A quite weak literally evidence about the relationship of wonder and missing, but still inspiring is at the beginning of the dialogue where it is said: "[I]was amazed that I was not able to find you" (142a2-3). Roochnik (2002) has claimed that this line expresses a fundamental theme of the entire dialogue, the one of "recognition".

test his beliefs and finds them wanting. Finally, the respondent is reduced to ἀπορία, and his recognition that he is in that state renders him the better and increases his self-knowledge. In the labour pain ἀπορία, on the other hand, the respondent is full of inchoate ideas and is suffering the ἀπορία of mental pregnancy. Socrates goes on to assist him in delivering the offspring; at which point the ἀπορία and the pain associated with it ceases (if only for a moment). Thus, although disruptive, the labour pain aporetic states do not indicate a dead-end and the breakdown of enquiry but, on the contrary, they motivate the epistemic agent to search for and to generate knowledge. The labour pain ἀπορία is thus similar to the zetetic ἀπορία, à la Politis (2006).

> Those who get together with me have something else in common with women in childbirth: they suffer birth-pains, and a sense of helplessness (ἀπορία) fills them, night and day – much more, indeed, than a woman, and my expertise is able both to awaken and put a stop to the pain. (151a5-b2)

Even if our claim – that θαυμάζειν, when it is epistemic (object-directed and knowledge-directed), involves ἀπορεῖν – is granted in regard to the *Theaetetus* passage, one may object against our inclination to widen this to Plato more generally. Thus one may appeal to a passage in which the term θαυμαστόν is clearly used for an object, and for the peculiar vision of this object, that is apprehended in a supreme act of knowing – it is the Form of Beauty-Goodness – but there is no reference to the experience of ἀπορεῖν or the articulating of a particular ἀπορία: *Symp.* 210e4-5.

If there is anywhere in the dialogues in which Plato appears to refer to a non-discursive, immediate, and non-sensory act of knowing, this *Symposium* passage is surely it.[24] And we must readily grant that the act of knowing referred to in this passage is not conceived of as directly involving the experience of ἀπορεῖν or the articulating of a particular ἀπορία. It is not clear, however, that this is a decisive objection to our claim. The question, it seems to us, is how, for Plato, this singular act of knowing is related to the path and ascent that (as is described in the immediate context of the passage) terminates and culminates in it. IF Plato thinks that this singular act of knowing is, essentially and in its epistemic nature, independent of and separable from any activity and process of enquiry that may lead to it, then we must concede that Plato admits of cases in which θαυμάζειν is epistemic but does not in any way involve the experience of ἀπορεῖν or the articulating of a particular ἀπορία. But this is a big 'IF'. It can

24 See Cross (1954) who is otherwise sceptical about attributing to Plato the idea of a non-discursive grasp of Forms.

be argued that, on the contrary, Plato admits of such a non-discursive, immediate and non-sensory act of knowing a supremely real object, only if this vision is conceived as, precisely, the terminus of a long and arduous process of enquiry. And, once this is argued, it is questionable whether Plato thinks that an account can be given of this singular act of knowing that is independent of and separable from the account of the distinctive enquiry that, all going well, terminates in it. In that case, however, we cannot rule out, indeed we may expect, that this process of enquiry is itself originally generated and set in motion by the recognition, articulation of experience of particular ἀπορίαι. And, if the account of this singular act of knowing is, for Plato, not separable from the account of the distinctive enquiry that, all going well, terminates in it, then, we may conclude, the experience of ἀπορεῖν and the articulating of a particular ἀπορία is indeed involved in the character and nature of this ultimate and singular act of knowing.

5 Ἀπορεῖν **Involves** θαυμάζειν

The other side of our claim says that, if one is engaged with a certain kind of question, the one at the basis of ἀπορία-based enquiry and ἀπορία-based argument, then one is experiencing the πάθος which is philosophical wonder, conceived as a state that is at once cognitive and affective-cum-desiderative. The implication is that wonder, understood as a state that is not simply cognitive but also affective and desiderative, is essential to labour pain and zetetic ἀπορία, and in general to engaging with a certain kind of question, the one at the basis of ἀπορία-based enquiry and argument.

There is an obvious objection to this claim, which we shall need to face up to straight away. For, it will be said, it is perfectly possible to recognise a particular ἀπορία, of the kind that is at the root of philosophical enquiry, without being moved or especially passionate about it; all it takes to recognise such an ἀπορία is the recognition of an apparent contradiction, and this recognition, it will be said, is a purely cognitive act and is not essentially in possession of an emotive or desiderative dimension.

One way of responding to this objection is to grant it, but urge that the affective and desiderative dimension, while it may not be essential to labour pain and zetetic ἀπορία, is an extra bonus, if and when it forms part of such ἀπορία. For, it may be said, it is only when the two come together – the purely cognitive state of recognising a radical ἀπορία and the affective-cum-desiderative state of wonder – that we have the response to ἀπορία distinctive of and peculiar to the philosopher. (Of course, if we respond to the objection in this way, we will have to re-formulate our claim accordingly.)

While this response may seem reasonable enough, we are inclined against it. It has the implication that recognising a particular ἀπορία, however radical, is not sufficient to generate the philosophical mindset and drive, rather, the philosophical mindset and drive is caused by something independent of such recognition, namely, a tendency in the soul of the philosopher towards πάθος and wonder and her desire to engage with this in the properly philosophical way. This, it seems to us, is an unfortunate consequence, which separates in the philosopher her distinctively cognitive side from her distinctively affective and desiderative side.

Let us, therefore, try to answer the objection directly. As has been argued in Politis (2015)(see esp. ch. 7), an ἀπορία, of the kind that generates and is at the root of philosophical enquiry, is not simply an apparent contradiction, it is an apparent conflict of reasons within a person: reasons, typically on either side of a dilemmatic question, that, to one and the same person, appear strong, and such that the person recognises that she cannot at all tell which of the two are the stronger (cf. *Tht.* 155b5, when Socrates speaks of propositions "battling with themselves in our souls"). Our present question, therefore, has to be this: whether it is possible for a person to recognise such a conflict of reasons within herself, without feeling anything about this and without being in the least inclined to do anything about it. We hope it will be granted that there is nothing immediately plausible about the supposition that this is possible. We would, on the contrary, argue that there is good reason to think that, for Plato, it is not possible. The fundament for this argument has been set out in Politis (2015), Chapter 7, and lies in the idea that for it to appear to a person that there is good reason for p (as opposed to a person's merely registering that others think there is reason for p), the person must positively be attracted to p. This means that the ἀπορία that consists in a conflict of reasons within a person involves the person's both being attracted to p and being attracted to not-p (or q, where it appears to her that q is incompatible with p); hence involves the person's both being attracted to p and being attracted away from p – being torn in opposite directions, as the graphic idiom has it. This does not at all look like a purely cognitive state, without an affective or desiderative dimension. And our claim is that, when a person lucidly recognises such a conflict of reasons within herself, and when she clearly and distinctly apprehends that this is a radical conflict – which means that it cannot simply be by-passed and ignored by one's invoking and leaning on pre-philosophical certainties, paradigm cases, exemplary examples, and the like – then, for Plato, this manifests itself in a state of high πάθος and wonder – an eminently affective, emotive and passionate state. The person who lucidly recognises such a conflict of reasons within herself, and clearly apprehends that this is a radical conflict, is, precisely, Plato's philosopher.

6 On the Phenomenology of *Pathos*, and Its Relation to the Body and the Senses

Wonder is characterised by Plato as a πάθος (τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, *Tht.* 155d2). We have insisted that Plato's use of this term here, πάθος, is intended to signify not only any state (as when, in philosophy today, we speak of states of mind or psychological states), but a state that is or involves an affective experience; the English epithets 'suffering' and 'passionate' come to mind, exaggerated though they may sound. In insisting on this, we have been relying not simply on the meaning of term itself, πάθος (that would not by itself give us the desired reading), but also, and especially, on the fact that when Plato uses this term here, he picks up on the immediately preceding passage in which he has described Theaetetus' engagement with and experience of a particular ἀπορία, in the sense of the apparent logical conflict among apparently attractive and well-motivated propositions, and has described this by using the striking idea of labour pains.

Let us now consider the phenomenology of this distinctively philosophical πάθος, thus understood; and let us ask how this πάθος and the distinctive experience of it – what it is like to be in it, as we might say – is related to the body and the senses.

It might be said that there is no reason to suppose that Plato associates any particular phenomenology with this πάθος, much less that this phenomenology is associated with the body or with embodiment; and that to invoke the fact that he describes the πάθος as involving 'labour pains' to support these ideas is going too far. We wonder whether it is going too far. We ought not treat of Plato's deliberate and elaborate maieutic language as no more than a dead metaphor, as in the mere phrase 'mental offspring'. On the contrary, we think that Plato's deliberate and elaborate maieutic language here suggests that he thinks of this θαυμάζειν as a πάθος of the embodied soul with a distinctive phenomenology of its own.[25] In that case, we may suggest that the dimension of suffering is not only embodied, but has an echo in the cognitive dimension too, since it is the epistemic suffering and epistemic perplexity prompted by the aporetic states.

This is, we recognise, a tentative reading. Can it be rendered more firm? One way of defending it, and, it seems to us, an especially promising way, is to consider what role, for Plato, the senses play in the recognition of the particular ἀπορίαι that, according to the *Theaetetus* passage, on our account of it, are at

25 "Plato uses *pathos* [πάθος] and *pathêma* [πάθημα] only when he wants to emphasize the sick, morbid, incurable nature of the affects, their pathological side. His dominant lexicon is that of motivity" says Giulia Sissa in Cassin et al. (2014), 746.

the root of philosophical enquiry. For, if we suppose that, for Plato, the senses play an essential role in the recognition of the particular ἀπορίαι that, according to the *Theaetetus* passage, on our account of it, are at the root of philosophical enquiry, then we can straightway conclude that the πάθος of θαυμάζειν that, according to this passage, is distinctive of the philosopher, and of which we have argued that it is inseparable from the experience of ἀπορεῖν and the articulation of particular ἀπορία, is a state of the embodied soul. Indeed, we shall do well to remind ourselves here that, in a famous passage in the *Theaetetus* (184bf.), Plato characterises the senses as involving at once the body and the soul. Once we have this important finding, moreover – that the πάθος of θαυμάζειν distinctive of the philosopher is a state of the embodied soul – the invitation can be taken quite seriously of treating Plato's deliberate and elaborate maieutic language, in the immediate context of the *Theaetetus* passage, as also serving to articulate the phenomenology of the distinctive philosophical πάθος of θαυμάζειν, and of pointing to the dimension of embodiment in this phenomenology.

That, for Plato, the senses are an essential element in enquiry (and, arguably, in knowledge too; unless we suppose that Plato wants to separate the account of knowledge from that of enquiry), indeed are at the root of enquiry, is implied by a famous passage from the *Phaedo*:

> We also agree on this: we haven't arrived at the thought of it [i.e. of the Form of equal] from anywhere (μὴ ἄλλοθεν), nor is it possible to think of it (μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι), except from (ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ) seeing or touching or some other of the senses – I am counting all these as the same. (75a5-8; trans. Gallop; adapted)

We find the same implication, but with a particular and most remarkable twist, in *Republic* VII.523a-525a. Here Plato argues that a certain use of the senses (e.g. when we look at the fingers on our hand and ask certain questions about them) reveal certain ἀπορίαι and problems, and that it is such ἀπορίαι and problems that prompt us to suppose that there may be more to the world than what we can directly perceive with our senses: there may be non-sense-perceptible Forms and essences such as, in particular, the Form and essence of oneness and unity (τὸ ἕν).[26] The *Republic* passage especially, we may suggest, invites a link with the *Theaetetus*, since in the *Theaetetus* Plato argues that that

26 Referring to the same lines of the *Republic,* Dixsaut (2003), 37 has claimed that the incapacity of perception to solve these ἀπορίαι is what "invites to think". The contradictions of sense-perception disclose the space of questioning, awakening the intelligence.

which is signified by certain concepts – he calls that which is signifies by such concepts, 'the common features' (τὰ κοινά) – cannot be specified in purely sense perceptual terms (see *Tht.* 186af.). And oneness or unity (τὸ ἓν) is evidently such a concept, if anything is. They are, apparently, concepts that are (either directly or indirectly) true of *all things*.

7 How Does the Experience of ἀπορεῖν Motivate Enquiry?

Even in modern studies, affective valence is commonly measured in terms of hedonic levels.[27] Taking our cue from this, we may suggest that the wonder distinctive of the philosopher, associated as it is not only with the articulation of particular ἀπορίαι but also with the experience of ἀπορεῖν and the labour pains that come with it, far for being a positive emotion of ecstatic contemplation of something marvellous, is related to pain. Following this experiential dimension of the wonder distinctive of the philosopher, we may suggest that the motivation for looking for answers through philosophical enquiry are exactly pain and suffering. Answers, in this case, will appear as what make the epistemic agent able to overcome the "negative" dimension of the aporetic state, and thus seek beyond ignorance through the desire for knowledge. Similarly, if we think about curiosity,[28] one of the most studied epistemic emotions and dispositional states, we should acknowledge that the interest driven by curiosity is not independent of our fears and fixations – as when we want to know everything about spiders because we are afraid of them.[29] However, this does not mean that wonder is just a "negative" emotion; in our opinion this requires us to admit a fundamental ambivalence, for which wonder is both pleasurable and painful. The reason of this ambivalence is to be found exactly in the liminal location of this wonder, in between ignorance and knowledge.

27 Cf. Barrett (2006).

28 Daston and Park (1998), 14–15 have understood wonder as a "cognitive passion", linked to curiosity and horror. For the differences between wonder and curiosity, cf. Schmitt and Lahroodi (2008), 130–31. The authors understood wonder as *admiratio* and, thus, they do not ascribe to wonder the appetitive dimension that they recognize to curiosity instead. Plato's account on wonder, however, points to the relationship between wonder and epistemic desire and, therefore, the distinction between wonder and curiosity is not so clear as it may seem if we understand wonder as *admiratio*. Aporetic wonder is thus a quite original conceptualization of wonder that comes from Plato, and we trust that it may play an important role in the contemporary debate in the field of philosophy of emotion too.

29 Cf. Morton (2009); Candiotto (2017).

The pleasure is not only the one of the release from suffering, that is, getting an answer – and thus achievable beyond the aporetic state. It is also the one that derives from the awareness of being in the process of generation of knowledge or, as Socrates said to Theaetetus, the awareness of not being empty-headed, but pregnant (148e8-9). On the other hand, pain is a huge motivational force, able to focus the attention on resolving the problem that creates it. In our case, the pain related to the aporetic state enhances the motivation for going beyond them and, finally, generating knowledge.[30]

We also need to consider another element for sketching the rich phenomenology of the aporetic wonder. Socrates has been depicted by Alcibiades as θαυμαστός (*Symp.* 219b7-c1): τούτῳ τῷ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ. This adjective seems to not have a technical epistemic meaning here – it can be translated both as "wonderful" and "odd" – but it is significant for highlighting the character of the epistemic agent *qua* philosopher in the enquiry. Other lines from the Alcibiades' encomium are relevant in this regard: for example, 216c7, where Alcibiades highlights the marvellous power of Socrates' speeches (τὴν δύναμιν ὡς θαυμασίαν), and 215b8, where Socrates is said to be far more marvellous (πολύ γε θαυμασιώτερος) than Marsyas.

The marvellous power of the discourse is often ascribed to the sophists.[31] But, and our lines from the *Theaetetus* are crucial here, wonder is the beginning of enquiry only if it belongs to the philosopher, who has a genuine interest for the truth (Candiotto (2019a)). Wonder is the mark of the philosopher and Socrates, as the best exemplar of a philosopher, is wonderful in striving for wisdom – literally to be a lover of σοφία.

Not only pain, but also ἔρως is a tremendous motivational force. We cannot discuss in detail epistemic desire here,[32] but let us just summarize some features that are important for our enquiry. First, epistemic desire is the desire

30 As we have already highlighted, the θαυμάζειν-ἀπορεῖν is triggered by the perception of change and by the puzzles about becoming in the *Theaetetus*. Maybe this is not just contextual, but it says something specific about the nature of the θαυμάζειν. Severino has argued that wonder arises from the incapacity to justify change-becoming, and finally death. Therefore, wonder as the beginning of philosophy is not delighted astonishment, but dread and anguish, and knowledge is the best remedy against it. Developing this perspective would bring us beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems nevertheless important to mention it, at least for stressing the existential dimension – brought by the affects – of the enquiry. Cf. Severino (1989), 347–55.

31 See for example *Symp.* 198a6 where Socrates defined Agathon's speech as marvellous.

32 The literature dedicated to the concept of ἔρως in Plato is quite huge. We just mention a new edited volume dedicated to the topic, Brisson and Renaut (2017), and the remarkable novel interpretation provided by Halperin (2017), for which Plato had built a metaphysics of desire through his erotic theory.

directed to σοφία, wisdom, recognized as something valuable, the maximum epistemic good. Second, epistemic desire is triggered by the recognition of missing σοφία, and thus the need of possessing it. And third, epistemic desire is orientated by the recognition of Forms in beautiful things. This last point is the most important one in relation to epistemic wonder, because it points to the pleasurable dimension envisaged by wonder in generating knowledge through beauty. This aspect would require that we consider the wonder experienced in the contemplation of the Forms, a topic that we cannot explore here, and not simply in the aporetic states (we touched on it earlier, when discussing *Symp.* 210e). But we should nevertheless highlight that they appear to be connected, at least for maieutic as depicted in the *Theaetetus*, since the desire for knowledge generates a distinctive process of enquiry that, we may suppose, is ultimately directed at Forms.[33,34]

We may conclude that the labour and its pains is itself the source of the desire to overcome it. Wonder issues in a desire to delve deeper into the understanding of the pleasurable object not already possessed.[35] Wonder, as a mark of the philosopher, is also a disposition that belongs to the lover of wisdom, and thus to who is driven by the epistemic desire.

8 What Comes First

Finally, let us propose an analysis of the cognitive dynamics at work at the beginning of the philosophical enquiry. What is the ἀρχὴ of the enquiry, as its beginning and cause?

33 We are deliberate setting aside here the view of some critics, according to which the fact that talk of Forms is absent (or, practically absent) from the *Theaetetus* indicates that Plato has given up on Forms. We are also setting aside, as a huge and most difficult issue, first, the question of what is the relation between the articulation of a particular ἀπορία, of the form *whether or not F is G*, and the need to raise the τί ἐστι question 'What is F?' (or G, or both F and G); and, secondly, the question of what is the relation between the τί ἐστι question, 'What is F?', and the need to postulate a non-sense-perceptible Form of the quality F. The first question has been taken up, and an answer proposed, by Politis (2015)(see esp. Ch. 8); the second question is one that Politis is working on at the moment.

34 Although Griffiths (2009), 126–29 takes wonder as delighted astonishment – and, thus, differently from Plato – his research on the relationship between wonder and desire of knowing more are very important for understanding this point, since he shows that wonder triggers the desire for knowledge.

35 Notably, ἔρως is related to pleasure, and thus framing aporetic wonder in epistemic suffering and epistemic desire highlights even more its ambivalent nature, that is in between pleasure and pain.

Plato said that the beginning of enquiry is wonder, that is, wonder comes first. But we do not understand this statement simply in causal terms, according to which wonder would trigger aporetic states. On the contrary, we interpret its primacy as a pre-reflexive embodied awareness of a problem as an aporetic experience. This pre-reflexive awareness will later be fashioned as the cognitive state of perplexity, but its embodied dimension should not be dismissed. Wonder, again, lies in between, in this case in between the aporetic experience and the aporetic mental state. Wonder is an emotive reaction that expresses the aporetic experience, but it is also an emotive force that stimulates the aporetic mental state. Therefore, we could eventually say that what comes first is the ἀπορεῖν, but in claiming this we need to differentiate between the aporetic experience and the aporetic mental state. The aporetic experience produces *wonder* as a πάθος (in its passive stance),[36] but this πάθος activates the process of enquiry, thus acquiring its active stance as epistemic emotion.

We should understand this procedure as efficiently dynamical: the very same ἀπορία is generated by the ἔλεγχος triggered by Socrates – as the midwife capable of awaken the pain (151b2), and thus who creates aporetic experiences – and the wondering that arises out of such an ἀπορία is the beginning of philosophy. This means that aporetic states comes first not as neutral mental states, but as complex states, endowed of cognitive, affective and desiderative dimensions. They are embodied mental states, and the affective-cum-desiderative dimension – the one we studied analysing wonder as epistemic suffering and epistemic desire – plays an important motivational function in the process of enquiry.

And what happens *after* the beginning? Is wonder dissolved by knowledge?

Sallis has claimed that for Aristotle the answer should be yes.[37] We cannot discuss the conceptualization of wonder provided by Aristotle here, but we should say that we are quite sceptical about thinking the same of Plato. The reason lies exactly in the dynamical procedure we have just depicted. Not only because new ἀπορίαι may always arise in a process of enquiry, but also because

36 For the passive dimension implied by the verb πάσχειν and the nouns πάθος and πάθημα, cf. Macé (2006), 9, 23–26, 172–73 and also Pradeau (2008), 37.

37 Sallis (1995), 195: "Thus, in the end knowledge is opposed, as the better, to wonder. Though it is through wonder that one comes to pursue knowledge, that pursuit has the effect finally of dissolving wonder. In the end there would be no place for wonder in knowledge, no place for a knowledge to which wonder would be essential and not merely an incitement. In the end there would be only knowledge, beyond the wonder of perplexity, beyond the wonders that comprise mythos. Philosophy would achieve its end by putting an end to wonder." Cf. for example Aristotle, *Met.* A, 983a13-21. For the opposition between knowledge and wonder in Aristotle and Descartes, cf. Pinotti (1989), 33.

the epistemic wonder belongs to the philosopher, embodied for Plato by Socrates. The philosopher, by definition, is who is in the process of searching for knowledge, and thus in constant and extended wonderment. Moreover, Socrates, the midwife, was a master of θαυμάσια and, performing this function, he always pushed the interlocutors to face their ignorance. “Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when philosophical thought has done its best, the wonder remains”.[38]

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38 Whitehead (1934), 96.

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CHAPTER 2

The Feel of the Real: Perceptual Encounters in Plato's Critique of Poetry

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Abstract

Plato's criticism of the value system conveyed by traditional (esp. Homeric) poetry is grounded on his conviction that the latter has an influence on people's dispositions and beliefs. The reason why this influence must be resisted depends, first and foremost, on the morally corrupted nature of the values conveyed: poets are liars and have no knowledge of what they represent. What's more, the way itself poetry exerts its influence on the citizens' ψυχή is also dangerous: poets are wizards and their imitations get hold even of 'the best of us' in such a way that 'we surrender ourselves' to them. How Plato thinks this happens is the question this paper seeks to air. The argument put forward is that, for Plato, the impact of poetry on real life is achieved by means of a mechanism of 'transportation', a psychological experience that blurs the boundaries between reality and fictionality. This paper addresses Plato's concerns about poetic mimesis by examining his claim that poetry appeals to a perceptual mode of cognition and shows that this claim is grounded on Plato's insights into the similar phenomenal character of mental imagery and stimulus-driven perception.

Keywords

Plato – mimesis – perception – affectivity – embodiment

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Plato's criticism of the value system conveyed by traditional (esp. Homeric) poetry is grounded on his conviction that the latter has an influence on people's dispositions and beliefs (e.g. *Resp.* 377b5-9, 377c2-5, 378d7-e1, 386a6-7, 387b1-6, 395c3-d3, 401b1-d3, 401d5-402a4, 605b7-c4, 605c6-8, 606a2-b8, 606d1-7, 607a5-8, 608a6-b2). The reason why this influence must be resisted depends, first and foremost, on the morally corrupted nature of the values conveyed:

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poets are liars and have no knowledge of what they represent (e.g. *Ion* 530a-533c and 536e-542b; *Resp.* 602b7-8). What's more, the way itself poetry exerts its influence on the citizens' ψυχή is not less dangerous than its content: poets are also wizards (e.g. *Resp.* 413c1-3, 602d2-4) and their imitations get hold even of 'the best of us' in such a way that 'we surrender ourselves' to them (605c10-d5). How Plato thinks this happens is the question this paper seeks to air. The argument I will put forward is that, for Plato, the impact of poetry on real life is achieved by means of a mechanism of 'transportation',[1] a psychological experience that entails the blurring of the boundaries between reality and fictionality.[2] In the *Ion,* he refers to this phenomenon by drawing on the imagery of divine rapture and 'magnetic' frenzy and on the vocabulary of ἐνθουσιασμός and ἔκπληξις (533d1-536d3). Both the rhapsode, who brings poetic characters to life through his own voice and body, and his audience experience the feeling of being present 'among the scenes' (535c1-2, 535d8-9) and are affected by poetic narrative 'as if they were there':[3] this eventually results in the implications of the narrative becoming part of one's real-life character and values.

My aim in this paper is to shed light on Plato's insight into the way poetic transportation is achieved by poetic narrative: I will claim that he thought that our imaginative experiences retain the same phenomenal qualities as actual sensory experiences and therefore believed the body to play a crucial role in our capacity for being caught up in poetry. I shall focus on Plato's contention that poetry appeals to the same part of the soul that unreflectively accepts visual illusions: I will argue that, if we want to make sense of this claim, we need to interpret the metaphor of the soul's tripartition as establishing a distinction between modes of cognition, rather than, as is sometimes done, between different sets of capacities (Section 1). I will then proceed to examine the idea that poetry appeals to perceptual cognition. Specifically, I will address Plato's concerns about poetic μίμησις by arguing that he believed the latter to encompass

1 I borrow the term 'transportation' from Green and Brock (2002), who use it to denote a mechanism of narrative impact.

2 On the 'transparency' of representation cf. Nehamas (1998), 284: 'it is precisely because the difference between imitations and their objects *is* ontological, a difference that cannot be perceived, that our reactions to both, which are based on our perception, are so similar'. Nehamas focuses on Plato's metaphysical view and does not expand on the cognitive mechanisms by virtue of which the poetic medium becomes transparent.

3 Already in Homer, a bard (Demodocus) is praised for his ability to sing about the Trojan war ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν (*Od.* 8.491). An implicit reference to this line appears in the *Ion*, where Plato also describes the audience as feeling in the same way as the rhapsode (535b-d). On ἐναργεία (vividness) as a central principle of ancient poetics cf. Zanker (1981); Webb (2009), 87–106; Sheppard (2014), 19–46.

not only the appearances imitated by the poet, but also our *imagining* those appearances: for Plato, μίμησις is not only in the represented content, but also – and perhaps most importantly – in our imaginative perception of this content (Section 2). Finally, I will turn to the audience's engagement with the emotions of poetic characters (Section 3) and I will conclude that Plato's criticism of the impact of poetry on education is grounded in the more fundamental criticism of its experiential 'feel'.

1 Modes of Cognition

The underlying assumption on which my general argument rests is that poetic transport is a psychophysical phenomenon that correlates with perceived realism. In this section, I will discuss this assumption by examining Plato's view that the part of the soul to which poetry appeals is the one that unreflectively engages in sensory and perceptual cognition and, at the same time, is the source of non-rational, heightened forms of emotional arousal.

In *Resp.* X Plato introduces his argument against the power of poetry to get hold of the ψυχή (605c5-606d5) via a metaphysical discussion of mimetic products being at two removes from the truth (595c-598d): as we shall shortly see, his contention is that exposure to poetry appeals to us in such a way that rational assessments concerning the ontological status of what we experience give way to a perceptual and emotional 'feel' of the fictional experience. I will argue that this contention amounts to the opposition of two different modes of cognizing: the epistemic one, leading to true knowledge, on one side, and the perceptual, mimetic one, relying on appearances, on the other. Imitative poetry hinges on (and encourages) the latter and for this reason it must be banished from the city.[4]

Plato's argument in *Resp.* X unfolds as follows: first, he affirms that μίμησις is at two removes from the truth and all that it produces are images of appearances; as a source of knowledge, imitation has no worth (595c8-602c2).[5] Next,

4 In book X Plato claims that imitative poetry is not to be admitted in the good city, but in books II and III he seems to be willing to admit 'the unmixed imitator of good characters' (397d4-5): for a discussion of the difficulties this raises for the interpretation of Plato's critique of poetry cf. Nehamas (1998), 252–56; Ferrari (1990), 120–41; Halliwell (2002), 56. Halliwell (2002), 79–82 discusses the non-mimetic nature of good characters and the use of verbs of understanding (e.g. γνωστέος vs. μιμητέος at *Resp.* 396a4-6, γνωρίζω at *Resp.* 402b-c; μανθάνω at *Leg.* 816e1 and 4) to explain in what sense Plato allows the imitation of good characters.

5 Cf. *Ion* 530a-533c e 536e-542b for a similar epistemological approach to poetic content.

he discusses painting as a paradigmatic example of μίμησις[6] and compares it to the production of visual illusions. What is true of painting and visual illusions will be true of poetry[7] insofar as they both appeal to a non-rational part of the soul (602c4-605c2). Finally, he delves into the effects of poetry on the soul and describes them in terms of strong emotional arousal (605c5-606d5). For our purposes, the major implication of this argument is that if (i) painting appeals to that part of the soul that unreflectively accepts visual illusions (602c4-605c2), if (ii) poetry appeals to that part of the soul that is the source of non-rational, heightened forms of emotional arousal (605c5-606d5), and if (iii) both painting and poetry appeal to the same part of the soul (603a9-b3, 605a2-c4), then the part of the soul that unreflectively accepts visual illusions is the same one that is the source of non-rational, heightened forms of emotional arousal.

Now, let us focus on Plato's discussion of visual illusions and the type of cognitive conflict they give rise to:

> one and the same object appears to vary in size depending on whether we're looking at it from close up or far away… And the same objects look both bent and straight depending on whether we look at them when they're in water or out of it… Now, methods have evolved of combating this – measuring, counting, and weighing are the most elegant of them – and consequently of ending the reign within us of apparent size, number, and weight, and replacing them with something which calculates and measures, or even weighs… And this, of course, is the job of the rational part of the mind… It's not uncommon for the mind to have made its measurements, and to be reporting that *x* is larger than *y* (or smaller than it, or the same size as it), but still to be receiving an impression which contradicts its measurements of these very objects… Well, [we said that] it is impossible for a single thing to hold contradictory beliefs at the same time about the same objects… So the part of the mind whose views run counter to the measurements must be different from the part whose views fall in with the measurements… But it's the best part of the mind which accepts measurements and calculations… The part which opposes

6 Cf. Nehamas (1998), 257–60 for a discussion of the reasons why it is so.

7 Cf. also 605a8-11, where Socrates says that the poet is the counterpart of the painter; at 605b7-c4 he talks about poetic images as inducing the part of the soul that is ἀνόητον to believing that 'the same things are at one time large and another time small'. Storey (2014), 90 rightly highlights the similarity with 602c7-8.

> them, therefore, must be a low-grade part of the mind. (602c7-603a8, trans. Waterfield)

This passage has been widely discussed and two main sets of conclusions have been drawn that are relevant to my argument in this paper. Some commentators think that the conflict between beliefs introduced with the example of visual illusions indicates that Plato is dividing the rational soul into a higher and a lower part, rather than arguing for a division between the rational and the non-rational as he does when he discusses the conflict among desires in book IV.[8] Others maintain that, on the contrary, tripartition is still in place and look for ways to restrict the non-rational activities to the perceptual experience of appearances. Lorenz (2006), for example, argues that our lower parts 'cannot help being taken in by sensory appearances' because they 'cannot do what *we* do, namely resort to measurement, arithmetic, and the like, so as to discover how things really are' (68: emphasis in the original). Likewise, Moss (2008) acknowledges that Plato attributes beliefs and 'abilities we might think paradigmatically rational' (37) to appetite and spirit and sets out to find out 'what abilities Plato means to deny these parts in calling them non-rational' (38). Notwithstanding the different conclusions they reach, the underlying assumption of both sets of interpretations is identical: Plato's soul is divided and this division amounts to the establishment of something like a hierarchy of capacities, according to which appetite and spirit are cognitively deficient and limited to sense-perception.[9] In this respect, Storey (2014) seems to take a more cautious approach when he observes that 'Plato's aim is not to partition the soul's basic abilities … but to identify parts of our soul that are distinct by virtue of their … goals. As such, each part can be endowed with whatever cognitive or conative abilities allow it to effectively pursue its characteristic goal' (88). Nonetheless, he also ends up with claims such as 'this analysis is consistent with one part of us being more integral to our personal identity than another, and in this respect Plato is inclined as we are to identify a person most with the part with which he reasons and believes' (111) or 'the relevant "believer" is the part of the soul that asserts, not the part that is asserted to' (114).

As Douglas Cairns has recently reminded us, the soul's tripartition is a metaphor and behind it lies the person as a unified agent.[10] For this reason, we

8 E.g. Kenny (1973), 22; Nehamas (1998), 264–69; Burnyeat (1999), 223–28; Sedley (2004), 113, n.40; Kamtekar (2006), 173, n.11. In book IV, the Principle of Opposites is introduced at 436b8-9.

9 Also see Kahn (2004). Bobonich (2010) provides strong arguments against the idea that the parts of the soul are the subjects of psychic items.

10 Cairns (2014), (2017b). *Contra* Bobonich (2002) esp. 254–57.

should not try to assign human abilities separately to each part (beliefs to one, desires to another, and so forth):[11] in the same way as the whole person interacts with the different 'parts' of her ψυχή, so each of these personified 'parts' relies on the faculties of the whole person.[12] On this basis, the definition of the non-rational parts as ἀλόγιστα (439d3-8, 441c2) does not entail that they cannot form beliefs, but rather that these beliefs are not the result of a cognitive approach based on 'calculating, measuring, and weighing' (602e1-2).[13]

On the basis of Cairns' approach, we can make better sense of another well-known passage from the *Republic* where Plato discusses sense-perception, the so-called 'finger passage' (523a-526c):

> here are three fingers, we'd say, the little finger, the second one, and the middle one… Each of them equally gives the impression of being a finger. There's no difference between them in this respect, and it doesn't matter whether the finger that's being looked at is in the middle or in the end, pale or dark, thick or thin, and so on and so forth. It's almost inconceivable that anyone's mind would feel impelled in any of these circumstances to think and try to come up with an answer to the question what a finger is, since sight has given the mind no grounds for supposing that the finger is at the same time the opposite of a finger (523c4-d5).
>
> …if oneness is adequately seen (or grasped by any other sense) for what it is, then it doesn't have any power to attract towards reality – as a finger doesn't, we were saying. However, if it's never seen without its opposite simultaneously being seen, so that the impression it gives is no more of oneness than of the opposite, then evaluation becomes imperative and the mind has no choice but to be puzzled: it sets its thought-processes in motion, and casts about for an answer to the question what oneness itself actually is. And if this is what happens, then oneness is one

11 Cf. Cairns (2014): 'The only answer to the question of what these metaphorical agents *really* do is "nothing". The only real agent in all of this is the person as such: the agency of the elements of the model is intended to explain what real agents, i.e. persons, do… At the same time, the qualities of the whole person also thoroughly permeate the elements of the vehicle – the εἴδη of the soul, and the desires of those εἴδη, are repeatedly credited with the cognitive, affective, and desiderative capacities of persons' (73–74).

12 Cairns (2017b). A classical critique of the 'facultist view' is that of Moline (1976). Many interpreters endorse the idea that the parts of the soul are better construed as types of agents rather than faculties, but still maintain that each part of the soul shares the features of, but is less complex than, the person as a whole: e.g. Annas (1981), 137–46 claims that Plato's parts of the soul are described drawing on the behaviour of the person as a whole, but reproduce 'some but not all of the functions of the whole' (145); in a similar vein, but with qualifications, Ferrari (1987), 200–03. Also see Irwin (1995), 217–20.

13 Cf. Storey (2014), 88–89.

> of those subjects which guide and turn people towards the contemplation of reality … we ought to provide for this subject in our legislation, and to persuade the people who are going to undertake our community's most important tasks to take up arithmetic. They shouldn't engage in it like dilettantes, but should keep at it until they reach the point where they can see in their mind's eye what numbers really are, and they shouldn't study it as merchants and stallholders do, for commercial reasons (524d9-525c6, trans. Waterfield).

Here, the strategy of metaphor and personification is meant to highlight that it is not one of our capacities, but we ourselves who can be or become uncertain about our perceptions and, if so, start thinking about them in an epistemically justified way. Plato's view is that we should always be uncertain and think about our perceptions, because they are epistemically unwarranted by definition: through perception we see things as one and many at the same time. Take the example of number one: we can see it instantiated in a visible and tangible object, e.g., a coin, and we can choose to deal with it as such, e.g., for trade. Otherwise, we can adopt a mathematical stance and investigate its essence. It is not that there are some perceptions that summon our λογισμός and some others that do not: it is we who can either question our sense perceptions or surrender to them and who, looking at our finger, can just see a finger or start questioning what a finger is.[14] It is we who can either rest on perception or embark on epistemic inquiries and who can choose what kind of beliefs (perceptual or epistemically justified) we want to have and the amount of contradictions and multiplicity we are prepared to give in to.

The *Theaetetus* provides us with a revealing illustration of the contrast between a life of practical engagements and the philosophical one, based on theoretical investigation. In the first part of the dialogue, Socrates discusses, and eventually refutes, Theaetetus's attempt at defining knowledge as perception (οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις, 151e2-3). In his final and most decisive objection, he contrasts perception with the function that the soul performs 'when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with the things which are' (αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα, 187a5-6). The objection is based on the premise that the soul views some things by itself and others through the faculties of the body (τὰ μὲν αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων, 185e6-7): perceptual experiences reach the soul through the

14 Cf. 524a5-9: Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἔν γε τοῖς τοιούτοις αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν τί ποτε σημαίνει αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις, where ψυχή, once again, stands for the person, not one of her faculties.

body, but what they are and what is true about them is only apprehended by reasoned calculations (186c2-4, d2-4). Thus, while perception is about what is, e.g., hot and white, knowledge concerns heat and whiteness (182a-b). On this basis, far from being 'philosophically quite pointless' (Ryle (1966), 158), Socrates's digression (172c1-177b7) reminds us of Plato's dual focus on sense perception in the narrow sense, i.e. the process by way of which we perceive, e.g., something white through our eyes,[15] and the personality that we develop and the life we lead if we limit ourselves to seeing something white, instead of delving into the nature of whiteness. Accordingly, Socrates illustrates the types of life that originate from epistemic and pragmatic engagements respectively: he compares the philosopher, who is ignorant of common things (175b6), with those who 'cannot keep their eyes fixed upon the whole' (175a1) and worry about what wrong they have done to another, or another to them, instead of inquiring into the nature of justice and injustice, and wonder if a king has great wealth, rather than investigating royalty and human happiness and misery in general (175b9-c8). Perception, as a mode of cognition and a way of living, is embodied, embedded, and pragmatically oriented: for this reason, we do not perceive things in themselves, but in relation to us, to our practical concerns and to our affections (153d-154a, 160a-b, 179c).

Thus, if the three parts of the soul are not distinct faculties, but a metaphorical model meant to explain the behaviour of individuals, a distinction can be made not between different capacities, but rather between different modes of cognition. We have seen that, for Plato, there are at least two ways one can engage with the world: a 'principled', epistemically justified one, based on mathematical knowledge, and an 'unprincipled' one, based on an empirical grasp of how things are.[16] What Plato is pointing at is that our non-theoretical, perceptual encounter with the world gives us a concrete and sensory access to it that is underpinned by our own practical concerns, rather than by epistemic ones. The bent stick under water and the straight stick out of water are, from a perceptual viewpoint, two different sticks. The reason why it is so is that the bent stick is indeed under water and this does make a practical (and therefore

15 At 184c-d, Socrates' distinction between the use of the dative and that of the preposition διά is meant to put emphasis on the person as the subject of perception. Cf. Cairns (2014), 58–59 for a discussion of this passage in relation to *Resp.* 436a8-b4. Also cf. Burnyeat (1976), 33–36 and Lorenz (2006), 27, n.22.

16 A good illustration of sense perception as a way of engaging with the world (rather than as a capacity) is found at *Phd.* 79c2-8: 'whenever *the soul uses the body to examine something*, either through sight or hearing or some other means of perception – for *examining something by means of perception is examination by means of the body* – then it's dragged by the body toward those things that are never in a constant state…' (emphasis added).

perceptual) difference. The same is true for numbers, to recall the example discussed above: we can engage with numbers on a mathematical basis or with the purpose of trading: in the latter case, we deal with numbers as 'physically visible or tangible' (ὁρατὰ ἢ ἁπτὰ σώματα, 525d7-8) and our perceptual experience is entangled with worldly features that matter to us.[17] This is why, in perceptual cognition, we neither interact with nor grasp the definition of 'numbers themselves'. So, what we learn from *Resp.* 602c-603a is not that, as Storey put it, there is 'at least one part of the soul – whatever part it turns out to be – that is both incapable of *logismos* and capable of forming beliefs' (Storey 2014: 89), but rather that *we* ourselves are capable of forming beliefs without grounding them on epistemic knowledge and just relying on perceptual cognition. *We* ourselves can choose to gain insight into the world by practical engagements rather than theoretical calculations. That this is exactly what we do when we are exposed to poetry, Plato is well aware; and here, as the next paragraph will show, is the rub.

2 The Experiential 'Feel' of Poetry

Sense perception is tinged with phenomenality. We have seen how Plato describes the perceptual mode of cognition as entangled with our practical concerns: at the very least, as with the bent stick, it is grounded on our presence in a physical environment that we might need or want to manipulate (hence the relevance of Plato's example of visual illusions, that emphasizes how perceptual cognition is context-dependent). For Plato, sense perception as a mode of cognition is different from epistemic knowledge insofar as it is characterized by a set of empirical goals, rather than theoretical ones. Therefore, not only does sense perception obviously involve bodily sensations, but it is also linked

17 Therefore, Nehamas' 'difficult question' is difficult only because it is wrongly tackled, and not for the reasons that Storey puts forward, but for those he rejects: 'the non-rational part' (i.e. our perceptual engagement with the world) is taken in by visual illusions precisely because of its desires (i.e. its empirical approach, grounded on pragmatic goals). Cf. Storey (2014), 93: 'Nehamas supposes that if the appearance-believing part is non-rational, we will be stumped by "the difficult question of what appetite has to do with perceptual error and illusion. Why should *desire* tell us that the immersed stick is bent?" (Nehamas (1998), 265)'. Storey claims that 'this gets the explanation back to front. It would of course be implausible to suggest that a non-rational part is taken in by visual illusions because of its desires, but the opposite is highly plausible: that this part has the desires that it does, desires that are often at odds with the calculated aims of the rational part, at least in part because it lacks calculation and must instead rely on mere appearances' (93).

to practical, affectively charged motivations and desires.[18] Accordingly, in this section I will argue that, for Plato, poetic imagery elicits emotional arousal via its link to actual sense perception and that, for this reason, the perceptual experience opened up by poetry amounts to a way of affectively engaging with the story-world.

One might object that there is considerable difference between sense-perception as a direct way to access the external world and performing or listening to poetry – if nothing else because, in the latter case, what we experience is a world that does not even exist. So, why does Plato think that poetry appeals to a perceptual mode of cognition? Let us return for a moment to the tripartite metaphor as a tool for distinguishing between distinct modes of cognizing. What is at stake here is not so much the representational output (e.g. a bent stick or a straight one), but rather the way itself we engage with what appears to us: ultimately, perceptual cognition is *how* we experience the stick as bent, while epistemic cognition is *how* we deal with it theoretically. When we perceptually experience the world, we take a sensory approach that is grounded on our practical concerns of embodied beings situated in a particular context. My argument is that Plato's apprehensions as regards poetic μίμησις should be addressed precisely on these grounds: he is worried not only because poetic μίμησις provides us with the imitation of appearances, but rather because it does so by eliciting the simulation of perceptual modes of cognition in the audience. This way, it obtains the result of poetic transportation, sweeping spectators 'among the scenes' and blurring the boundaries between the fictional and the real world in such a way that poetic experience ends up contributing to the audience's real-life attitudes and beliefs.

We can learn more by looking at *Resp.* III, where Plato discusses the educational requirements that must be set for the guardians of the city by scrutinizing the content and the form of Homeric epic. He claims that the dangerousness of narrative content is proportional to its poeticity:

18 Cf., in the *Phaedo*, Plato's description of the body as the prison bars through which the soul looks at the world; his claim is that, unless it is released from the body with the help of philosophy, the soul cannot examine reality on its own and its activity is jeopardized by the desires that come from its bodily prison (82e). What the senses offer to the soul is inflected in terms of 'pleasure or pain or fear or desire' (83b) and this affects contribute to making 'whatever the soul is experiencing' look 'the most palpable and most real, even though it's not so' (83c). It is because sense perception is affectively charged that 'the soul is especially bound fast by the body': 'each pleasure and pain fixes it as if with a nail and pins it to the body and makes it body-like, supposing that whatever the body says is the truth' (83d). This is where emotions step in: not as add-on features, but as essential constituents of perceptual cognition. Emotions are described alongside sense perceptions also at *Ti.* 69c-d, 77b4-6 and *Tht.* 156b.

> we'll implore Homer and the rest of the poets not to get cross if we strike these and all similar lines from their works. We'll explain that it's not because the lines are not poetical and don't give pleasure to most people; on the contrary, the more poetical they are, the more they are to be kept from the ears of children and men who are to be free. (387b1-6, trans. Waterfield, slightly modified)

He says so after quoting from Homer a few passages about death; the general discussion regards the importance for the guardians not to fear death. A distinctive feature of the Homeric lines that Plato quotes is the rendering of death via the description of a soul flying out of its body and entering the underworld: the soul is presented as the subject of an experience (that is, dying) that is in turn presented as an action, or a series of actions, in which the soul is engaged (esp. movement through space: out of the body, into the underworld, walking away from life).[19] The emotional (distressful) import of these scenes chiefly emerges from the wide range of sensory cues we are provided with: the despairing souls are shrieking and their audible, piercing lamentations[20] resemble the squeaking and the wing clapping of bats in a cave;[21] compared with smoke, they are presented as pale to our eyes and ghostly intangible to our hands.[22] The perceptual cues contained in these Homeric quotations actually span all sensory realms and even encompass motor activity.[23] They are delivered through metaphors and similes in such a way that it is possible to grasp the experience of passing away in a sensory and emotionally charged way.[24] The presence of souls (themselves a metaphor for the individuals who died) as action-engaged subjects further facilitates our 'from-within' experience of what is going on.[25] Our basic response when reading these lines is that of

19 E.g.: 'The soul flew from its limbs and went to Hades / Bewailing its fate, leaving behind manhood and / youth' (386d9-10 [*Il.* 16.856–57]).

20 The word itself (τετριγυῖα, from τρίζω) is onomatopoeic and thus conveys some kind of verbal auditory imagery.

21 'As when bats in the depths of a wondrous cave / Squeak and flit about whenever one of the string falls / From a rock, and they cling to each other, / So with a shriek [the souls] went together' (387a5-8 [*Od.* 24.6–9]).

22 'The soul went below ground like smoke, / shrieking' (387a2-3 [*Il.* 23.100–01]).

23 For a non-pictorial, enactivist interpretation of Homeric vividness cf. Grethlein and Huitink (2017). On vivid imagery in Homer see Minchin (2001); Graziosi and Haubold (2010), 23; Clay (2011).

24 On metaphors as a way of mapping from the domain of embodied and sensory experience to that of abstract concepts cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980); Lakoff and Turner (1989); Lakoff and Johnson (1999).

25 In real-world experiences, action and bodily movements are central to perception: perceptual attendance to any object is based on a sensorimotor understanding of our potential for interacting with it (cf. Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), 89–100 for a discussion of the

producing sensorial imaginings and we can speculate that this was the case for epic listeners too – all the more so since they were listening to rhapsodes, whose physical presence and reciting voice provided the audience with even more tangible modes of embodiment and with non-semantic stimuli (such as acoustic information carried by the sound of words, accompanying melodies and rhythms) that echoed sense-perceptions and fed back on and intensified the mental imagery generated by the referential content of poetry.[26] On these grounds, it is plausible to say that Plato understands 'poeticity' in terms of the capacity of the poetic message to be delivered through the body: this intuition finds further support in the passage that immediately follows the Homeric quotations, where Plato makes his point by saying that all poetry shall be banished that makes us 'shudder'. The verb φρίσσειν stands metonymically for 'fear' and refers to the symptom of 'shudders': by making this lexical choice Plato put emphasis on the embodied nature of the emotional reaction of which poetry is the cause (and he also elicits the production, on our part, of the kind of imagery that will persuade us even more of how dangerously powerful poetry can be). It is also worth noting that the phenomenology of shudders was regularly associated with instinctive responses to direct perceptual stimuli:[27] this comes as one more hint at the connexion between poetry and sense perception. Plato was aware that the audience's imagining had a similar phenomenal character as actual perceiving. He recognized that narrative engagement via perceptual cues and sensory descriptions primes mental imagery that comes with bodily feelings:[28] by eliciting mental imagery, poetry provides us with the 'feel' of an unmediated access to the imagined world.

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intertwined character of action and perception and for references). The same areas of one's brain that are activated when one engages in intentional action are also activated when one sees another perform a similar intentional action (on mirror neurons cf. Gallese et al. (1996); Rizzolatti et al. (1996)) and the possibility for other people to act upon an object has been proved to affect our way of processing it (on one's own and somebody else's peripersonal space representation and reaching potential cf. Costantini, Ambrosini, and Sinigaglia (2012); Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia, and Costantini (2013); also cf. Ricciardi et al. (2017): the same mapping of objects into peripersonal space occurs when objects are presented within the subjects' reach and outside it, but within the peripersonal space of another agent). In this respect, the narrative presence of an experiencer and his or her reported motor activity and interaction with the narrative environment can be expected to contribute to the readers' imaginative-perceptual enactment along similar lines (for analogous claims cf. Grünbaum (2007) and Kuzmičová (2012)).

26 See *Resp.* 398c-400e for Plato's discussion of how auditory stimuli (esp. harmonies and rhythms) lead to affective states. Also cf. 401d6-7 on rhythm and harmony sinking into the soul (καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία).

27 Cairns (2013), (2017a).

28 Here and throughout the paper, by mental imagery I mean sensory imagery (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc.; as opposed to propositional imaginings, cf. Lopes (2003)), i.e. a kind of

The connexion of mental imagery to sensorimotor processes is by now well established[29] and narrative modes in ancient and modern literature are being explored by a growing number of scholars endorsing a so-called second-generation cognitive approach.[30] As Grethlein and Huitink have recently shown, Homeric epic is rich in descriptions of bodily actions and action-relevant features that enhance imageability via the perceptual elicitation of motor patterns in the listeners/readers, who are thus in the position to enact the narrative.[31] Plato himself must have noticed that when, discussing poetic representations of grief, he deplores the following Homeric lines about Achilles who is weeping for Patroclus's death: 'sometimes lying on his side, and at others / On his back, and yet others on his face / 'then standing up, / weaving around distraught along the shore of the barren sea' (388a7-b1 [*Il.* 24.10-13]).[32] Here, we are presented with a moving picture, depicting a sequence of emotionally charged bodily actions of both gestural and translocal kind.[33] Achilles's bodily movements take place within a spatial description ('along the shore of the barren sea') that can easily be inhabited from within.[34] We come to have an experiential 'feel' of this scene because we imaginatively enact it as a perceptual experience.[35]

On this account, Plato's contrast between the epistemic mode of cognition and the pragmatic engagements to which poetry appeals and his phenomenological observations of the effects of poetry attest to an intuition on his part that the structure and the phenomenal quality of the experience are the same in perception and imagination, i.e. that vividness is experiential and, when exposed to poetry, the imager's body is felt at work. Therefore, his concern

perceptual processing that takes place in the absence of corresponding, actual sensory stimulation and, in the experience of poetry, is primed by textual cues (in the case of ancient audiences, by the performer's gestures and voice as well). Mental imagery can be multimodal (i.e. we can get, e.g., olfactory mental imagery that is triggered by non-olfactory cues: Nanay (2017)) and encompasses exteroception, interoception, and kinesthesia. This makes it possible for textual cues to span the full range of the phenomenal qualities of our imaginative-perceptual experience.

29 For a review of the empirical evidence of the analogies between imagination and perception cf. Kosslyn, Ganis, and Thompson (2001); Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis (2006).

30 For an introduction to literary study based on 4e cognition and for further references cf. Kukkonen and Caracciolo (2014).

31 Grethlein and Huitink (2017).

32 The Homeric text is partially altered (Plato replaces τοτὲ δ᾽ ὀρθὸς ἀναστὰς δινεύεσκ᾽ ἀλύων παρὰ θῖν᾽ ἁλός with τοτὲ δ᾽ ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα πλωΐζοντ᾽ ἀλύοντ᾽ ἐπὶ θῖν᾽ ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο).

33 In the first two lines Achilles's movements are related to his own body and in the last two ones they are set in a wider spatial environment.

34 Cf. Kuzmičová (2014), 288 for a discussion of in-between phenomena across enactment- and description-imagery.

35 For an enactivist account of the phenomenology of mental imagery cf. Thompson (2007).

about the false and morally corrupted nature of poetic content is underpinned by the more fundamental one about poeticity itself (387b4), that makes that content all the more dangerous. What Plato worries about is that, in the experience of poetry as much as in real-life perceptual activities, we enact rather than conceptualize: when imagining we engage in the very same performance as in real-life perceptual activities and, as a result, we explore the imagined world in an embodied and affectively charged way. If imagination amounts to practical engagements with poetic content and if these practical engagements bear on the same resources that we use when dealing with the real world, it follows as a result that poetry transports us 'among the scenes', allows us to inhabit the fictional context 'as if we were there' and perceive our own embodied presence in the poetic world.

3 Emotions for Fictional Characters

We have seen that, for Plato, the 'as-if-you-where-there' effect achieved by poetry translates into a feeling of bodily presence: the audience imagines the poetic world from within and inhabits it in a perceptual and affective way. This sense of entering a tangible environment also lays the basis for the audience's engagement with the emotional experience of characters.

At *Resp.* 603c5-9, poetic imitation is said to be about people who act, develop beliefs and feel emotions about what happens to them:

> we'd better start by having certain ideas out in the open. We'd say that [poetic] imitation, represents people doing things, willingly or unwillingly, and afterwards thinking that they've been successful or unsuccessful, and throughout feeling distressed or happy. (trans. Waterfield, slightly modified)

The range of the audience's responses to poetry notably includes their emotional reactions to the characters' emotional states. These reactions are often psychologically very complex and entail considerations of how the characters' mental states relate to each other and of their role in motivating or influencing actions and behaviour. Still, they originally stem from some kind of basic understanding of what it is like for the characters to experience such states. These two tasks (understanding what it is like for a character to experience an emotional state and emotionally reacting to that state) need not (and should not) be understood as alternative or occurring sequentially one after the other.

Research in developmental psychology[36] and neuroscientific evidence on the sub-personal, agent-neutral activation of resonance systems[37] support the thesis that our basic ability to grasp another person's mental states is, so to say, phenomenologically direct. The perception of another person's gestures and actions activates the same areas of our brain that are activated when we engage in similar actions: this means that, at a sub-personal level, so-called implicit simulation is not at all simulation,[38] but perceptual elicitation.[39] Basic intersubjectivity is therefore embodied and perceptual: other people's minds are primarily accessible to us through their embodied actions and expressive behaviours in a direct perceptual way. Intersubjectivity is also contextualized: our perceptual understanding of another's gestures is framed by our capacity to tie other people's actions to pragmatic contexts.[40] At the same time, recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive literary studies have put forward the claim that consumers of fiction deal with and experience fictional minds in very much the same way as they do with actual minds.[41] In poetry, as much as in real life, the emotional states of another are presented to us as expressive phenomena (bodily gestures and behaviours) embedded in meaningful (narrative) contexts:[42] as a result, our understanding of fictional characters is primarily based on perceptual processes that are pragmatically contextualized in the narrative framework. For all these reasons, the attribution of mental states to another (real or fictional) person co-occurs with the embodied experience of the phenomenal aspects of that mental state and any distinction between 'feeling with' and 'feeling for' seems somewhat artificial at this level.

36 E.g. Baldwin (1993); Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997); Johnson, Slaughter, and Carey (1998); Allison, Puce, and McCarthy (2000); Johnson (2000); Baldwin and Baird (2001); Baldwin et al. (2001).

37 E.g. Jeannerod and Pacherie (2004); Gallese (2005); Hurley (2006).

38 The concept of simulation in simulation theory implies pretence and instrumental control: cf. Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), 179–80.

39 Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), 177–81.

40 What Trevarthen would call 'primary' and 'secondary' intersubjectivity (Trevarthen and Hubley (1978); Trevarthen (1979)). On enactive social perception cf. Gallagher (2008). Also cf. Gallagher and Hutto (2008).

41 E.g. Zunshine (2006); Palmer (2004), (2011); Hutto (2011). For a critique of the 'Exceptionality Thesis' and further references cf. Herman (2011).

42 This is not necessarily true of *all* narratives, but it is certainly true of the kind of poetry (Homer's epic and ancient Greek tragedies) that we are discussing here (cf. Plato's definition of poetic imitation at *Resp.* 603c 5-9 quoted above).

In this respect, Plato seems to have been on to something when, at *Resp.* 605c10-606b3, he describes the overlap between the characters' and the audience's emotions not only as compatible with, but as *developing into* the audience's third-person response:

> when Homer or another tragedian represents the grief of one of the heroes, they have him deliver a lengthy speech of lamentation or even have him sing a dirge and beat his breast; and when we listen to all this, even the best of us, as I'm sure you're aware, feels pleasure. *We surrender ourselves, let ourselves be carried away sharing the hero's pathos* (*ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὑτοὺς ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες*); and then we enthuse about the skill of any poet who makes us feel particularly strong feelings… What a poet satisfies and gratifies on these occasions is an aspect of ourselves which we forcibly restrain when tragedy strikes our own lives – an aspect which hungers after tears and the satisfaction of having cried until one can cry no more, since that is what it is in its nature to want to do. When the part of us which is inherently good has been inadequately trained in habits enjoyed by reason, it relaxes its guard over this other part, the part which feels sad, in that it is *watching the suffering of other people* (*ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν*), and *there is nothing shameful for it in praising and pitying* (*ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν*) *another person who claims to be good, but grieves* (*πενθεῖ*) *inappropriately* (trans. Waterfield, slightly modified; emphasis added).

The audience being affected in common with (συμπάσχοντες) the hero and the audience's pity *for* (ἐλεεῖν) the hero's grief (i.e. the audience members' response to spectacle of somebody else's sorrow: ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν) amount to the same emotional phenomenon precisely because the audience's reaction stems from the embodied engagement with the hero's grief that results from poetic transportation (ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς…). A similar scenario is vividly described in the *Ion*: the rhapsode's performance consists in the enactment of the emotions of the characters to whom he assimilates with his voice and his body:[43] he feels as if he were 'among the scenes' (535c) and weeps and shudders as if pitiable and fearful things were happening to him (535d). At the same time, he is aware that he elicits these very same reactions (ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, 535d) in the audience: he looks down at spectators to make sure they respond to the narrative in the desired way, i.e. crying and being filled with awe (535e). That these tears and awestruck

43 Cf. the equation of μίμησις and ὁμοίωσις at *Resp.* 393c5-6: Οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἄν τις ὁμοιοῖ;

gaze are symptoms of the emotions that spectators, as onlookers, feel *for* the characters follows from the claim that Ion has put forward only a few lines before: 'when I relate something pitiable (ἐλεεινόν τι), my eyes are filled with tears; and when it is of fear or awe (φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν), my hair stands on end with terror, and my heart leaps' (535c).[44] Plato's psychological observations in this passage are particularly compelling because he purposely blends the performer's and the spectators' reactions *to* the narrative with their primary enactment *of* the narrative: he puts emphasis on the congruence of the bodily symptoms of pity and fear as *emotions for* the characters, on one side, and grief and fear as *emotions of* the characters, on the other. In both cases, one cries and shudders: we know that Plato's focus is on pity and fear as 'emotions for' because of the lexical cues (ἐλεεινόν and φοβερὸν at 535c) and because of the description of Ion keeping an eye on the audience's reactions; we also know that Plato grounds the very possibility of the onlookers' emotional reaction in the 'stunned astonishment' (ἔκπληξις) of both the performer and the audience, whose imaginative re-enactment of the characters' emotions is made possible by poetic transportation. On these grounds, the feelings of fear and pity (the two most representative audience responses) for fictional characters depend on poetic cues (and on those provided by the rhapsode's embodied performance) priming the audience's imaginative re-enactment of the emotional 'feel' of the characters' experience. In this respect, the way the audience attend to and keep track of the characters' states of mind amounts to a type of performance that is similar to that of the rhapsode, rather than to a disembodied attribution of mental states: as mentioned before, the audience's attribution of emotional experience to the characters co-occurs with its imaginative-perceptual re-enactment.

Plato is thus aware of the embodied nature of our basic engagement with fictional characters and acknowledges that it bears on capacities that are closer to perception than to a theoretical cognitive approach: our *emotions for* presuppose, and are grounded in, an embodied, affective understanding of what it is like to feel the emotions we are reacting to. Furthermore, the socio-cultural meanings embedded in the narrative context evaluatively shape the perceptual information we gather via embodied engagements and this paves the way for poetic content to interfere with our real-life beliefs and dispositions. Ultimately, this explains why Plato thinks that how we react to others' sufferings will impact on how we deal with our own:

44 On Plato's focus on the audience's responses cf. Cairns (forthcoming).

> few people have the ability to work out that we ourselves are bound to store the harvest we reap from others: these occasions feed the feelings of sadness until it is too strong for us easily to restrain it when hardship occurs in our own lives (*Resp.* 606b, trans. Waterfield).

Our own self-acquaintance does not take place in isolation from others and it does not make any difference if these 'others' are fictional characters since, by drawing on a perceptual and affective mode of cognition, poetic transportation bridges the gap between reality and fiction, making the imagined world 'most palpable and most real' for us to inhabit.

4 Conclusion

I have addressed Plato's concerns about poetic μίμησις by examining his claim that poetry appeals to a perceptual mode of cognition. I have argued that this claim is grounded on Plato's insights into the similar phenomenal character of mental imagery and stimulus-driven perception and that he thinks this is how poetic transportation is achieved. By discussing the tripartite soul in terms of modes of cognition and types of life, I have shed light on the affective nature of our non-theoretical, perceptual encounters with both the real and the fictional world. Finally, I have shown that the audience's emotions for fictional characters also draw on embodied engagements and are pragmatically contextualized in the narrative framework: as a result of this, socio-cultural meanings and basic embodied re-enactments feed back on each other and contribute to the shaping of characters and dispositions that Plato was so worried about. By putting emphasis on μίμησις not only in terms of representational content, but also of our imaginative perception of this content, my aim was to show that Plato's criticism of the impact of poetry on education rests on the more fundamental criticism of the experiential 'feel' of poetic narrative.

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Chapter 3

Why Do Itches Itch? Bodily Pain in the Socratic Theory of Motivation

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Abstract

Imagine that Socrates gets a cavity treatment. The drilling is painful, but he also knows that it is best to get it done and so he stays. Callicles is not so smart. Once the dentist starts drilling, Callicles takes off. I argue that this scenario presents a puzzle that interpreters have missed, namely: why does Socrates have an aversion to pain? To us, this might not be puzzling at all. Socrates, however, believes that we have an aversion only to bad things and that pain is not in fact bad. If Socrates knows that pain is not bad, why does he still feel aversive pain from drilling? I argue that the *Protagoras* and *Hippias Major* suggest that pain immediately appears to be bad to us. So even though pain is not in fact bad, it appears and feels that way, and thus even Socrates has an aversion to it. Pain is a felt evaluation. My interpretation contributes to the debates in the literature in two ways. First, it fills an explanatory gap. Interpreters have acknowledged that a Socratic theory of motivation has room for pain aversions as "itches," but they leave unexplained why we have an aversion to pain, i.e., why those itches itch. Second, I offer an alternative account of Socratic motivation by proposing that pain aversions can motivate some of our actions.

Keywords

Socrates – motivation – pain – emotion – action

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According to the Socratic theory of motivation, we all have one general, overarching desire for the good, which is happiness, and we all have one general, overarching aversion to the bad, which is misery.[1] We all desire happiness; no

1 By 'Socratic theory of motivation I mean the theory we aim to reconstruct based on what Socrates says in the following dialogues: *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Charmides, Laches, Lysis,*

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one wants to be miserable.[2] In addition to our two general, overarching motivations – our desire for the good and our aversion to the bad – we also have desires for and aversions to specific things. For example, sometimes we desire to socialize with friends, finish an essay, or eat a sandwich. The question that is at the center of this paper is: how do desires for and aversions to specific things or actions come about in Socratic psychology?

Socrates believes that the objects of our particular desires are things or activities we take to be good: "all men want good things" (τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν), as he argues in the *Meno* (77c). The connection between particular things and our overarching desire for the good (happiness) seems to be that those particular things are good – i.e., that they promote our happiness. As Socrates explains to Meno:

> Is there anyone who wants to be miserable and evil-spirited (βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι)? – No, it doesn't seem to me, Socrates. – No one then wants bad things (βούλεται τὰ κακὰ), Meno, if he does not want to be such. For what else is being miserable but to desire bad things (ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν) and possess them? – You are probably right, Socrates, and no one wants bad things (οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά).[3] (*Men.* 78a4-b2)[4]

For Socrates, we are motivated by things that are of value to us.[5] Particular things become the object of our desire if we take them to be good. For my

Euthydemus, Meno, Protagoras, Ion, Hippias Minor and *Major,* and *Gorgias*. What unifies this group is that they are all pre-*Republic* dialogues, and that they have been taken to present the Socratic philosophy (see e.g., Penner (1992), 124; Reshotko (2006), 11–13; Brickhouse and Smith (2010), 18, 248–58; though some have argued that parts of the *Gorgias* and *Meno* are un-Socratic). For a helpful discussion of which dialogues we should count as 'Socratic' see Rowe (2002).

2 'Happiness' should be understood as 'objective well-being,' i.e., 'leading an objectively good life, living virtuously,' and not in the modern sense of 'subjective well-feeling' (*Cri.* 48b, *Grg.* 497a). Socrates does not explicitly identify the good with happiness (though Plato will in *Symp.* 205a.), but he strongly indicates it when he says that "we all want to be happy" (εὐδαίμονες μὲν εἶναι προθυμούμεθα πάντες, *Euthyd.* 282a) or "do well" (εὖ πράττειν, *Euthyd.* 278e), and that "the end of all action is the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), for the sake of which we do everything else" (*Grg.* 500a). Arguably, happiness is our final goal, the thing for which we do everything else. For other, later passages see *Resp.* 505e, *Phlb.* 20d, *Tht.* 175c-d.

3 All translations are mine, though I consulted those in Cooper (1997).

4 See also: "We become happy by getting good things" (*Euthyd.* 178e), and *Prt.* 358c-d, *Grg.* 468b-c.

5 I use 'motivation' to refer broadly to conative attitudes (such as desire, aversion, attraction, wanting). By 'aversion' I mean conative con-attitudes, and I use 'desire,' 'attraction,' and 'wanting' interchangeably to refer to conative pro-attitudes.

purposes, "taking to be good" can mean believing that something is good, but it also encompasses other mental states such as noticing or perceiving. I therefore propose the following *Socratic Principle of Motivation*: I want *x* because I take *x* to be good, i.e., happiness-promoting; I have an aversion to *y* because I take *y* to be bad, i.e., happiness-diminishing.[6]

How do things become of value to us? Why do we take some things to be good and others to be bad? Sometimes things become valuable to us because we reason that they will help us meet a particular end (i.e., they become valuable to us through means-end reasoning). I may deliberate, for example, about whether socializing with friends tonight would promote or diminish my happiness. If I conclude that it would promote my happiness, I label "socializing with friends" as "good," and then I desire it. If I conclude that it would diminish my happiness, I label it as "bad," and then I have an aversion to it. Consider also the example of wanting to take foul-tasting medicine. I want to take medicine because I have reasoned that taking it is good.[7] My reasoning process is likely to include comparing and measuring goods and bads (*Prt.* 358d): the medicine tastes bad, but it will make me feel better, and thereby it will promote my overall happiness rather than diminish it. Socrates would probably also acknowledge that many things have value to us because we remember them to be good.[8] Means-end reasoning, measuring, and remembering are three ways for things to become valuable to us.

Now consider the experience of current pain from drilling at the dentist. Most people have an immediate aversion to pain, i.e., they do not want to be in pain.[9] Given the *Socratic Principle of Motivation*, if we do not want to be in pain, pain must be of negative value to us. But how does pain become of negative value? How does pain receive the label "bad"? It is not, I believe, because we concluded that pain is bad after having reasoned about whether bodily pain promotes or diminishes our happiness. Reasoning – even the most simple and basic kind of reasoning – cannot account for our aversion to bodily pain because our aversion arises *immediately*. There is simply no time for reason to figure out whether bodily pain diminishes our happiness. Further, the immediacy of our pain aversion cannot be explained through memory. One may say

6 What I call *The Socratic Principle of Motivation* is known, in contemporary philosophy, as *The Guise of the Good* doctrine (see Orsi (2015), 714).

7 In the *Gorgias*, Socrates claims that we do not want (βούλεται) means but only ends (467c-e). Accordingly, we would not want to take medicine but to be healthy. This claim is quite puzzling because there is surely *a* sense in which we want means. Kamtekar suggests that we understand 'want' here as 'prefer': "one prefers the end […]. [W]anting the end is the basis for a derivative desire, to do actions which are means to the end" (Kamtekar (2017), 85).

8 As Plato will say in *Phlb*. 35c-d.

9 Some people may not have an immediate aversion to pain. More about those people later.

that we concluded in the past that pain diminishes our happiness, and that is why we have an immediate aversion when we now experience painful drilling. But that explanation is implausible since our very first pain experiences were already aversive.

Interpreters of Socratic psychology acknowledge that we have an aversion to pain. They also acknowledge that pain aversions, along with emotions, appetites, and desires for pleasure, do not arise out of reason. Instead, interpreters classify these states as "hankerings, itches, or drives,"[10] "longings, drives, urges, and raw desires,"[11] or simply as "attractions and aversions."[12] They distinguish these kinds of "itches" from desires "to do some particular thing," i.e., from action-causing desires, and they reserve the term "motivation" for these action-causing desires. Action-causing desires, unlike pain aversions and other "itches," arise out of reasoning about what is best to do.[13] First, we reason about what is best to do; then we form a belief that a certain action is best, and this belief gives rise to a desire which motivates an action.

According to this account, when someone experiences painful drilling at the dentist and deliberates about what to do, she entertains all kinds of information such as that leaving the office would be easy because the door is right there and wide open; but also that the procedure is already paid for. While some interpreters explain that her pain-itch, her aversion to the painful drilling, is simply another piece of information she entertains when deliberating about what to do, others argue that her pain-itches may even cause some of her beliefs, though they do not motivate actions. All interpreters seem to agree that the agent's motivation for either staying at the dentist or taking off results from reasoning about what is best to do.[14]

I see two problems with these existing interpretations. First, they leave an explanatory gap. In the existing accounts, pain aversions are not full-fledged

10 Penner (1991), 201, n.45.

11 Reshotko (2006), 76–77, 84–88.

12 Singpurwalla (2006), 249, Brickhouse and Smith (2015), 14.

13 Penner (1991), 201, n. 45, (2011), 261–62; Rowe (2012), 305–07; Reshotko (2006), 33–34, 39–40, 86.

14 Penner, Rowe, and Reshotko on the one hand, and Brickhouse and Smith on the other are usually taken to argue for opposing interpretations. It is worth noting, though, that Brickhouse and Smith agree with Penner, Rowe, and Reshotko that attractions and aversions or "itches" are not action-causing motivations (see Brickhouse and Smith (2010), 52, n.6; (2012), 238). They disagree over how influential attractions and aversions are. Brickhouse and Smith argue that our attractions and aversions can *cause* beliefs (Brickhouse and Smith (2010), 71, 80, (2015), 11), while Penner (2011), 263-4 and Reshotko (2006), 85–86 deny that. Thanks to Nicholas Smith for many helpful discussions of these interpretative differences.

motivations. Yet, they have motivational flavor – after all, they are "itches," and what is an itch if it does not make us want to scratch it?[15] I believe that we should try to give a Socratic explanation for why pain has any motivational flavor, i.e., we should try to explain why pain is aversive or why pain-itches itch. Second, it seems implausible that pain is merely an itch, and that this itch contributes to the generation of our actions just as one piece of information among many. What is it about pain that renders it motivationally deficient? What justifies its classification as merely an itch? It seems to me that pain aversions can play a more motivationally robust role in the generation of actions. I argue that, sometimes and for certain agents, pain is not just an itch, but it is actually a motivation for action. Some people leave the dentist because they do not want to be in pain, and this immediate motivation precedes any further deliberation about what would be best to do.

Interpreters worry that if we classify pain as motivational and thus as more than just an itch, pain would then compete with those desires that arise out of reasoning. This competition between our reasoned desire and our pain aversion would be troublesome because it would violate the following four Socratic core beliefs:

1. We always desire the good (*Grg*. 468b) and the things we take to be good (*Prt*. 358d; *Men.* 77c-78b).[16]
2. We always do what we believe is best to do (*Prt*. 358d).
3. All wrongdoing is due to ignorance (*Prt*. 357c-e, 360c-e; *Lach.* 194d).
4. The knowledgeable person's soul is harmonious (*Prt*. 356e).

If pain were more than an itch, it seems that we would not always desire good things and have an aversion to bad things; instead, sometimes we would desire pleasure and have an aversion to pain, regardless of any consideration of the good. This violates the first Socratic core belief. Further, it would be possible that pain causes us to act against our beliefs about what is best to do (thus violating the second core belief). In that case, some wrongdoing may not be the result of ignorance, but instead of a strong aversion to pain (a violation of core

15 I borrow "motivational flavor" from Emily Fletcher (in her comments on an earlier version of this paper for the Central APA 2018).

16 Interpreters disagree on what exactly Socrates means when he says 'we all desire the good or good things.' Does Socrates mean that (i) we all desire what *seems* or what we *take* to be good, or (ii) we all desire the *real* good, or (iii) both? Option (i) is best supported in *Meno* 77–78, option (ii) in *Grg*. 466dff. I believe that a version of (iii) is right. My tentative interpretation is that our general, overarching desire is for the *real* good, but our particular desires are for what we *take* to be good, which may not be what is actually good. For a helpful discussion of the different interpretative options see Barney (2010), Callard (2017), Wolfsdorf (2008), 29ff.

belief three). Finally, a competition between reasoned desire and pain aversion could potentially render the knowledgeable person's soul disharmonious (a violation of belief number four).[17]

It may thus seem problematic to make room for pain aversions that are motivationally more robust while holding on to the four Socratic core beliefs. But I argue that this problem only arises if we give pain a motivational force that is independent of badness. There are two general strategies one could use to explain pain aversion: (1) we might say that pain is aversive because it has a relation to our general, overarching aversion to badness. Or (2) one might instead argue that we have an intrinsic aversion to pain which is independent of badness. This second explanation indeed violates the four core Socratic beliefs: if pain-itches itch because we have an intrinsic aversion to pain, then we do not only have one overarching, final aversion to badness; instead we have two aversions, one to pain and one to badness. This would also mean that we do not have one overarching, final desire for goodness, but two separate desires, for pleasure and for goodness. An intrinsic aversion to pain is thus inconsistent with Socratic thought. But I will argue that the first explanation offered above– that pain is aversive because it relates to our general, overarching aversion to badness – is in fact compatible with the four Socratic core beliefs. This argument allows us to understand how pain can have a motivational flavor and how pain can be more than just an "itch."

My interpretation has two parts, based on the two problems with existing interpretations that I have identified above. First, I will fill the explanatory gap. I will offer a Socratic explanation for why we have an immediate aversion when we experience bodily pain.[18] In other words, I will offer a Socratic explanation for why our pain-itches itch. I will argue that bodily pain is immediately aversive because it immediately appears to be bad; we are hard-wired to perceive pain as bad. I take this part to be compatible with many existing interpretations. Second, I aim to offer a more plausible Socratic account of motivation. I will argue that bodily pain can be more than an itch. Pain can play a more robust motivational role in the generation of intentional actions because it can

17 For some of these worries see Penner (1991), 201, n.45: "So long as (a) the ἐπιθυμία for pleasure in the *Charmides* is only a hankering, itch, or drive for pleasure, and (b) mere hankerings, itches, or drives cannot automatically result in action when put together with a belief, then it will remain true for Socrates that all desires to do some particular action will be the product of desire for good." See also Irwin (1977), 128; Carone (2004), 89; Singpurwalla (2006), 244.

18 I aim to give an account of *bodily* pain only, but I believe that we can apply parts of my account to *psychological* pain as well. I will outline some potential applications below.

be the final motivation of an action.[19] Here, I offer an alternative to existing interpretations.

1 Part One: Why Do Most People Not Want to Be in Pain?

It is an empirical fact that most people do not want to be in pain. But there are some exceptions, the so-called asymbolics. Asymbolics are people for whom pain is not aversive. When the asymbolic experiences drilling at the dentist, for example, she does not have an immediate aversion, and yet she refers to her experience as 'pain.' Contemporary philosophers have responded to the existence of pain asymbolia in two ways. Some have concluded that pain and motivation (aversion, disagreeableness, unpleasantness) can come apart. 'Pain' refers only to the perceptual, sensory information of bodily damage. Motivation is separable from pain. Others have concluded that asymbolics falsely refer to their motivationally neutral experience of bodily damage as 'pain.' 'Pain' implies a motivational component. Consequently, those who receive cavity treatment and do not have an aversion are not in pain.[20]

In this paper, I am not concerned with this *conceptual analysis* of 'pain,' i.e., I will not investigate whether the term 'pain' necessarily refers to a motivational state in the Socratic dialogues.[21] Instead, I will focus on the *empirical* fact that most people do not want to be in pain. Socrates, I take it, acknowledges the empirical connection between pain and motivation when he says that children avoid burning (cauterization) and cutting (surgery) because those treatments are painful (*Grg*. 479a9: ὅτι ἀλγεινόν) and bring about the most intense pains (*Prt*. 354b2: ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας καὶ ἀλγηδόνας), and that criminals avoid punishment because it is painful (*Grg*. 479a-c). It is an empirical fact that pain is aversive for most people and that our aversion to pain can influence our actions.[22]

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19 My focus will be on intentional actions (e.g., going to the freezer to get some ice after having burned my hand) not reflexes (e.g., reflexively withdrawing my hand from the hot stove).

20 For a helpful discussion of the two accounts see Bain (2013).

21 The textual basis for a conceptual analysis of 'pain' (the Greek terms translated as 'pain' are λύπη, ἀνία, ἀλγηδὼν, ὀδύνη, ἀχθηδὼν) in the Platonic corpus is very slim. The etymological investigations in the *Cratylus* (419b ff.) give some insight, though not on whether 'pain' implies motivation: λύπη comes from the dissolution of the body (τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος), ἀνία is the hindrance of motion (ἐμποδίζον τοῦ ἰέναι), ἀλγηδὼν comes from painful (ἀλγεινοῦ), ὀδύνη from the entry of pain (ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης), and ἀχθηδὼν from carrying a weight (τῷ τῆς φορᾶς βάρει).

22 See also *Chrm*. 156b, *Lach*. 191 d-e.

How could Socrates explain our aversion to pain? Earlier, I proposed an argument along the following lines: (i) we are motivated only by things that are of value to us; (ii) pain is aversive (has motivational flavor); (iii) therefore, pain is of value to us. Let me now point to some initial evidence for the idea that bodily pain has some relation to badness. It seems reasonable that pain is connected to badness because bodily pain indicates a physical disturbance or damage, and Socrates believes that physical health is good (ὑγίεια ἀγαθὸν, *Lys.* 219a4) and disease is bad (νόσος κακόν).[23] Health is a good or excellent state of the body (εὐεξίαι τῶν σωμάτων, *Prt.* 354b3-4; ἀρετὴ σώματος, *Grg.* 479b4).[24] If our body is in a terrible condition, our life is bad (*Grg.* 505a) and in some cases not even worth living (*Cri.* 47e). It seems, then, that bodily pain is connected to badness in virtue of diseases being bad. Correspondingly, bodily pleasure is connected to goodness in virtue of bodily health being good.

Our central question is: how does pain become of negative value to us? Which mental state establishes the relation between pain and badness? It cannot be reasoning, as I maintain, because pain is *immediately* aversive. When we experience drilling, we immediately feel aversive pain. There is no time for reason to figure out whether pain promotes or diminishes our happiness. What we need is a mental state that can account for pain's being *immediately* motivational. I propose the following two mental states as candidates for establishing the relation between pain and badness:

(a) *Immediately Evaluative Perceptual Appearances*: when I experience pain, pain immediately appears to be bad. I have the immediate appearance of it being bad, and that is why pain is aversive.[25]

(b) *Immediately Evaluative Beliefs*: when I experience pain, I immediately form the belief that pain is bad, and that is why pain is aversive.

I will argue that we have textual and philosophical support for option (a), which says that pain is motivational because it immediately appears to be bad to us. Option (a) is textually supported by the *Hippias Major* and the *Protagoras*; its philosophical support stems from its being more plausible, as I will show. My interpretation maintains the *Socratic Principle of Motivation*, that we

23 *Chrm.* 164a9-b1; *Grg.* 467e4-5.

24 See also *Grg.* 504c.

25 I call the kind of appearances I am interested in "perceptual appearances" to avoid confusion with what I call "higher order appearances." "Perceptual appearances" arise from perception; "higher order appearances" involve cognitive states higher than perception such as beliefs or memories. In the *Gorgias*, for example, confiscating the citizens' property appears to be good (ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς, 467a3, a5; 468d4) or best (αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι, 466e2; 467b3-4) to the tyrant, probably because he believes that accumulating property is good.

only desire that which we take to be good. I will propose that there are different ways of 'taking something to be good'; reasoning is not the only way for things or actions to become of value to us. Some things are immediately evaluated because they appear good or bad when we perceive them.

1.1 *Immediately Evaluative Perceptual Appearances*

How does bodily pain become evaluative? I propose that the agent first has a disturbance of the natural state of her body. In the later dialogues, Plato will explicitly say that pain arises when we notice that the good state of our body is disrupted, and that pleasure arises when we notice that the good state is restored.[26] We can find traces of this view already in the Socratic dialogues when Socrates says that health is a good or excellent state of the body (*Prt*. 354b3-4; *Grg*. 479b4), and that we must like what belongs to us by nature (φύσει οἰκεῖον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν φιλεῖν. *Lys*. 221e-222a). A Hippocratic might further describe the natural, good state of the body as the balance of bodily fluids.[27] We have good evidence that Plato was influenced by Hippocratic explanations, most notably in the *Timaeus*, where he explains that sexual intemperance is caused by a particular fluid that renders the body moist (*Ti.* 86d-e).[28] While Socrates does not explicitly support Hippocratic theories in the early dialogues, we know that Socrates was familiar with them – he mentions Hippocrates, for example, in *Prt.* 311b – and therefore we have some reason to believe that his account of pleasure and pain may have been influenced by physiological explanations à la Hippocrates.

After there has been a disturbance of the natural state of the body, this disturbance must be perceived in order to give rise to pain. Some disturbances of

26 *Phlb*. 31d, *Resp*. 585d.

27 We can find at least three different explanations of pain in the Hippocratic writings. Some believe that we are in pain when (a) breath (φύσας) pierces the flesh (*On Breaths*: 9.1–12); (b) others when one of our bodily fluids gets separated from the others (*Ancient Medicine*: 14.23–28); (c) and others again when we have an excess or deficiency of hot or cold (*Places in Man*: 42.1–10). According to all three explanations, pain is caused by certain physiological conditions. As Longrigg explains, this idea was progressive at Socrates' time. Before Hippocrates, diseases and pains were explained with reference to gods and divine intervention, and supernatural practices were thought to cure patients. Hippocrates revolutionized the history of medicine with his "entirely rational outlook towards disease" (Longrigg (1989), 3). I propose that we attribute such a "rational outlook" to Socrates.

28 I take Plato's explanation to be in the Hippocratic spirit because it provides a physiological cause for sexual overindulgence. However, I also believe that the Hippocratics may disagree with Plato on the details of his explanation since they believe that old (and presumably sexually less active) bodies are moist (*Regimen in Health* 2). For more passages in which Plato seems to echo Hippocrates see *Symp*. 185d-188e, *Phdr*. 270c, *Chrm*. 156b-e. For an interesting discussion of these passages see Demont (2008) and Candiotto (2015).

our body remain unnoticed, in which case we do not experience pain. Again, our best textual support for this comes from the later dialogues,[29] but we can find traces of that view already in earlier dialogues. In *Hippias Major* 298d-299a, Socrates and Hippias discuss sensory pleasures and things that are pleasant according to the senses (κατὰ αἰσθήσεις). They have just established that 'fine things' are fine because they are pleasant according to the senses of hearing and sight. Socrates imagines their opponent saying:

> What, Hippias and Socrates? Do you distinguish the sort of pleasant you call fine [καλὸν, i.e., pleasures from hearing, sight] from the pleasant, and do you say that what is pleasant *according to the other senses* [κατὰ αἰσθήσεις; the other senses being touch, taste, smell] is not fine – food and drink, what comes with making love, and all other such things? (*Hp. mai.* 298d6-298e2)

Fine pleasures arise from hearing and sight, while other pleasures arise from touch, taste, and smell. Whether fine or not, all pleasant things such as music, paintings, sex, food, and flowers are pleasant *according to the senses* (κατὰ αἰσθήσεις). If such things are pleasant according to the senses, then, their corresponding opposites are presumably painful according to the senses. For example, if food is pleasant according to the senses, then presumably the lack of food is painful according to the senses. The lack of food – a disturbance of the natural state of our body – must be perceived in order to give rise to pain; similarly, food and the restoration of our natural state must be perceived in order to give rise to pleasure.

Our perception is, however, not always accurate. In the *Protagoras*, we learn that perception represents things of the same size as being large when they are closer, and small when they are further away (*Prt.* 356c). For example, a tower appears to be small when seen from a distance but large when we are right in front of it. The same applies to pleasure and pain, Socrates explains (*Prt.*356a-c). Pain close in time appears to be more painful, just as objects close in space appear to be larger; pain anticipated far in the future appears to be less painful, just as objects further away appear to be smaller. From Socrates' explanation it follows that *present pain* appears to be very painful just as very close objects appear to be very large.

At this point, we know that sense perception is involved when we experience bodily pain and that our sense perception is not always accurate. In order to understand why pain is aversive we now need to understand how evaluations

29 *Phlb.* 43b, *Ti.* 65a.

enter the picture. Another passage in the *Protagoras* provides a crucial clue. There, Socrates believes that the present pain appears to be very painful to both the ignorant and the knowledgeable person. The ignorant person, however, is fooled by appearances, while the knowledgeable person is not:

> While the power of appearance (ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις) often makes us wander (ἐπλάνα) all over the place (ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω), often changing (μεταλαμβάνειν) [our minds about] the same things and regretting (μεταμέλειν) our actions and choices about things large and small, the art of measurement [ἡ μετρητικὴ, i.e., knowledge], would make this appearance (φάντασμα) powerless (ἄκυρον) by showing us the truth, and it would make our soul have harmony (ἡσυχίαν) standing by the truth (μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ) and it would save our life. (*Prt.* 356d4-e2)

When the ignorant person receives cavity treatment, for example, the present pain appears to be so painful to her that she might jump off the chair and run home. Afterwards, she regrets having acted on this appearance. The knowledgeable person, by contrast, is not fooled by appearances. She knows that the present pain of cavity treatment is not as painful as the potential future pain that would arise if she left her cavities untreated. How exactly do appearances of pleasure and pain fool the ignorant person? How do they make the ignorant person "wander all over the place"?

Socrates seems to believe that appearances can play a role in the generation of actions similar to the role of knowledge. The ignorant person acts on appearances, the knowledgeable person acts on knowledge. What kind of knowledge and what kind of appearances can bring about an action? In the case of knowledge, Socrates specifies that it is the *knowledge of what is good and bad* that can bring about actions:

> If someone knew (γιγνώσκῃ) which things are good and bad, then he would not be forced by anything, so that he wouldn't do anything but what knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) orders to do. (*Prt.* 352c4-6).

Since Socrates believes that *knowledge of what is good and bad* brings about actions in the knowledgeable person, I infer that *appearances of what is good and bad* bring about actions in the ignorant person. Both knowledge and appearances can bring about actions in virtue of being evaluative. We can also give the following deductive argument for the same conclusion:

(i) The power of appearances moves us to do things we later regret (*Prt.* 356d4-7).

(ii) We are moved (attracted/averted) only by evaluations (*Socratic Principle of Motivation* established in the beginning).

(iii) Therefore, the power of appearances to move us lies in their being evaluative.

I propose that appearances fool the ignorant person and make her wander all over the place in confusion because they are evaluative. Pleasure appears to be good and pain appears to be bad, at least to most people. Our perceptual apparatus is simply built in this way. Similarly, our perceptual apparatus is built in such a way that the far-away sun appears to be small and the stick in the water appears to be bent. How bad something appears to be usually depends on how painful the experience is; how painful the experience is usually depends on how intensely our perceptual apparatus is affected; how intensely our perceptual apparatus is affected usually depends on how severely or abruptly the natural state of our body is disrupted. Therefore, if our natural state is disrupted severely or very abruptly and our perceptual apparatus is affected intensely, we usually have a very painful experience, and this pain appears to be very bad.[30]

If this is indeed why bodily pain is aversive, we are also in the position to explain why states we would call 'emotions,' such as fear and anger, are likewise aversive. When we are afraid, for instance, we expect that a future evil will happen to us.[31] This expectation disturbs our psychic harmony. Since we are hardwired to perceive *any* disturbance of our natural state – physiological and psychological – as bad, fear, shame (i.e., the fear of a bad reputation, *Euthphr.* 12b10-c1), anger etc. are all aversive.[32] Since they are immediately aversive, they allow us to evaluate things or actions in a non-deliberative way.[33] When we feel pain, fear, or shame we *perceive* value and *feel* that something is bad. Pleasure and pain as well as emotions are, then, what we can call "felt evaluations."[34] The gods, too, experience felt evaluations. When the gods see beauty and justice, they feel friendly (φιλοῦσιν), and then they feel that beauty and justice are

30 I benefited from Moss' work on evaluative appearances. While Moss and I both argue that pleasure appears to be good and pain appears to be bad, I further distinguish between *experiences* and *anticipations* of bodily pain and pleasure, and I explain why pain *experiences* are motivational. Moss seems to focus on *anticipations* of pleasure and pain (Moss (2006), 513).

31 *Prt.* 358d6-7, *Def.* 415e5, *Lach.* 198b8-9, *Leg.* 644c10-d1.

32 Thanks to Rachel Singpurwalla for discussing with me this extension of my account.

33 Plato subsumes pain, fear, and anger under the term παθήματα (*Ti.* 69d). Παθήματα are motions of the soul, or at least they cause motions of the soul (*Leg.* 896e8-897a2) that are strong and forceful (δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, *Ti.* 69c8), that need to be fought (μάχεσθαι, *Lach.* 191e1), and that provide an occasion for virtues such as courage (*Lach.* 191e).

34 I borrow the term "felt evaluations" from Helm (2002).

good (*Euthphr*. 7e). But when they see injustice, they feel indignant (μισοῦσιν), and then they feel that injustice is bad.[35]

1.2 *Immediately Evaluative Beliefs*

I have argued that pain is aversive because it immediately appears to be bad. Immediately evaluative perceptual appearances establish the relation between pain and badness. Another possible explanation for pain's aversiveness is that we immediately *belief* that pain is bad. Let me now explain why the 'immediately evaluative beliefs' account is inferior to the 'immediately evaluative appearances' account. In both cases, we have an immediate, spontaneous, prereasoning evaluation of pain as being bad. However, the 'immediately evaluative beliefs' account leads to an unfortunate dilemma: either we can abandon immediately evaluative beliefs, in which case we could reason ourselves out of feeling aversive pain, or we cannot abandon immediately evaluative beliefs, in which case the knowledgeable person holds false beliefs.

To explain the first horn of the dilemma, imagine again that you are getting cavity treatment at the dentist. The dentist starts drilling, you perceive the disturbance of the natural state of your body, and you now experience aversive pain because you immediately *believe* that this pain is very bad. However, you were also convinced by Socrates' argument in the *Euthydemus* that only ignorance is bad in itself (281d). Pain, as you know, is not always bad. Pain is only bad if it prevents you from becoming knowledgeable, but that does not seem to be the case in our dentist scenario. In fact, if you endure the present painful drilling, you can philosophize more in the future, and that will get you closer to leading a knowledgeable, virtuous life. Since you believe that pain is neither in itself bad, nor, in this situation, bad for some external reason, you believe 'this pain is not bad.' According to a widely accepted understanding of 'belief,' beliefs are states that aim to fit the world, meaning that: a belief that *p* will tend to be eliminated by a belief that *not-p*.[36] It seems, then, that you should be able to override the belief 'this pain is very bad.' But since this evaluative belief is what made your pain aversive in the first place, the pain should stop being aversive as soon as you believe that it is not bad. In other words, you should be able to make yourself stop feeling *any aversion* to the present drilling.

35 Some felt evaluations may rely on beliefs or memory: I fear *x* (for instance corporal punishment or death) because I have experienced *x* as painful in the past or because I believe that *x* is bad. However, feeling value through pain does not necessarily involve beliefs or memory, as I argued above. These evaluations can be correct or incorrect, and some can be corrected (such as feeling that death is bad), while others cannot (such as feeling that pain is bad).

36 Anscombe [1957] (2000).

I believe that this 'evaluative belief account' is implausible and textually unsupported. It is implausible because it assumes that we can reason ourselves *entirely* out of feeling aversive pain. Once I conclude that 'this pain from drilling is not in fact bad,' I should stop feeling any aversive pain. Yet, it seems that, while reasoning about the benefits of the dental treatment can make the pain from drilling milder, it cannot entirely neutralize the pain. Here, I see a clear advantage of the 'immediately evaluative appearance' account: pain can continue to be aversive, due to its appearance of being bad, despite our belief that it is in fact indifferent.

A skeptic might respond, however, that we must distinguish between us ignorant people and the knowledgeable person. It may be implausible that *we* can reason ourselves out of feeling aversive pain, but it is quite plausible that the knowledgeable person can. On the skeptic's proposal, the knowledgeable person can reason herself out of feeling aversive pain. She is like someone with pain asymbolia, i.e., someone for whom pain is not aversive. But this portrait of the knowledgeable person is textually unsupported. In fact, some passages in the later dialogues suggest that even the knowledge person experiences aversive pain. Socrates himself, for example, experiences aversive pain (*Phaedo* 60b-c), though it is uncertain, of course, whether Socrates is in fact knowledgeable.[37] In the *Laws*, the Athenian claims that the wise man (σοφὸν) "has acquired pleasures and pains that are harmonious with and follow right reasons (λόγοις)" (696c8-10), though it is unclear whether that includes bodily pleasures and pain. Since we do not have any textual evidence for the rather implausible view that the knowledgeable person can reason herself entirely out of feeling aversive pain, I suggest that we reject it.

To avoid the first horn of the dilemma – that we *can* abandon our belief that pain is bad and then do not feel any aversion to pain – one may respond that we *cannot* abandon immediately evaluative beliefs. Not even the knowledgeable person can abandon the belief 'this pain is bad' when experiencing drilling. Therefore, she will continue to experience aversive pain. This response brings us to the second horn: if the knowledgeable person cannot abandon the evaluative belief that makes her feel aversive pain, she holds two incompatible beliefs at the same time, namely 'this pain is bad' and 'this pain is not bad.'[38]

37 For Socrates' repeated disavowal of knowledge see *Ap.* 20e, 21b, d. However, Socrates also claims to *know* that doing wrong, disobeying a superior (*Ap.* 29b), and a life without philosophy are bad (*Ap.* 37e-38a).

38 I argue that if pain is aversive because we immediately believe that pain is bad, then the knowledgeable person holds false beliefs. The belief 'this pain is bad' is false because, for Socrates, pain is neither in itself bad, nor, in the dentist scenario, bad for some external reason. But what if Socrates genuinely believes what he argues for in *Prt.* 351b ff., namely

One of those two beliefs must be false. The 'immediately evaluative beliefs' account, therefore, leads to the incongruous conclusion that the knowledgeable person holds false beliefs. The 'immediately evaluative perceptual appearances' account, by contrast, avoids such a contradiction; it is perfectly feasible for the knowledgeable person to have the appearance of the present pain being bad, while having the belief that pain is indifferent. Similarly, it is problematic to *believe* both that the sun is small and that it is big; but it is unproblematic to have the *appearance* of the sun being small, while believing that it is big.[39]

2 Part Two: the Ignorant and Knowledgeable at the Dentist

I will now move on to the second part of my interpretation and propose how bodily pain can play a more robust motivational role in the generation of actions. Let us imagine that the ignorant and the knowledgeable person both undergo cavity treatment at the dentist. When the dentist starts drilling, both immediately have the perceptual appearance of the present pain being very bad, and they both have an aversion to the present pain; but they differ in what happens next.

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that pleasure is the good and pain is the bad? Wouldn't then the belief 'this pain from drilling is bad' be true because (i) the bad is bad in itself, (ii) pain is the bad (Hedonism), (iii) so, pain from drilling is bad in itself? It seems to me that the belief 'this pain from drilling is bad in itself' is false because even hedonistic Socrates does not believe that bodily pains are bad in themselves (or that bodily pleasures are good in themselves). To see this, consider the following argument: (i) the scratcher and glutton in *Grg*. 493a-494d live pleasant lives. (ii) The pleasant life is the good life (Hedonism). (iii) So, the scratcher and glutton lead good lives. (iv) But Socrates denies (iii). (v) So, the pleasures of the scratcher/glutton, i.e., bodily pleasures, do not constitute a good life. (vi) So, the good life is constituted by other pleasures; presumably the pleasure of virtuous activity (here I agree with Rudebusch (1999) and Moss (2014)). If Socrates is a hedonist, not any kind of pleasure will do. Bodily pleasure is not the good, and the life of bodily pleasures is not a good life, therefore bodily pleasure is not good in itself. This way, Socrates could be a hedonist while maintaining that only virtue (knowledge of what is good and bad) is good in itself. Note also that, presumably, not all psychological pleasures are good in themselves either (consider Schadenfreude), nor will it be true that all psychological pains are bad (consider fear of ignorance).

39 The 'immediately evaluative perceptual appearance' account has another advantage over the 'immediately evaluative beliefs' accounts: it keeps the cognitive bar for experiencing bodily pleasure and pain low. The only mental state we need in order to experience aversive pain is an appearance, and this allows us to explain pain aversions in babies and animals. In the 'immediately evaluative beliefs' account, by contrast, one needs to be able to form beliefs to experience aversive pain.

In the case of the knowledgeable person, knowledge blocks the appearance of pain as bad from leading to the belief that pain is bad.[40] The knowledgeable person does not form the belief 'the present pain is bad,' but she may believe 'cavities are bad' because they keep her from doing philosophy in the long run. The belief 'cavities are bad' now triggers a reasoning process about what would be best to do. The goal of this reasoning process is to identify the best means to the end 'no cavities.' The result of this reasoning process may be that 'staying at the dentist and receiving the treatment is the best thing to do.' This belief brings about a desire to stay, and so the knowledgeable person stays. Note that we can identify three motivations at play: (i) aversion to pain; (ii) aversion to cavities, which functions as the *final motivation* of her action; (iii) desire to stay, which functions as an *instrumental desire*, i.e., a desire to achieve a further end, namely to get rid of her cavities.

In the case of the ignorant person, by contrast, nothing blocks the appearances from leading to a belief. The ignorant person not only has the appearance of the present pain being very bad, but she also believes that the present pain is very bad. This belief triggers a reasoning process about the best way to make the present pain stop. *What she wants is already set* (no pain!); all she has to do now is to come up with an *action plan*. She may conclude that fleeing the dentist is the best way to make the present pain stop. This belief brings about an instrumental desire to flee, and so she takes off. Note that we can identify two motivations: (i) aversion to pain (final motivation); (ii) desire to flee (instrumental desire). It follows that belief and reasoning may be required to bring about many or maybe even all of our instrumental desires, but they are definitely not required to bring about all final motivations. The chart below visualizes my proposal.

Knowledge does not erase the appearance that the present pain is bad, nor does it erase, for example, the appearance that the stick in the water is bent. But the knowledgeable person is not fooled by those appearances, meaning that she does not believe them to be true.[41] Since she does not believe that the present pain is very bad, she does not act on her appearance; she does not try to make the pain stop. Knowledge blocks the appearances from becoming the final motivation of her action, and I propose that this is precisely how knowledge makes appearances "powerless" (ἄκυρον, *Prt.* 356d8). Knowledge

40 I agree with Carone and Singpurwalla that a step like "assent" (Carone (2005)) or "endorsement" (Singpurwalla (2006)) is part of the Socratic generation of actions.

41 Others have also proposed that knowledge does not erase what I call 'perceptual appearances,' but that it prevents the knowledgeable man from being governed by them (see e.g., Boeri (2007), 62).




FIGURE 1 While the knowledgeable person blocks her pain aversion from becoming an action-causing motivation, the ignorant person acts on it

can make appearances powerless because it is stronger (κρεῖττον, *Prt*. 357c3) than them. Knowledge is stronger, I suggest, because it is more stable.[42]

My Socratic explanation of actions assigns a motivationally robust role to our aversion to bodily pain. The ignorant person flees because she does not want to be in pain. Her pain aversion serves as the *final motivation* of her action in this particular situation. It is not the overarching final motivation, since this is always a desire for the good (happiness) and an aversion to the bad (misery). But I argue that in a given, limited sequence, our pain aversions can function as the final motivation of particular actions. In this case, the ignorant person's reasoning process brings about an instrumental desire, a desire for something that she needs to do in order to get what she already wants (no pain!). What the ignorant person lacks when she experiences aversive pain is not a motivation, I argue, but an *action plan*. Her pain aversion is not *practically sufficient* to produce an action – she still needs to figure out how to make the pain stop.[43] But

42 The stability of knowledge brings about psychic harmony. For the connection between strength and stability or harmony, and weakness and instability or disharmony see *Men*. 97e-98a, *Resp*. 411b, 503c.

43 Note that, for example, knowing that an injustice has occurred is not practically sufficient for action either. The agent may know that an injustice occurred, and that injustice is bad. She therefore has an aversion to the present occurrence of injustice and she wants the injustice to stop. However, this aversion is not practically sufficient to produce an action. She also needs to figure out whether to stop the injustice is the best thing to do right now, and if so, how to best achieve her end (i.e., to stop the injustice).

in a sense her pain aversion is *motivationally sufficient*: her pain aversion can be the final motivation of an action, if endorsed and combined with an action plan.[44] In my interpretation, there is nothing motivationally deficient about pain aversions that would justify degrading them to the motivationally lower class of "itches."

3 Compatibility with the Socratic Core Beliefs

Let me now show that my interpretation is compatible with all four Socratic beliefs. In my interpretation, it remains true that (1) we always desire the good (happiness) and things we take to be good (happiness-promoting); we have an aversion to the bad (misery) and things we take to be bad (happiness-diminishing). Pain is aversive because it appears to be bad. (2) We always do what we believe is best. I argued that our aversion to pain is not practically sufficient to produce an action; we also need a plan for how to make the pain stop. This plan may arise out of careful deliberation, or it can arise immediately via association or memory. The belief that a certain action is best is our action plan. Therefore, it remains true that we always do what we believe is the best thing to do.[45] Next, it remains true that (3) all wrongdoing is due to ignorance. Knowledge is stronger than appearances, and in virtue of being stronger, it can block them from becoming final motivations. Only the ignorant person believes her appearances to be true, and then she acts on them.

Finally, let me explain how in my interpretation (4) the knowledgeable person's soul stays harmonious. Other interpreters have worried that if pain were more than an itch, the knowledgeable person would experience a psychological conflict between two competing motivations that would threaten her psychic harmony: her aversion to pain would compete with her reasoned desire. For example, when the knowledgeable person experiences painful drilling, she would experience a motivational conflict between her aversion to pain

44 Thanks to Tad Brennan for the useful distinction between 'practically sufficient' and 'motivationally sufficient,' and thanks to Rachana Kamtekar for pointing out to me that the label 'instrumental desire' captures well which role I take our reasoned desires (i.e., our desires that arise out of reasoning) to play in the dentist scenario.

45 I followed the common translation of οἴομαι as 'believe' in 'we always do what we believe is best to do,' but I take it to be an open question whether that is a good translation. If Schwab and Moss (2019) are right in that "at least up until his late dialogue the *Theaetetus* Plato shows no signs of using the concept of belief," Socratic actions do not require a 'belief' about what is best to do. In that case, every action requires an action plan, but not every action plan requires a belief.

and her desire to stay in the chair. I propose that her aversion to pain poses a threat to her psychic harmony, *only if* this aversion to pain is part of a second set of overarching final ends. If her present pain from drilling were aversive because she had a general, overarching aversion to pain (in addition to her general, overarching aversion to the bad), then she would indeed experience a harmony – threatening motivational conflict. This motivational conflict would be harmony – threatening because it is *unsolvable*; it is unsolvable because it is a competition between two different overarching final ends, namely badness and pain. In that scenario, when the knowledgeable person feels aversive pain at the dentist and reasons about what to do, she would compare apples to oranges – pain to badness.

In my interpretation, however, pain does not compete with badness, nor does pleasure compete with goodness. Pain is aversive in virtue of appearing bad. We only have one set of overarching final ends, namely a desire for the good and an aversion to the bad. Since pain is immediately converted into the currency of evaluation, the knowledgeable person can easily compare different goods and bads; she compares apples to apples – something of value (pain) to another thing of value (dental health). Therefore, my interpretation of pain aversions does not threaten the psychic harmony of the knowledgeable person.

At this point, let me summarize our interpretative options. Do we want to say that even the knowledgeable person has an immediate aversion to pain?

> *Option 1*: No! The knowledgeable person does not have an immediate aversion to pain. On this view, pain does not have any motivational flavor whatsoever. The knowledgeable person is like someone with pain asymbolia (pain is not aversive or "itchy" to her). The advantage of this view is that there is absolutely no risk of motivational conflict. The big disadvantage is that it is implausible and textually unsupported.
>
> *Option 2*: Yes! Even the knowledgeable person has an immediate aversion to pain. Those who take this option must explain why pain is aversive. I proposed that pain is aversive because pain immediately appears to be bad. The potential problem with this view is that it may seem to invite a harmony – threatening motivational conflict. A 'harmony – threatening motivational conflict' is an unsolvable conflict, and I propose that pain aversions do not bring about such a conflict.

I am not aware of anyone in the secondary literature taking the first option. We all seem to agree that pain is aversive in Socratic moral psychology. But then, we all have to explain *why* pain is aversive, and we have to provide an

explanation that renders the soul of the knowledgeable person harmonious. I here proposed one such explanation that is plausible and textually supported.

4 Conclusion

I have argued that our aversion to bodily pain poses a question for Socratic psychology that has been overlooked, namely: why is pain aversive? In the first part of my paper, I aimed to answer this question and thereby fill the explanatory gap in the secondary literature. I proposed that pain is aversive – that pain-itches itch – because pain immediately appears to be bad. We are hard-wired to perceive pain as bad.[46] In the second part of my paper, I argued that we can assign a more robust motivational role to pain aversions. Pain aversions can be the final motivations of our actions if they are endorsed and combined with an action plan. In my interpretation, when the ignorant person flees the dentist, she was motivated by an aversion that preceded all reasoning: she acted on her aversion to pain.

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CHAPTER 4

Emotions in Context: "Risk" as Condition for Emotion

Stefano Maso

Abstract

My aim is to investigate *the conditions* for the manifestation of passions and emotions. Are these conditions independent from the subject-agent? Are they, as objective, somehow analyzable and governable? I think that we must assume that there is an *external condition* of risk (κίνδυνος) which interacts with an *inner emotional state*. Usually we connect immediately risk with fear; but the risk seems the necessary condition also for another experience: the human being reacts to fear and finds it important, perhaps fascinating, engaging, and then, literally, takes risks in view of a new goal to be achieved. The "risk condition" is an objective circumstance in which the reason is excluded or, at first, does not seem able to intervene. As an example, my investigation deals with courage and love in Plato. I think that *in general* we can assume the risk as a kind of the external, and of the inner too, *precondition* of the occurrence of emotion.

Keywords

risk – danger – courage – love – fear

•••

1 What Is πάθος in Greek Language?

Πάθος/η in modern languages has different shades. 'Passion' has, primarily, an obviously passive valence (see the Latin verb *patior*), exactly as affection (see *adficio*). Passion and affection are what one has experienced, good or bad; if bad, passion means 'suffering'. 'Emotion', instead, seems to have an active value, given to it by the verb *movere*. 'Feeling' seems to have a passive meaning, but the private and interior dimension, which it pertains to, opens the way for reconsideration in an active perspective, a perspective in which the subject

 | DOI:10.1163/9789004432277_006

realizes his intention to express what he feels.[1] I intend to ponder on this last aspect of πάθος: I would like to understand if, at the origin of this active intention, there is a need to respond to a pressing and unavoidable psychological tension that is exigent and, at the same time, worrisome.

As we know, Greek philosophers as Aristotle and the Stoics in particular, studied and prepared one or more classifications of passions. The criterion of these classifications seems to respond to the need to find the key to describe uniformly their manifestation and their evolution. Furthermore, these analyses point to the virtues: both Aristotle and the Stoics (I refer not only to Chrysippus but also to Seneca) study intemperance (ἀκολασία), or cowardice (δειλία), or anger (ὀργή), or courage (ἀνδρεία) or fear (φόβος) trying to understand their relationship with virtue, and, only as a result, how these πάθη should be adjusted with respect to desire.[2] Aristotle builds a true frame of reference to place passions and "regular habits" (ἕξις) in which men incur or which men manifest. Aristotle tries to define the medium (μέσον / μεσότης) between opposing excesses, explicitly equating this medium with virtue or excellence.[3] Otherwise, the Stoics consider the passions as an evil, as something that ends up being

1 Chantraine's, Ernout-Meillet's and Liddell-Scott's lexica give us the first information. See also Beekes and Beek (2010), 1156. On tragic πάθος, see Munteanu (2012); at 52–69, the scholar studies the ordinary experience of πάθος and the philosophical drama in Plato. On πάθος and passion considered by the modern theories of emotions, see Konstan (2006), 3–40, and Price (2009; on emotions in ancient philosophy, see the comprehensive research of Knuuttila (2004). On the connection between πάθος and ἦθος, with reference to the Aristotle's rhetoric, see Wisse (1989), 9–76; on Aristotle's rehabilitation of rhetoric and poetics by a cognitive analysis of emotion, see the classical work of Fortenbaugh [1975] (2002), where the scholar argues that Aristotle's theory of the emotions allows Aristotle to develop a more plausible moral psychology than Plato (see 31–37). But for a more comprehensive thesis on this topic see Cooper (1998), 406–23.

2 On this topic, see now Lorenz (2006), 25–34, and, in particular, his analysis of the Socratic example of the desire to drink (see *Resp*. 437b-439e). Cairns – Cairns &Nelis (2017) – has recently proposed a collection of essays, dedicated to individual passions, informed by the cognitive-evaluative approach: through which, the evidences offered by the Classics of literature (especially epic and tragedy) are interpreted within the theoretical conceptions offered by philosophers, as the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle.

3 See *Eth. Eud.* II.3, 1220b35-1221b26; *Eth. Nic.* II.5, 1106a14-1106b35. Aristotle confirms that: "Virtue regards passions and actions, in which the excess constitutes a mistake, and the defect is blamed; instead the right medium is praised and is correct", ἡ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται], τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται (*Eth. Nic.* 1106b25-27). On this topic the bibliography is impressive; we should mention Broadie (1991), 95–104; Natali (2001), 35–37; Fermani (2012), 155–72; and among the essays of Polansky (2014) esp. Brown (2014).

uncontrollable.[4] Even in their most light phase, the initial one (the one that can be coincident with the emotion), passions are negative and condemn to failure men seduced by them. In the Stoic philosophical system, this follows from the centrality assumed by reason: passions and emotions are irrational; therefore, they are the enemy against which reason battles.[5] This is an everlasting battle. Even in Plato's philosophy, the 'problem of passion' is present, but we do not find a detailed classification of passions or a general criterion for establishing it. In Plato's philosophy, passions and emotions can be on good terms with reason,[6] but they can also counter the attainment of what the well-meaning man tries to achieve. They, their control, and their use belong to what most deeply characterizes the human soul, as the myth of the winged chariot[7] immediately certifies: the contrast between divergent tensions.

2 Conditions for the Manifestation of Passions and Emotions

Of course, I do not want to deny the irrational trait of the πάθη, as well as the tension between πάθη and reason, but my aim is to investigate *the conditions* for the manifestation of the passions and the emotions. Are these conditions independent from the subject-agent? Are they, as objective, somehow analyzable and governable? Obviously, we can see that, both for Plato and Aristotle, and for the Stoics, the man's character (his nature, his ἕξις) determines his way of being and, partially, his behaviour. But, according to Plato, not only a craftsman is by nature a craftsman, or a soldier is by nature a soldier (and so on), but also the choleric is by nature less able to control the anger, and the brave is by nature more intrepid than other men.[8]

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4 See Knuuttila (2004), 41–71. The loss of control in emotion is 'insanity' and 'passion'; see Graver (2007), 109–32.

5 This enemy is, in a dualistic interpretation, a real entity: Seneca, in *Ep*. 113.1–26, argues around the issue: *an iustitia, fortitudo, prudentia ceteraeque uirtutes animalia sint* (§ 1).

6 Lorenz (2006), 47: "Plato seems to conceive of the appetitive part as being equipped with, or having access to, considerable cognitive resources such as, crucially, the capacity for means-end reasoning."

7 See *Phdr*. 246a-249b.

8 See *Resp*. IV, 435e-436a, and 441a-b: "You can see it in young children. Right from the time they are born, they are full of spirit (θυμοῦ … μεστά ἐστι), though most of them, if you ask me, only achieve some degree of rationality late in life. And some never at all". For Plato, the assumption of the role to which each one by nature is brought becomes a fundamental element of the social and political organization that he himself proposes; education thus becomes strategic. Cf. Cross and Woozley (1964), 112–33; Gastaldi (2008), 78–82.

In Plato, we observe the different expression of different passions in different characters: more precisely, in every human being the "independent source of motivation"[9] of the soul produces different effects, and generates different responses to external stimuli. How can this happen? This is the first problem. In addition, we know that, according to Plato, the behaviour is determined by desire or fear, and the analysis of desire and its relationship with the rational part of the soul is one of the key points of Plato's psychology. An analogous phenomenon takes place in relation to the irascible part of the soul (θυμοειδές): but the aim of Plato is showing not so much the power of the ἐπιθυμητικόν or of the θυμοειδές or of the λογιστικόν, but rather their role with respect to perfection and justice.[10] This approach to the problem of interaction between different passions in relation to human activity and its moral value is also rewritten in a political and social perspective.

In *Resp.* 441d8-e2 we can read:

> We haven't at any point forgotten, I hope, that the city was just when each of the three elements in it was performing its own function (…) We must also remember that each one of us will be just and perform his own proper task, when each of elements within him is performing *its* proper task.[11]

Evidently, Plato thinks of an explanatory model that can be studied regardless of context. At least in the first instance. However, it is not possible to overlook what is complementary to this model: my analysis focuses on the context that promotes (or at least does not prevent) the expression of passions and emotions. Plato does not focus explicitly on this issue, but we are able to grasp how this aspect is crucial.

The first point: in the mythical language of the *Timaeus*, the human ontological structure is presented. The original elements (air, water, earth, fire) are, first, forcibly pinned between themselves (πυκνοῖς γόμφοις συντήκοντες, 43a);

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9 Cooper [1984] (2001), 94.

10 On Plato's psychology and its connection with the political-social sphere (and on the obstacles produced by his use of the tripartite analogy), see in particular Williams [1973] (2001), 157–67. On the evolution from the original tripartition of the soul (*Resp.* IV, 437c–439d, *Phdr.* 246a-e) to the bipartition emerging in the *Leg.* 863a-e (in which the rational part opposes, with no internal differences, an irrational and passionate polarity), see Vegetti (1989), 129–38.

11 ἀλλ᾽ οὔ πῃ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἐπιλελήσμεθα, ὅτι ἐκείνη γε τῷ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν τριῶν ὄντων γενῶν δικαία ἦν. (…) Μνημονευτέον ἄρα ἡμῖν ὅτι καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος, ὅτου ἂν τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττῃ, οὗτος δίκαιός τε ἔσται καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων. Transl. by T. Griffith, Ferrari (2000).

then, these individual clusters are linked with the soul ties. At this point, in utter instability and risk of destruction, these living beings are immersed in the waters of a river, and are at their mercy. They do not dominate them, nor are dominated (οὔτ᾽ ἐκράτουν οὔτ ἐκρατοῦντο): evidently, an order is missing (ἀτάκτως) in their movements. In the inevitable clashes, the bodies are under intense sensations (αἰσθήσεις), which are transformed, in the soul, in affections (παθήματα, 43b-c). Hence further tensions and intense movements (μεγίστην κίνησιν) originate, which must in some way discharge their energy: this produces, says Plato, a gradual reduction of the rotation of the circle of the identity and of the circle of the difference. Practically, just such conditions – originated in the time of training and in a situation of absolute independence – will gradually be brought back to reason (ἔμφρονα τὸν ἔχοντα) and will become quiet (λαμβανόμεναι γαλήνης), if the stream that nourishes them (44a-b) will end.

The second point: outside the mythical language, Plato explains that the implications of the context become decisive when the human beings leave some opportunity to the passions (i.e. when the desiderative function of the soul, or the irascible one are expressed and operate). Maybe not for all πάθη, the conditions of context are equally necessary to their occurrence: but surely, this is evident in the case of courage (ἀνδρεία) and love – of the passion of love (φιλεῖν / ἐραστεύειν) – and, of course, of their opposites too: first fear (φόβος, δεινόν).

3 Risk as External and/or Internal Condition for Passions

We must assume that there is an *external condition* of risk (κίνδυνος) which interacts with an *inner emotional state*: obviously, we connect immediately risk with fear; the risk, as condition of instability and insecurity, opens the door to fear. But the risk seems the necessary condition also for another important experience: the human being reacts to fear and finds it important, decisive, and perhaps fascinating, engaging, and then takes risks in view of a new goal to be achieved. It is not just about defeating fear; rather, the human being has to deal with a more radical issue: the confirmation of his power. If there is no risk of failure, the brave man will never have the chance to show his courage (and the coward will never have occasion to show his cowardice). In addition, if there is no risk of failure, the man will never experience the satisfaction of conquering a woman and vice versa: a woman will never feel pleasure in conquering a man: only by winning the fear of failure, the lover will dare to declare his or her love (and so he or she can see reconfirmed his or her power).

Certainly, in both cases one can detect the dominance of desire (of ἐπιθυμητικόν) and, together, the power of the angry tension (the θυμοειδές): but only when *the condition of risk* is evident, the human being can appreciate his decision of acting in one way or another. But this decision is not completely (or not at all) controlled by reason (by the λογιστικόν): my suggestion is to look at the interaction between the tension (which forces man to escape from the control of reason) and the reason that sets the limits within which man must remain.

The "risk condition" – a objective condition in which the λογιστικόν is excluded or, at first, does not seem able to intervene – is necessary to emphasize the extreme uncertainty of the result: in particular, the «risk condition» highlights the responsibility of the decision maker: the responsibility of the rational part (the λογιστικόν), who decides to intervene or to abstain from intervening (and, in doing so, to grant to the passions the opportunity to produce the desired actions). Plato seems to take the first significant steps in this direction, towards a careful awareness of the concept of κινδυνεύειν. The Greek verb basically has in Plato two uses: (a) (literal sense) it refers to the action of *running a risk*, i.e. *to be daring, take a risk*; or *to be in dire peril, to be in danger*; in the passive form it refers to the condition of risk, i.e. *to be ventured, to be hazarded*;[12] (b) (weak sense) the verb expresses *chance*, i.e. what may possibly or probably happen. This second meaning is frequent in Plato,[13] but here it does not concern us.

The "literal sense" of κινδυνεύειν is that in which we find the meaning of danger or peril and that of risk: for κίνδυνος brings together the meaning of danger/peril and of risk. With danger or peril, today, we mean something that, by means of our reason, we were able to frame, to determine: something in front of which, finally, we were able to prepare a remedy.[14] Whereas by risk

12 See, e.g., the *Phaedo*; in this dialogue we find ten occurrences of κίνδυνος / κινδυνεύειν literal sense: 64a4, 66b3, 69c3, 85d1, 85d3, 90e1, 91a1, 107c4, 114d5, 114d6. As for the problematic etymology, after Chantraine's, and Beekes-Beek's lexica (Greek κίνδαξ /κινέω / κίω ?, Lat. *cieo* ? = to throw upside), see Semerano (1994), 140 : κιν- (from Accadian kīnu, kintu < kittu = law/justice, linked with kinūnum = the furnace) and -δυν- (from Accadian dūnu, dunnu = strength/vigor). The risk would be related to the evidence of fire test from which justice emerges. On this interpretation, see Maso (2006), 23–28.

13 See, e.g., *Tht.* 164e: Κινδυνεύσομεν βοηθεῖν, "We shall probably to have to assist"; 187b: κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, "But true opinion probably is knowledge".

14 On this point, see Maso (2006), 17–37. In particular, in reference to the conception that science and technology can provide a remedy (in fact, an 'apparent' remedy) to the risk, cf. 140–43. See also Maso (2012). More generally, a different interpretation of risk/danger is proposed by Luhmann (1996), 30–39: he understands a kind of asymmetry between the two concepts, according to which "the risk" indicates a precise case in which the ability to

today we refer to something undetermined, something we do not know well because we are not yet able to determine. Both the danger and the risk induce fear; but, for this reason, they also create the conditions so that the brave man, and the man eager to conquer fear can perform their actions.

3.1 *Courage and Risk*

In the *Laches*, the dialogue dedicated to the "virtue"[15] of courage (ἀνδρεία), one of the typical excellences of man, we find a specific analysis of temerity (θρασύτης / τόλμησις), which is compared to courage. Courage is progressively linked to knowledge: according to the intellectual account of Nicias (one of Socrates's interlocutors), the real brave is the man who has "the knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared, either in war or in anything else", τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν (194e-195a). Temerity, rather than an excellence, seems to be a passion, for it is not accompanied by the use of reason in the assessment of the danger or what is most useful to do. Plato explains, through the words of Nicias:[16]

> No, Laches, I do not describe animals, or anything else that from thoughtlessness has no fear of the dreadful (τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον), as courageous, but rather as reckless and foolish. Or do you suppose I describe all children as courageous, because they have no fear since they are thoughtless? I rather hold that the fearless and the courageous are not the same thing. In my opinion, very few people are endowed with courage and forethought, while rashness (θρασύτητος), boldness (τόλμης), and fearlessness (ἀφόβου), with no forethought to guide it (ἀπρομηθίας), are found in a great number of men, women, children, and animals. So you see, the acts that you and most people call courageous (ἀνδρεῖα), I call rash (θρασέα καλῶ), and it is the prudent acts (τὰ φρόνιμα) which I speak of that are courageous (ἀνδρεῖα) (*Lach*. 197a6-c1).[17]

decide comes into play; on the contrary, in the face of "the danger" the human being is simply exposed.

15 As we shall see, in the concluding section of the dialogue (199b-e) Socrates will admit that it was not possible to define courage as a virtue.

16 The translation of *Laches* is by W.R.M. Lamb (1924), reproduced in Perseus Digital Library. Some slight changes are present.

17 Even Aristotle seems to follow the interpretation of Plato in the definition of courage and of the brave man. In particular, he thinks that it is possible to determine who is brave (or, at the opposite extremes, coward or rash) by controlling his behavior in the same conditions of context (i.e. of danger): "The coward (ὅ δειλὸς), the rash man (ὁ θρασὺς), and the courageous man (ὁ ἀνδρεῖος) are therefore concerned with the same objects (περὶ ταὐτὰ), but are differently disposed towards them: the two former exceed and fall short

Let us now consider closely the character of the brave man: he is, above all, one who shows, in front of the enemy, no cowardice. The brave man and the coward man exhibit their character and their virtue in front of the enemy, and both are aware of their actions (and, in particular, of their excellence or lack of excellence) only when they are in the battle. The battle is *the occasional and effective context* where the danger reveals itself:[18] it is, therefore, the condition for the exhibition of virtue and courage by the human being. Thanks to the support of reason, the man is aware of this.

However, Socrates wonders who is the most courageous: the one who is expert in a certain field (war, engineering, agriculture and so on) or the one who is not expert, when they face an imminent danger (193c). Socrates argues that: "Persons of this sort (i.e. who are not expert) are more foolish in their risks and endurances than those who do it with proper skill (μετὰ τέχνης)".[19] This is the moment in which reason is 'set aside' and excitement, emotion, and passion come forward: this is why Laches does not hesitate to define courage *simply* as a sort of fortitude (δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καρτερία τις εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, 192b) independent of rationality.

Risk is the context in which reason is absent, in which the emotion grows and manifests itself. Finally, risk is the condition that *can allow* courage to become temerity, and in which courage can be confused with a "sheer force, devoid of reason (ἄφρονα καρτέρησιν)" (193d).

Obviously this is only one of the two possibilities that arise: the second one is that for which courage is interpreted in a positive way, once flanked by the science of things to fear and of the thing to be dared. Precisely this is what Nicias confirms: "courage is knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared (δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων, 196c-d)"; and this happens in a well-defined context, that one in which man is not confronted with the past or with the present, but

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(ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν), the last keeps the mean and the right disposition (μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ). The rash, moreover, are impetuous, and though eager before the danger (πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων) comes they hang back at the critical moment; whereas the courageous are keen at the time of action but calm beforehand (πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι)", *Eth. Nic.* 1116a 4-10. See Pearson (2014), 110–17; and Maso (2015), 225–34.

18 The battle is certainly the most representative context in which man can be in danger. In *Lach.* 189b, the soldier Laches declares that precisely during the battle at Delium he was able to appreciate the courage of Socrates in the moment of danger: "…the day on which you came through the same danger with me (συνδιεκινδύνευσας)". In addition to the battle, Socrates evokes sea, diseases, poverty and political problems as dangerous contexts (see: ἐν τούτοις … ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις) in which other forms of emotion can be manifested in addition to courage or cowardice (191d-e).

19 *Lach.* 193c: Καὶ μήν που ἀφρονεστέρως γε … οἱ τοιοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσίν τε καὶ καρτεροῦσιν ἢ οἱ μετὰ τέχνης αὐτὸ πράττοντες.

with the future. The insecurity that emanates from the future – together with the hope of having the ability to control it – is what inspires fear and at the same time encourages us to dare.[20]

The perspective approved by Socrates, in the final part of the dialogue, is that which allows bringing the risk (and what depends on it, i.e. the emotions) under control of reason. Yet this is a paradoxical goal, because when the human being has taken back all his actions under the control of reason, he will have reduced, together, the emotions. A condition (and therefore a context) in which there is no risk implies the lack of fear and, lastly, the deficiency of emotions. And this is not an acceptable conclusion according to Plato.

For this reason Socrates, while saving the centrality of knowledge, lets a door open to doubt when he urges Nicias to confirm that courage is certainly knowledge. In fact, just because knowledge does not refer only to the past or the present but also to the future ("And things to be dreaded and things to be dared have been admitted to be either future goods or future evils", τὰ δὲ δεινὰ ὡμολόγηται καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα κακὰ εἶναι), Socrates will repeat once again that "courage is knowledge of what is to be dreaded and dared", ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν δεινῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν καὶ θαρραλέων (199a-b). Consequently what one can dare is always something that, by definition, cannot be sure and opens the risk area (and emotion, which goes with it). It would be much too nice to be able to establish right now (i.e. in a scientific way) what are the future evils to be feared and the future assets to be daring.

I emphasize that, in the final section of the *Laches*, Socrates in vain tries to propose, via Nicias, the thesis that courage is the science of things to fear and things to be dared, *with respect to all the goods and all the evils of every age* (see 199b-d: πάντως ἐχόντων). This kind of knowledge seems to exclude the possibility that courage is a virtue: if it were so, it would be a condition completely under control, in which courage could not perform.

This is the complete argument:

a) courage is a part of virtue (τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρος, 190d3 and, after, 198a2)
b) courage is not only a faculty (δύναμις), the same whether in pleasure or in pain or in any of the things in which it can be found (192b6-8)
c) courage is a certain endurance (καρτερίας τις, 192b9)
d) courage can be foolish endurance (ἄφρων καρτέρησις,193d7), or something noble (καλόν τι, 193d4)
e) courage is knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared (τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη, 194e11-195a1, 196d1-2)

20 *Lach.* 198b: "Fear is caused not by past or present, but by expected evils: for fear is expectation of coming evil (δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ)".

f) courage is knowledge of coming evils that are to be dreaded and of good things that are to be safely dare (τὰ μέλλοντα κακά … τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα, 198c3-4).

But

g) the same knowledge has comprehension of the same things, whether future, present, or past (ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων, 199a7-8);

then

h) courage is the knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared not merely in the future, but also in the present and the past and in any stage (πάντως ἐχόντων, 199c7).

If it is so:

i) courage is not referring to a part (μόριον εἶναι), but to the whole of virtue (σύμπασα ἀρετή, 199e4-6).

But because

j) we said that courage is one of the parts of virtue (τὴν ἀνδρείαν μόριον εἶναι ἓν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς, 199e6-7 = 190d3)

then there is a problem.

Since courage is not compatible with *absolute* knowledge and since *partial* knowledge is not compatible with virtue (while only the *absolute* knowledge is compatible with virtue), then courage is not a virtue.

As a consequence of this, *Laches* remains an aporetic dialogue. This is why Socrates concludes: "Thus we have failed to discover, Nicias, what courage really is".[21]

In short, it is important to emphasize that courage cannot perform in a condition of complete knowledge, that is when rationality completely controls the situation. The courage needs a risky context in which to perform: the *external* condition of risk opens to the decision to dare (τολμᾶν), i.e. to follow an emotional impulse *interiorly* perceived, when our knowledge of the situation is not complete because it is not yet realized.

3.2 *Love and Risk*

Even in the case of another emotional experience, love, we can see a similar condition. A man in love feels within himself the power of emotion and passion. The reason strives to bring the lover under its control; the lover, however, is ready to take risks by acting irrationally. And this is not all: the more the object of love becomes "risky", the more it is covetous and seems to demand to

21 *Lach.* 199e: Οὐκ ἄρα ηὑρήκαμεν, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδρεία ὅτι ἔστιν.

give up the reason. In *Symposium* we see Alcibiades abandoning every retentions and declaring, in front of all present friends, his own love for Socrates:

> I consider … that you (*scil.* Socrates) are the only worthy lover I have had, and it looks to me as if you were shy of mentioning it to me. My position is this: I count it sheer folly not to gratify you in this as in any other need you may have of either my property or that of my friends (*Symp.* 218c7-d1).[22]

Alcibiades dares to show his passion: the emotion he feels when he reveals it to his lover is a great sign of victory of desire over reason. We observe that the scene, presented in the Plato's dialogue, is very complex: Socrates has just finished making his praise of Love and, suddenly, Alcibiades entered the room where other friends are chatting and drinking. Alcibiades is aware of being drunk. However, he is clearly aware of being in a *risky state*. In this condition he strives to show his companions how, in the days before, he had the courage to overcome shame declaring his love for Socrates. This declaration cannot be considered only a form of shamelessness: it is really a courageous decision, because through it Alcibiades exposes himself to the confrontation with Socrates. In doing so, he *risked* a great deal: but not everything went wrong. As we know, Socrates did not give him the physical love that Alcibiades wanted, but he made him fall him in love with philosophy.

> As for myself, gentlemen, were it not that I might appear to be absolutely tipsy (εἰ μὴ ἔμελλον κομιδῇ δόξειν μεθύειν), I would have affirmed on oath all the strange effects I personally have felt from his words (*i.e.* of Socrates), and still feel even now. For when I hear him I am worse than any wild fanatic; I find my heart leaping and my tears gushing forth (ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα) at the sound of his speech, and I see great numbers of other people having the same experience. When I listened to Pericles and other skilled orators I thought them eloquent, but I never felt anything like this; my spirit was not left in a tumult and had not to complain of my being in the condition of a common slave: whereas the influence of our Marsyas here has often thrown me into such a state that I thought my life not

22 σὺ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμοῦ ἐραστὴς ἄξιος γεγονέναι μόνος, καί μοι φαίνῃ ὀκνεῖν μνησθῆναι πρός με. ἐγὼ δὲ οὑτωσὶ ἔχω: πάνυ ἀνόητον ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι σοὶ μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο χαρίζεσθαι καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἢ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἐμῆς δέοιο ἢ τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν. The translations of the *Symposium* are by H.N. Fowler (1914), reproduced in Perseus Digital Library. Some slight modifications are present.

> worth living on these terms (πολλάκις δὴ οὕτω διετέθην ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω). In all this, Socrates, there is nothing that you can call untrue. Even now I am still conscious that if I consented to lend him my ear, I could not resist him, but would have the same feeling again (ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ ἂν πάσχοιμι). For he compels me to admit that, sorely deficient as I am, I neglect myself while I attend to the affairs of Athens. So I withhold my ears perforce as from the Sirens, and make off as fast as I can, for fear I should go on sitting beside him till old age was upon me. And there is one experience I have in presence of this man alone (πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον μόνον ἀνθρώπων), such as nobody would expect in me; and that is, to be made to feel ashamed; he alone can make me feel it (τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν: ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι). For he brings home to me that I cannot disown the duty of doing what he bids me, but that as soon as I turn from his company I fall a victim to the favors of the crowd. So I take a runaway's leave of him and flee away; when I see him again I think of those former admissions, and am ashamed (καὶ ὅταν ἴδω, αἰσχύνομαι τὰ ὡμολογημένα). Often I could wish he had vanished from this world; yet again, should this befall, I am sure I should be more distressed than ever; so I cannot tell what to do with the fellow at all. Such then is the effect that our satyr can work upon me and many another with his piping (*Symp.* 215d3-216c5).

We can appreciate the double risk's condition: (a) Alcibiades cannot control himself (because he is drunk) and manifests his love for Socrates; (b) Alcibiades tells that he risked everything, but to no avail, with Socrates: that is, he tried in all ways to perform (i.e. to have sex) with Socrates.[23] This is a condition of extreme weakness for Alcibiades, and Plato emphasizes this by evoking his emotion and in particular his shame: τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι … ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι.[24]

23 Alcibiades invited Socrates to dine with him, like a lover scheming to ensnare his favorite; the first time Socrates went, but, after dinner, he returned to his home. The second time, says Alcibiades, "he sought repose on the couch next to me, on which he had been sitting at dinner, and no one was sleeping in the room but ourselves (…) so up I got, and without suffering the man to say a word more I wrapped my own coat about him – it was wintertime; drew myself under his cloak, so; wound my arms about this truly spiritual and miraculous creature; and lay thus all the night long. (…) You may be sure, by gods – and goddesses – that when I arose I had in no more particular sense slept a night with Socrates than if it had been with my father or my elder brother", 217d and 219b-d.

24 This feeling of shame that Alcibiades experiences – which is testimony to his moral inferiority and therefore which is evidence of the danger of being unable to succeed – is constantly reiterated in this passage: 216b2, b3, b6; 217d3; 218d4. Nussbaum [1986] (2001), 184–99, too studies the fragility of Alcibiades' passion: she confirms that everything depends on the profound difference between Socrates and Alcibiades. I think that this dif-

Nevertheless, we must not forget that Alcibiades finds the strength to escape the *impasse*. He decides to tell his friends what has happened to him: the risk he has suffered, the failure on the level of physical love, the success on the level of spiritual love. He dares to expose himself to the judgment of his friends, and especially to Socrates, finding himself finally approved; and Socrates, after the praise given to him by Alcibiades, subtly remarks: "I believe you are sober, Alcibiades; else you would never have enfolded yourself so charmingly all about, trying to screen from sight your object in all this talk" (*Symp.* 222c).

In the *Symposium*, we can test this experience of risk as condition for emotion not only with Alcibiades, but also with Diotima.

In *Symp.* 208c1-d2 Diotima says to Socrates:

> Be certain of it, Socrates; only glance at the ambition of the men around you, and you will have to astonish at their unreasonableness, unless you are careful of what I have told you, considering how singularly *they are affected with the love of* winning a name (ἔρωτι τοῦ ὀνομαστοὶ γενέσθαι), 'and laying up fame immortal for all time to come.' For this, even more than for their children, they are ready *to run all risks* (κινδύνους τε κινδυνεύειν ἕτοιμοί εἰσι πάντας), to expend money, perform any kind of task, and sacrifice their lives.

Love, as Socrates says, is, above all, love of those things that are lacking in the human being.[25] Therefore, in agreement with Diotima: "Love loves the good to be one's own for ever".[26] The condition of lack (of love), ἔνδεια, is a risk's condition: this condition is dangerous, but, at the same time, it opens the door to a solution: in particular, to the manifestation of desire and, finally, of love.

Therefore, love becomes a serious problem: it requires that the lover is courageous in declaring it and, then, prepared to endure the jealousy, envy, insults and even beatings.[27] Exaggerating, but – to be honest – addressing the issue with a realistic intention, Socrates asks Agathon:

ference helps to define the delicacy and riskiness of the situation in which Alcibiades is located. His soul is in a turmoil and he is angry at himself for his slavish condition (215e6). Correctly Nussbaum stresses the importance of the words with which Alcibiades closes his speech: we must avoid "learning after suffering", παθόντα γνῶναι (222b7). Like Socrates, Alcibiades too must be able to control itself, even in the most risky situations.

25 *Symp.* 200e: ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ὁ Ἔρως πρῶτον μὲν τινῶν, ἔπειτα τούτων ὧν ἂν ἔνδεια παρῇ αὐτῷ;

26 *Symp.* 206a: ἔστιν ἄρα συλλήβδην, ἔφη, ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἀεί.

27 *Symp.* 213c-d: "From the time when I fell in love with him (scil. Socrates is referring to Alcibiades) I have not had a moment's liberty either to look upon or converse with a single handsome person, but the fellow flies into a spiteful jealousy which makes him treat me in a monstrous fashion, girding at me and hardly keeping his hands to himself".

> So take care that he [i.e. Alcibiades] does no mischief now: pray reconcile us; or if he sets about using force (ἢ ἐὰν ἐπιχειρῇ βιάζεσθαι), protect me, for I shudder with alarm at his amorous frenzy (ἐγὼ τὴν τούτου μανίαν τε καὶ φιλεραστίαν πάνυ ὀρρωδῶ) (*Symp.* 213d4-7).

Even in the *Phaedrus* 231d2-6 we can read that the man who falls in love runs many risks:

> They themselves confess that they are insane, rather than in their right mind (νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σωφρονεῖν), and that they know they are foolish, but cannot control themselves (οὐ δύνασθαι αὑτῶν κρατεῖν); and so, how could they, when they have come to their senses, think those acts were good which they determined upon when in such a condition? (ὥστε πῶς ἂν εὖ φρονήσαντες ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγήσαιντο περὶ ὧν οὕτω διακείμενοι βουλεύονται;).[28]

Note that this is not even the greatest risk: in fact, a serious danger makes the lover jealous and worried when his beloved may be attracted by other lovers, or even by philosophy.[29] The lover may indeed be afraid of being despised by her beloved.

Finally, another condition of risk can generate the emotion and the passion: it occurs when who has just fallen in love, sees the face or the beautiful body of his beloved: he first feels the chills and feels fear, but then, ultimately, he venerates him as a god:

> But he who is newly initiated, who beheld many of those realities, when he sees a godlike face or form which is a good image of beauty, shudders at first (πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε), and something of the old awe comes over him, then, as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did not

28 Cf. 236a-b: "The lover is more distraught than the non-lover", τὸ μὲν τὸν ἐρῶντα τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος μᾶλλον νοσεῖν. The translations of the Phaedrus are by Lamb (1925).

29 Cf. *Phdr*. 239b: "And from it [i.e. from the divine philosophy] the lover will certainly keep his beloved away, through fear of being despised", ἧς (i.e. θείας φιλοσοφίας) ἐραστὴν παιδικὰ ἀνάγκη πόρρωθεν εἴργειν, περίφοβον ὄντα τοῦ καταφρονηθῆναι. See how this same thesis is present in the *Symp*. 218a: "Now I have been bitten by a more painful creature, in the most painful way that one can be bitten: in my heart, or my soul, or whatever one is to call it, I am stricken and stung by his philosophic discourses (ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων), which adhere more fiercely than any adder when once they lay hold of a young and not ungifted soul, and force it to do or say whatever they will".

fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a god (ὡς θεὸν σέβεται) (*Phdr.* 251a1-5).

4 Conclusion

According to Plato, it is not possible to rest in the condition of risk; an evolution of context is inevitable. However, what first emerges is always an emotional outcome. This turns into passion, or is quickly brought back under the control of reason.

If the emotion and the passion arise in a lack of control condition (i.e. in the deficiency of reason), it is clear that they reveal themselves as dependent on psychological instability. For, they can be interpreted as a symptom of this instability. Yet, this instability in turn is the result of an external environmental risk precondition, or the reflection of this external risk precondition in the psyche of everyone: in conclusion, an inner experience, seeking and desiring to overcome the critical situation of risk, gives way to the emotions' and passions' displaying.

In this contribution, I focused on this issue in reference to courage and love, which are two particular emotional manifestations in Plato. They are not the only ones, but certainly among the most important ones. With reference to the distinction made by Robert Gordon between factive and epistemic emotions,[30] we can argue that in the case of Plato we are dealing with two emotions that in any case depend on a knowledge defect and are therefore epistemic. Obviously the lack of knowledge contributes to determine a real risk condition, to which everyone must react.

I think however that *in general* we can assume the risk as a kind of the external, and of the inner too, *precondition* of the occurrence of emotion. Even factive emotional states imply a condition in which the cognitive moment is at stake: in this case, *thanks to its presence*, knowledge determines the way to deal with risk.

30 See Gordon (1987). The scholar rejects the familiar distinction between backward- and forward- looking emotions and aims to distinguish the classes of emotions by referring to the criterion of knowledge / non-knowledge of the context on the basis of which we decide our actions. According to Morton (2009), 385–99, however, epistemic emotions not only seem to imply the knowledge of what is going on, but they are fundamental in activating those virtues that allow an action based on a pre-established pattern. See Candiotto (2017).

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PART 2

Plato's Emotions between Rationality and Irrationality

CHAPTER 5

Emotions and Rationality in the *Timaeus* (*Ti.* 42a-b, 69c-72e)

Olivier Renaut

Abstract

Taking *Timaeus* 42a-b and 69c-72e as a starting point, this paper claims that emotions are rational in Plato only in a derivative sense. First, what we call "emotions" are, in the *Timaeus*, a complex state not only of "mind", but of the compound "body and soul", or, rather of the "incarnate soul"; in this sense, they are non-rational for they derive from necessity. Second, in the framework of a psycho-physiological account, emotions are, *prima facie*, irrational affections, insofar as they may prevent reason from working properly. Third, it is true, however, that there are some emotions that actually help the reason to command, but the cognitive dimension that is commonly found within emotions comes from a distinct and separate power, δόξα, that makes these emotions display a kind of derivative "rationality". With such a psycho-physiological explanation, the *Timaeus* can better explain how to rationalize our actions and ways of being through these intermediate states, by bypassing the apparently natural process that goes from sense-perception to what is found pleasant or painful and by giving these emotions their proper (though extrinsic) object of value.

Keywords

emotions – affections – psychophysiology – dualism – intermediary

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1 Introduction: "Emotions" in Plato's Dialogues

A general consensus has emerged that a "cognitive" understanding of anger, jealousy, envy, *erôs*, fear, etc. can account for what we, contemporaries, call

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"emotions" in ancient texts.[1] The reappraisal of cognitive and rational aspects of "emotions" in Antiquity, especially in Aristotle, has led commentators to define emotions as psychophysiological states of mind, relying on an evaluative representation.[2] As recent interpreters have shown, when Plato (or Socrates) sets up his moral psychology, he pays particular attention to non-rational forces, such as shame, fear and anger.[3] The fact that Plato shows interest in "emotions" cannot be doubted; but the fact that Plato has a proper "theory" of emotions is less certain, even if it seems possible to reconstruct some pieces of definition. What remains obscure is the relation of emotions with reason: do emotions have a function or a rational intention? Do they possess their own cognitive capacity, either perceptual, representational or judgmental? And if they do, how do the different levels of cognition cohere in the agent's soul? Lastly, are emotions some means, for the agent, to behave more rationally, or more reasonably?

In this chapter, I will use two passages from the *Timaeus* (42a3-b3 and the long passage 69c-72e) to answer, tentatively, these questions, in the hope of specifying the kind of "rationality" that can be attributed to emotions in Plato. I will distinguish three steps to account for the idea that emotions may be said to be rational. (1) What we call "emotions" are, in the *Timaeus*, complex states not only of mind, but of the compound "body and soul", or, rather of the "incarnate soul". In this respect, emotions are "non-rational", being derived from a non-rational physical necessity. (2) Timaeus settles a genealogy of emotions so that they are presented, at first sight, as irrational affections, because they threaten the normal functioning of reason in the agent. (3) But in 69c-72e, emotions seem to present some characteristics of cognitive processes and

1 We should not, of course, understand that there is a single version of cognitivism at stake. See especially Pearson (2014) for a very useful survey of competing approaches on Aristotle's so-called "cognitivism".

2 Fruitful connections between Aristotle and Plato in this regard are made by Moss (2012), 260–62; Wilburn (2014), Sec. 4.3. presenting Plato paving the way for Aristotle's definition of emotions as grounded on φαντασία. But *pace* Moss p. 261, and following Wilburn p. 642, n. 36, I take Plato's position to be incompatible with the view that "appearances" can be "evaluative" *per se*. As I intend to show below, it is precisely a merit of Plato's explanation of emotions to make a powerful distinction between the source of evaluation (δόξα) and the experience of the emotion itself.

3 See for example Brickhouse and Smith (2010), and more recently Brickhouse and Smith (2015). The authors try to show that the so-called "intellectualist" theory of virtue should make use of non-rational forces such as anger, shame and fear; emotions are altogether dialectical targets of the refutation (so that rationality should "erode", in the end, the power of emotions), and means at the disposal of Socrates for those whose beliefs come from a non-rational process. They deny, however, that emotions have any cognitive power of their own.

seem more "rational" than mere drives and movements. Emotion is that by which the agent has a representation of an object, or the feeling of an impending event, or seems to value an object, a person or an action. The agent deploys through his/her emotions a kind of intentional rationality. In fact, I will show that this rationality may be called "derivative", for what makes an emotion align with reason derives from a distinct capacity, at least δόξα or reason itself: emotions seem to manifest "rationality", but they do not possess a judgmental capacity of their own. In conclusion, I will show that through this psycho-physiological account of emotions, the *Timaeus* can better explain how to rationalize our actions and ways of being through a good use of these intermediate states, in the framework of a strict dualism. Emotions can be seen as natural behaviors in compliance with reason, and efficient in a pragmatic sense.

2 Non-rational Emotions Derived from Necessity

At 42a3-b2, Timaeus mentions a series of affections that follows the constitution of the living human being, which is a compound of a divine principle inherited from the Demiurge and a body serving as its vehicle, making the "mortal soul" necessary for the whole to function properly.

> So, once the souls were of necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) implanted (ἐμφυτευθεῖεν) in bodies, and these bodies had things coming to them and leaving them, the first co-natural (σύμφυτον) capacity they would of necessity come to have would be sense perception (αἴσθησιν), which arises out of forceful disturbances (ἐκ βιαίων παθημάτων). This they all would have. The second would be love, mingled with pleasure and pain (δεύτερον δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ μεμειγμένον ἔρωτα). And they would come to have fear and spiritedness as well, plus whatever goes with having these emotions, as well as all their natural opposites (πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φόβον καὶ θυμὸν ὅσα τε ἑπόμενα αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁπόσα ἐναντίως πέφυκε διεστηκότα). And if they could master these emotions, their lives would be just, whereas if they were mastered by them, they would be unjust.[4]

Emotions of love, fear, spiritedness are not states of the mind exclusively, nor bodily states, but states of the incarnate soul (or animated body). It is once the soul is implanted (ἐμφυτευθεῖεν) in bodies that emotions arise. This is

4 Plato, *Ti.* 42a3-b2. All translations are borrowed from D.J. Zeyl in Cooper and Hutchinson (1997); minor modifications are noted when suggested.

confirmed in our second passage at 69c, where emotions are mentioned *before* sense-perception, when daemons give the body as a vehicle of the soul, creating the mortal part of the soul; emotions are evoked through the word πάθημα:

> And within the body they built (προσῳκοδόμουν) another kind of soul as well, the mortal kind (τὸ θνητόν), which contains within it those dreadful and necessary disturbances (παθήματα).[5]

In these two passages, πάθημα refers to the passive side of an action, done by an agent on another.[6] Sensations and emotions, then, are altogether results of and responses to those necessary changes in the sensible realm (ἐκ βιαίων παθημάτων). In both cases, they are affections caused by an external movement, affections that one perceives and feels. But in the first passage, παθήματα mean the impressions aroused externally, because of some bodily parts that are added and removed from the body; these movements arouse sensation (αἴσθησις), and then come the emotions. By contrast, in the second passage, πάθημα is a genus term for the following emotions: pleasure, pain, boldness, fear, anger and hope (69d1-4).

On the one hand, the use of the same word, πάθημα, for external affections and emotions shows that we must think of emotions such as anger and fear as being of the same kind with what arouses sensation or desire, irrespective of their corporeal or psychological nature: emotions are παθήματα in the sense that they are affections and reactions that are experienced by the incarnated soul. On the other hand, using the same term for the cause that arouses sensation and the result, which is the emotion itself, may hint to the fact that there is a causal link between these two poles. Commentators have underlined the continuity between the παθήματα as impressions, which are echoed in the body and even in the soul, and the παθήματα as "passions of the soul"; πάθημα means a concomitant alteration between the agent and his environment.[7] Sometimes, πάθημα would refer to what arouses sensation, and sometimes to the effect of sensation or to the emotional reaction of the agent.

In all cases, this lexical similarity between the cause and the effect of emotion shows that, by contrast with other dialogues where emotions are more strictly understood as psychological states of mind, the *Timaeus* insists on the irreducible integration of emotions in the psycho-physiological compound.

5 *Ti.* 69c7-d1.

6 On the meaning of πάθημα in the *Timaeus*, see O'Brien (1984), esp. 124, and Brisson (1997).

7 On this particular meaning of πάθημα see Macé (2006), 172–75. Aristotle uses πάθημα with the same meaning as external impressions at *De An.* 1.1, 403a20. cf. Polansky (2007), 54, n.40.

An emotion is not a mere "mental" state; it always has an origin and effect in a body. This is not to say that Plato had considered emotions as exclusively psychic before the *Timaeus*; but it is true that in some dialogues, the corporeal dimension of emotion is even not mentioned, as if their underlying judgement was the only important aspect to define them. For example, fear (φόβος or δέος) in the *Protagoras* (358d5-6) or the *Laches* (198b9) is defined as "an expectation of something bad" (προσδοκία κακοῦ). This is the kind of judgement and its intentional object that defines fear, not its physical aspects. Plato insists here on the cognitive, not to say intellectual, activity underlying this emotion, maybe at the expense of other aspects such as its physical counterpart in courage: endurance for example. Other dialogues ascribe emotions to disincarnate souls.[8] But the fact that in these passages Plato emphasizes the psychic activity that sets the agent in motion, much more than the bodily states that are often associated with emotions (blushing, sweating, palpitating, and the like), does not mean that emotions could exist without the physical affections by which they arise.[9] One may even go further, and take the *Timaeus* to be the dialogue where the traditional dualism between soul and body is challenged.[10] As Anthony Price states in his survey of emotion in Plato and Aristotle, the *Timaeus* seems to pave the way to Aristotle's view: emotions are, indeed, some states

8 In the *Phdr.* 254b7-d7, Socrates describes the intra-psychic conflict whenever the lover approaches his beloved, and attributes fear and awe to the rational part of the soul (ἔδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα), shame and reverence (αἰσχύνης τε καὶ θάμβους) to the intermediary part, and anger (ὀργῇ) to the desiring part. See Cairns (1993), 384–85 and Renaut (2013) on this passage. Strictly speaking, these emotions happen to a charioteer and horses, and not to disincarnated psychic "functions". See also *Leg.* 896e9-897a3, where Plato ascribes to the disincarnated soul some movements whose names are, among others, joy, pain, boldness, fear, love and hate.

9 In this sense, I fully agree with Lorenz (2012), 249–51 in saying that anticipatory experiences in the *Phlb.*32b9-36c2 rely on lower functions of the compound (perception and memory) and do not require a specific intellectual activity. There are no emotional affections without a primary experience of sense-perception. Lorenz draws from this passage, however, that the lower parts of the soul are given the ability to form forward-looking states and motivations of their own. But this is not how Plato would account for anger, which he takes to be already a complex interaction of distinct capacities, as I will try to show in Section 3 below.

10 See Karfík (2005) for an important analysis of the way body and soul become progressively indistinguishable when the physician comes to the marrow. See also Carone (2005). I depart here from Carone's conclusion that the *Timaeus* offers us clear examples of how dualism is abandoned here. Carone is certainly right in underlining the fact that some psychophysiological processes linked with tripartition are best understood when compared to Aristotle's *De Anima* I, but as I will show in Section 4, it does not imply that we should abandon a strong dualism between soul and body. For this view, see recently Jorgenson (2018), Ch. 1–3.

in which the border between body and soul is blurred.[11] In other words, even if it seems to be a truism, emotions are psychophysiological states; but that does not mean that we should conflate the question of the psychophysiological nature of emotions with the question of their putative cognitive power.[12]

If we accept that emotions are not states of mind, but are primarily affections or impressions that are attributed to the living compound, we can account for a first kind of "non-rationality" of emotions from these two passages. They are the result of a pressing necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) which effects are not rational. It is then necessary that violent moves happen and disturb the regular movements of the soul. Natural necessity determines the whole chain that goes from sensations to affections of the soul, related ones (ἑπόμενα) and opposite ones (ἐναντίως πέφυκε διεστηκότα). It is not surprising that emotions are said δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, dreadful and necessary, and we may here understand dreadful *because* necessary. At 43b1-2, the movements of the living being in the realm of the sensible are said to be ἀτάκτως and ἀλόγως (in a world which is itself moving ἀλόγως καὶ ἀμέτρως, 53a8).[13] The non-rationality of the bodily mass explains why sense-perception itself is non-rational (28a3 and later again at 69d4), whose movement threatens the rational revolutions of the soul (43e3).

Emotions are thus not, at first sight, rational movements; on the contrary, Plato considers them primarily as non-rational drives that obscure rational and regular activity. Daemons are submitted to necessity (69d5) when they shape the human compound, and emotions are the non-rational effects of this incarnation.

3 A Threat to Reason

In both passages, Timaeus depicts the way emotions arise in what we can call a "genealogy", which accounts for the mixed character of emotions. Timaeus mentions basic elements, from which emotions seem to derive, or with which emotions are combined: sense-perception, ἔρως, and pleasure and pain. In these genealogies, Timaeus does not only present emotions as non-rational

11 Price (2009) esp. 126, n. 7 on intentionality and materiality of anger, and 129 on what he calls a "phenomenology" of emotions in the *Timaeus*.

12 I follow Moss (2012), 272, n.24 in giving credit to Plato that the question is not whether passions are psychological or physical, but rather to what extent the experience of passions amounts to a physical "state" implying fillings and depletions.

13 See also 42d1, about the mass that is added to the original nature of the man, which is θορυβώδη καὶ ἄλογον, "full of disturbances and irrational".

(as deriving from necessity), he describes them as threats to a reasonable ethical life.

The first passage 42aff., apparently goes from the bodily movements to psychic activities. Sense-perception is the first thing (πρῶτον μὲν) that appears when the soul is encapsulated in its body. The sensible body, through sense-perception, relays the violent sensible movements (adjunction or subtraction) to the soul, provoking a pleasant or a painful sensation. Everything we call emotions in the *Timaeus* is somehow derived from this common origin: sense-perception. This is confirmed in the *Thaetetus* at 156b2-c7, where "pleasures, pains, desires, fears and the like" form a general kind of "sense-perception" from the viewpoint of the one who perceives them as pleasant, harmful, desirable of fearsome.[14] Mingled with sense-perception, pleasure and pain occur; they are presented as the two basic feelings from which all other passions or emotions derive.[15]

The second element (δεύτερον δὲ) is ἔρως (love or perhaps more broadly *desire*), together with pleasure and pain. Ἔρως accounts for the way an agent, human or not, aims to restore a void by filling what he lacks. It is difficult to say whether ἔρως has a conative or cognitive dimension here; at least, ἔρως is an essential component for any subsequent emotion, in recognizing a lack, and positing an object of desire that may replenish this lack. In giving a meaning to pleasure and pain with which ἔρως is mixed, the *Timaeus* is congruent with the *Philebus*: desire is presented as an activity of the soul (35a-d), which treats the physiological impressions in qualifying them as pleasure and pain.

Emotions appear at last (πρὸς δὲ τούτοις), in an ordinate enumeration according to the criteria of affinity and oppositeness (ὅσα τε ἑπόμενα αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁπόσα ἐναντίως πέφυκε διεστηκότα). In 42a-b, the list is limited to two emotions – fear and spiritedness – whereas in 69d2-4 Timaeus adds another pair of opposites – boldness and hope.[16] The sequence seems quite clear: we begin with something co-natural to any living being, sense-perception, then we have a mixture (μεμειγμένον) with ἔρως, pleasure and pain, that finally ends with a more complex collection of feelings or emotions. We move then from simple to

14 "For perceptions (αἰσθήσεις) we have such names as sight, hearing, smelling, feeling cold and feeling hot; also what are called pleasures and pains, desires and fears (καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι); and there are others besides, a great number which have names, an infinite number which have not." (trans. M.J. Levett revised by M. Burnyeat in Cooper & Hutchinson (1997)).

15 See also *Leg.* 644c-d and 653a5-7.

16 Brisson (1994), 418 insists on the echo between the two passages, and contends, rightly in my view, that the function of θυμός unifies these emotions as "a part of the spectrum of the mortal sub-species of the human soul".

complex as if the emotions could be deduced from the elements they come from, and Plato hints to a way we could classify emotions (by opposites), depending on the criteria of pleasure and pain,[17] which are the two pillars of sensibility.

This genealogy is useful to understand why, besides being necessary, emotions are also "dreadful" for reason. One may easily understand how an emotion can give rise both physical and psychological troubles, which are described at 86b-c.

> We must lay it down that the diseases that pose the gravest dangers for the soul are excessive pleasures and pains (ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας ὑπερβαλλούσας). When a man enjoys himself too much or, in the opposite case, when he suffers great pain, and he exerts himself to seize the one and avoid the other in inopportune ways, he lacks the ability to see or hear anything right (οὔθ' ὁρᾶν οὔτε ἀκούειν ὀρθὸν οὐδὲν δύναται). He goes raving mad and is at that moment least capable of rational thought (λυττᾷ δὲ καὶ λογισμοῦ μετασχεῖν ἥκιστα τότε δὴ δυνατός).[18]

Timaeus explains how a physiological state creates an emotional one, that consequently has some effect on the use of rational thought. Excessive pleasures and pains first affect sense-perception itself (οὔθ' ὁρᾶν οὔτε ἀκούειν ὀρθὸν οὐδὲν δύναται) by obscuring either organs or even memory and representation; then, they affect rational thought and anticipation, preventing the agent from using calculation and reasoning correctly, or even from using them at all. If the agent lets desire and sense-perception lead the course of his action, sooner or later, he will experience the diseases that affects each part of his soul. Emotions are then not only irrational in having no share of reason, but in being an obstruction of reason; they are not only *deprived* of reason, but they are also a *threat* to reason. The agent has lost control of his own sensations and desires, whose unmastered excess will give birth to afflictions. Bad temper and melancholy (δυσκολία and δυσθυμία), recklessness and cowardice (θρασύτης and δειλία), forgetfulness and stupidity (λήθη and δυσμαθία) are the names Timaeus chooses to depict the diseases that occur when excessive affections have overwhelmed reason in its control of sense-perception and desire.[19] The use of reason is now made impossible, literally, in its capacity of judgement

17 For the parallel here with Aristotle, see Moss (2012), 264.

18 *Ti.* 86b4-c3.

19 *Ti.* 87a2-7. On the congruent description of vice as disease in the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, see Renaut (2019).

and calculation (λογισμοῦ μετασχεῖν) as well as its capacity to have a proper sensation.[20]

This first genealogy in 42aff. seems to adopt a genetical order. By contrast, at 69d1-6, the same elements of emotions appear, though in a slightly different order:

> And within the body they built another kind of soul as well, the mortal kind, which contains within it those dreadful but necessary disturbances (δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον): pleasure, first of all (πρῶτον μὲν), evil's most powerful lure (μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ); then (ἔπειτα) pains, that make us run away from what is good (ἀγαθῶν φυγάς); besides these (ἔτι δ'), boldness also and fear, foolish counselors both (ἄφρονε συμβούλω); then also the spirit of anger hard to assuage (δυσπαραμύθητον), and expectation easily led astray (εὐπαράγωγον). These they fused (συγκερασάμενοι ταῦτα) with irrational sense perception (αἰσθήσει δὲ ἀλόγῳ) and all-venturing desire (ἐπιχειρητῇ παντὸς ἔρωτι), and so, as was necessary, they constructed the mortal type of soul.[21]

As Johansen rightly noted, the difference of the order of presentation between the two passages can be accounted by their respective aims. In 42aff., Timaeus adopts a genetic description following the order of *necessity*; whereas in 69dff., emotions are something with which daemons must cope in order to obtain the best functioning of the mortal soul regarding its relation with the immortal function.[22] At 69d, pleasure and pain lead the way, followed by the emotions of boldness and fear, anger and hope. An echo of the classification by affinity and opposites can be found through the chiasm κακοῦ δέλεαρ / ἀγαθῶν φυγάς, the oxymoron ἄφρονε συμβούλω, and the opposition δυσπαραμύθητον / εὐπαράγωγον. And last, if Timaeus does not explicitly say that emotions are a genetic composition of sensation and desire at 69dff., he insists on the intimate link between

20 The expression λογισμοῦ μετέχω is formerly used about the World soul at 36e6, and again at 47c2, where we are expected to recognize the kinship between the revolutions of the Intellect and our own in our soul, through vision. The same expression is used at 71d4 to qualify the desiring part of the soul, which has no share of reason.

21 *Ti.* 69c5-d6.

22 Johansen (2004), 145–49, rightly argues that 42a.ff. and 69c.ff. represent two stages in presenting affections, the former underlying on pure physical necessity, and the latter presenting affections as challenges for the daemons to make them co-operate with reason. This depiction of the incarnated soul avoids a naïve conception of teleology, which would have presented the work of the daemons as implausibly wicked in having instilled such emotions in order to force the agent to cope with them.

affections that are seated in the mortal part of the soul on the one hand, and sensation and desire on the other hand. Each affection is then presented as a threat to reason; and we can deduce that reason is an opposing power, capable of mastering emotions, as it is already suggested in 42b1-2, when Timaeus says that "if they could master these emotions, their lives would be just, whereas if they were mastered by them, they would be unjust".

4 A Derivative Rationality

Being rooted in the living compound, emotions are then non-rational but also irrational insofar they are a threat to reason. Moreover, as H. Lorenz points out, once the living compound is vicious, some emotions could also lead to physical diseases, as it is the case when political and educational institutions corrupt the citizens in prescribing bad habits and regimen.[23] However, if emotions are presented as dreadful and irrational, why is it the case that some emotions seem to side with reason?

4.1 Δόξα *and Emotions*

After having presented παθήματα as potential obstacles to reason, Timaeus explains how the daemons locate each function of the soul, mortal and immortal, in the body which the whole soul enlivens, in order to enable reason to rule. Given the intermediary place that is ascribed to θυμός, to which I will return in the next section, the agent is now capable of mastering his desires and appetites by "listening" to reason's commands. The example of anger is crucial here to demonstrate how such an emotion, despite being "hard to assuage (δυσπαραμύθητον)", is nevertheless useful to react correctly when facing injustices.

> Now the part of the mortal soul that exhibits manliness and spirit (τὸ μετέχον οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ θυμοῦ), the ambitious part, they settled nearer the head, between the midriff and the neck (μεταξὺ τῶν φρενῶν τε

23 Lorenz (2012), 256: "He [Timaeus] does not tell us how that might happen, but we may speculate that just as certain disturbances in the body can impart corresponding disturbances to the parts of the soul, so a suitably powerful disturbance in a given soul-part, such as reason, can impart a corresponding disturbance to adjacent parts of the body – for instance, to the internal fire in the region of the brain. (…) To put it succinctly, Plato in the *Timaeus* subscribes to bidirectional body-soul interaction". A clear example of this interaction is given at 88a3-7 when those practicing controversy experience rheum and inflammations of all kind.

> καὶ αὐχένος), so that it might listen to reason (ἵνα τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον) and together with it restrain by force the part consisting of appetites, should the latter at any time refuse outright to obey the dictates of reason (τῷ τ'ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ) coming down from the citadel. The heart, then, which ties the veins together, the spring from which blood courses with vigorous pulse throughout all the bodily members, they set in the guardhouse. That way, if spirit's might should boil over (ὅτε ζέσειεν τὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ μένος) at a report from reason (τοῦ λόγου παραγγείλαντος) that some wrongful act involving these members is taking place – something being done to them from outside or even something originating from the appetites within – every bodily part that is sensitive (πᾶν ὅσον αἰσθητικὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι) may be keenly sensitized (ὀξέως… αἰσθανόμενον), through all the narrow vessels, to the exhortations or threats (τῶν τε παρακελεύσεων καὶ ἀπειλῶν) and so listen and follow completely (γίγνοιτο ἐπήκοον καὶ ἕποιτο πάντῃ). In this way the best part among them all can be left in charge. The gods foreknew that the pounding of the heart (τῇ δὲ δὴ πηδήσει τῆς καρδίας), which occurs when one expects what one fears and when one's spirit is aroused (ἐν τῇ τῶν δεινῶν προσδοκίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐγέρσει), would, like all such swelling of the passions (οἴδησις…τῶν θυμουμένων), be caused by fire.[24]

This passage depicts a very detailed analysis of the emotion of anger.

1) *The presence of judgement.* Anger arises with a judgement that comes from reason, which reports an injustice (τοῦ λόγου παραγγείλαντος), whether internal (in the body) or external. Timaeus ascribes to reason the capacity to interpret a series of perceptions, according to a law which happens to be flouted. In other words, it is not the θυμός's function to interpret a sensation before the reaction of the agent: it is because reason informs the agent that there is an injustice that θυμός reacts and boils. For the first time here, Timaeus gives the missing link between sense-perception and a complex emotion such as anger: a judgment coming from reason, having some effects on θυμός. In order for a painful sensation to arouse anger, there must be a judgement that qualifies this sensation as *unjust*.
2) *A complex belief.* Anger is a complex synthesis between the judgement that comes from reason and the painful sensation that is qualified as unjust. In order to be sensitive to "anger", the agent should be, in a way or another, committed into a specific belief that leads the course of action.

24 *Ti.* 70a2-c4 (trans. Zeyl slightly modified).

In that sense, facing a dangerous situation, one could either flee and be a coward, or try to overcome one's fear in believing that it would be worse, for the sake of one's honor, to abandon one's position in the battlefield. This complex belief at stake in the emotion of anger in our passage is rendered by the expression ἐν τῇ τῶν δεινῶν προσδοκίᾳ, which is the very same expression used to define fear in the *Protagoras* (358d5-6) and in the *Laches* (198b9).[25] In our passage though, it is not fear but anger that arises (καὶ τῇ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐγέρσει); this is because the intermediary function of the soul is previously characterized with three features before our passage: θυμός partakes in courage, spirit and desire of victory, which makes the agent less vulnerable to dangers and more sensitive to honor and shame. The fact that the very same προσδοκία could lead to fear in other dialogues, or to anger here in the *Timaeus*, shows that there is more than a simple representational "expectation" at stake in an emotion; it is a belief that comes with *values*, which can modify the content of the emotion itself.

3) *Modes of transmission.* Anger makes the body more acute, more sensitive, and more akin to fulfill what reasons commands. The pounding of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the role of the lungs are the principal agents of the transmission of the reasons's commands to the whole body. At 70a7-c1 quoted above, Timaeus explains how the heart's function is to support the spirit in preventing the excessive anger from having a physiologically deleterious effect. Provided that the judgment about what is right is in fact true, right anger is capable (a) when the danger is external, of putting the body at the disposal of the soul (in the sense that a soldier should be acutely aware of dangers, be on the lookout for enemies, be steady, quick, etc.[26]) and (b) when the danger is internal, to put the soul itself in the right order, even if it entails ambiguous or conflicting emotions (intense fear and the desire to flee, and intense indignation and the desire to fight and have the injustice rectified). Anger appears, with the assistance of other intermediaries such as the heart and the lungs, as a complex psycho-physiological state capable of influencing sense-perception, with the general aim of realizing reason's rule.

25 See also *Leg.* 646e7-8. The notion of προσδοκία is not always connected with fear, but refers more broadly to intellectual anticipations which rely on previous sensitive experiences with the body: see *Resp.* x, 584c9-11, and most notably *Phlb*, 32b9-c5. See on this last passage Delcomminette (2006), 303-90.

26 See on this description *Resp.* 375a.ff. on the description of the good warrior's qualities.

This short description of anger raises many difficulties for interpreters. How should we account for the fact that the reason's commands are "translated" into a sensitive language that put the body at the disposal of the soul? And what makes the two "mortal" parts of the soul more inclined to follow or obey reason? One of the most difficult issues is to clarify what kind of "cognitive" power θυμός has, if it has any.

I follow here the general "imagistic" explanation, given by J. Wilburn about the inferior parts of the soul, and particularly about θυμός; according to this interpretation, it is through "images" (rather than propositional "judgments") that θυμός understands reason, as 71a4-7 makes clear.[27] To be sure, "listening to" reason does not entail that θυμός *understands* it as a propositional content; the adjective κατήκοον and, later, ἐπήκοος seem rather to refer to a reverent way the agent receives a discourse than a distinctive rational understanding.[28] Accordingly, in the *Republic*, educative models pervade the childrens' soul through music and gymnastic to shape images of a good character.[29] Concepts such as honor and victory, and consequently shame, even if they are not "perceptible" things, are translated into "images" insofar as, in each of those cases, an image of the self is at stake.[30] In this respect, there is no need in conferring θυμός a higher cognitive power than its ability to be sensitive to "images", or a representational-based sensibility, to understand how anger, for example, should work in the *Timaeus*. This account both explains how emotions such as anger could arise when a propositional judgement is at work (as in the case when there is a προσδοκία in our passage), or without it (as the pages 42a-b and 69c-d seemed to claim). This is why it is all the more so justified, as J. Moss suggests, to compare Plato's and Aristotle's views on emotions in subsuming them under the wide label "cognitivist" account of emotions.[31]

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27 Wilburn (2014). See 630–34 for a useful refutation of Carone (2007), though Carone's account (which insists on a unified way of experiencing an emotion) remains in my view phenomenologically true; and see 634–41 for a full account of his imagistic account, with which I completely agree.

28 Ἐπήκοος is used to refer to the way an important discourse is received by the audience, with awe and respect, for example a sacred or religious one (*Men.* 247d3; *Phlb.* 25b8; *Leg.* 800d7, 931b6-d9), a discourse of a *sophos* (*Prot.* 315b6, *Resp.* 499a5), or a verdict *Leg.* 767d8; 855d7.

29 *Resp.* 411a5-b1.

30 On this, see Wilburn (2014), 645–49, Renaut (2014), 182–97, and Hobbs (2000), 30.

31 Moss (2012), 273: "Therefore, we can call the Aristotelian and Timean accounts of passions cognitivist while respecting their denial that passions involve full-fledged rational judgments".

4.2 Θυμός *has No Cognitive Power*

The Timaean account of emotions should be interpreted, nevertheless, through a strongly dualistic framework. As it is well known, there is no "image" of anything unjust or fearful that do not refer, ultimately, to a kind of judgement that accounts for it, whether this judgement is rational or only doxastic, whether this judgment takes the shape of a prescription of a law, a threat, a warning, a rumor, etc. The judgement remains distinct from the image that refers to it, as the scribe remains distinct from the painter in the *Philebus*, even if the final representation or belief does conflate their respective work. This is up to the agent, so to speak, to account for the underlying judgement that makes him react emotionally in such a way. The *Timaeus*' account of emotions remains, in this respect, perfectly compatible with a strong dualism which separates what emanates from the intellect and reason, and what comes from the other parts of the soul and from the body.

One may compare our passages from the *Timaeus* with the Hippocratic treatise *Sacred Disease*, when the physician explains how we mistakenly assign cognitive capacities to φρένες and καρδία. This comparison should lead us to find some important differences between Aristotle and Plato regarding emotions.

> The diaphragm (φρένες) has a name due merely to chance and custom, not to reality and nature, and I do not know what power (τίνα δύναμιν) the diaphragm has for thought and intelligence (ὥστε φρονέειν τε καὶ νοέειν). It can only be said that, if a man be unexpectedly (ἐξ ἀδοκήτου) overjoyed or grieved, the diaphragm jumps (πηδῶσι) and causes him to start. This is due, however, to its being thin, and having a wider extent than any other organ; it has no cavity where it can receive any accident, good or bad, but it is disturbed by both owing to the weakness of its nature. Since it perceives (αἰσθάνονταί) nothing before the other parts do, but is idly named as though it were the cause of perception; just like the parts by the heart called "ears", though they contribute nothing to hearing. Some people say that the heart is the organ with which we think (φρονέομεν τῇ καρδίῃ), and that it feels pain and anxiety. But it is not so; it merely is convulsed, as is the diaphragm, only more so for the following reasons. From all the body veins extend to it (ἐξ ἅπαντος γὰρ τοῦ σώματος φλέβες ἐς αὐτὴν συντείνουσι), and it so encloses them that it feels (ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι) any pain or tension that comes upon a man. The body must, too, when in pain, shiver and be strained, and the same effects are produced by excess of joy, because the heart and the diaphragm are best endowed with feeling (διότι ἡ καρδίη αἰσθάνεταί τε μάλιστα καὶ αἱ φρένες). Neither, however,

> has any share of intelligence (τῆς μέντοι φρονήσιος οὐδετέρῳ μέτεστιν) but it is the brain which is the cause of all the things I have mentioned.[32]

Apart from the striking lexical similarities, and despite the obvious difference between Plato and the physician who makes the brain the organ of thought, they can be compared regarding the following points. Just as the physician denies that any organ like φρένες and καρδία could partake in thought or even in a representational or, broadly speaking, a cognitive perception – for they just "perceive" an excessive pleasure or pain with the whole body – Timaeus distinguishes the origin of the judgment that may qualify an emotion (such as anger) from the location of the emotion itself. The fact θυμός is the psychic part endowed with spirit does not entail that θυμός itself is the seat of the cognitive content that qualifies a situation as *unjust*. The physician is then right to assert that the overreaction of φρένες to an "unexpected" (ἐξ ἀδοκήτου) joy or pain proves that the ability of an organ to partake in thought is not deducible from its propensity to react to a perception. In the *Timaeus* as well, προσδοκία probably refers to a judgmental capacity or power, and it would be a mistake to ascribe it to a lower part of the soul, not to say the least to the body, on the grounds that this is where the emotions are felt. One can imagine that Plato would agree that θυμός "perceives" an image of what is just or unjust, fearful or not, but he would not say that it is able to form the judgment necessary for an "anticipation", which belongs to the rational part of the soul. What spirit is capable of, rather, is to make the agent "sensitive" to images, situations, values, in making him angry, fearful, shameful, etc.

If I am right in maintaining a form of dualism between affection and reason here, it is then quite understandable that, at 69d3, Timaeus qualifies boldness (θάρρος) and fear (φόβος) with what I take to be an oxymoron: they are "foolish counselors" (ἄφρονε συμβούλω). Those emotions are paradoxical states: for on the one hand they may set deliberation or a calculus in motion (or be conditioned by it) – and here lies what is generally called their cognitive dimension; but they are also, on the other hand, some affections that do not go in any way beyond a mere conative response to physical and perceptual stimuli.

We can conclude this section by giving a third meaning to the so-called "rationality" of emotions. They were first found non-rational in the sense that they derive from necessity. Secondly, they are irrational for preventing reason from functioning properly. But thirdly, emotions can be said rational for, even being derived from an irrational sense-perception, they are overdetermined by a δόξα which inheres in the images that are produced in the lower parts of the

32 *Sacred Disease* XX, (§ 17 Littré) (trans. W.H.S. Jones, in Hippocrates (1923)).

soul. Some emotions, then, are seen as being "rational" or siding with reason in the contemporary sense we give to this term, for example anger or fear being appropriate reactions to a concrete scenario which commands the agent to be committed in certain behaviors. But for Plato, they are "rational" only in a *derivative* manner, for they borrow their meaning from a δόξα (or at best knowledge) whose formulation belongs to the immortal part of the soul.

5 A Rational Use of Emotions

In the *Timaeus*, emotions, together with sense-perceptions, form a common genus which is called "παθήμα". We may refer to specific emotions such as fear, anger, boldness and hope – but they are not a natural kind that are distinct from other affections such as pleasure and pain on the one hand, and sense-perceptions on the other hand.

Nevertheless, there may be a reason, as we have seen, to isolate some of these affections, insofar as some emotions reveal the power of reason through them. To put it briefly, emotions are clear manifestations of how the rational human agent controls (or not) his own life. Emotions are ordinarily thought of as necessary and spontaneous reactions that reason cannot handle or master, but they are also, at best, instruments of reason to put the whole body at its disposal – as in the case of anger in the pages 70a-c. This is also why it is so difficult to recognize that there is a special "seat" of emotions in Plato: for some of them are undoubtedly akin to θυμός (such as anger and boldness), whereas others seem to be more akin to the desiderative part (φοβός at 71b5; joy at 71d1-2). A clear-cut typology of emotions depending on the psychic parts or locations in the body seem, at this point, impossible to draw from Plato's text: emotions are mixed states, where further psychic capacities and organs intervene. One can even describe the same emotion – anger for example – either by the feeling of an injustice, or bodily warmth, or both, even if further processes are at work.

If we recognize the variety of the operations at stake in emotions, one can better understand why emotions are ambivalent in Plato, and why they are altogether dangerous and may help during education in order to shape the experience of pleasures and pains in the city:

> I maintain that the first sensation (πρώτην αἴσθησιν) that a child feels in infancy is pleasure and pain (ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην), and this is the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul. (But for a man to acquire good judgment (φρόνησιν), and unshakable correct opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους), however late in life, is a matter of good luck: a man who

> possesses them, and all the benefits they entail, is perfect.) I call 'education' the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in the right courses (ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται) before he can understand the reason why (μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν). Then when he does understand, his reason and his emotions agree (συμφωνήσωσι) in telling him that he has been properly trained by inculcation of appropriate habits. It is this concord that is the whole virtue. But there is one element you could isolate in any account you give, and this is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain (τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς), which makes us hate what we ought to hate from first to last, and love what we ought to love. Call this 'education', and I, at any rate, think you would be giving it its proper name.[33]

A psycho-physiological account such as the one we have described in the *Timaeus* helps us to understand the mechanism and efficiency of such training.[34] First, sense-perception combined with pleasure and pain occurs in each newly incarnated soul. Second, knowledge or, for want of anything better, right and true opinion instilled by law, should be instilled in these very sensations or feelings. Thirdly, emotions such as love or hatred (but we could add fear, anger or shame) appear to be intermediary states that are signs of concord or discord between sensations and beliefs (which is not exclusive with self-mastery). A "correct formation of our feelings" is then the explicit result of primary education; emotions are rational if and only if they are signs of or means towards this concord between right δόξα and the sensations of pleasure and pain. Emotions can assist or support a kind of rationality, provided that both body and soul are shaped, by nature and education to achieve this rational order.

6 Conclusion

We should now answer the two sets of questions I raised in the introduction.

Are emotions rational? A first answer is a definite "no". Insofar as they are mixed states of the incarnated soul (or animated body), and insofar as they

33 *Leg.* 653a5-c4 (trans. T.J. Saunders in Cooper & Hutchinson (1997)).

34 See Wilburn (2013) on this point in the educational program in the *Laws*, which is, according to the author, aimed primarily to θυμός. See esp. 80ff. for a convincing analysis on the relation between spirit on the one hand, and pleasure and pain on the other hand, and 87 on a parallel between *Ti.* 70c1-d6 and *Leg.* 790e-791b.

are mixed states of sense-perception, pleasure and pain, ἔρως and an external judgment on what is valued or not, they cannot be not rational *per se*. Nevertheless, Plato provides a theory that enables us to understand how to rationalize our states of body and mind, in investing those states by shaping them, by exercises and habits. This is how we should understand this long psycho-physiological passage of the *Timaeus*: a correct understanding of how emotions are aroused, or how emotions arouse some psycho-physiological states may help the educator to shape them, especially when he should bypass the spontaneous way that goes from a pleasant sense-perception to a deleterious δόξα. Being non-rational or irrational does not mean either that emotions are not important in the individual and civic life. Indeed, there are emotions whose controlled intensity and meaning are parts of the living being. Being just, as the *Timaeus* says, consists in a firm control of these mixed states. Emotions are not only states of the incarnate soul with which we should cope; they are means for the individual to bring about the rule of reason.

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CHAPTER 6

On the Desire for Drink in Plato and the Platonist Tradition

Lidia Palumbo and Anna Motta

Abstract

In our paper we set out to discuss some pages of the Platonic corpus – also commented upon within the Platonist tradition – in which Plato argues that elements such as desires and appetites are not identical with reason, and describes thirst as an appetite for drink. As our aim is to better understand what kind of desire that for drink is, we start with the section of *Republic* IV where this desire is used to illustrate the motivational conflict within the soul through the well-known example of thirst. It will be argued that this example does not refer, as is commonly maintained, to the urge to imbibe some kind of liquid, nor – as is often argued – to the need to drink water, but rather that it refers to the specific urge to drink wine. Moreover, it will be evaluated how the Platonic masters engaged with the issue of emotional conflict presented in the dialogues, especially in certain passages from *Republic* IV.

Keywords

Plato – Platonism – thirst – desire – drink

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1 Introduction

This paper is devoted to analysing the appetitive part of the soul, which is the seat of emotions connected with immediate sensual pleasure.

In the first part of the paper it will be argued that the example of thirst, which Plato provides in Book IV of the *Republic* in order to illustrate the division of the soul[1] does not refer, as is commonly maintained, to the urge to imbibe

1 Shields (2010), 158 has clearly argued that, strictly speaking, we cannot talk of a tripartition of the soul, since the various "parts" of the soul emerging from the argument in *Republic* IV are

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some kind of liquid nor, as is often argued by way of example, to the need to drink water, but rather that it refers to the specific urge to drink wine. Only when understood in such terms does the example of thirst work as a useful example to illustrate the motivational conflict[2] which often emerges in the soul and hence, indirectly, the division of the ψυχή. In order to demonstrate this thesis, we will first offer an overview of the topic;[3] then we will endeavour to show that what Plato is talking about in the passage on thirst is the desire to drink wine.[4]

The second part of the paper is an attempt to verify whether this interpretation was already put forward by late-antique commentators. The aim is to evaluate how the Platonic masters engaged with the issue of emotional conflict presented in the dialogues, what exegetical difficulties they encountered, and how they solved them. We will therefore be referring to the main theories developed with regard to the passages from the *Republic*, quoted in the first part of the paper, and to the division of the soul, devoting particular attention to Alcinous' and Proclus' comments on the topic of (the) desire (for drink).[5]

2 Plato

In order to examine the thirsty man argument from Book IV of the *Republic*, we can start by focusing on passage 436e, where Socrates assumes that:

> It will do nothing to persuade us that it is in any way possible for one thing, in the same part of itself, with respect to the same object, to be at

aspectual parts, not compositional parts. Like the late-antique Platonists who defended Plato against the charge of inconsistency, Shields also notes p. 167: "This is a welcome result, because it saves Plato from the charge that he 'directly contradicted himself on a point of the gravest importance'. If he believes that souls are both essentially tripartite and also essentially simple, then Plato embraces an unsustainable contradiction right at heart of his *Republic*". On the attempt to acquit Plato of the charge of inconsistency made by the ancient Platonists, who acknowledged the existence of different points of view in the Platonic corpus, yet sought to trace them back to a single and coherent theoretical framework, see Ferrari (2016).

2 On Plato's use of two models for talking about psychic conflict in *Republic* IV, namely in terms of opposing forces and in terms of command and consent, see Bobonich (2009). On personification in Plato's psychology see Kamtekar (2012).

3 In certain cases we will also be providing a slightly different translation of the passages from those we have perused, and which in our view do not always help clarify the meaning of the text.

4 Lidia Palumbo is the author of this first part, and specifically of I §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

5 Anna Motta is the author of this second part, and specifically of II §§ 1, 2, 3.

> the same time in two opposite states, or to be or do two opposite things[6] (Pl. *Resp.* IV.436e8-437a2).[7]

Socrates then presents Glaucon with some pairs of behaviours: "Saying yes" and "saying no", the desire to attain something and the act of rejection, attraction and repulsion (437b).[8] Finally, he asks Glaucon whether he would classify the behaviours just mentioned as pairs of opposites: "Wouldn't you classify all those as pairs of opposites?" (437b). Glaucon unhesitatingly answers: "Yes, as opposites". This is where thirst is brought up.

2.1 *The Argument on the Desire to Drink Wine*

The following step in Socrates' argument is to assign thirst (and hunger) to the category of behaviours just mentioned, the category of desire.

> What about hunger and thirst, I said, and desires in general? Or wanting and being willing? Wouldn't you find all those a place among the categories we just mentioned? (437b7-c1).

In order to assign thirst to the category of desires, Socrates outlines the image of the desiring being, or rather of the soul of the desiring being (τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχή). He asks Glaucon: "Would you not say that it strives[9] for that which it desires, or draws it towards itself, embraces it, and longs for it to become its own?" (437c). Insofar as it wishes to obtain something, the soul of the desiring being assents to itself,[10] as though someone were questioning it, and longs for its desire to be fulfilled[11] (437c).

Having described the condition of the person who wishes to drink, Socrates moves on to evaluate the opposite condition. In opposition to thirst *et similia,* we find psychic behaviours that are designed not to draw an object, but to reject it:[12]

6 All translation of passages from the *Republic* are by Griffith (2000).

7 See Annas (1981); Rosen (2005), 152; Shields (2010), 154.

8 See Gabrieli (1950); Vegetti (2007); Ferrari (2000).

9 The verb ἐφίημι means to invite, tend towards, aim for, long for, approach, launch oneself towards something.

10 ʼΕπινεύω: here we find "to assent to", the first of the verbs mentioned above in relation to their opposites.

11 The soul of the desiring being is structurally assertive, meaning that it tends towards that which it wants, wants it, and claims to want it. There are no hiatuses between the verbalisation of the desire and the desire itself, nor is there any reserve.

12 Precisely in order to thematise the condition of opposition, which would appear to be essentially connected to the act of speech, Socrates assimilates desire to assenting ("as if

> What about not wanting (τὸ ἀβουλεῖν), being unwilling (μὴ ἐθέλειν), and not desiring (μηδ᾽ἐπιθυμεῖν)? Won't we classify them with rejection (τὸ ἀπωθεῖν) and refusal (ἀπελαύνειν), with all the corresponding opposites, in fact? (437c8-10)

This is how Griffith translates the next passage:

> That being so, can we say that the desires form a class, and that the most striking of them are the ones we call thirst and hunger? We can. And that one is a desire for drink, the other a desire for food? (437d2-5)

First of all, we would like to focus on the expression ἐπιθυμία ποτοῦ, which has been translated as "desire for drink". We would start by noting that the noun ποτόν in *Iliad* 1.470 does not refer to just any beverage, or to water, but to wine. And this is also the case in Aeschylus' *Persians* and Sophocles' *Trachiniae.*[13]

Most importantly, when Plato speaks of pleasures in his dialogues – as in the *Hippias Major* (298e), where he mentions "the pleasures of food, drink, sex and all such things"[14] – the term ποτόν is used to refer not to water, but to wine, the desire for which represents the most common form of intemperance. In the *Protagoras* (353c5-8) he addresses those who are overcome by food, drink and sexual desire as follows: "'Aren't you saying that this happens to you in these [situations] – that you're often mastered by foods and drinks and sexual allurements as actual pleasures, knowing that they are wicked but nevertheless doing them?' They'd say [yes]".[15] It makes no sense to assume that the drink mentioned alongside food and sex as a harmful pleasure is water, since it is explicitly stated that the pleasure in question can lead to sickness and poverty (νόσους τε καὶ πενίας, *Prt.* 353d3).[16]

The same reference to wine is implied by another occurrence of the term ποτόν in the *Timaeus* (72e3-6):

> The gods who formed the human race knew that we would lack self-control over food and drink (ποτῶν καὶ ἐδεστῶν ἀκολασίαν), that our greed

someone put the question") and non-desire to dissenting, as though one were giving a negative answer to an offer.

13 Aesch. *Pers.* 615, Soph. *Tr.* 703.

14 Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 436a: "Desire for the pleasures of food, sex, and things like that".

15 Transl. Arieti and Barrus (2010).

16 Nor it is reasonable to think that the drink in question is poisoned water, since the text makes no allusion to this at all (we will get back to this point when discussing the corresponding passage from the *Republic*).

> would make us consume far more of them than was either moderate or necessary.[17]

Here too it is unreasonable to think that what Plato is referring to is an insatiable desire for water, or the immoderate drinking of it. What proves particularly interesting for the sake of our argument is a passage from Book VII of the *Republic* describing the behaviour of the egalitarian man, who indulges in all pleasures – both noble and moral pleasures, and evil ones. In fact, this man denies that it is possible to draw any distinction between good pleasures and bad. To illustrate the distinction between good and bad pleasures, this passage from the *Republic* presents two opposite ways of drinking: "One day" – Socrates states – "he drinks himself under the table to the sound of the pipes, the next day he is on a diet of plain water" (561c7-8). The context of the *Phaedo* (64d), which describes the kind of pleasures suited to the philosopher, further confirms this reading. Nor does Socrates need any further argument to have Simmias agree that such a man "could not take seriously" so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking and ἀφροδίσια.[18]

In the light of these examples, it seems quite clear that when Plato speaks of drink as a forbidden pleasure, discusses it to illustrate forbidden pleasures as a whole, and mentions drinking along with eating (and ἀφροδίσια), what he is referring to is *the drinking of wine*. So in the context of our passage from *Republic* 4, when Socrates presents the example of thirst, and states that it is ἐπιθυμία ποτοῦ, what he has in mind is the desire to drink wine.

2.2 *Thirst Itself Is Not the Desire for an Indeterminate Drink but for an Unqualified Drink*

Let us continue with Socrates' argument, which – according to some translations – apparently disproves this reading, insofar as it seems to implausibly conceive drink as the desire for an indeterminate beverage.

> Well, then, is thirst, considered simply as thirst, a desire in the soul for anything more than we have just said? For example, is thirst thirst for a warm drink or a cold drink? For a large drink or a small one? (437d7-9)

After having asked Glaucon whether thirst in itself, qua thirst (καθ' ὅσον δίψα ἐστί), is something else than the soul's desire to drink the beverage it longs for, Socrates specifically asks whether this desire may be seen to include other

17 Trans. by Waterfield (2008).
18 See Vasiliou (2012), 10–11.

qualifications: that the drink be hot or cold, large or small. He then raises a question that would appear to rule out the possibility of interpreting the kind of thirst discussed here as the desire for wine: ἢ καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινος πώματος? Griffith translates: "Or, to put it briefly, is it for any particular kind of drink at all? (437d9)".[19]

In our view, Socrates' question cannot be translated as it usually is, namely as a question meant to deny that thirst is *the desire for a specific drink, i.e. a determinate drink*. Rather, we would argue that Socrates' question is meant to deny that thirst is the desire for a *qualified* drink.[20] In other words, what Socrates is denying here is the idea that the drink desired by thirst qua thirst possesses any qualification, i.e. – as is immediately stated – that it is hot, cold, large, small, or – as is stated subsequently – that it is good, bad or, *in short* (ἑνὶ λόγῳ), *that has any qualification at all.* The ποιόν of a drink does not consist in the fact that it is one drink and not another, but rather in the fact that it is qualified as good or bad, etc. As confirmation of this, the expression ποιοῦ τινος πώματος is introduced as a recapitulation (ἑνὶ λόγῳ) of the specifications just provided: thirst is not thirst for a hot or cold, large or small, beverage; *in other words*, it is not thirst for a *qualified* beverage. Thirst ποιοῦ τινος πώματος means thirst for a qualified beverage and not thirst for a specific beverage.

We regard this as one of the strongest arguments in support of our interpretation: had Socrates intended to say that thirst qua thirst is not thirst for a specific beverage – which is how everyone translates this passage – he would not have presented his statement as a *recapitulation* (ἑνὶ λόγῳ) of what had already been stated by denying that the thirst under discussion is the desire for a hot or cold, large or small, good or bad drink. These claims are *recapitulated* by stating that the thirst under discussion *is not* the desire for a qualified beverage (ποιοῦ τινος πώματος).[21]

Let us continue to follow the argument, which runs on precisely by specifying that the (possible) qualities of the desired drink represent something further, something added to the desire for drink – whereas the desire for drink, taken in itself, is not the desire for a beverage possessing such qualifications. Socrates states that if thirst goes along with the feeling of being hot, this will add another desire in addition to thirst, namely the desire for coolness – and vice-versa. Besides, even quantitative determinations are to be regarded as being foreign to thirst *qua thirst*.

19 See Bloom (1991): "In a word, for any particular kind of drink"; Lorenz (2006), 30: "In a word, for drink of a particular sort"; Vegetti (2007): "O in una parola di un particolare tipo di bibita".

20 See Lorenz (2006), 27–32.

21 Socrates' examples are all examples of qualitative determinations: none would seem to refer to specific beverages.

> Or does the addition of a little bit of warmth to the thirst produce the desire for cold as well? And does the addition of cold produce desire for warmth? If the presence of largeness makes the thirst a large one, will it produce the desire for a large drink? And will a small thirst produce the desire for a small one? (437d10-e4).

Having denied the presence of any qualification[22] in the desire for drink in itself,[23] Socrates concludes:

> Thirst itself cannot possibly be a desire for anything other than its natural object, which is purely and simply drink – any more than hunger can be a desire for anything other than food (437e4-6).

Now, this sentence might be taken to mean that thirst, qua thirst, does not distinguish between this or that drink, just as hunger, qua hunger, does not distinguish between this or that food. *Yet, this is not what Socrates has argued at all*. If – as we believe to be the case and as the examples of harmful bodily desires in the other dialogues show – the example of thirst was conceived as *a craving for wine* right from the start, in accordance with what we mean by saying that someone "is fond of drinking" – where we do not specify that we are talking about alcohol, and yet are not implying that the drink might be something else – then what Socrates is arguing here is that the person who craves wine desires nothing but to drink wine,[24] and there is no qualification to this desire. Indeed, this is precisely what Socrates states immediately afterwards:

> Each and every desire, in itself, is a desire only for the thing which is its natural object (437e4–5).

We would not translate the following sentence as Griffith does – "the additional element in each case is what makes it a desire for this or that particular kind of object" (τοῦ δὲ τοίου ἢ τοίου τὰ προσγιγνόμενα, 437e8) – because the text never speaks of a particular kind of object but only of its qualifications. Hence,

22 See Lorenz (2006), 28.

23 See Annas (1981), 129.

24 Someone could say that the point of the whole passage is that an appetite is correlated precisely with its natural object (437e4-5), so thirst is for drink and nothing else, and hunger for food and nothing else, just like the more is related to the less and the double to the half (see 438b-c). But our point is that here Plato is not speaking about the general need to drink but a specific desire to drink to which reason is opposed. The example of thirst whose fulfillment is forbidden is only that of alcohol.

we would translate: “the additional element in each case determines the further qualitative specifications”.[25]

What Socrates adds immediately afterwards would appear to confirm our analysis. What is added – as a potential objection to the argument – once again concerns the qualitative specifications of the beverage considered the object of the desire for drink, and *not* its nature as a determinate beverage.

> We don’t want to be interrupted by objections we haven’t considered, I said. So here’s one. No one desires drink, but rather good drink. No one desires food, but rather good food, since everyone desires good things. So if thirst is a desire, it must be a desire for something good. Either a drink, or whatever else it is a desire for. The same goes for the other desires (438a1–6).

The objection refers precisely to the qualification of the object of desire. According to this objection, no one desires something unqualified but, rather, everyone desires something good;[26] hence, thirst too is the desire not for an unqualified drink, but for a good drink. Glaucon tells Socrates “you might think there was something in this objection” (438a6), but Socrates makes a general claim:

> If you take all the things which are such to be related to something else, I think that qualified instances are related to qualified objects, whereas the things themselves are each of them related only to an object which is just itself (438a7–b2).

Thirst qua thirst – which we are interpreting here as the desire to drink wine[27] – is not the desire to drink good wine[28] or a lot of wine, but only the desire to drink *unqualified wine*, whereas the thirst for good wine represents a qualified

25 See Adam (2009), vol. 1, 250.

26 We will not be discussing an interpretation that has been put forward by a number of scholars, who – as Lorenz (2006), 28 notes – believe that Plato here is making a point against Socrates’ view of human desire, as it is presented in earlier Platonic dialogues (such as the *Meno*, the *Protagoras*, and the *Gorgias*). On this issue, see again Adam (2009), vol. 1, 250.

27 A very interesting occurrence of the term is to be found in Book VIII (562c-d), where Socrates is speaking of the democratic city and its thirst for freedom. The city will find itself being led by bad cup-bearers and will get drunk, after imbibing unmixed freedom (ἀκράτου, i.e. not mixed with authority). The desire for drink is here metaphorically expanded to describe not just every harmful desire to drink, but every harmful desire in general.

28 See Annas (1981), 138.

thirst, i.e. one modified through the addition of the qualitative determination of goodness. This raises the question of what *unqualified wine* means.

2.3 *A Short Reference to Republic* V

We believe that an explanation of this expression is to be found in Book V of the *Republic*, where Socrates, once again addressing Glaucon, states that when someone loves something, he loves this thing *as a whole*:

> Do I need to remind you – or do you remember – that when we say someone is a lover of something, he must not, strictly speaking, love one bit and not another bit? It must be clear that he loves the whole thing (474c8–10)

Socrates argues that just as lovers of boys love *all* boys, lovers of wine love *any* wine (474d-475a).[29] Therefore, he concludes:

> "Tell me this, then. Yes or no. When we say someone desires something shall we say he desires something, shall we say he desires that whole class of things? Or does he desire one particular example of it, but not another?" "The whole class of things", he said (475b4–7).

Let us consider the objects of desire just mentioned: boys and wine. The lovers of wine (οἱ φιλοίνοι) do not like one wine but dislike another: they love any wine (475a6). This, then, is what Plato means in Book IV, when he says that the desire to drink wine is not a qualified desire, but a desire for the object as a whole, with no qualifying determinations at all.

However, in Book IV Glaucon has trouble understanding Socrates, when he talks to him about a desire that must be conceived without any qualifications. Glaucon here takes the role of the reader, who wants Plato to clarify this point. Socrates then offers some examples.

> "I don't understand", he said. "What don't you understand? That it is the nature of what is greater to be greater than something?" "No, I understand that." "Greater than what is smaller?" "Yes." "And what is much greater than what is much smaller?" "Yes" (438b3–10).

Once Glaucon has understood this, Socrates goes on to explain:

29 Likewise, lovers of honour desire any kind of honour and, generally speaking, when a person desires something, he or she desires all aspects of it, not just this or that aspect. On Plato's theory of ἔρως see Halperin (2017).

> I said that when things are such as to stand in some relation to something else, the things just by themselves are related to objects just by themselves, while qualified instances are related to qualified objects (438d10–e1).

Socrates then also explains that by these words he did not mean to say that the science of knowledge is just like its object, which is to say good, or that the science of sickness is sick. Rather, what he meant to say is that science in itself has an object in itself (the knowable) and that each qualified science (e.g. medicine) has a qualified object (e.g. what is knowable about health and sickness).[30]

2.4 *Desire in Itself as Opposed to Qualified Desire*

After this digression on relatives, Socrates gets back to the desire for drink. He states that in itself it is πώματος δίψος, thirst for a drink. It is Glaucon who completes the sentence, at 439a2-3. Here all the abstract considerations made about relative terms are applied to thirst. Socrates once again claims that thirst in itself (δίψος αὐτό) is relative to a drink that is neither a lot nor little (οὔτε πολλοῦ οὔτε ὀλίγου), neither good nor bad (οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ), but simply drink in itself (ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ πώματος μόνον, 439a6-7). Not least in the light of the aforementioned Homeric passages, we believe that for a Greek speaker of Plato's day wine was not *a* drink but *the* drink par excellence – drink in itself.

Moreover, we believe that Socrates' emphasis on the fact that thirst in itself is nothing but the desire for unqualified drink – a desire which, as we have seen, may be interpreted as the desire for drink as a whole – is due to the need to deny that desire expresses something other than the drive towards self-satisfaction.[31] The desiring person does not choose, consider or hesitate, because choice, consideration and hesitation are features associated with a qualified desire, a choosy desire, so to speak, where the desiring person is merely driven to satisfy his or her desire. According to Socrates' argument, qualified desired, which is so emphatically distinguished from desire in itself, is an impure desire, a desire expressing something other than itself, namely reason,

30 If we apply the example of *science* to the *desire for drink*, we find that *science in itself* (which has an object in itself = *the knowable*) corresponds to the *desire for wine* (which has an object in itself = *wine*). By contrast, qualified science (*the medical science*, with a qualified object = *what is knowable about health and sickness*) corresponds to qualified desire (*the desire for chilled wine*, which has a qualified object = *chilled wine*). See Pimenta (2010), 326.

31 See Annas (1981), 129. As far as the passage Pl. *Resp.* 439d1-2 concerns, someone could say that our interpretation does not discern παθήματα and νοσήματα. It is not correct, because διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων could be considered as a hendiadys.

which considers, qualifies, hesitates, and chooses. In the context of Book IV of the *Republic*, Socrates must distinguish between reason and desire; hence, he must consider these two aspects of the soul in their purity. In order to consider desire in its purity, Socrates distinguishes it from qualified desire. Pure desire, desire in itself, is a desire that can only be understood starting from its object, and this object is a whole: the lover of wine loves any wine. The lover of good wine is a connoisseur, a qualified lover, not a pure desiring person. The pure desiring person is blindly driven ("like an animal", 439b4)[32] towards the acquisition of the object of his or her desire as a whole. This is what Socrates means at this point in his argument, when he states:

> Then all the thirsty person's soul wants, in so far as he is thirsty, is to drink. That's what it reaches out for, and makes for (439a9–b1).

The reader is here led to understand what Socrates is seeking to demonstrate through the hypothesis towards which the whole argument was geared from the very beginning:

> Then all the thirsty person's soul wants, in so far as he is thirsty, is to drink. That's what it reaches out for, and makes for. Clearly. And if there is anything at all holding it back when it is thirsty, would this have to be a different element in it from the actual part which is thirsty, and which drives it like an animal to drink? After all, the same thing cannot, in our view, do two opposite things, in the same part of itself, with respect to the same object, at the same time (439a9–b6).

Socrates here puts forward the hypothesis of someone who, while being thirsty, does not want to drink (οὐκ ἐθέλειν πιεῖν, 439c2-3). This hypothesis presents the scenario of a soul that is necessarily divided, since the desiring soul wishes to drink, wants nothing else than this, and only expresses the drive to satisfy this desire. If it does not wish to drink,[33] this necessarily shows that in the desiring

32 The case of ἐπιθυμίαι, including thirst in particular, arisen in children and non-human animals (who have never drink wine), seems to us not relevant because we find quoted only humans, who are "as animals" (animal cannot be *as* animals, 439b4). The passage of thirst on which we have focused our attention is instead on the conflict between reason and desire and accordingly it is impossible to refer it to cases like that of children or animals where reason has no role.

33 It may be interesting to note that dictionaries explain the verb πίνω by reference to wine rather than water. The verb may be followed by the accusative of the beverage (οἶνον, *Od.* 15.391), the partitive genitive of the beverage (οἴνοιο, *Od.* 22.11), the accusative of the vessel

soul something else has come into being (ἐγγένηται, 439d1), something foreign to the sphere of desire, something that comes from reason (ἐκ λογισμοῦ, 439d1). The 'something' in question is that which forbids (τὸ κωλῦον, 439c7), that which is opposed to desire: reason does not want what desire wants. In this engagement with what is other than itself – with reason, which stands in opposition to it – desire emerges as something which leads and drags (τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ ἕλκοντα, 439d1), which comes (παραγίγνεται, 439d2) *through passions and illnesses* (διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων, 439d2).

Now, the question we would like to pose is this: how can we conclude that the desire that is being discussed here, the desire which is presented in order to illustrate the *sick and passionate* side of the soul, and which is opposed by the prohibitions of reason, is the desire to drink water? Why should this harmless desire be taken to exemplify the conflict between reason and passion, between desire and its prohibition? Thirst, which stands here as a metaphor for pleasure in general,[34] and which is coextensive with the dimension of ἐπιθυμία as a whole, can only mean the desire for wine, a symbol of excitement and irrationality, materiality and pleasure. These elements are the focus of the closing argument of Book IV of the *Republic,* which seeks to distinguish the appetitive part of the ψυχή from its rational part.

> It will be a reasonable inference, then, I said, that they are two completely different things. The part of the soul with which we think rationally we can call the rational element. The part with which we feel sexual desire, hunger, thirst, and the turmoil of the other desires can be called the irrational and desiring element, the companion of indulgence and pleasure. Yes, he said, that would be a perfectly natural conclusion for us to come to[35] (439d4–9).

2.5 *Conclusions*

We do not intend to investigate the problems that have been raised with regard to Plato's argument in Book IV,[36] as here we are only interested in examining the example of the thirsty man who does not drink. We believe that, had Plato

(κύπελλα οἴνου, wine cup, *Il.* 4.345–46; κρητῆρας οἴνοιο, wine kraters, *Il.* 8.232), or the instrumental dative of the vessel (the wine-filled cup, *Od.* 14.112–13).

34 I am leaving aside the references to thirst in the *Philebus*, for which I will refer to Lorenz (2006), 103. See too Carone (2005), 114.

35 On this passage, see Whiting (2012), 188.

36 We will refer here to Purshouse (2006), 56–57; Lorenz (2006), 18–34; Santas (2010), 84–85; Shields (2010), 151–58; Brown (2012), 63–65.

lived in our age, he would have chosen the example of the drug addict to exemplify the blind nature of desire.[37] We would argue that the thirsty man in *Republic* 4 stands for the man filled with desire, who is so utterly caught up in his desire that he is incapable of evaluating the opportuneness of satisfying it. Therefore, we believe it is unreasonable to conclude that the thirsty man craves water. Drunkenness, which leads to dependency, is an ancient example used to illustrate the kind of desire that enslaves us and makes us ill, driving us to pursue self-satisfaction like animals.[38] If instead of a man thirsty for water we think of a man thirsty for wine, we can better understand Plato's argument and even clear it of some of the accusations that have been raised against it. For instance, Julia Annas writes:[39]

> The argument here gives an inadequate and potentially misleading characterization of reason. This emerges if we ask why reason opposes the desire to drink. We are not told, but we are probably right to infer that it is for reasons of health (the desire being due to 'diseases'). The person is thirsty, but should not drink because he is about to exercise, or perhaps has dropsy; that is, it is in his interests to refrain from drinking. Now to do this reason does not need anything more than the limited 'Humean'[40] role of organizing desires so that they form a harmoniously attainable whole; it does not have to have any aims peculiar to itself which might conflict with particular desires.

The assumption that the example of the thirsty man refers to the desire to drink water[41] engenders a complete misunderstanding of the argument.[42]

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37 Cf. Penner (1971), 117.

38 In the *Symposium* Plato chooses to ban drunkenness, which is seen as a risk, difficulty and affliction for human beings. Agathon's guests choose to drink ῥᾷστα, without difficulty, meaning without excess (176a1-3). Wine is not banned but the choice is made to have each person drink it at his own pleasure, without the kind of compulsion that comes from a symposiast's orders or from dependency. See Romeri (2002), 85: "si c'est le λόγος qui finalement facilite (et même soulage) le πόθος, alors la modération dans le vin est à la fois la cause et l'effet de la parole. On parle parce qu'on ne boit pas beaucoup, mais réciproquement on ne boit pas beaucoup parce que la parole allège le poids du vin en le rendant inoffensif".

39 Annas (1981), 140.

40 On why Plato disagrees with Hume's conception, see Lorenz (2006), 32–33.

41 See Sheppard (2009), 63; Shields (2010); see too Pappas (2013).

42 As water does not create dependency, the desire to drink water could never stand for desire as a whole, which for Plato is intrinsically unquenchable, since it emerges again as soon as it is fulfilled. But this is not at all the case with water, which we no longer desire as soon as we have quenched our thirst (cf. *Grg.* 496e). Nor could the desire for water

Realising that the example of the thirsty man actually refers to dependency on wine allows us to understand that thirst here represents desires in general, which, if satisfied, make man a slave, addict, and sick person. This – self-control[43] – is the only reason why reason opposes such desires; it is the only reason for the conflict between desires and reason: reason is concerned with the good of the whole soul,[44] desire only with self-satisfaction, even though it brings ruin.[45]

3 The Platonist Tradition

Within the context of this emotional conflict of the soul which aspires to rediscover its divinity, in the imperial and late-antique age desire was seen as the *garment* – to quote Damascius (*in Phd.* I § 111) – that is most difficult to cast off when seeking to fulfil this aspiration, namely the soul's return to its origin. In this section of the paper, therefore, we will be re-examining the argument of *Republic* IV, 436a ff. in the light of what Alcinous and Proclus wrote, in their attempt to show that desire is a sickness which tarnishes the divinity of the soul with its corporeal garment.

3.1 *Concerning Some Problems Related to the Idea of a Divided Soul*

According to the ancient exegetes of Plato, the greatest problem in this section of the *Republic* – which upholds the division of the soul into three parts, the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν), the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδής), and the appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) – is to show that, although Plato speaks of parts, he does not mean that the soul is *literally* divided into parts: for if the soul had parts, it could not unify the body and it would therefore be necessary to find something that unifies the soul. While this issue poses considerable difficulties to modern interpreters, it was apparently used by ancient exegetes to confirm the idea

represent the danger of pleasure, the lure of evil. The hypothesis that reason opposes the quenching of thirst because the water might have been poisoned is untenable precisely because of the accidental character of this prohibition, whereas the prohibition expressed by reason here must be an essential one, a prohibition which is always applicable, like the prohibition of the kind of dependency which stems from the lack of moderation.

43 Self-control is that condition in which the best part of the soul controls the worst (cf. *Resp.* 430e–431a; Kamtekar (2012), 94).

44 For an overview of the topic of desire, see Chu (2012).

45 A more cogent interpretation (and one compatible with our own reading of the argument) is put forward by Lorenz (2006), 33. Cf. Burnyeat (1999), 227–28 and esp. Ferrari (2007), 175.

that the soul has no parts.[46] Additional information on the topic is provided by other dialogues, such as the *Phaedo* – where Plato clearly distinguishes only two rather than three conflicting things, body and soul, and treats the soul as a *unitary* whole – and the *Timaeus*, which helps assign these *states* to different parts of the body.

In its attempt to prove the unity and consistency of Plato's system, the Platonist tradition developed a harmonious reading of claims scattered throughout the dialogues, which it regarded as only apparently diverging and sought to harmoniously interpret. Some philosophers and teachers from the imperial age emphasise that it is incorrect to state that the soul is divided into parts,[47] although it is commonly accepted by Platonists that soul is both tripartite and partless. We also find teachers, like Alcinous, who seem to draw upon Plato's writing without engaging in any detailed discussion of the difficulties raised by the notion of a soul divided into parts. With this premise it is clear that it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive treatment of this issue – which in any case exceeds the scope of the present paper – by offering an overview of all those philosophers who, already at the time of the Academy, wrote on the soul by drawing upon Plato's and Aristotle's arguments.[48] Therefore, in this section we will only outline the topic of desire by reflecting on the exegetical strategies of ancient commentators, starting from the problem of the division of the soul into parts.

The difficulty posed by the notion of a soul divided into parts emerges from Plotinus' treatises *On the Essence of the Soul*, IV 2 [4] and *On the Immortality of the Soul*, IV 7 [2], where the indivisibility of the soul is presented as that quality which ultimately accounts for the fact that, despite its embodiment, the soul

46 Numenius' view (*fr*. 44 des Places) is very interesting: he is one of those philosophers who think that that the soul has not three or two parts but we have two souls.

47 For instance Alexander of Aphrodisias speaks of powers – δυνάμεις – which do not belong to any one "part" of the soul, but rather to the composite soul made up of soul and matter: *in De An*. 30, 29–31, 1.

48 The Aristotelian *De anima* was read together with Plato's *Phaedo* as we know through Marin. 12, 289–300. Plutarch of Athens wrote the first Neoplatonic commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* and together with Proclus he studied this Aristotelian treatise and Plato's *Phaedo*. Especially for Neoplatonists, since Plutarch, who accepted the Aristotelian opinion according to which human soul is one substance, this is Plato's major work on human psychology: see Blumenthal (1975); Blumenthal (1996); Delcomminette (2015). On Plutarch and his interpretation of soul as one substance with many potencies, see Taormina (1989). This theory is the same that we find in the *Phaedrus* commentary by the philosopher Hermias: see Herm. *in Phdr*. 165, 2–16; 208, 10–14 (Lucarini and Moreschini (2012)). Based on a lecture of Syrianus, Hermias' commentary even transmits to us some questions of Proclus himself, proving by this his attendance of this course: see Westerink (1990), 325; Bernard (1997), 4–23; Goulet (2000), 640.

remains a member of the intelligible realm, distinct from bodies. Furthermore, this indivisibility lies at the basis of Plotinus' considerations about the unity of sense perception.[49] In the present context we do not intend to discuss the idea that the whole soul is simultaneously divisible and indivisible, as Plotinus' treatises would seem to suggest; rather, we feel it is crucial to stress that the ancient exegetes sought to develop suitable strategies to interpret Plato's texts and harmonise them in order to come up with a solution to this theoretical problem. The problem in question is to accept that the soul is divided into parts, as several dialogues suggest (e.g. *Resp.* 440e-441a, *Phdr.* 246ab, *Ti.* 69d-70e). The exegetical method of clarifying *Platonem ex Platone*[50] – a method primarily designed to make Plato's writing self-consistent – allows Iamblichus to offer a solution to the problem. According to Plato, by focusing on what is stated in the *Timaeus* – the "cardiological text"[51] of Platonic doctrine – rather than on what may be inferred from the *Republic*, it may be concluded that the soul exists or *functions* in three different *ways* in three different *parts of the body*. A further explanation of the importance of defining the parts of the soul as powers (δυνάμεις) is to be found in Porphyry and in the fragments of his treatise *Concerning the Powers of the Soul.*[52] Like Iamblichus, he states that different parts have different substrates but that different powers can subsist in the same substrate. However, this tradition, which sees the soul as being devoid of parts and interprets what Plato calls parts as powers/functions (δυνάμεις), is traced back by Porphyry to Longinus. The latter reportedly denied that the embodied soul (τὸ ζῷον) is composed of different parts (πολυμερές), claiming instead that it is without parts (ἀμερές) and with many powers (πολυδύναμον). Longinus thus implied that the embodied soul is in one sense ἀμερές (presumably because the soul itself is partless) yet becomes πολυμερές

49 See Emilsson (2005), 82: "If the soul behaved like bodies or bodily qualities, there really should be many subjects of sense perception in each of us with no communication between them (IV 2 [4], 2.4–10). Such phenomena, Plotinus argues at some length, cannot be explained by materialistic theories positing some kind of physical transmission. They require a non-materialistic conception of the soul which allows that the soul is present as a whole to the different parts of the body".

50 See Porph. *Quaest. Hom. ad Il.* 297, 16–17, Procl. *Theol. Plat.* I 2, 10.1–4 and Mansfeld (1994), 204–05.

51 This expression is used by Barnes (1993), 140, especially with reference to the importance of the *Timaeus* for imperial-age Platonism.

52 Porph. 253F. 1–122 Smith = Stobaeus I 350, 8–354, 18, in part. 253F. 33–42 and 63–76. See also Procl. *in Ti.* II 306, 6–11. Porphyry discusses only quantitative and qualitative, that is no substantial, differences in the soul, and he accepts the opinions of Nicolaus and Longinus, that the soul has parts only insofar as it resides in different parts of the body. On this aspect see Taormina (1999); Finamore and Dillon (2002), 108–12.

in the body (because the body has parts in which the soul's many powers reside).

3.2 *Desire: the Greatest Evil*

While not quite balanced, the interaction between the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, to which we should also add the *Phaedo* – a crucial dialogue, as we shall see – and *Phaedrus*, proves crucial for the discussion of the partition of the soul in Chapter 24 of Alcinous' *Disdaskalikos*, even though this text only provides a fleeting reference to the *parts* of the soul as its powers. On the one hand, Alcinous proves particularly faithful to Plato's discussion in the *Republic*, and introduces the Aristotelian term 'tripartite' (τριμερής; Arist. *Top*. 133a31) – while also resorting to Stoic vocabulary at times.[53] On the other hand, he tends to stress the fundamental opposition between the rational part of the soul and the irrational one, as it emerges not from the *Republic* but from the *Timaeus*.[54] It seems as though, according to Alcinous, the key question that is raised by this section of the *Republic* – and which ought to be discussed in a handbook on Platonist doctrine – concerns not emotional conflict but the immortality of the soul. The tripartition of the soul – which Alcinous cursorily touches upon – seems to serve as a pretext to newly address the distinction between τὸ λογιστικόν and τὸ παθητικόν: by illustrating the relation between the image of the charioteer and the horses in the *Phaedrus* and the different positions within the body assigned to the immortal part of the soul and the mortal one in the *Timaeus*,[55] Alcinous introduces and further investigates the question of the immortality of the soul, which is to say its divinity.

We will examine Alcinous' argument in an attempt to determine whether and how this Middle Platonist exegete adopted the example of thirst. Alcinous writes that the human soul is immortal, as it is the gift of the first God; however, *two mortal parts* were added to it by the gods overseeing the generation of the mortal species of man; in order to prevent the divine and immortal part of the soul from being tainted by mortal vanities, it was established in the 'acropolis' of the body: for it befits that which steers the body like a chariot to have the head as its dwelling place. Alcinous explains that the soul is composed of

53 In the *Didaskalikos*, to refer to the rational part of the soul, the term ἡγεμονικόν is used alongside the Platonic one λογιστικόν (or λογικόν); to refer to the irrational part of the soul, recurrent use is made of the Stoic term παθητικόν. For the intriguing hypothesis of an influence from Posidonius, see Dillon (1993), 140–51. On Alcinous' theory see also Finamore (2010).

54 See Pl. *Ti*. 72d and also *Plt*. 309c.

55 On the "localisation des parties de l'âme" in the *Timaeus* see Brisson (2002), 58–60. See also Pl. *Resp*. 438d ff. and 580d ff.; *Phdr*. 246a ff; *Ti*. 69c ff; *Phd*. 79c ff.

three parts, according to its faculties (κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις); and since things that are separate by nature are also different, it follows that the part pertaining to passions and the rational part are separate by nature: the former concerns the intelligibles, the latter pleasure and pain. It is at this stage that Alcinous reinterprets the logical argument from *Republic* IV, while not discussing the theoretical difficulty of the idea that the soul is a unitary structure articulated into a range of autonomous parts:

> Then, since the affective and the rational parts are different in nature, it is proper that they occupy different locations; for they are found to conflict with one another. But any single thing cannot be in conflict with itself, nor can things which are in opposition to each other occupy the same place at the same time. One can see in the character of Medea the spirited element in conflict with reason: 'I know what evil I am about to do / But anger overcomes my resolutions'. And similarly in the case of Laius, when he abducted Chrysippus, we see desire struggling with reason; for he speaks as follows: 'Alas, alas, for mortals this is an evil sent from God, / When one sees the good, but makes no use of it'.

Alcinous reformulates what Plato states about emotional conflict with a Homeric quote (*Resp*. IV. 439d) and the example of thirst (*Resp*. IV. 439b) by means of two Euripidean quotes, one from *Medea* (1078–1079) and the other from the lost *Chrysippus*[56] (fr. 841 Nauck). The passage quoted in the *Didaskalikos* shows that Alcinous connected the suggestions made in *Republic* 4 with the Platonic reflections occurring in the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias* and *Meno*, while adding that desire manifests itself as an error of the will. Interestingly, if this reflection is applied to the example of thirst, it may be seen to support the hypothesis that the ἐπιθυμία for drink refers to a drink that is acknowledged to be 'the worst' and capable of leading to a harmful pleasure that brings sickness and/or dependency.

This chapter, therefore, contains no explicit or implicit reference to the desire for drink, and/or the desire for wine, but in the following chapter, 25, which is *explicitly* devoted to the immortality of the soul,[57] we find something interesting: Alcinous draws upon a passage of the *Phaedo* (79c) to discuss the affinity between the soul and the divine, and their co-generic nature. When the

56 According to Galen, these verses were often also used by the Stoics (e.g. by Chrysippus) to refer to the polemic on the nature of the soul: see Galen. *de H. et Plat*. IV 6 (147), p. 376 Mü. = *SVF* III 473. On this matter, see Dillon (1993), 150 and Finamore (2007).

57 On this chapter see Gertz (2011), 125–29.

soul makes use of the body through sight, hearing or other senses, it is dragged by the body towards something that is no longer co-generic with it, but which actually separates it from its true nature: by wandering here and there – as Alcinous states and as we read in the *Phaedo* – the soul becomes agitated and staggers *as though it were drunk*. Hence, by focusing not just on the exegesis of the *Republic*, but on the whole treatment of the question of the soul in (Middle) Platonist handbooks, it might be possible to find confirmation of the fact that what intoxicates the soul, namely wine, stands as a symbol of irrationality: this specific drink shows that desire not only seeks to imprison the soul, but makes it stagger. Indeed, when commenting on this page of the *Phaedo*, Olympiodorus claims that the word 'dizzy' (εἰλιγγιᾷ) was aptly chosen by Plato, as it describes precisely the condition of the person affected by a kind of sickness, such as drunkenness.[58]

3.3 *The Conflict between Reason and Desire: Some Final Remarks*

The idea that the highest part of the soul is co-generic with the divine is a distinctly Neoplatonist theme. Plotinus develops it in a different way compared to his successors. We will refrain here from comparatively examining the Plotinian theory of the undescended soul and that of the wholly descended soul. However, it is noteworthy that Proclus, who was able to say something new, succeeded in bringing together all the various discussions that had emerged over the centuries with regard to divine unity and the tripartition of the soul.[59] The seventh Dissertation of his *Commentary on the Republic* centres on an analysis of *Republic* IV. 436a ff. and on the demonstrations of the tripartition of the soul (and its four virtues). Proclus' thesis about the difficulties posed by the idea of a tripartition of the soul differs from those mentioned so far, since it must be interpreted in the light of the developments of the Neoplatonist doctrine of a structural analogy between the various levels of reality: it posits different levels of soul, the unity of which is preserved, not without some difficulties.[60] More important, as Perkams summaries: "Proclus did not think that our

58 See Olymp. *in Phd.* 13 § 18.

59 Proclus' *Commentary on the Republic* is the only Neoplatonist commentary on this dialogue to have reached us: see Sheppard (1980), 15–103. On Proclus' metaphysics see Chlup (2012), 47–111.

60 For instance, Proclus reports a discussion between Medius and Longinus, from which it emerges that the soul is one despite being tripartite, because it is incorporeal: for all incorporeal entities possess unity; moreover, reason, operating as form, unifies the irrational life of the soul; finally, given that the irrational element is introduced by the younger gods, whereas reason is the work of the one and only demiurge, it is the latter that unifies reason and the irrational element. See Procl. *in R.* I 233, 29–234, 30.

soul merely has different faculties, or that it consists of several parts, but he believed it to be a compound of several beings or substances, each different from the others".[61]

Proclus immediately explains what activities (ἐνέργειαι) pertain to each part.[62] One part of the soul is co-generic with the intellect, another by nature befits the soul, and the third has an intermediate position. While that which is co-generic with the intellect governs, the part which relates to the body is governed. This is the appetitive part, which longs to satisfy its corporeal needs; reason, instead, longs for intelligible goods. Compared to the rational part, the appetitive one is in turn composed of many parts (πολυμερές) and many forms (πολυειδές), but lacks knowledge.[63] We also have a part that both governs and is governed, namely the spirited part: in some cases it governs, but in other cases it is governed because it is irrational, and what is irrational – precisely insofar as it is not guided by reason – must be governed by what is co-generic with the intellect. However, when conflicts with desire emerge, it is the spirited part which governs – albeit differently from reason – because it is closer to reason than desire.[64]

Unlike the spirited part, desire does not have the capacity to govern, because it is so bound up with the body that it is incapable of leaving it in order to fulfil its duty. On the other hand, the spirited part scorns the body and longs for a kind of desire which has nothing to do with it: victory and honour, which are what this part aspires to, often lead people to spurn the body and life itself. Proclus' argument is a long and complex one, but the most relevant point is that desire emerges as a part of the soul which is merely governed and which, when governed by reason, has temperance as its virtue. Only through temperance – meaning the healing of passions, which is referred to as 'the octave', precisely because it ensures harmony between the various parts – can the soul restrain its impulses, which are like those of a many-headed animal[65] (πολυκέφαλον θηρίον).

61 Perkams (2006), 167.

62 Proclus says that "three parts are different from each other in their substance" (*in R.* I 207, 9–11) and Perkams (2006), 174 observes: "Plato does not speak about three substances but about three εἴδη. The word εἶδος signifies in the Aristotelian ontology, of course, the form of a composite, which makes this an independent substance and can also itself be called an οὐσία, at least in the Neoplatonic understanding. It is, however, fairly obvious that Plato uses the word simply to designate a different kind without a clear ontological implication. I think that Proclus' insistence in distinguishing within the soul different substances has its roots in his wish to link each of them to a goal or natural perfection on its own".

63 See *infra* p. 143.

64 See Procl. *in R.* I 211, 4–215, 14.

65 See Pl. *Resp.* IX. 588c7-8 and Procl. *in R.* I 225, 16–27.

After having summed up the logical argument according to which – as already noted – the same thing cannot perform or undergo opposite actions in the same condition and in relation to the same object, Proclus moves on to examine those modes of living marked by a struggle between reason and spiritedness, or reason and desire, or spiritedness and desire. With regard to the specific object of our enquiry, the conflict between desire and reason, Proclus observes that it

> Occurs in those who are sick, when reason advises them not to drink, if the body is feverish, even though desire urges them to drink, so that they [i.e. reason and desire] enter into conflict with one another[66] (Procl. *in Resp.* I 223, 28–224, 1).

By contrast to what we find in the *Didaskalikos*, in order to discuss the theory of the emotional conflict between reason and desire in the *Commentary on the Republic* Proclus draws upon the example of thirst. However, he adds a detail that – compared to the Platonic text – explicitly highlights the blind nature of desire, which is akin to that of a sick person – or, as suggested above, that of a drug addict. As in Alcinous' case, the bond which desire establishes with the body is then clarified through a reference to the *Phaedo*.[67] Whether it strives after pleasure or wealth, the appetitive part loves the body, since both pleasure and wealth concern the body. Indeed, the *Phaedo* (66c8-d1) states that we acquire riches under compulsion from the body, *to which we are enslaved*. This condition of enslavement may therefore be compared to sickness, just as desire – according to Proclus' example – may be compared to the sick side of the soul.

So although Proclus – like Alcinous before him – makes no reference to drink as the explicit desire to drink wine, it is clear that the exegetical strategies he employs to interpret the theory of the tripartition of the soul, and of the emotional conflict accompanying it, have a new metaphysical and ontological context and serve the common Platonist goal of making Plato self-consistent and of harmonising the various discussions of the soul provided in the dialogues into a single and coherent doctrine. As regards the specific case of desire, Proclus' analogy between the desiring soul and the sick body reinforces the hypothesis that desire, insofar as it is completely irrational and lacks the guidance of reason, longs to accomplish an aim which is utterly contrary to

66 The idea that reason advises not to drink while being feverish, reflects a cliché in the ancient world: see Cic. *Cat.* 1, 31 and Galen. *Meth. Med.* 11, 9 (XI, 757 Kühn).

67 See Procl. *in R.* I 226, 1–8.

reason. As a paradigmatic case, Plato's example is intended to show that reason governs the soul and prevents it from falling sick and becoming totally enslaved to the body through the fulfilment of the worst possible sort of desire: a desire which cannot be the *normal* desire for water, or – as Proclus rephrases it – the desire to drink water under *normal conditions*.

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CHAPTER 7

Plato's Seasick Steersman: On (Not) Being Overwhelmed by Fear in Plato's *Laws*

Myrthe L. Bartels

Abstract

In Book I of Plato's *Laws*, the requisite quality of the leader of a symposium is illustrated through the contrastive example of the seasick steersman. The qualified steersman and the symposiarch should be 'imperturbable' (ἀθόρυβος) in the face of the perils of their tasks. Such people are not at all easy to find; yet they are essential if the Athenian's provocative claim that the symposium is beneficial for *paideia* is to stand up to scrutiny. In order to illuminate the rare quality of resistance to seasickness, this contribution offers an examination of the metaphors of seasickness and θόρυβος. Both seasickness and θόρυβος can be used as an analogy or metaphor to conceptualize fear, and sources suggest that seasickness is thought to disappear with *experience*. The challenge is therefore to find people whose experience makes them undaunted to govern the symposium. These, it turns out, are the senior members (50 plus) and law guards of the Dionysiac chorus, which coincides with the symposium. Through their more advanced *paideia*, they are exposed to the consumption of wine and acquire the necessary familiarity with the practice. Since the symposiarch represents the law guard, it is no surprise that the description of the nocturnal council recalls that of the Dionysiac chorus, including the internal fault line between junior and senior members. The experience acquired by the law guards in the context of their education in the Dionysiac chorus and the nocturnal council therefore effectively rules out the possibility of a seasick steersman.

Keywords

Plato's *Laws* – fear – *thorubos* – symposium – *paideia*

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1 Introduction

The steersman and his craft, steersmanship (κυβερνήτης, κυβερνητικὴ τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη), repeatedly serve as a paradigm example of τέχνη in the Platonic corpus. As with the other examples of craftsmen appealed to, the steersman – the expert who knows how to steer a ship – lends credibility to the claim that the attainment of a particular good (in the case of the helmsman, σωτηρία at sea[1]) is conditional upon the expert's craft (τέχνη or σοφία[2]) or on his understanding (νοῦς).[3] It thus comes as something of a surprise that Plato in his last work introduces his stock experts in a helpless state: in the *Laws*, the κυβερνήτης returns in the tragicomic shape of the *seasick* steersman, on a par with the military general overcome by cowardice. In both cases, their afflictions (seasickness and cowardice) render the experts incapable of exercising their respective ἐπιστῆμαι.

T 1 | *Leg.* 639a9-b4: the seasick steersman:

> ATH. Do we regard someone as a good person to be in command of a ship if he just has the knowledge of seafaring – whether or not he gets seasick? What would our view be? (Χρηστὸς δὲ ἄρχων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ἐν πλοίοις πότερον ἐὰν τὴν ναυτικὴν ἔχῃ ἐπιστήμην μόνον, ἄντ' οὖν ναυτιᾷ ἄντε μή, ἢ πῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;)
>
> MEG. No, not at all a good person, if he has the skill but also the weakness you mention (Οὐδαμῶς, ἄν γε πρὸς τῇ τέχνῃ ἔχῃ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ὃ λέγεις).[4]

1 For σωτηρία at sea as the goal of the κυβερνητικὴ τέχνη: Pl. *Plt.* 296e4-297a2, 298c7-d3; *Chrm.* 173b6-7, 174c6-7 (ἡ δὲ κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ἀποθνῄσκειν); *Euthyd.* 279e4-6; *Grg.* 511d1-512b2 (the steersman can save the people on board, but cannot determine to whom that is a harm and to whom a boon); *Resp.* 332e1-2, 346a6-8; *Leg.* 961e1-5. Cf. [Pl.] *Alc.* 2, 147e4-148a1. Cf. also Iambl. *Protr.* 42.19–20.

2 For κυβερνητική as an example of a craft or wisdom, τέχνη: Pl. *Ion* 537c5-7, 540b6-8; *Resp.* 341c9-d4, 342d9-e4, 488d4-e3; *Leg.* 709c1-3, [Pl.] *Clit.* 410b7-c1. Cf. Pl. *Chrm.* 173a9-b2 (ἐπιστήμη); [Pl.] *Alc.* 2, 146e6 (ἐπιστήμη), and [Pl.] *Thg.* 123b2-9, 123d11-14 (σοφία). In Pl. *Phlb.* 56a3-b2, κυβερνητική is listed among the imprecise τέχναι, such as *aulos*-playing, medicine, farming and generalship, whose subject matter contains much obscurity (τὸ μὴ σαφές) and little certainty (τὸ βέβαιον). Along the same lines, [Pl.] *Epin.* 976a5-b1 denies any claim κυβερνητική might lay to being the highest form of σοφία on the ground that it cannot know the favour (φιλία) or wrath (ὀργή) of the winds, which is a knowledge it covets.

3 [Pl.] *Alc.* 1, 135a5-8 if on a ship a person were at liberty to do anything, but devoid of the understanding and excellence of a steersman (νοῦ τε καὶ ἀρετῆς κυβερνητικῆς ἐστερημένῳ), all those on board of the ship are likely to perish.

4 Translation Schofield & Griffith (2016), slightly modified.

T 2 | *Leg.* 639b5-8: the cowardly general:

> ATH. How about the person in command of the foot soldiers? If he has the knowledge of war, will he be a capable commander, even if, being a coward, in the midst of dangers he will be nauseous because of drunkenness with fear? (Τί δ' ἄρχων στρατοπέδων; ἆρ' ἐὰν τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔχῃ ἐπιστήμην, ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, κἂν δειλὸς ὢν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ὑπὸ μέθης τοῦ φόβου ναυτιᾷ;)
>
> MEG. Of course not. (Καὶ πῶς;)[5]

These analogies are striking because the possession of the relevant τέχνη by itself is claimed to be insufficient for realizing the aims of navigation and warfare. The insistence that the commander be 'effective' (χρηστός) complicates the idea of the qualified ruler, implying that attaining the aim of the τέχνη is dependent on an additional ability. Apart from their respective τέχναι, the steersman and the military commander need a particular *disposition*: in the case of the former, this may be described as 'not being prone to suffer from seasickness at sea'; for the latter, it is 'not being overcome by cowardice on the battlefield'. The additional quality required of the craftsman is the ability to remain unaffected by the perils to which his craft exposes him.

The analogies in T 1 and T 2 cited above are part of the Athenian's consciously provocative claim that drunkenness and the symposium are beneficial for citizen education (παιδεία). This claim meets with incredulity on the part of the interlocutors, the Cretan Cleinias and the Spartan Megillus. To their mind, drunkenness is the peak of disgraceful behaviour; hence the symposium as the setting in which drunkenness is the more or less inevitable result constitutes the ultimate evidence against any positive value of the symposium.[6] The τέχνη-analogies of the seasick steersman and the cowardly general seek to circumvent this objection by claiming that the way in which symposia are normally conducted does not constitute conclusive evidence against symposia *per se*; the Athenian claims that, when carried out correctly (though he admits that he has never seen that happen),[7] symposia *can* benefit education. It is therefore essential that the symposium is supervised by a suitably qualified sympotic leader – someone who has the stomach to face the perils of his task. In order to do so, besides his τέχνη he needs an additional capacity, which is the *sine qua*

5 Translation mine.

6 In *Leg.* 636e4-637b6, Megillus praised Spartan legislation precisely for banning the Athenian *symposium*, that occasions drunkenness (cf. Wecowski (2014), 112 n.111).

7 Pl. *Leg.* 639d8-e3.

non for his τέχνη to be effective at all: the social or convivial equivalent of 'not being prone to seasickness'.[8]

Before drawing out the implications of this for the argument about symposia, we should ask about the quality at which the two analogies hint. What emotional *disposition* do 'not prone to being overcome by seasickness' and 'not prone to cowardice on the battlefield' betoken? The reason why this is not immediately discernible is partly due to the fact that Plato does not simply put forward a positive trait; it is, rather the *absence* of an unwelcome sensation (nausea) which enables the craftsman to perform his craft. One question we might want to ask here is why the Athenian speaks of the *absence of* fear on the battlefield and of the *absence of* seasickness, rather than straightforwardly identifying a positive quality (which would presumably be courage and its nautical equivalent). The reason for this becomes clear by looking at what the steersman and the army general have in common. The very essence of their crafts is the confrontation with extreme hazards:[9] warfare and sea-voyages involve serious dangers which are assumed to naturally elicit fears. The τέχνη of the κυβερνήτης in particular is a paradigm example of the ability to manage circumstances fraught with risk, in which the expert's *own* safety is at stake as well (in contrast to, for example, the doctor or the horse-trainer). Speaking of the absence of seasickness hence at once implies that seasickness is the natural and instinctive reaction (anyone would be afraid in that circumstance), and that whoever is *not* susceptible to seasickness is *an exception*. The implication is clearly that someone like that will not at all be easy to find.

The need for someone with this rare resistance to seasickness lies in the fact that the symposium will in all likelihood become filled with uproar (οὐκ ἀθόρυβος, *Leg*. 640c2; cf. 671d8) as the symposiasts become more and more intoxicated. The good symposiarch therefore needs to be sober and 'imperturbable' (ἀθόρυβος): the sympotic analogue of the steersman who is not prone to seasickness.[10] That the symposiarch should not be overcome by afflictions that

8 See Tecușan (1990), 238–44 for reflections on the change in Plato's attitude to *symposia*. The guardians in Plato's *Republic* are not allowed to get drunk, *Resp*. 403e4-5, 389d9-e2.

9 The craft of the κυβερνήτης has as its aim σωτηρία and involves the risk of harm and death, see n. 1 above. The sea is typically an example of an extreme danger, as may be gleaned from Aristotle's discussion of courage (while Aristotle however disputes that facing the sea belongs to the finest kind of courage), Arist. *Eth. Nic.* III.6, 1115a28-b6. Likewise, that it is considered natural to fear the sea (and unnatural not to) is implied, for example, in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* III.7, 1115b26-28: since there is no term for one who exceeds in fearlessness (ἀφοβία), someone who fears nothing, *not even earthquakes or the sea*, like the Celts, may be called 'mad' or 'insensitive' (μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος).

10 As well as not too young, Pl. *Leg*. 640c6-7, πότερον οὖν ἀθόρυβον, εἰ δυνατὸν εἴη, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄρχοντα ἐκπορίζεσθαι δεῖ; Furthermore, the symposiarch has to be φρόνιμος (or σοφός) –

would prevent him from directing the symposium seems obvious, but that still leaves it unclear whether we are to suppose that there is a *positive* trait or disposition which enables him to exercise his leadership and govern the drinking capably. Again, the fact that the two analogies converge here helps. T 2 obviously implies that the expert must be resistant to *fear*: the military commander should *not* be a coward in the midst of dangers; and the brave differs from the faint-hearted because the former is 'less perturbed by fears' (ὁ μὴν ἀνδρεῖος τῶν δειλῶν ὑπὸ φόβων ἧττον τεθορύβηται).[11] That fear is also the affect in T 1 seems to be implied by the fact that seasickness is used as a metaphor for this fearful affliction in T 2: 'he is nauseous through drunkenness with fear', ὑπὸ μέθης τοῦ φόβου <u>ναυτιᾷ</u>. One might therefore have assumed that the quality which the steersman and the general lack is, simply, courage. But Plato does not say so – presumably either, or both, because courage (ἀνδρεία) had just been dismissed as an inferior part of virtue in the criticism of the Spartan and Cretan law codes, and because Plato is careful to avoid any possible suggestion of overconfidence.[12]

We may therefore ask what it is about managing a symposium that instinctively elicits fear, and what this entails for the preternatural qualification of the symposiarch who is able to *resist* it. In this contribution, I shall attempt to elucidate the nebulous quality of the symposiarch who has the stomach to face his task. I shall do so by first investigating the metaphors of seasickness and θόρυβος in an attempt to better understand both how these conceptualize (a particular kind of) fear and the ability to resist it (Section 2). In particular, I shall ask what the causes and pathology of nausea entail about the disposition or capacity signalled by its *absence*. The association between seasickness and fear in *Laws* 639a9-b4 is not peculiar to the *Laws*; we find the same connection in texts with different philosophical provenance – from a collection tackling natural problems in the Aristotelian tradition to a Stoic fragment in which seasickness is used as a model for conceptualizing fears in a way not unlike what we see in Plato's *Laws*.

Since immunity from seasickness represents the faculty to remain ἀθόρυβος in the face of perils, we will then turn to a brief semantic study of θόρυβος in

specifically, φρόνιμος *περί γε συνουσίας*: with respect to the meeting – sober (νήφος, 640d4) and not of the age of a νέος (640d6). Wecowski (2014), 37 n.69 for the claim that Plato's high demands on the symposiarch must have been "alien to an ordinary Greek".

11 Pl. *Leg*. 640a11-12.

12 This is why he is careful to distinguish a good and a bad type of courage (courage and fearlessness) and a good and a bad type of fear (shame and cowardice); on these see Pfefferkorn in this volume (Chap. 13). The importance for Plato of demarcating courage (ἀνδρεία) from overconfidence (θάρρος) is highlighted in Bartels (2017), 89-96.

order to pinpoint more precisely its relation with fear (Section 3). We will see that the notion of θόρυβος is connected to fear in several ways, referring to the indistinct clamour or din that generally signals some disturbance, including fear but also agitation and enthusiasm, and through metonymy or metaphor can come to denote the affect of fear itself.

Having thus looked at the ways in which the emotional symptoms and experiential phenomena involved in seasickness and θόρυβος structure the emotional concept of fear, the final section (Section 4) will approach afresh the question of the qualification of the leaders of the symposia in Plato's *Laws*.[13] It offers an account of the imperturbability of the symposiarch in the context of the symposia and the need to resist fear, pointing to an affinity between this imperturbability and a particular kind of courage found in the Platonic corpus. Since the symposiarch and the symposium with its sympotic laws represent the law guard and the laws (who will play a major role in the rest of the dialogue), the question of the qualification of the symposiarch bears directly upon the successful education of its future leaders, the law guards, and thereby upon the legislative project of the *Laws* as a whole. In fact, we will see that the institution of the nocturnal council, whose description in Book XII bears some manifest resemblances to the symposium-episode in Books I–II, is designed in such a way that it rules out the possibility of a seasick steersman.

2 Seasickness and Fear

In a diagnosis similar to the modern medical consensus, Galen attributes the cause of nausea to the violent movement (κίνησις) that impacts on the human body at sea: the tossing spoils the contents of the stomach, leading to nausea and vomiting.[14] A divergent explanation of the pathology of seasickness can be found in Plutarch's *Quaestiones Naturales*, a collection that betrays some influence of the ancient medical tradition, both from specialist knowledge and from popular medical lore.[15] Problem 11 (914E-F) is dedicated to the question of why only navigation at sea – including, significantly, navigation on a *calm*

13 For difficulties surrounding the precise identity of the leaders of the symposium, Tecușan (1990), 251–52. For the identification of the chorus of Dionysus with the drinking parties, Bartels (2017), 108–113.

14 Gal. *In Hippocratis Aphorismos et Galeni in eos commentarii* 4, 14 (Kühn 17b, 674.4–5): δηλοῖ δὲ ἡ ναυτιλίη ὅτι κίνησις τὰ σώματα ταράσσει. For other ancient sources on nausea, see also the lemma in Oldelehr (1977).

15 On the incorporation of ancient medical knowledge of variable standing in the *Q.N.*, Meeusen (2017), 280–81; for the genre of collections of natural problems ibid., 77–83.

sea – causes seasickness, whereas navigation on (calm) rivers does not.[16] Plutarch reasons that, of the senses (αἰσθήσεις), it is smell, and of all the emotions (πάθη), it is fear (φόβος) that most stir seasickness.[17] At sea, people's unfamiliarity with the smell of seawater causes distress, and they harbour fears about what might come because they do not derive any comfort from the good weather and the calmness of their present situation.[18]

Since an explanation of the kind offered by Galen (the effects on the body of the undulation of the sea) is ruled out by the fact that those voyaging on a calm sea suffer from seasickness nevertheless, Plutarch is bound to account for this condition at least partly in psychologizing terms.[19] In fact, he stresses the interconnectedness between sensory and emotional stimulants: as Meeusen notes, Plutarch's "aetiology draws on a close relation between human physiology and psychology showing how our sense (c.q. of smell) stirs our soul into an erroneous emotion (c.q. fear of things to come), and how the body reacts on this erroneous impulse, thereby leading to sickness".[20] That seasickness is at least partly caused by fear Plutarch infers from the fact that the physiological signs of seasickness are the same as those of people who (falsely) imagine a danger: they tremble, shiver, and have their bowels turned to water.[21] Rather than being congruent with medical literature, Plutarch's account of seasickness in the *Quaestiones Naturales* thus reflects a more philosophical approach, taking the conditions as the outward manifestation of a disturbance within the soul.[22]

16 A similar distinction between the broad sea and rivers with a straight current to which one can safely entrust one's ship to follow a steady and reliable course is made in Max. Tyr. 30.2

17 Plut. *Q.N.* 914F: ᾗ μάλιστα ναυτίαν κινεῖ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἡ ὄσφρησις, τῶν δὲ παθῶν ὁ φόβος; Meeusen (2017), *ad loc.*, 411–12.

18 Maximus of Tyre uses the unreliable and unpredictable sea as a metaphor for the treacherousness of pleasures and pains; it is especially the calm sea which arouses suspicions. The life of a person inclined towards pleasure and fearful of pain is 'flimsy, nervous and without any reliance, and more unpredictable than any sea', κοῦφος καὶ ψοφοδεὴς καὶ ἄπιστος καὶ θαλάττης πάσης ἀδηλότερος (Max. Tyr. 30, 4). The adjective ψοφοδεής, 'frightened at every noise', is another example of an acoustic metaphor for the emotional concept of fear, whereby noise as a cause of fear can come to denote fearfulness *tout court*.

19 In fact, this is the only section in the entire collection where the term ψυχή is mentioned, Meeusen (2017), 64.

20 Meeusen (2017), 411.

21 Plut. *Q.N.* 914E: καὶ γὰρ τρέμουσι καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ κοιλίας ἐξυγραίνονται φαντασίαν κινδύνου λάβοντες. Cf. the references in Meeusen (2017), *ad loc.* to Arat. 29, 6, where the physical symptom of having one's bowels turned to water is linked to cowardice, and to Ps.-Arist./Alex. Aphr. *Suppl. probl.* 2, 106 for the connection between seasickness and fear. For an analysis of φρίκη, Cairns (2013).

22 In Plut. *De tranq. an.* 475E-F, the trembling and quivering of a steersman overcome by fear is an image of one who fails to preserve his tranquillity and excellence of soul in the face of the vicissitudes of life. As long as the steersman does not despair and makes use of his

Although Plutarch omits the looming of the waves from the pathology of seasickness, kinetics does play a role in his aetiology. Yet rather than as the immediate sensory cause of nausea – which Plutarch assigns to smell – being tossed on the sea enters his explanation as a *metaphor* for the psychological aspect of the condition. The affliction of the soul called 'fear' (φόβος) is the soul 'being tossed and disturbed'; the soul then passes its emotional turbulence on to the body and 'fills it up with distress'.[23] Through a cognitive mechanism that has been well studied and described, an emotion is understood in terms of a conceptual metaphor: in this case, fear is understood as being tossed by the sea (the undulation of the waves, of the people on board).[24] In the metaphorical sense (referring to the soul), θόρυβος and θορυβεῖσθαι often refer to fear as a 'disturbance' of the soul's tranquillity.[25]

Can seasickness be overcome? Evidence suggesting an answer in the affirmative is offered by a fragment from the *Similarities* (Ὁμοιώματα) of the Stoic Aristo of Chius:

> Κυβερνήτης μὲν οὔτε ἐν μεγάλῳ πλοίῳ οὔτε ἐν μικρῷ ναυτιάσει, οἱ δὲ ἄπειροι ἐν ἀμφοῖν· οὕτως ὁ μὲν πεπαιδευμένος καὶ ἐν πλούτῳ καὶ ἐν πενίᾳ οὐ ταράττεται, ὁ δ᾽ ἀπαίδευτος ἐν ἀμφοῖν, *SVF* 396, 89 (= Stob. *Ecl.* II 218, 7 Wachsmuth).
>
> 'The steersman suffers from seasickness neither on a large nor on a small ship, but the inexperienced on both. In the same way the educated person is not perturbed neither in wealth nor in want, yet the uneducated in both' (transl. mine).

skill (ἕως οὐκ ἀπέγνωκε τῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος), he can escape the sea. Cf. Vamvouri Ruffy (2011), 138. As in *Leg.* 639b5-8 quoted above, the steersman's ability to use his skill is dependent on his ability to remain in control of his fear to steer clear of despair. Whereas in *Q.N.* 11, the movement of the sea is a metaphor for fear, in *De tranq. an.* 475E-F, the mode of reasoning is analogical: the benefit (ὄφελος) of having a firm disposition in the face of the challenges of life exceeds the benefit of the presence of a steersman on board a ship, because even a steersman can be overcome by fear.

23 Plut. *Q.N.* 914F: ἡ ψυχὴ σάλον ἔχουσα καὶ θορυβουμένη συγκινεῖ καὶ ἀναπίμπλησι τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταραχῆς. Cf. Meeusen (2017) *ad loc.*, 413.

24 Kövecses (1990). Cairns and Nelis (2017), 7–30 stress the central importance of physical symptoms and somatic experiences in the construction of our emotional concepts (cf. Cairns (2013), 92). Cairns (2013), 91 for an explanation of how our ways of conceptualizing emotions are dependent on standard metaphors according to which emotions are conceived as substances (for example, being 'full of' emotions).

25 E.g., Pl. *Symp.* 215e6; *Phdr.* 248a1-4; *Resp.* 518a4-5; Plut. *Lyc.* 22.3.4-5; *De coh. ira* 454A 9; *De gen.* 588D 6-7, cf. 589D 4; D.L. 10.132.5; Herm. *in Phdr.* 158.5, 158.31-2; Procl. *in Ti.* 3.329.13, 3.333.3; Olymp. *in Grg.* 44.1.3; in non-philosophical prose, Ach. Tat. 2.23.4.2 (with ὁ τοῦ κινδύνου φόβος).

In this fragment, the steersman's freedom from seasickness is attributed to his *experience* at sea.[26] The experienced steersman is an illustration of the cultured person (πεπαιδευμένος), who is able to maintain his equanimity regardless of his financial situation. Neither wealth, engendering fears of losing it, nor deficiency, causing worries about being unable to fulfil one's most basic wants and needs, affect his peace of mind. Like Plutarch in his *Quaestiones Naturales*, Aristo here connects seasickness with fear, and particularly ascribes it to a lack of familiarity with the sea and its effects. The insusceptibility to nausea, which is linked directly with *paideia* and framed as a positive 'capacity' to resist it (and hence as a virtue in its own right), is here viewed as the result of practice or training. This view of seasickness of course tallies well with the idea of seasickness in the *Laws* and its juxtaposition to the military general, in a wider dialectical context saturated with the idea that courage – resistance to fear – can be trained through homoeopathy, by exposing people to fears in the closely monitored and choreographed setting of military exercise.[27] The contrasting anxious and worrisome disposition of the uneducated (ἀπαίδευτος) in the fragment of Aristo is here denoted by the verb ταράττεσθαι, which is conceptually closely related to θορυβεῖσθαι and often found in conjunction with it. Θόρυβος, however, has a specific character of its own; it is hence to a brief examination of this notion that we must now turn.

3 The Semantics of θόρυβος

In the previous section, we saw that θόρυβος and its cognates, such as θορυβεῖσθαι, can serve as a metaphor to conceptualize the emotion of fear. However, θόρυβος may also simply denote fear or a type of fear, as becomes apparent from the Stoic classification of emotions listed in Diogenes Laertius 7.112–13 (cf. 10.132), in which θόρυβος is one among six kinds of fear:

26 For steersmanship as typically acquired through experience, cf. [Xen.] *Resp. Ath.* 1.19-20, esp. 1.20.1–2: καὶ κυβερνῆται ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται δι' ἐμπειρίαν τε τῶν πλόων καὶ διὰ μελέτην; In Arist. *EN* 3.6, 1115b2-4, it is implied that fearlessness at sea does not so much come about through courage as it does through experience (παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν) (although the courageous person will be so at sea as well). Therefore, the 'courage' of seamen (οἱ θαλάττιοι) is of a different kind than that of the person who is courageous in the primary sense (the person whom one may κυρίως call ἀνδρεῖος). Cf. n9. In Max. Tyr. 30, 1, the reaction to philosophy of those who are unused to arguments is likened to that of faint-hearted sailors who encounter the sea for the first time and are terrified by the unfamiliar experience.

27 For an analysis of the symposia as analogous to syssitia and military training, see Bartels (2017), 92-99.

> Ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐστὶ προσδοκία κακοῦ. εἰς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀνάγεται καὶ ταῦτα· δεῖμα, ὄκνος, αἰσχύνη, ἔκπληξις, θόρυβος, ἀγωνία. δεῖμα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φόβος δέος ἐμποιῶν, αἰσχύνη δὲ φόβος ἀδοξίας, ὄκνος δὲ φόβος μελλούσης ἐνεργείας, ἔκπληξις δὲ φόβος ἐκ φαντασίας ἀσυνήθους πράγματος, θόρυβος δὲ φόβος μετὰ κατεπείξεως φωνῆς, <ἀγωνία δὲ φόβος ἀδήλου διαπτώσεως> (ed. Dorandi).
>
> Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions: terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright; shame is fear of disgrace; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence; panic [*thorubos*] is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear of an uncertain failure. (Transl. Hicks (1925))[28]

The above definitions either stipulate what the fear is of (in the case nervous shrinking, ὄκνος, and shame, αἰσχύνη) or what causes the fear (consternation, ἔκπληξις, and mental agony, ἀγωνία). The type of fear labelled θόρυβος, translated above as 'panic', most likely falls into the latter category, as it seems to be the kind of fear sparked by a noise (φωνή); presumably, the thought is that it is the kind of fear that arises when something is *heard but not seen*.[29] The demarcation of a kind of fear ('panic') provoked by an acoustic cause is confirmed by the use of the verb θορυβεῖσθαι, 'to be disturbed, startled', for cases in which the cause is literally a sudden or unexpected sound. For instance, the report that Socrates' *daimonion* was in fact a sneeze is dismissed in Plutarch on the grounds that it would be unbefitting for such a great man to be upset at any odd moment by a voice or a sneeze.[30] It is also because of its acoustic connotations that θόρυβος typically refers to the panic and uproar caused by an unidentified noise that

28 MS F has μετ' ἐκπλήξεως instead of μετὰ κατεπείξεως in MSS BP and the *Suda*. A slightly different wording is given in the catalogue of thirteen kinds of fear in *De passionibus* (Περὶ παθῶν), ascribed to Andronicus of Rhodes, 3.1.16: θόρυβος δὲ φόβος μετὰ φωνῆς κατεπείγων (ed. Glibert-Thirry). This is also the version in Ar. Did. *Liber de philosophorum sectis* (*epitome apud Stobaeum*) 75.1.20–21 (ed. Mullach) and Stob. 2.7.10c.4.

29 Cf. Borgeaud (1979), 139: "Quelle que soit l'expression choisie, la panique est présentée comme une peur vaine, solidaire de bruits et de mouvements désordonnés, qui s'empare à l'improviste d'un camp militaire, la nuit de préférence. (…) L'accent est mis, d'autre part, sur l'absence de cause visible, absence créatrice d'illusions; la panique livre sa victime aux conjectures, c'est-à-dire à l'imagination du pire. Un bruit y est aussitôt interprété comme une charge de l'ennemi."

30 Plut. *De gen.* 581B 9–11, ὑπὸ φωνῆς ἔξωθεν ἢ πταρμοῦ τινος ὁπηνίκα τύχοι θορυβούμενον ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ἀνατρέπεσθαι καὶ προΐεσθαι τὸ δεδογμένον, 'to be upset at odd moments by such external matters as a voice or a sneeze, and thus be diverted from his actions and abandon his decisions' (transl. Einarson & De Lacy (1959)).

overtakes an army, particularly at night. As such, θόρυβος receives separate discussion in handbooks of military tactics because of the disruptive effects of nocturnal panics upon the army.[31] The sound may be purely imaginative. The fearful person either expects that a danger is imminent, hears something unclear or *thinks* that he hears something, and takes it to be an assault by the enemy.[32] The imaginary cause of θόρυβος, however, need not be an imagined *sound* (as in Plutarch's *Quaestiones Naturales*: φαντασίαν κινδύνου λάβοντες, where it is the mental image of a fearful event), although it frequently is. In dangerous situations, an unclear, unidentified sound may suggest an imminent threat, even if that danger, or even the sound itself, turns out to be illusory.

Thus, although the Stoic classification of fears may be pressing the differences and not exactly reflect the common usage of these terms, in its neatness it does highlight a distinctive aspect of the semantics of θόρυβος, namely its connection with sound. As a kind of sound, θόρυβος primarily refers to the confused, disarticulate noise produced by an amalgam of different sounds or large groups of people (such as an army or *thiasos*).[33] Indeed, it is from the sonorous realm that θόρυβος draws its primary significance: it captures a particular kind of auditory stimulus that is common to a whole range of both emotional and non-emotional events. We thus find θόρυβος among the terms which the ancient Greeks used to describe and distinguish between various kinds of noises, as becomes apparent from its use for the sounds emitted by musical instruments such as the *aulos*,[34] the *tympanon*[35] or the *salpinx*.[36] Although pinpointing the differences between the various Greek terms that divide and structure

31 E.g., Aen. Tact. 27 (see also below, n. 42). On panic in military contexts, Borgeaud (1979), 137–55. In turn, one of the most typical contexts for θόρυβος to occur is war.

32 On the role of the imagination and the illusory in panics, Borgeaud (1979), 139, 142–43 (especially the reference to the definition of πανικὸν δεῖμα in the *Suda*), 181; Patera 2014, 117.

33 E.g., Pl. *Criti.* 117e6-8 ; Plut. *Anton.* 75.5–6 (951A). In the latter case, sound *creates* the illusion of a group, namely of a *thiasos*: it is reported that at one night, noises from all kinds of instruments were heard, and the shouting of a crowd together with Bacchic cries and satyr-like leaps, as if a tumultuous group of revellers were making their way through the city (ὥσπερ θιάσου τινὸς οὐκ ἀθορύβως ἐξελαύνοντος). There is a clear association with fear in this context; the sounds of a *thiasos* are heard in a night when the city (Alexandria) was weighed down by an anxious expectation of what was to come (διὰ φόβον καὶ προσδοκίαν τοῦ μέλλοντος οὔσης).

34 Thus, θόρυβος is used dismissively for a new style of *aulos*-music, which had grown more autonomous (and was possibly louder) than the straightforward accompaniment of the chorus, in the 'Hyporchema' of Pratinas, *PMG* 708 *apud* Ath. 14, 617b-f. See on this fragment Krumeich, Pechstein, and Seidensticker (1999), 81–87.

35 E.g., Arist. *Mir.* 838b30-839a2; Strab. 10.3.11.

36 Poll. *Onom.* 4.85.3–4. These are also associated with φρίκη, which suggests that the Stoic classification is over-tidy.

the realm of sonority would go beyond the purposes of this contribution, a brief semantic overview of the term shows that θόρυβος refers to a confused or disorderly noise, which may then by way of metonymy be used for the upsetting or disturbing effect upon the listener,[37] not necessarily emotional: to say that something is ἀθόρυβος may be a way of simply saying that a situation or an activity remains undisturbed, without carrying any emotional connotations.[38] It is hence not surprising that we find θόρυβος repeatedly associated with disorder (ἀκοσμία)[39] and 'confusion' (ταραχή), a term close to θόρυβος in meaning and use, but lacking the acoustic connotations of the latter. The literal noise or metaphorical disturbance of θόρυβος can drown out other sounds,[40] or distract one from what is more important.[41]

It may therefore be concluded that on the most basic, sensible level, θόρυβος is the din or noisy clamour that accompanies a crowd in a state of uproar or panic, which is perceived as confused and inarticulate, and hence can, by way of metonymy, be used both for the underlying emotional state of 'turmoil' in groups – of which the noisy clamour may reasonably be taken as the outward manifestation – and hence for emotional disturbance in the individual, such as fright.[42] Yet through metonymy, θόρυβος can be extrapolated from the acoustic

37 Compare the analysis of the metonymous extension of φρίκη in Cairns (2013), 80–84.

38 Ath. 2,2.78.3–5 reports that the Sybaritai were the first to banish the 'noisy crafts' (αἱ ψοφοῦσαι τέχναι) of the blacksmiths and builders outside the city, so that their sleep might remain undisturbed (ὅπως αὐτοῖς πανταχόθεν ἀθόρυβοι). For ψόφος as having a disturbing effect in the sense of 'frightening': Gal. *In Hippocratis prorrheticum i commentaria iii* (Kühn 5, 551, 3): ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν ψόφων θορυβοῦνται παραπλησίως τοῖς δειλοῖς.

39 With ἀκοσμία, e.g. Eur. *IA* 317, Plut. *Cor*. 18.5; with ἀταξία, e.g. Plut. *Demetr*. 38.4, *De gen. Socr*. 598E 7.

40 Ascl. 2.9.4–7; *Suda*, Onom. Tact. 17.6–7, s.v. ἔκτακτοι.

41 E.g., Pl. *Phd*. 66d3-7: the body with its noise and disorder (θόρυβον … καὶ ταραχήν) constantly disturbs our examinations and prevents us from setting eyes upon the truth; *Ti*. 70d7-71a3: the soul-part that is subject to bodily appetites should be housed as far away from the rational part of the soul (ὁ βουλευόμενος), so that it causes the least disturbance (θόρυβον καὶ βοὴν ὡς ἐλαχίστην παρέχον): as the juxtaposition with βοή shows, the idea seems to be that these drown out the rational part.

42 For the associations of θόρυβος with particular attention to the physiological aspect of psychological θόρυβος in medical writings, Vamvouri Ruffy (2011), 136–39. The internalization of θόρυβος, whereby an experiential phenomenon produced by a collective comes to denote the emotional disturbance in the individual, is a good example of the interaction of metonymy and metaphor: θόρυβος may extend from the sound ('clamour') produced by a collective to the underlying emotional state of that collective ('uproar') (that is, metonymy); then the notion of 'uproar' may itself be used for emotional turbulence in the individual soul ('distress') (metaphor).

realm to refer to the individual affect of fear, and hence even to cases when any reference to an actual sound is absent, such as in the passage from Plutarch's *Naturales Quaestiones* discussed in Section 2 above. Covering both the auditory stimulus and the underlying disturbance in groups, its uses thus range from the nocturnal panic of an army[43] to the indignant rumouring of judges at a trial in court,[44] and from a riotous night-time parade (κῶμος) by intoxicated revellers[45] to the cheering and clamouring of a theatre audience.[46] Though θόρυβος accompanies all of these, the underlying emotional states differ from case to case: noisy judges in a court are not fearful, and alarmed soldiers are not enthusiastic. Likewise, θόρυβος in the individual soul may be a term for emotional upset in general, covering the entire spectrum of sensory experience, as in the physical aetiology of the senses in Plato's *Timaeus*.[47] Most importantly, however, this brief overview revealed that the complex of emotions with which θόρυβος is most intimately linked is that of fear, and as such it may refer both to fear coming with panic (in collectives) and that with anxiety (upset in the individual soul).

43 Aen. Tact. 27 lists a number of strategies if an army is particularly prone to nocturnal panics (τοὺς … ἐξαίφνης θορύβους καὶ φόβους γενομένους). One of these is setting up a guard to quench panics right at their onset, for example if someone wakes up from a dream and creates a stir (ἐάν τινα αἰσθάνωνται ἐκ τοῦ ὕπνου ἢ ἄλλως ἀρχόμενον θορυβεῖν). Significantly, the guards should be people 'cognizant of irrational fears' (οὗτοι δὴ εἰδότες τοὺς ματαίους φόβους): presumably, experienced, courageous soldiers (cf. Borgeaud (1979), 139–40: "Savoir resister à la panique est considéré comme un critère de valeur, chez le soldat"). This is reminiscent of the type of courage equal to extensive experience (ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα) recognized by Aristotle in *Eth. Nic.* 3.8, 1116b4-15. Soldiers who have experience in war may *appear* courageous, because they know that in war there are many false alarms, most of which they have seen; thus, compared to others who lack this experience, they seem brave. This is not the kind of courage that Aristotle prizes most. Cf. n. 9 above.

44 E.g., Pl. *Apol.* 20e4, 21a5, 27b1, b5, 30c2-3; Isocr. *Ant.* 123.6.

45 In Pl. *Symp.* 223b2-6, the symposium at Agathon's house is suddenly disturbed by drunken κωμασταί who fill everything with uproar (θορύβου μεστὰ πάντα). In the 'Hyporchema' of Pratinas, the the new-style music in which the *aulos*-player leads the chorus instead of the song directing the auletic accompaniment is called a κῶμος of the sympotic kind (νέων … παροίνων) (cf. n. 34 above).

46 E.g., Pl. *Leg.* 700d2. Folch (2015), 129–30, 134–35, for the argument that Plato in the *Laws* supplants θόρυβος as a "perlocutionary education in democratic citizenship" (135) with the performative act of judgement of the virtuous critic. Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 876b3-4, where the Athenian criticizes courts filled with uproar, in which approval and disapproval are made known through shouting, just as in the theatre (θορύβου μεστὰ καθάπερ θέατρα ἐπαινοῦντά τε βοῇ καὶ ψέγοντα τῶν ῥητόρων ἑκάτερον).

47 Pl. *Ti.* 43b5-c7.

4 Symposiarchs and Law Guards

In the previous two sections, we have looked into the notions of seasickness and θόρυβος, and seen how these metaphors help to conceptualize the sensation of fear. Both metaphors are derived from experiential phenomena related to fear: seasickness is the physiological manifestation of a particular kind of fear in the individual, and the confused clamour labelled θόρυβος is the acoustic manifestation of uproar or fear; either of these can, by way of analogy and metonymy, be used for the sensation of anxiety, whereby θόρυβος in turn can be used to conceptualize the fear underlying seasickness. These findings provide further evidence of how embodied experiences (illness, sound) yield metaphors and metonymies that structure the ancient understanding of emotions.[48]

In Plato's *Laws*, the combination of seasickness and θόρυβος creates a single scenario in which fear is presented as natural and unavoidable. The symposium with its likely result of drunkenness and concomitant potential excesses is by implication likened to the sea, which as we have seen is generally regarded as a commonsensical cause of fear due to its unpredictability and the inevitable risks that come with sea-voyages.[49] Precisely because of the inevitability of this emotion stirring in anyone confronted with the tumult of symposia and the ever-present threat of excess, there is need of a leader in possession of the experience required to face such affects.[50] As the drinkers become more and more intoxicated, their meeting will become increasingly noisy and uproarious (θορυβώδης).[51] "There is a risk (…) that things will be getting on so well that

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48 See especially Cairns & Nelis (2017), Introduction, 7–30.

49 Wecowski (2014), 39. The danger inherent in symposia "is usually understood pragmatically as resulting from the subsequent excessive consumption of wine" (an additional reason may be that the symposium was "itself a hubristic act and thus potentially offensive to the 'eternally happy' gods"), 39–40. For the dangers inherent in a symposium, Wecowski (2014), 47, 50–55, 73; Pellizer (1990), 79–83; Tecușan (1990), 251.

50 For the tasks of the symposiarch, Wecowski (2014), 36–38; Lissarrague [1987] (1990), 8–9. In real symposia, musical entertainment could help to calm down tensions: in *Quaest. conv.* 713E-F, Plutarch explains that music is most opportune when a symposium 'surges and crests towards disputes or the ambition to attain victory' (κυμαίνοντι καὶ κορυσσομένῳ πρὸς ἔριν ἢ φιλονεικίαν); it can quench derisive language, and keep in check a discussion deviating into unpleasant rivalry or a contest in sophistry, or one that is moving towards political or forensic disputes, until the symposium again becomes 'quiet and windless' (ἀθόρυβον καὶ ἀνήνεμον). Here, we again see the implicit likening of the symposium to the sea. Cf. *Quast. conv*. 622A-B, where Theon implicitly compares the skills of a symposiarch to a steersman who must save the symposium from suffering shipwreck (see on this comparison Vamvouri Ruffy (2011), 136–38).

51 Pl. *Leg*. 671a4-6: θορυβώδης μέν που ὁ σύλλογος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐξ ἀνάγκης προϊούσης τῆς πόσεως ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἀεὶ συμβαίνει γιγνόμενος, κτλ., 'I imagine a gathering of that kind is inevitably

every member of the choir 'listens to his own *parrhēsia* only', and that in his (…) boldness each of them has great plans for organizing the life of others as well".[52] This is why, for the drinking of wine to yield any benefit for *paideia*, the symposia must be led by a leader who is, as noted above, sober, σοφός, ἀθόρυβος, and not young.[53]

Who exactly is this experienced ἄρχων? This may be discerned by taking a closer look at the so-called chorus of Dionysus. At the end of Book II, the chorus of Dionysus, composed of members between 30 and 60, has in the argument collapsed with the symposium. This is already evident from the fact that the Athenian concludes that their defence of the Dionysiac chorus – that is, of what he earlier referred to as the symposium – has proven to be justified.[54] The proof for the justification lies in the fact that the interlocutors have been able to meet the demand that would make the drinking of wine useful for *paideia*: to find or designate someone (or several people) capable of governing the symposium. This turns out to be the *more senior half* of the Dionysiac chorus: those over 50 years of age. Key here is the fault line that separates the junior and senior members of the chorus of Dionysus.[55] This is not just age, but the ability

going to become increasingly rowdy as the drinking progresses', transl. Schofield & Griffith.

52 Raalte, van (2004), 307. It is only the sober and ἀθόρυβος who is truly ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν: the danger is that inebriated symposiasts will deem themselves capable of governing the lives of others (*Leg.* 671b3-6). The ἀθόρυβος symposiarch seems to be comparable to the isolated individual charged with regulating sexual passions (*Leg.* 835c1-8), who "dares to speak out against the most violent passions", with "only the λόγος for his guide", Raalte, van (2004), 308.

53 Cf. above, n. 10.

54 The Athenian can conclude the discussion of the disputed value of symposia for education by stating that the defence of the Dionysiac chorus was reasonable: Pl. *Leg.* 671a1-4: καὶ ὅπερ ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἐβουλήθη, τὴν τῷ τοῦ Διονύσου χορῷ βοήθειαν ἐπιδεῖξαι καλῶς λεγομένην, εἰς δύναμιν εἴρηκεν· 'Well, the original aim of our discussion was to demonstrate that a defence of the Dionysiac chorus was worth making; and we have made that defence to the best of our ability', transl. Schofield & Griffith. The identity of the symposium with the chorus of Dionysus has been discussed in more detail in Bartels (2017), 108-113.

55 In Pl. *Leg.* 670a3-b2, the Athenian talks about what the 30-year-olds and the over-50s should do; at 670d5-e2, he mentions that the older members should select songs appropriate to their age, and that, by singing themselves, they will become leaders inspiring in the younger the wish to acquire good characters. Pl. *Leg.* 670c8-e2, especially (…) μέχρι γε τοσούτου πεπαιδεῦσθαι σχεδὸν ἀναγκαῖον, μέχρι τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι συνακολουθεῖν ἕκαστον ταῖς τε βάσεσιν τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ ταῖς χορδαῖς ταῖς τῶν μελῶν, ἵνα καθορῶντες τάς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, ἐκλέγεσθαί τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἷοί τ' ὦσιν ἃ τοῖς τηλικούτοις τε καὶ τοιούτοις ᾄδειν πρέπον (…)· μέχρι δὲ τοσούτου παιδευθέντες ἀκριβεστέραν ἂν παιδείαν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος φερούσης εἶεν μετακεχειρισμένοι καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτούς, '(…) it is virtually essential that they should have been educated to a level at which each has the ability to follow the

to offer reliable pronouncements about the third of the three criteria for judging character representations in music; that is, to pronounce authoritatively on whether the musical means deployed are appropriate to the moral character portrayed ('whether the representation is fine or not', εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε μὴ καλὸν τὸ μίμημα, 670e5).[56] This, the Athenian says, is not something which the general crowd or even the composers themselves need to know, but it is part of the more advanced education (ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν, 670e2-3; cf. 965b1, below) which enables those chorus members over 50 to select harmonies and rhythms of the appropriate kind for the singers of their own age and for the younger members.[57] Since the analogies discussed in Section 1 were part of the argument stating that the benefit of drinking was conditional upon capable leadership, the more advanced *paideia* of those within the Dionysiac chorus singles out the more senior members – those over 50, hence including the 'leaders of Dionysus over 60' (671e1)[58] – as the appropriate overseers of the drinking activities of the younger members of the Dionysiac chorus.

The ἄρχοντες govern according to the banqueting laws made by the good lawgiver (νόμους … συμποτικούς, 671c4).[59] The ἄρχοντες are here called the law

steps demanded by the rhythms and the notes demanded by the melodies, so that they can review the harmonies and the rhythms, and be capable of selecting the ones which are fitting (i.e. the ones it is appropriate for people of their age and character to sing). (…) If they are educated to this level, they will have received a more exact education than the common run of the people, or even the poets themselves' (transl. Schofield & Griffith).

56 The three criteria of musical judgment are discussed in *Leg*. 667b5-671a1. The exact nature of the third criterion has been debated: for a succinct overview of the positions in the discussion and a convincing solution, Meyer (2015), 307–12.

57 Pl. *Leg*. 670a6-b2: τόδε μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν δοκεῖ μοι σημαίνειν ἤδη, τῆς γε χορικῆς Μούσης ὅτι πεπαιδεῦσθαι δεῖ βέλτιον τοὺς πεντηκοντούτας ὅσοισπερ ἂν ᾄδειν προσήκῃ, 'And what comes out of this discussion, what I think the argument so far indicates, is that the 50-year-olds who are expected to sing need to have had an education better than that of the Muse of choruses' (transl. Schofield & Griffith).

58 The confusion noted by Tecuşan (1990), 252, concerning the question of whether the members of the chorus of Dionysus are συμπόται or ἄρχοντες, arises from her failure to perceive the internal division within the third chorus set out in 670d-e, namely that between those who have received a more advanced *paideia* and the younger ones. On the correct understanding of the argument of Books I–II, the chorus of Dionysus and the symposium coincide; the Athenian does not "*return to* the third chorus after a long speech about music as imitative art (667b-670c)" (my emphasis), but the exchange about the judging of music is embedded in, and part and parcel of, the discussion about the value of drunkenness.

59 Pl. *Leg*. 671c3-4. See for the συμποτικοὶ νόμοι Wecowski (2014), 37, 73–74, 87 with n.7; for 'drinking to the right' (ἐπιδεξία), *id*., especially 85–102 (noting that κατὰ μέρος in *Leg*. 671c "no doubt alludes to the habit of doing things 'to the right'"); for speaking and drinking in turn *id*., 88 n. 9, 90 n. 19, 91 n. 22.

guards and co-governors of the sympotic laws (νομοφύλακας καὶ συνδημιουργοὺς αὐτοῖς), who are the imperturbable and sober commanders of the intoxicated (τοὺς ἀθορύβους καὶ νήφοντας τῶν μὴ νηφόντων στρατηγούς).[60] The law guards have to remain sober and be imperturbable because it is their duty to take care of the application of the drinking laws.[61] The banqueting laws regulate the alternation between remaining silent, speaking, drinking and singing, render the disobedient obedient, and when necessary send in the divine fear that the interlocutors have called deference and shame.[62] The intoxicated symposiasts who refuse to comply need to be brought to obedience through the disgrace that accompanies punishment.[63] Only if properly regulated can a symposium make its participants friends (φίλοι) instead of enemies.[64]

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60 Pl. *Leg*. 671d5-7. It is impossible not to be reminded here of Socrates, who, at the end of Plato's *Symposium*, despite the heavy drinking during the night, gets up completely sober in the morning to head to the Lyceum for a new day of philosophizing.

61 Tecușan (1990), 253, noting that the term ἀθόρυβος is not explained, supposes that "the leader's capacity to resist wine and the [intoxicated] company (…) may spring from an inner quality of his mind, perhaps the *dynamis* alluded to at 671c1" (in τῷ δυναμένῳ … παιδεύειν τε καὶ πλάττειν); however, this pertains to the good lawgiver mentioned in 671c3. Equally succinct is Boyancé (1951), 13: "un dirigeant qui soit de sa nature réfractaire à l'agitation tumultueuse".

62 Pl. *Leg*. 671c2-d3: τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν πλάστην τὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τότε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην, οὗ νόμους εἶναι δεῖ συμποτικούς, δυναμένους τὸν εὔελπιν καὶ θαρραλέον ἐκεῖνον γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀναισχυντότερον τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα τάξιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος σιγῆς καὶ λόγου καὶ πόσεως καὶ μούσης ὑπομένειν, ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν πάντα τούτοις τἀναντία, καὶ εἰσιόντι τῷ μὴ καλῷ θάρρει τὸν κάλλιστον διαμαχόμενον φόβον εἰσπέμπειν οἵους τ' εἶναι μετὰ δίκης, ὃν αἰδῶ τε καὶ αἰσχύνην θεῖον φόβον ὠνομάκαμεν; 'And this person who moulds them [*sc*. the souls of the drinkers], we said, is the same good lawgiver, now as then, who must have laws to govern drinking parties: when our drinker becomes cheerful, overconfident, and utterly outrageous, refusing to observe any kind of order or alternation in keeping silent or in speaking, in drinking or in music, these laws must make him willing to behave in exactly the opposite way; when his overconfidence (which is so far from fine) makes its entrance, then they must be capable, with a little assistance from justice, of sending in against it that finest of all fears, a divine fear, to which we have given the name 'sense of shame or respect' (transl. Schofield & Griffith). For the association of αἰδώς and fear, see Cairns (1993), 371, 372, 374. See Pfefferkorn in this volume (Chap. 13) for the argument that αἰδῶς and αἰσχύνη are emotions that help to develop the virtue of temperance.

63 Pl. *Leg*. 671d1-d3: (…) τὸν κάλλιστον διαμαχόμενον φόβον εἰσπέμπειν οἵους τ' εἶναι μετὰ δίκης, ὃν αἰδῶ τε καὶ αἰσχύνην θεῖον φόβον ὠνομάκαμεν, '[laws] capable of sending in the most beautiful fear in combat [of that audacity] together with punishment, [the fear] which we have called deference and shame' (transl. mine). Cf. Cairns (1993), 374, with reference to disgrace and eventually punishment in *Leg*. 648b4-c4. Lissarrague [1987] (1990), 9: disobedience results in "exclusion from the banquets, hence social isolation". For another interpretation of μετὰ δίκης, see Meyer (2015), 327: 'fear with justice', *ad* 671c8-d2, with reference to 647c7-8; cf. Schofield & Griffith, who translate: "with a little assistance from justice".

64 Cf. Wecowski (2014), 71–72.

Since the law guards take the place of the ἄρχων mentioned in analogies in Book I (Section 1 above), we can now better discern the kind of fears to which the law guards must be resistant as implied in the need to remain ἀθόρυβος. The communal drinking may cause a precarious situation in which a drinker loses his sense of shame and any sense of what is appropriate, with the possible consequence of thinking out of pure shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) that he knows better than the judges and law guards what is right and will prove unimpressed by the opinion of the ἄρχων superior in judgment and training.[65] In such cases, it is of the utmost importance that the law guards (the judges of what is καλόν and what is not) resist the pressure of those who are led by pleasure alone and moreover claim that they are right about that. The law guards need, first, to be resolute and intrepid in confronting the loss of shame and lawlessness on the part the inebriated, and in speaking out against those who have lost their sense of decorum (αἰδῶς) and shame (αἰσχύνη). This requires a capacity resembling courage of the Socratic kind: the courage to say what one believes to be good, however unwelcome this may be to the audience.[66] Second, they also need not to feel fear for the practice of drinking, and not be disturbed by its dangers and possible excesses. Their training in the Dionysiac chorus is supposed to impart both of these kinds of emotional firmness. The ultimate claim underlying the symposium-chorus episode in Books I–II is thus that the drinking can only truly be paideutic for its younger members under the guidance of experienced, senior law guards.

The more advanced *paideia* which for the first time was introduced to divide the chorus of Dionysus in those under 50 and those over 50 returns as a topic in the context of the nocturnal council in Book XII (965b1). This council, like its sympotic, Dionysiac counterpart in Book II, is divided into a younger part (the senses, αἰσθήσεις) and an older part (understanding, νοῦς).[67] In view

65 This scenario is sketched in Book III, *Leg.* 700a7-701a3: in the past, musical performances were regulated by those in control of education who knew the different genres and styles, and it was forbidden to make any combinations; they could judge and punish the disobedient on the basis of these (τὸ δὲ κῦρος τούτων γνῶναί τε καὶ ἅμα γνόντα δικάσαι, ζημιοῦν τε αὖ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον, 700c1-3). At that time, the populace still submitted to being ruled and did not pronounce a judgment *through clamour* (ἤθελεν ἄρχεσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ μὴ τολμᾶν κρίνειν *διὰ θορύβου*, 700d1-2). Later, however, the poets considered *themselves* ἄρχοντες, and without any idea of the just and lawful music and unduly in the grip of pleasure (μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος κατεχόμενοι ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς, 700d6), they began composing all sorts of illicit musical forms and combinations.

66 For the notion of Socratic courage (which is in turn closely related to Socratic *parrhēsia*), Raalte, van (2004), especially 289 n.30, 301, 309–10.

67 The younger members, who are the senses, memory, and the messengers for the older ones: *Leg.* 964e2-5 (τοὺς μὲν νέους ... ὀξύτητας ἐν πάσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντας, περὶ ὅλην κύκλῳ τὴν πόλιν ὁρᾶν, φρουροῦντας δὲ παραδιδόναι μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταῖς μνήμαις). The older members

of the fact that the symposium has been likened to the sea and the symposiarch to a steersman, it seems significant that the nocturnal council is introduced as the *anchor* of the whole *polis* (οἷον ἄγκυραν πάσης τῆς πόλεως, 961c4-5). The goal of the κυβερνητικὴ τέχνη is the salvation (σωτηρία) of the people on the ship at sea;[68] in *Laws* 961e1-5, we hear that the combination of the senses and νοῦς is in fact precisely that which is deemed necessary to save a ship and its crew. The nocturnal council functions as the steersman and sailors whose joint efforts save the ship, whereby the senses are identified with the sailors and νοῦς with the steersman.[69] If the echoes of Book I were not obvious enough yet, in Book XII the crafts of steersmanship and generalship (and medicine) return as the crafts that characteristically aim at σωτηρία.[70] Together, the two sections of the nocturnal council, which is, as it were, the sober incarnation of the chorus of Dionysus, ensure the preservation of the whole *polis*, as the younger members of the council slowly acquire the experience they need to govern when they have come of age. Thus the advanced *paideia* of those above 50 and their extensive experience with the sympotic laws effectively rules out the possibility of a seasick steersman. Indeed, as the anchor of the city ensuring that the laws are not changed or overturned, the nocturnal council secures order in the individual souls (εὐνομίαν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς) and the preservation of the laws (σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων).[71]

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are likened to *nous* because of their exceeding capacity for reasoning; they act as counsellors with the younger ones as assistants and fellow counsellors: *Leg.* 965a1-a3 (τοὺς δὲ νῷ ἀπῃκασμένους τῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια λόγου διαφερόντως φρονεῖν, τοὺς γέροντας, βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ ὑπηρέταις χρωμένους μετὰ συμβουλίας τοῖς νέοις).

68 Cf. n. 1 above.

69 Pl. *Leg.* 961e1-5: ἀλλ᾽ ὁ περὶ τί νοῦς μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεων κραθεὶς σωτηρία πλοίων ἔν γε χειμῶσιν καὶ ἐν εὐδίαις γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν; ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης ἅμα καὶ ναῦται τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῷ κυβερνητικῷ νῷ συγκερασάμενοι σῴζουσιν αὑτούς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ναῦν; 'But reason applied to what, in combination with the senses? Take the saving of boats, for example, in storms or fair weather. Isn't it that, in a ship, the helmsman together with the sailors combine the senses with reason exercised by the helmsman, and in that way keep themselves and everything to do with the ship safe?' (transl. Schofield & Griffith).

70 Pl. *Leg.* 961e1-962a7; 963a11-b7. I have signalled a number of obvious correspondences between the beginning section and the end of the *Laws* (between Books I–II and Book XII) in Bartels (2017), 77, Chap. 6. The three τέχναι κυβερνητική, ἰατρική and στρατηγική are often grouped together as 'stochastic', and concerned with 'foreknowing the future', cf. n. 2 above and Eus. 14.20.6.1–3; in Pl. *Leg.* 709a7-b5 this is given a decidedly pessimistic turn, as these are precisely found lacking in the capacity to foresee events. Late antique discussions of prophecy include medicine and steersmanship in the category of 'technical prophecy' (ἡ … τεχνικὴ προφητεία, Io. Chrys. Fr. in *Jer.*, MPG 64, 741.43–47) because they involve foreknowledge of a technical kind based on experience.

71 Pl. *Leg.* 961d1-4.

5 Conclusion

The analogy of the seasick steersman in *Laws* 1 prompted an investigation into seasickness and θόρυβος, in order to ultimately uncover the qualification and identity of the leaders of the Dionysiac chorus. I have argued that seasickness and θόρυβος create a scenario in which the ability to resist seasickness (and the dangers of the sea) and to not fall prey to fear emerges as the result of sufficient *experience*. In line with this scenario, the chorus of Dionysus, whose members are slowly habituated to an increasingly liberal consumption of wine, functions as the training ground for this kind of experience. The symposiarch, who represents the older and fully educated members of the chorus of Dionysus, supervises the drinking habits of the younger members, and if necessary applies punishment for transgression of the drinking laws. He needs the emotional capacity to remain ἀθόρυβος in order to meet the increasingly rowdy and noisy (θορυβώδης) gathering of the symposiasts. This emotional robustness involves both not shrinking from stating in all frankness what might be unwelcome to his company, a disposition which stands in the lineage of Socratic courage; and being undaunted as regards the activity of the drinking itself, precisely because he has acquired sufficient experience with it to make him able to resist the kind of drunkenness that comes with it. Parallel to the Dionysiac chorus, the nocturnal council is also divided into a group of older and a group of younger members. The parallels between Books I–II and XII thus demonstrate that the disposition of the older members of the nocturnal council in *Laws* (the law guards above 50) not to be overwhelmed by fear and to defend the laws at all times is the product of the advanced *paideia* which these groups impart to their members.

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CHAPTER 8

The Dialogue between the Emotions in the Platonic Corpus

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Abstract

The Dialogues seldom address the topic of emotions without referring to the self-control problem. How can the soul overcome emotions strong enough to deprive it of its rational power? I contend that the solution lies in what the multipartite model of the soul leads to conceive as a dialogue between the emotions. Emotions are affective constituents of opinions about good and evil. They enter into a dialectical relationship when a second emotion takes a first emotion as its object, making it vary in intensity. The multipartite model, accounting for emotional tensions, still underlines the soul's endeavor towards unity. Self-control requires a virtue-oriented emotion in order to overcome irrational emotions pulling the soul in the opposite direction. Education is expected to engender such virtue-oriented emotion. Yet educating methods cannot but rely on, and thus nurture the irrational emotions they intend to thwart. Nevertheless, a first irrational emotion, with its doxastic (not cognitive) element, is doomed to arouse a second emotion, originating from the same source, and including an assessment of the first emotion's doxastic element. The way out of the self-control problem depends on the ensuing dialogue, and on its ability to redirect the soul's emotional thrust towards still unattained virtue and knowledge.

Keywords

self-control – dialogue – soul – cognitivism – meta-emotion – affective stress – education – virtue

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1 Introduction

The Platonic Corpus does not contain any equivalent of the broad concept of emotion, in the sense given by modern thinkers. The respective scopes of the

words πάθος (or παθήμα) and "emotion" may overlap, but only partially.[1] Even when they refer to the same fact, these words actually do not tell the same story about it. The word πάθος, which belongs to the same family of words as πάσχειν, connotes passivity. Its opposites are: δρᾶμα, πράξις and ἔργον. A. Furetière's definition of "emotion" in 1690 ("extraordinary movement that agitates the body or the spirit, and that disturbs its temperament or its balance"[2]) stresses the idea of motion rather than the idea of passivity.[3] However, Plato's Dialogues regularly deal with the sort of affections which a modern thinker would name "emotion", and they even depict the state of agitation that such affections may generate.[4] This is evidence that the Dialogues address the topic of emotion, which is represented by its kinds, such as anger (θυμός), fear (φόβος), hope (ἐλπίς), shame (αἰσχύνη) and so on.[5]

Some of the related texts – *Phd.* 94b7-e7, *Resp.* IV.439c2-441c3, *Phdr.* 253c7-256e2, and *Leg.* I.644d7-645c1[6] – give a picturesque description of the strains pervading the soul under the influence of its own emotions. These passages can be compared to some modern thinkers' writings (sometimes alluding to these very passages[7]) about emotional restraint. The emotions deflect the soul

1 See Price (2009), 1.

2 This is A. Furetière's definition of "emotion" in his French Dictionary (Furetière et al. (1690), vol. 1). A. Furetière's remark about the verb "to move" ("*esmouvoir*" in French) – "in morals, figuratively said of passions" – reveals that the idea of movement, when applied to the soul, is perceived as a metaphor. Descartes, in *The Passions of the Soul* art. 27, so defines the passions: "perceptions, or feelings, or emotions of the soul which one relates particularly to it, and which are caused, maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits". He then explains (in art. 28) his choice of the words "perception", "feeling" and "emotion". He writes: "[…] they [the passions] can be more precisely called emotions of the soul, not only because this name may be attributed to all the changes that occur within it – that is, to all the diverse thoughts that come to it, but more particularly because, among all the sorts of thought which the soul may have, there are no others which agitate and shake it so strongly as these passions do". Descartes' remark about using "emotion" to name volitions (in art. 28) confirms that this word "emotion" stresses the idea of motion rather than the idea of passivity. All translations from French into English are mine.

3 The latin verb *emoveo*, composed of *ex* and *moveo* (past participle: *emotus*) means "to move, to stir, to shake".

4 The issue of passivity or activity happens to be left aside, e.g. *Resp.* IV.437b4-5, maybe because affections generate actions.

5 Zaborowski (2016), 75–79 puts forward a few lists of emotions found in the dialogues (e.g. in *Lach.* 191d6-e1, *Tht.* 156b4-6, *Phd.* 67a7-9, *Leg.* II.653b2-4, *Phlb.* 50b7-c1).

6 *Resp.* IV.439c2-441c3 is echoed in *Resp.* IX.580d3-581a2, X.603c10-604d11 ; *Leg.* I.644d7-645c1 is reminded in *Leg.* VII.803c2-804c1. Frede (2010), 117–18 underlines the difference between the simile of the puppets in the *Laws* and other representations of the soul in the Platonic Corpus.

7 See Descartes (1996), art.47 .

from the path towards emotional restraint, to such an extent that the rational mind seems deprived of any practical power, as if to support Hume's claim that "reason is and ought only to be, the slave of passions" (Hume (1978), 415).[8] The difficulty amounts to the problem of self-control, which is generally stated in the context of those passages.[9] Part of the problem arises from the fact that, in order to achieve self-control, the same individual should fulfil the roles of both director (master) and directed (subjected to the master), making it all the more problematic for ancient Greeks that they conceive mastery and slavery as heterogeneous functions. Far from being a competent director, the individual in need of guidance is not even able to look for a proficient master (*Resp.* IV.489b5-c3).[10] The affections prevent the intelligence (νοῦς) from performing its specific task, which consists in governing them.[11] The individual dominated by emotions is actually in danger of being enslaved by himself. How can he even just purport to get a grip on himself?

My hypothesis is that the solution to the problem of self-control lies in what these passages lead to conceive as a dialogue between the emotions. The soul may simultaneously experience various emotions, which enter into a relationship akin to a dialogue between the parts of a multipartite soul, each of these parts being characterized by its special emotion (e.g. the love of knowledge for the so-called "rational" part). The platonic similes picturing the multipartite soul often depict a dialogue between its parts.[12] For example, the soul may be both harsh or lenient with its "desires, angers and fears, like one thing dialoguing

8 Hume argues from the fact that reason has a representative quality (like ideas) whereas a passion is an original existence (like impressions; this is also true for the will).

9 The issue of self-control is stated in *Phd.* 94c10-d2, *Resp.* IV.430e6-431d6, *Phdr.* 256b1, *Leg.* I.626d1-627c2 (ἄτοπος), 645b2-4. The opposite of "self-controlled" is "defeated by oneself" (*Leg.* I.626e2-627a4, 633d6-7). The guardian of oneself or inner guardian is mentioned in *Resp.* II.367a3, IX.591a2.

10 According to *Leg.* I.627d8-628c5, inner conflicts, both in a family and in a city, cannot be resolved but by a judge or a legislator from the outside.

11 The intelligence (or a rational part of the soul) is appointed to govern the soul and its emotions in *Phdr.* 247c7-8 (ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης), *Resp.* IV.431c5-8, 442a4-9, IX.586d4-587a2, 591c1-e5, *Leg.* I.631d5 (ὁ ἡγεμὼν), 632c6. Zaborowski (2012), (2016), 72–73 presents the debate about whether Plato is interested in affectivity or not, and whether he has a negative or positive conception of the emotions. But these questions may be wrongly put.

12 Bobonich (1994), 11–12 observes that the parts of the soul in *Resp.* IV apparently address one another. Werner (2013), 65–68, while commenting about the horse-team simile in the *Phaedrus*, highlights an "intrapersonal communication, that is, the kind of communication that takes place within the soul". Renaut (2014), 122–49 is particularly aware of the importance of the inner dialogue of the soul.

with another thing" (*Phd.* 94d5-6).[13] The presentation of my hypothesis will proceed in three stages: (1) the first stage, based on key passages of the Platonic Corpus, will aim at identifying the conditions and functions of the dialogue between the emotions; (2) the second stage will specify the terms of the self-control problem, placed within the context of education; (3) the third stage will consider whether the concept of a dialogue between the emotions casts any light on this problem.

2 Conditions and Functions of the Dialogue between the Emotions

The concept of a dialogue between the emotions is based on three assumptions, the first two being closely connected with the third one.

(1) The perceptions of pleasure and pain are inseparable from the emotions, such as desire and aversion, which these perceptions entail and from which they stem.[14] Pleasure and pain depend on the affections of desire and aversion, or love and hate; and conversely, these affections depend on the perceptions of pleasure and pain (*Resp.* IX.581c6-582a3, *Leg.* II.658c10-659c5).

(2) Emotions include a cognitive or rather a doxastic element. This assumption implies that an emotion is the affective constituent of an opinion, i.e. a state of mind that does not necessarily involve knowledge or reasoning. This last point helps to understand why an emotion, although endowed of a mental element, may appear irrational or unreasonable (*Resp.* IV.439d7: ἀλόγιστος).[15] We qualify as good and evil, beautiful and ugly, just and unjust the respective objects of desire and aversion; and these objects, being qualified in this way, engender desire and aversion respectively (*Resp.*

13 In *Resp.* IV.440a6, 441b7, the relationship between the parts of the soul is likened to an encounter between two different things.

14 See *Ti.* 42a6-7 (love implies a mixture of pleasure and pain), *Phlb.* 50b7-c3. In the dialogues, pleasure and pain happen to be designated as emotions. Zaborowski (2016), 70–71 observes a similarity between *Phlb.* 50b7-c3 and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1105b, *Rh.* 1378a.

15 H. Lorenz's explicit refusal to make a distinction between doxastic and rational elements leads him to deny that the appetite involves a cognitive (or rather mental) element Lorenz (2006). Price (2009), 7 uses the word "doxastic" in order to remind that the cognitive element of emotion is "belief-related" rather than "perceptual", not to underline the distinction between opinion and reason. O. Renaut admits that emotion in general implies a cognitive aspect (Renaut (2014), 9), which he mentions in relation to Socratic intellectualism (76). He asserts that, on this issue, it is necessary to pay attention to the distinction between opinion and knowledge (80–84). He also refers to *Resp.* IV.437b1-c10 (131–32).

IV.437b1-c10, VI.493a6-c9). The intensity of the emotion varies in relation to the strength of the corresponding opinion, and vice versa.[16]

(3) The perceptions of pleasure and pain are indicative of opinions about good and evil, as suggested through the statement "we rejoice whenever we believe we are acting well and again, whenever we rejoice, we believe we are acting well" (*Leg.* II.657c5-6: χαίρομεν ὅταν οἰώμεθα εὖ πράττειν, καὶ ὁπόταν χαίρωμεν, οἰόμεθα εὖ πράττειν αὖ;[17]). This is the reason why pleasure is so frequently mistaken for the good, a point underlined by Socrates' emphasis on the importance of distinguishing the good from pleasure, e.g. in the *Gorgias*.

These assumptions account for the fact that a disagreement in opinion about the good, the beautiful or the just goes together with a discrepancy between the affective responses given to the same stimulation (or with an identity between the responses given to different stimulations).[18] These assumptions admittedly sound akin to cognitivism, but differ from such theory of emotion by their focus on the distinction between knowledge and opinion. An acute awareness of this distinction leads to doubt the characterization of opinion as cognitive element, since opinion is what happens when the cognitive faculties are not properly implemented.

Speaking of a dialogue between the emotions means that the second emotion is related to the first emotion as to its object. For example, in a dialogue between desire and aversion, the second emotion (aversion) is less in opposition to the object for which the first emotion (desire) yearns for than to this very first emotion (desire).[19] The second emotion, taking the first emotion as its object, is indeed also concerned by the object of the first emotion, but this does not amount to both emotions having one and the same object. The nuance is crucial, even though it is generally seldom outlined or noticeable. The anger pulling in the opposite direction than thirst can certainly be said to divert from the drink, but this is only because the word "drink" refers to a liquid

16 The excess of confidence, provoked by drunkenness, makes any human being believe that he is wise (*Leg.* I.649b3-6).

17 The context of this sentence suggests that εὖ πράττειν here means "to act well" rather than "to prosper".

18 Differences of opinions about the good, sometimes related to emotional behaviours, are instanciated in *Grg.* 451e1-452d1, *Leg.* I.631b6-d2, II.661a4-c6.

19 Annas (1981), 138 writes "Plato does not have in mind conflicts which are created by facts about the *objects* of the motivations, only conflicts created by the nature of the motivations themselves".

made attractive by thirst.[20] Leontius blames his own eyes for enjoying the sight of the corpses: the object of his anger is his desire (*Resp*. IV.439e6-440b4).[21] The coachman and the first horse of the loving soul resist the compulsion exercised by the second horse, which then tries to thwart their resistance (*Phdr*. 253e5-254e5). The contemporary concept of meta-emotion, understood as "emotion about emotion", may apply to the second emotion, provided that this concept, far from being taken for granted, is used to explore the relationship between both emotions (so avoiding the temptation to distinguish between two classes of emotions, a class of emotions *per se* and a class of metaemotions).[22]

Since the second emotion takes the first emotion as its object, the second emotion may strengthen or inhibit the first, thwart or fortify it. It depends on the second emotion (*Resp*. IV.437b1-d1) as well as on the first emotion, or rather on the impact each emotion has on their combination, but not necessarily on the form of appraisal, negative (in case of divergence) or positive (in case of agreement), which the second emotion makes of the first. A second emotion may reinforce a first emotion without agreeing with it, as well as a second emotion may attenuate a first emotion without diverging from it. Shame (αἰσχύνη) distinguishes itself from the emotion which it takes as its object, but does not necessarily weaken it (*Lys*. 204b5-c5, 213d2-e1: in those very cases, shame diverges from love, the intensity of which is not any more reduced). The relationship between the emotions is more conspicuous in case of divergence than in case of agreement, "divergence" and "agreement" being interpreted as referring to negative appraisal and to positive appraisal (of the one emotion by the other), respectively. When emotions disagree (the second emotion being in opposition to the first emotion), it raises a problem (which takes the form of an inner conflict); when they agree (the second emotion being in keeping with the first emotion), it may be that the problem has been overlooked (in most cases)[23] or solved (more rarely). This point is sometimes expressed through the

20 Other examples can be found in *Phd*. 94b7-c2 (τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθη refers to affections that are body-related but nonetheless experienced by the soul), *Resp*. IV.439c2-440b4.

21 " 'Yet surely, this anecdote', I said, 'signifies that the principle of anger sometimes fights against desires as an alien thing against an alien' " (*Resp*. IV.440a5-6 : Οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφην, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὡς ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλῳ ; P. Shorey's translation).

22 For such use of the concept of metaemotion, see Norman and Furnes (2016).

23 In the case of shame of shame, experienced by someone whose opinions have been refuted, but who feels too ashamed to acknowledge this shameful fact, the divergence between the second emotion and the first emotion happens to be overshadowed, especially since the second emotion reinforces the first. For this analysis of that specific kind of shame of shame, see Candiotto (2014), 198, who also explains that, in this very case, admitting to being ashamed would lead to purification (and to being freed from shame).

harmony metaphor.[24] The related emotions can be identical or different. In Homer's story, Ulysses scolding his own heart gets angry at an organ which is particularly prone to anger (*Resp.* IV.441b3-c2; the verb ἐπιπλήττειν at 441b7 underlines Ulysses' anger).[25] Socrates claims to be in love with the love of knowledge (*Grg.* 484d1-5). The question whether emotions can be reflexive or self-related is not as irrelevant as it appears at first glance (*Chrm.* 167e1-168a2).

The similes of the city, the horse-team and the puppets allow to match mutually opposite emotions with different parts of the soul.[26] So these similes eliminate the inconsistencies resulting from the conflicts between the emotions which the soul experiences simultaneously. However, these similes are not intended to hide[27] the fact that the soul, whatever emotions it may experience, strives for preserving its unity.[28] The description of the soul torn between its diverse parts or limbs actually aims at highlighting the soul's endeavor to overcome its inner tensions. The multipartite model, far from denying the soul's unity, is meant to give an account of its endeavor towards unity.[29] The tensions between its diverse emotions (or motivations) certainly lead to conceive the soul as divided, but the distinction between different parts of the soul

24 In *Phd.* 93e8-9, the refutation of the soul-as-harmony thesis postulates identity between vice and disharmony, and between virtue and harmony. In addition to the simile of harmony and disharmony (*Resp.* III.410e10-411a4, 9.592d1-3, *Ti.* 47d2-7, *Leg.* II.653b6), the similes of war and peace (*Leg.* I.626d1-2), and of health and disease (*Resp.* IV.444c5-e2) can be found in the Corpus. Harmony and self-control are equated sometimes with virtue in general as opposed to vice (*Leg.* I.644b6-7), sometimes with a specific virtue: temperance as opposed to intemperance (*Resp.* IV.430e3-432b1, 442c10-d3), justice as opposed to injustice (*Resp.* IV.441e8-442b4, 443c9-444b9).

25 Homer's verses (*Od.* 20.17–18) are also quoted in *Phd.* 94d7-e1, *Resp.* III.390d3-5.

26 Commentators have raised an issue about the parts of the soul, whether they should be conceived as agents or as faculties. Werner (2013), 63 n.36 subscribes to the first view and objects to the second. Lorenz (2004), 92 n.20 also refers to this debate. Renaut (2014), 152–67 equates the soul with an intentional functional structure.

27 The context generally reminds that no simile should be accepted without question. See *Phdr.* 246a4-6 (253c7: μύθος), *Resp.* II.369a1-3, IV.435c9-d5, *Leg.* I.644c1-2, 645b1 (μύθος), II.658b9-c1, d10-11. Descartes, in *The Passions of the Soul* art. 47, comments on "the error committed in making it [the soul] play several parts, which are usually contrary to one another". Descartes does not see that the aim of the similes is to make the plurality of – sometimes opposite – affections consistent with the unity of the soul experiencing those very affections.

28 See *Resp.* X.611a10-612a7, where the love of knowledge goes along with the thrust (ὁρμή) which pulls the soul out of the affections and forms that it assumes in human life (τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πάθη τε καὶ εἴδη). The word ὁρμή echoes the verb ὁρμῆσθαι in the disjunction at *Resp.* IV.436a8-b2, which I understand as inclusive (see below).

29 According to Werner (2013), 59, the words σύμφυτος δύναμις (*Phdr.* 246a6-7) indicate that the compound consisting of three parts is in fact a single organism.

eventually accounts for the effect which these tensions produce on the soul as a whole.[30] The apparently mutually exclusive views, which depict the soul respectively as divided (first view) and as united (second view), turn out to be mutually inclusive (both views can be held simultaneously). Then, the disjunction enunciated in *Resp.* IV.436a8-b2 can be understood as inclusive: the first person plural refers to unified agents, each of them using a specific part of his soul to carry out an activity in which *he*, i.e. *his whole soul* thus gets involved.[31] The experience of the second emotion merges with the experience of the first emotion, from which the second emotion has been aroused and from which it still draws its intensity. In *Resp.* III.410b10-412a8, Socrates, describing the effects physical training and music have on the spirited and philosophic parts the soul, explains that these activities both make the soul prone to experience various emotions, depending on the amount of time spent on each. The metaphor of tension and relaxation bespeaks an inverse proportion between the respective intensities of such characteristic emotions as θυμός and φιλοσοφία. These different points having been stated, the relationship between the emotions of one same individual may be compared to the encounter between platonic characters experiencing different emotions. Socrates is ashamed (*Phdr.* 237a4-5, 243b6-7, d3-5) to make a speech which, like Lysias', might entail the fear of a kind of love (245b2-4). The platonic writings sometimes take into account the emotions that the characters' statements, with their affective load, might entail.

The various similes which depict the soul as made of several parts draw the attention on the doxastic constituent of the emotion. The parts of the soul, being personified, pretend to be able to perform cognitive operations (this pretention indeed raises a problem, but taking note of this pretention does not

30 For this point, see Kamtekar (2006), 181.

31 Lorenz (2004), 85–95 quotes *Resp.* IV.436a8-b2. He observes that Socrates sometimes speaks as if the whole soul experienced desires which are supposed to be characteristic of one specific part of it (439a9-e5). In fact, the evocation of the archer (439b9-11), which echoes the counter-examples to the principle of non-opposition (436c8-e7), may indicate that the disjunction is inclusive. H. Lorenz comments on these examples, and on the ambiguity of the texts (90, n.13, 89–90). He recalls (95) that at *Tht.* 184c5-d5, the instrumental dative (used in *Resp.* IV.439b5) refers to the soul. The instrumental dative is actually also used to name the parts of the soul in the disjunction of *Resp.* IV.436a8-b2. H. Lorenz still asserts that, according to *Resp.* IV, the embodied soul consists of distinct and specifiable elements, and that human motivations ensue from these elements. Even if he does not agree (94 n.22, 95 n.25) with Bobonich (2002), 254–56, who contends that Plato denies the unity of the person, H. Lorenz understands the disjunction of 436a8-b2 as exclusive and provides a simple (or simplified) picture of the tripartition of the soul. Renaut (2014), 130–33, 162–63, invokes the soul's thrust in order to question the interpretation of the disjunction as exclusive.

amount to assuming that every part of the soul is rational).[32] These similes also recall that neither reason (λόγος) nor law (νόμος) can govern without the help of affectivity. Self-control itself, being a way of life based on rational or legal regulation, requires an emotion – such as outrage (*Phdr*. 254a7-b1) or love of knowledge (*Phdr*. 256a7-b3) – to overcome the emotions pulling the soul in the direction opposite reason or law. The existence of such an emotion testifies that reason and law may impact the affectivity (*Leg.* I.644d1-3). The contention, supported by the multipartite model, that "reason has its own desires"[33] does not lead to equate reason and law to emotional facts. The desire for rationality must not be mistaken for reason, which indeed is the object of such a desire. In the puppets-image (*Leg.* I.644d7-645c1), the pull (ἕλξις) which subjects the puppet to the guidance (ἀγωγή) of reasoning is one of the sinews or strings featuring the affections (πάθη).[34] This pull is the affective result of a virtue-oriented education which, being provided from childhood, instils both the desire and the passion to become a perfect citizen, i.e. one who knows how to govern and be governed with justice (*Leg*. I.643e3-5: ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδεία, ποιοῦσα ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης). The virtue-oriented emotion (i.e. resulting from a virtue-oriented education) relies on the dialogue between the emotions in order to alter or even to fix the effects produced by other emotions.[35]

3 The Self-control Problem, Placed within the Context of Education

The analysis of the relationship between the emotions confirms that they have a role to play in the acquisition and the possession of virtue. But their

32 Kahn (1987), 91 remarks that "all three parts of the soul have a cognitive aspect and all three are also forms of desire". According to Werner (2013), 63–65, this is also true for the horse-team simile. He asserts that its rationality makes the rational element able to criticize or to change the desires of the other parts in the light of a global notion of what is best. Kamtekar (2006), 197 explains "our being rational allows our appetitive desires to appear to us as reasons, and our being appetitive allows our reasons to appear to us as violent forces".

33 See Lorenz (2004), 101 for this contention, with a reference to *Resp*. IX.580d7-8. H. Lorenz objects to the assumption that Plato's view of the relationship between reason and passions is akin to Hume's.

34 The Athenian says that we must cooperate (συλλαμβάνειν) with the leading-string (ἀγωγή) of the law and help (ὑπηρετεῖν) the leading-string of reasoning. Commentators wonder about this support provided to law and reasoning. See Kurke (2013), 128.

35 According to Frede (2010), 119, the puppet hasn't got three strings pulling in opposite directions, in a dispute won by the stronger, but two irrational (or non rational) strings, assessed and shaped by the rational faculty.

educating role still raises issues. Education is based on processes aimed at arousing the kind of emotion that the soul is expected to feel as a response to one specific emotion or another. The appropriate emotion is engendered by a stimulation which is intended to make the affectivity experience this very emotion. The traditional educating methods, such as reward and punishment, praise and blame (*Prt.* 323c5-326e5 ; *Leg.* I.631d6-632d1) can apparently be used to achieve this purpose. Reward and punishment rely on pleasure and pain – and on the desires and aversions entailed by these perceptions of pleasure and pain – to produce desire and aversion of specific objects and of the corresponding affections. Praise and blame, which present themselves as expressions of desire and aversion, make their listeners behave as if experiencing mimetic desires and aversions for the objects or affections that are praised or blamed (*Prt.* 326a1-4, *Resp.* VI.492b5-d1).

These traditional educating methods raise the following issue. Reward and punishment aim at diverting the soul from the very desires and aversions from which they derive their efficiency, and which they thus tend to nurture.[36] The original state of any human being cannot be but irrational. This original state, being characterized by irrational emotions, has to be rectified (*Ti.* 42a3-b2, 44a7-c4). Intelligence (νοῦς) is not automatically implemented by human beings (*Resp.* VI.508b12-509c4). Therefore, the educating process cannot avoid relying on the very affections which the education strives to redirect and to reform. This accounts for the fact that the transition from the standpoint of vice to the standpoint of virtue brings about a swap between pleasant and painful perceptions (*Leg.* II.663b4-664a7; at the early level of education, the claim that virtue is more pleasant than vice is akin to a lie, since the child is not already inclined to enjoy virtue). Praise and blame jeopardize the whole educating process by encouraging mimicry. They urge their listeners to speak in terms contrary to some of their own tendencies and reluctances, which neither praise nor blame can suppress (*Leg.* II.654b11-656b8). Shame (αἰσχύνη) is related to the fear of a specific opinion (*Grg.* 461b4-7, 482c7-e2, *Leg.* I.646e10-647a2) and love of honor also appears to have a limited impact (*Phdr.* 256c1). In the Platonic Corpus, praise and blame are often criticized for covering up the lack of knowledge concerning both the things (that are praised and blamed) and the criteria on which praise and blame depend. This educating

36 See Adimantus' analysis of the failure of the Athenian education (*Resp.* II.362e1-367e5). The use of pleasures and pains in the educating process raises a crucial problem (*Leg.* I.636d7-e3). It may be the reason why education sometimes strays from its path (*Leg.* I.644b2-4).

method leads to overlook both the things and the criteria.[37] In fact, there is no guarantee that the traditional educating methods can produce properly directed emotions.

Last but not least, these methods necessitate an educator or a legislator, to make sure that they are properly used in the educating process. But the educator or legislator herself must receive an education.[38] Then, the kind of affectivity needed to secure a correct assessment of the emotions – and thus to provide the foundation of the educating process – is an affectivity already shaped by such an assessment. Self-control and knowledge are mutually dependent. The question remains of how education should proceed to really make the soul able to stem the affective impact of inappropriate emotions.

4 The Self-control Issue Seen in the Light of the Dialogue between the Emotions

My hypothesis is that the concept of a dialogue between the emotions helps to answer the question. The learning process leading to self-control has a paradoxical character (*Leg*. I.646b5: it is amazing and weird). This learning process is based on tests where the souls are challenged with irrational emotions, allowing to observe how they handle such emotions (*Resp*. III.413d7-414a8, VI.502e2-503a7, *Leg.* I.646d1-650b4). That kind of test may be called an "affective experiment". The souls are trained to get through the self-control process, and then to break the grip of their emotions, by being subjected to a condition of alienating emotions (*Leg*. I.645d1-646a6: this condition is akin to a return to early childhood). Imitation, as depicted in Plato's Dialogues, provides a way to make such a test. The relation between the emotions is analogous to the relation between a piece of imitation and the emotion aroused in the soul of the imitator or of the spectator (*Grg*. 502b1-d9, *Resp*. X.603c4-608b10, *Leg.* II.655d5-656a6). The soul must resist its own mimetic tendency in order to let itself be guided by the constituent which, within the soul, is akin (but not identical) to the divinity.[39] There is a significant difference between imitation of affectively determined human-beings and imitation of the divinity. Imitation of the divinity is achieved as much as possible through a flight which drives the soul

37 *Symp*. 198c5-199b2, *Phdr*. 259e4-260d2, *Grg*. 448d2-e7, 462c8-d2, 463d3-5, *Resp*. IX.582d15-e9, 589b7-c5, *Leg*. I.638c2-d7.

38 See *Leg*. I.639a2-b11 (self-control is required to assume the function of a director), 643e3-6 (education teaches how to govern and be governed with justice).

39 The divine constituent of the soul is mentionned in *Ti*. 90a2-d7, *Resp*. IX.589d1, e4, 590d1, X.611e2-3.

away from inappropriate affects and thus contributes to the thoughtful acquisition of the required virtues (*Tht.* 176b1-3: φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι).

The emotions of the soul generate new emotions which distinguish themselves from the former, taking them as their objects. In a dialogue between two emotions, the second one involves an assessment, positive or negative, of the first. The doxastic element of the first emotion contributes to its conversion into object of a second emotion, which also involves a doxastic element related to the same topic, making the second emotion enter into a dialogue with the first emotion. The doxastic elements of the emotions generally deal with good and evil, beautiful and ugly, just and unjust etc., those very notions that all human beings try to grasp, albeit they remain unable to find any criteria which would settle their disputes on the subject, preventing these disputes to degenerate into conflicts (*Euthphr.* 7b6-8e10, *Phdr.* 263a2-d3). These notions form the common topic with which the doxastic elements of the emotions are concerned. The analysis of H. Lorenz's argument to contend that appetite is irrational ("in the strong sense of lacking the capacity of reasoning") may cast some light on the role played by doxastic elements in the mutual generation of the emotions. H. Lorenz's argument is a *reductio ad aburdum*:

> If appetite is rational, it is capable of forming reasoned desires for what it takes to be better in the long run, and of forming reasoned aversions to what it takes to be worse in the long run. If so, it is vulnerable to just the kind of motivational conflict that Platonic soul-partition rules out at the level of individual soul-parts.
>
> LORENZ (2006), 9

My contention is that the concept of a dialectical relationship between the emotions removes the absurdity. The desire that goes beyond itself retrospectively blames its previous form for its lack of reasoning. When a second emotion overtakes a first emotion, the first emotion turns out to look irrational. The admission that the first emotion had a cognitive element (in fact a doxastic element) is thus granted only to be challenged.[40]

40 Renaut (2014), 76 distinguishes between two interpretations of the so-called Socratic intellectualism: (1) every emotion has a cognitive core, which might entail mistakes, (2) Socrates puts forward an ideal rationalization of human motivation, knowing that the main part of our actions is determined by irrational powers. Renaut, agreeing with the latter interpretation, assumes that a retrospective analysis takes place, linking the emotion to an argument, and thus making the emotion look rational (81).

Then the Socratic idiom, “all humans desire the good”,[41] contains the seeds of an emotional anthropology: the idiom brings human emotions back to their common root[42] which, being identified as Erôs in the *Symposium* or as “the first friend” (219c6-d5: πρῶτον φίλον) in the *Lysis*, cannot be apprehended but through its multiple images (εἴδωλα).[43] This may be the reason why every part of the soul presents all the characteristics that distinguish them from one another. This observation usually leads to the “homunculus problem”: since each part of the soul contains as many parts as the entire soul, it entails an infinite regress.[44] However, the multipartite model, which emphasizes emotions, may be related to the definition of the soul as a self-moving motion (*Phdr*. 245c5-246a2, *Leg.* X.895e10-896a5), i.e. a living thing which can differentiate itself from its own emotion (with which it previously identified), and so recognize itself in a new emotion (which may be opposite to the first). O. Renaut, dealing with the homunculus problem (Renaut (2014), 134–38), asserts that the parts of the soul should be compared with dialoguing interlocutors (rather than with agents). In a dialogue, each participant endorses the other participant’s thesis, in order to assert a different one (which may eventually replicate the other participant’s thesis). R. Kamtekar relates the personification of the parts of the soul to the description of thinking as “the soul’s conversation with itself about the objects under consideration” (*Tht*. 189e4-a8, *Soph*. 264a6-b1), and claims that the personification “facilitates disowning some of one’s motivations and identifying with others” (Kamtekar (2006), 184–85).

The Socratic idiom is thus not belied by the proliferation of the emotions nor by their adversarial relationships, which would actually be inconceivable

41 *Resp*. IV.438a3-4, VI.505d11-e1, *Alc.* 115e1-4, *Lys*. 219a6-b2, *Euthd*. 278e3 ff., 282a1-2, *Charm*. 167e4-5, *Men*. 77c1-2 ff., *Symp*. 205a5-8, 205e7-206a1, *Grg*. 468b1-4, c 5, 499e6-500a1, *Phl.* 61a1-2.

42 This point questions the interpretation which assumes that human motivations start not from a single common root, but from diverse unrelated roots. See Werner (2013), 59. Motivations starting from a single common root may still be quite different from one another.

43 All the affections of the horses and the coachman are manifestations of love (*Phdr*. 253c7-256e2), which happens to be a controversial topic (263a2-d3) (Renaut (2014), 18–19). Θυμός, which is sometimes identified to the emotion of anger, shelters many emotions, among which love (ἔρως). Ἐπιθυμία may refer to the desire for knowledge (Lorenz (2004), 108, referring to *Resp*. I.328d2-4, 475b4-6, *Phd*. 96a6-8). The love of dialectic is mentioned in *Tht*. 146a6-8, 169c1, 181b8.

44 See Moline (2009), 22–25, Annas (1981), 142–46, 149–51, Williams [1973] (1999), 256, Bobonich (2002), 248–54, Roochnik (2003), 14–20, Rosen (2005), 70, Renaut (2014), 134–38. Kamtekar (2006), 176, referring to *Resp*. IV.443d and X.603d5-7, notes that “Plato does not insist on three and only three parts of the soul”. Plato, being fully aware that his similes entail infinite regress, may consider that this consequence adds to the likeness between the *illustrans* (the images) and the *illustrandum* (the soul).

without this idiom. The admission that the object of thirst is drink in general, not a drink of such and such quality does not contradict the Socratic idiom (*Resp*. IV.437b1-439b2). On the contrary, thirst exemplifies that idiom, since it leads to equate drink with the good, instead of considering goodness as a mere attribute of drink, i.e. something different from drink itself. The fact is that this equation between drink and the good betrays a lack of interest for the real good, and thus challenges the Socratic idiom. But this is precisely the reason why the part of the soul which endeavors to differentiate between better and worse (441c1-2) comes to oppose the desire for drink (441c1-2). The subsequent antagonism reflects a disagreement about the good, and so testifies that both participants, the angry part of the soul and the thirsty one, desire the good, thus substantiating the Socratic idiom. The blindness of the "irrationnal desires blind to the good"[45] makes them miss the target, i.e. the good, at which those desires actually aim, although they mistake it for something else.

The related emotions can be simultaneous or successive. In the ascent to the beautiful, the transition from an inferior form of love to a superior form of love requires the first form of love to be converted into object of contempt (*Symp*. 210a4-211d1). The respective intensities of desires aiming at different goals are indirectly proportional, like the streams of two canals fed by a single spring (*Resp*. I.328d2-4, VI.485d6-e2). The opposition to the early expression of desire turns out to be a new expression of that same desire, which, being redirected, ends up distinguishing itself from the opposition itself.[46] According to

45 See Ferrari (2007), 168–69. G.R.F. Ferrari gives an account of the positions adopted by the commentators, who usually assume that 437b1-439e1 questions the Socratic claim that there is a universal desire for the good. The widespread view of the commentators stems from their common tendency to understand τὰ ἀγαθά – in πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (438a3-4) – as if ἀγαθά was an attributive adjective qualifying something else and not a nominal adjective performing the function of a noun. See Lorenz (2004), 96–98. In fact, the shift from the nominal adjective to the attributive adjective is a condition and an outcome of the distinction between "the good itself" and the thing which happens to be qualified as "good". When Weiss (2007) questions the widespread view about 437b1-439e1, she argues from the distinction between ἀγαθά and χρηστά (and from other points too). Renaut (2014), 166 asserts that the good is diversely understood, depending on the dominating function in the soul's structure.

46 See *Ti*. 42a3-b1 for an explanation of the emergence of emotions. The playful etymology of ἐπιθυμία relates this word to "the power that goes into the θυμός" (*Crat*. 419d8-e2). This etymology underlines the fact that a frustrated desire brings about irritation. Ferrari (2007), 191–92 relies on *Resp*. VI.485d6-e2 to explain that the rational element, transcending the task which consists in governing the inferior elements of the soul, comes to perform a task driven by the love-of-knowledge. Ludwig (2007) observes an ambivalence about *erôs* in the *Republic*, where *erôs* is alternately disapproved and approved (as in the *Symposium* and in the *Phaedrus*). He compares the hierarchy of desires in the *Republic* to the scale at

the "second demonstration" given in *Republic* IX (580d3-583b2), the lover of knowledge outperforms his competitors, the lover of honor and the lover of profit, not only in experiencing the pleasure of thinking but in experiencing their specific pleasures as well. The lover of knowledge could not outperform his competitors in their specific pleasures if he did not outperform them in their specific desires (the desire for honor and the desire for profit).[47] It is evidence for the fact that he was governed by those desires before he could redirect them in the opposite direction. The suggestion that desires should be redirected rather than suppressed is also made in the *Laws*. According to the Athenian Stranger (*Leg.* VI.782d10-783b1), for human-beings, everything depends on three needs and desires (thirst, hunger and sexual appetite), from which ensues virtue, if these desires are correctly directed, or the opposite of virtue, if they are badly managed. The right behavior consists in directing one's desires to what is best – far from the so-called pleasure –, and in trying to restrain them by fear, law and true discourse, with the help of the Muses and the agonistic deities, in order to reduce the desires' growth and flow. In a kindred passage (*Leg.* VIII.841a6-c6), which relates to the danger of being defeated by oneself, the Athenian Stranger proposes to turn (τρέπειν) the desires that are opposed to virtue into a different direction. Thus, the corrupt type would be surrounded by three other types, which would prevent the former from breaking the law: the fear of the deity, the love of honor and the desire to acquire good manners (τρόπος, which echoes τρέπειν), not in the body but in the soul.

5 Conclusion

The reduction of the impact of an irrational emotion, opposite to knowledge, relies on another emotion which, being aroused by the former, would enable the soul to distance itself from it and to commit in the search for knowledge (which does not exclude a knowledge-oriented affection to be thwarted by the emotion it has aroused). The overtaking of affectivity is then based on affectivity (*Plt.* 277d6-7, *Tht.* 155d1-3, *Resp.* II.376a11-b1, VI.511d7), or rather on the dialogue between the emotions. The doxastic constituents of the emotions

Symp. 210a4-211d1, Ludwig (2007), 217–20. He shows (*Ibid.* 220–30) that the link between θυμός and *erôs* gives way to an *erôs* without θυμός, a philosophical *erôs*. He eventually admits that there is still a gap between the "political account of *erôs*" and the "philosophical account of *erôs*". For the part played by love (ἔρως) in the acquisition of virtue, see *Leg.* I.463c8-d4.

47 The third demonstration (*Resp.* IX.583b3-587b10) emphasizes the lack of experience of the lover-of-knowledge's contenders.

contribute to this dialogue, where the leading thrust of the soul is redirected towards knowledge and self-control, two conditions which eventually turn out to be independent from the dialoguing emotions (*Phlb.* 21d9-e2, 33d4, e10, *Leg.* 1.647d7: ἀπαθής).

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CHAPTER 9

Love, Speech and Charm in Plato's *Charmides*: Reading the Dialogue through Emotions

Carla Francalanci

Abstract

In this text I intend to show Socrates' dialectics in the *Charmides* through a rhetorical aspect, namely the conduction of the interlocutor's emotions. It is my intention to show the Socratic-Platonic operation here in display, his 'charm', as a kind of psychagogy which goes along with the philosophical investigation, in which the difference between Sophistics and Philosophy can be shown through Socrates' conduction of *pathos*, in his dialogue with Critias, from eristic dispute to philosophical love.

Keywords

emotions – rhetoric – persuasion – φιλοτιμία – φιλία

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1 Introduction

The guiding question of this writing, and the one it will necessarily leave unanswered, far exceeds the scope of an investigation on the field of Platonic or Hellenistic studies: what is the bond between emotions to reason? And between desire and discourse? Formulated in contemporary terms, we could refer to it in this way: to what extent must we take seriously and thus assume the consequences of Jacques Lacan's statement, according to which 'each one concludes according to each one's desire'?[1] I take as a starting point the need not

1 In this paper I will make use of the ordinary, "loose" meaning of the word "desire" and not to the Lacanian technical term, in which it emerges as an effect of our condition of speakers and as something which always evades or remains unsaid and unfulfilled in the demands we are pressed, by and through this speaker condition, to make to the Other. But even if the

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to radicalize this dictum, in the sense of affirming that the role of rationality and argumentation is null or ineffective before the imperative of desire. However, the phrase seems to point in an important direction, the necessity to mark that changing someone's intellectual position does not dispense with the necessity to operate a redirection, or a conversion in the desire and, thus, in the whole economy of emotions of the one who is being persuaded.

Contrary to what the above statement may have implied, I would like in this paper to consider the rhetorical dimension of discourse through the study of a Platonic dialogue. In spite of the well-known contention and opposition between Platonic philosophy and sophistry, in which the latter is reputed to possess a rhetoric which is circumscribed to a body of discursive techniques and figures as its main concern (see *Phdr*. 266d-267e), I am convinced that it is precisely a rhetoric conversion of the soul at the level of desire that the Socratic-Platonic dialectics is concerned with. It is this conversion that Plato's philosophy is trying to propose, to exemplify and to perform. I follow the outline pointed out by Hadot,[2] in order to show that philosophical conversion – in these lines, I restrict myself to the one that is put forward by Plato – cannot be thought of as strictly intellectual, and that philosophy is marked in Platonic dialogues as a path that aims, through dialectical argumentation, to lead to an integral modification in the way of life of those who engage in it.

A passage from the *Seventh Letter* well exemplifies this goal of integral conversion of the soul intended by Plato.[3] Referring to his encounter with Dion and his education by the philosopher, he reports:

> For Dion in truth, being quick-witted, both in other respects and in grasping the arguments I then put forward, hearkened to me with a keeness and ardour that I have never yet found in any of the youth whom I have met; and he determined to live the rest of his life in a different manner from the majority of the Italians and Sicilians, counting virtue worthy of more devotion than pleasure and all other kinds of luxury.[4]

In the view I am proposing to follow, Dion's conversion can be taken as a model of what Platonic teaching seeks to accomplish. As an exemplary pupil of these teachings, he gathers virtue in its intellectual and moral dimensions, at the

quoted sentence refers to this meaning, it can nonetheless make us think of the efficacy of argumentation when it addresses a non pure logical-argumentative hearer, which we always are, and which is my point here.

2 Hadot (1995), 147–79.

3 See Candiotto (2012), 201–35.

4 *L. VII*, 327a-b (trans. Bury (1989)).

same time learning and converting what he has learned in a transformation that affects his entire life.

If this assumption is appropriate, in order to understand why Socrates is the model of philosopher and philosophical discourse in Platonic dialogues, it will be necessary to consider him as someone who seeks, in his dialogical exercises, to operate an effort to accomplish an affective or psychic conversion, which aims to instill in the soul a desire to know and the commitment to investigate. I propose that this goal runs parallel to what he performs on the intellectual plane, the refutation of opinions and the conduction of the interlocutor to a new epistemic level. This awakened desire, in turn, also modifies the interpersonal relationship in this intertwining of affection and discourse, since it also establishes a change in the bond between the one who asks and the other who answers. This new philosophical desire leads to a feeling which is distinct from eristic rivalry, so that the friendship (φιλία) shared by those who engage in a common cause has the function, intended by Socrates, to operate as a substitute and an antidote to the desire for honor and distinction (φιλοτιμία) of the interlocutors who take part on eristic struggles (see *Lys*. 270b-c for a perspective on *philia* which shelters friendly dispute and competition).

2 The *Charmides*

The dialogue I chose in order to show this Socratic operation on emotions is the *Charmides*. A reading of this text with a specific focus on the role performed by the emotions present and also raised in the course of the dialogue will be made, assuming that it is possible to read this philosophical text from a rhetorical perspective. But how far?

First, 'rhetoric' is understood here in its broadest sense: it belongs to the inter-human dimension of discourse, that is, the fact that every utterance or enunciation is addressed to someone and presupposes an addressee.[5] In this sense, I call 'rhetoric' the procedures that aim at persuasion, consent or adhesion of the interlocutor. In the case of Platonic dialogue, it is important to keep in mind that there is a duplication in this aspect: for it will apply in this sense both to the strategies of Socrates as a character to generate persuasion and agreement in the characters with whom he dialogues, as well as to the textual strategies used by Plato in order to generate adhesion or persuasion in his readers. In both cases, the purpose of the inference of the emotions is to bring about *psychagogia*, in the interlocutor-listener-reader, specifically regarding his desire.

5 Michelini (2003), 8.

Second, the emphasis given in this paper to this dimension in no way signifies the attempt to propose a new valuation, placing the affective aspect over the content of the argumentation present in the dialogue, which in this case is the attempt to find a definition for σωφροσύνη. This dimension, I intend to say, only deserves greater visibility.[6] Therefore I will try to show that the Platonic Socrates proceeds explicitly in order to operate a substitution of emotions, in the sense of enforcing φιλία, which brings together the interlocutors in the joint search for a common cause, understood as the search for the subject that they try to apprehend and define. This philosophical *pathos*[7] appears in the dialogue in clear counterpoint and in a necessary attempt to serve as a substitute for the antagonistic polarity that sustains eristic struggle. This interpretation also appears to explain the dialogue-form in Platonic writing as the means of conducting a philosophical path, since it makes more visible and comprehensible Plato's efforts, in many dialogues, to portray the emotional changes that not only his interlocutors, but also Socrates, experience through the discussion.

In this sense, the *Charmides* is a privileged dialogue, for emotions are abundantly present in it, they are portrayed in an extremely careful way, and they perform functions which are not merely ancillary or 'scenic' but which are directly related to the cognitive or intellectual level concerned in the discussion. And among the emotions, I would like to emphasize in particular the role played by love, taking this term in a broad sense, as we shall see.

Therefore, I would like to highlight some privileged places in which Socrates employs rhetorical means, in order to show how the philosopher makes use of the emotions in establishing dialogue and philosophical inquiry.

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6 The perspective I adopt here follows some contemporary studies on Plato, which intend to highlight the rhetoric dimension present on Plato's dialogues. See Michelini (2003). My contribution resides in showing how these rhetorical procedures are employed by Socrates in the *Charmides.*

7 The following lines of my paper will show why, if we follow Socrates' rhetorical strategies in the *Charmides*, we can call φιλία a 'philosophical *pathos*' in comparison to ἔρις, which could be called a 'sophistical' one.

Although φιλεῖν composes the term φιλόσοφος, the philosophical pathos is most often addressed in Platonic dialogues as ἔρως or ἐπιθυμία (Cf *Symp.* 203e-204b and *Resp.* 485a-e). One exception is the *Lysis*, in which ἔρως, ἐπιθυμία and φιλία appear as synonyms (221e-222a). The *Charmides*, in its turn, reinforces the 'gathering' or interhuman aspect present in φιλία, as it appears in the dictum 'Friends have all things in common', the closing lines of the *Phaedrus* (279c). In this sense, φιλία can be understood as the feeling or attitude toward each other which makes the common search for truth possible, since the arguments displayed in a discussion ruled by φιλία will be focused only on the object of research, instead of being directed to mere attempts to convince the others of whatever point the speaker has.

3 The Prologue

The first passage where emotions – and love in particular – play an important role is in its prologue. When Socrates, who is also the dialogue's narrator, returns to Athens from the war expedition to Potidaea and meets some acquaintances in a palaistra, he asks how philosophy is going and if any of the youngsters stands out for σοφία, beauty (κάλλει) or both. Critias points out young Charmides as distinguishing himself from the others by beauty.

At that moment, the young man himself appears, and he is said to look astonishing (θαυμαστός) to the philosopher for his beauty and stature. Socrates also says that he perceives Charmides to be the object of love of all the presents, both of the adults and, what he marks as not being usual, also of the other young people, given the astonishment and confusion caused by his presence.[8]

The erotic ambience of the dialogue continues, in Chaerephon's comment that the impression made by Charmides' face, which seems so handsome to Socrates, would be eclipsed by his body, if the young man consented to undress. Socrates retorts that Chaerephon would present him as unbeatable (ἄμαχον) in beauty, if his soul happened to be as well-formed as the rest of the body.[9] Hearing from Critias that the young man is καλός καὶ ἀγαθός also in his soul, Socrates suggests undressing this part of the adolescent by means of a conversation. Critias proposes the stratagem of presenting Socrates to the young man as the one who has the cure (the φάρμακον)[10] for the headache that he had complained about in the morning.

Charmides' approach begins with a comic episode. Everybody present promptly made room by their side, hoping that the young man would sit there, which resulted in the last man being expelled. The sequence of the text deals with an escalation of Socrates' love. When the adolescent takes place between Socrates and Critias, the philosopher describes himself as astonished (ἠπόρουν), and he abandons the previous confidence that to dialogue with the boy would be an easy undertaking. When he is introduced to Charmides as the one having healing powers, the young man looks at him as if he wants to ask something, but everyone present at the palaistra join them, what creates a moment of disturbance. At that moment Socrates claims to have looked into Charmides' cloak and then to 'catch fire' (ἐφλεγόμην),[11] being out of himself, and then

8 *Chrm.* 154c.
9 *Chrm.* 154d-e: Εἰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς.
10 *Chrm.* 155b.
11 *Chrm.* 156d.

seeming to be at his mercy.[12] The youth asks if he knows the cure for his head. Thus they begin a conversation about the treatment, which the philosopher claims to consist of a plant and a charm.

Socrates explains that the charm will proceed like the treatments of good doctors, who say they cannot heal the body part without healing the body as a whole. Upon hearing the young man's assent to this way of proceeding, the philosopher claims to regain his courage (ἀνεθάρρησά τε)[13] and start little by little to regain confidence. He explains then that the treatment comes from the divine king Zalmoxis, who affirmed that he cannot heal the part without healing the whole body, nor heal the body without healing the soul. It must be cured first by means of certain charms (ἐπῳδάς) consisting of beautiful speeches (λόγους…τοὺς καλούς). Through them temperance is generated in the soul; and by this generation the healing for the head and the rest of the body is assured.

Once Critias attests that Charmides also exceeds in temperance all the others, Socrates affirms that he can do without the charm, if the young man in fact possesses this virtue; otherwise he should apply the spell before the medicine. He then asks the young man to respond whether he participates in temperance or he is deprived of it. At that moment Socrates reports that Charmides blushed, appearing even more beautiful, for his shame was at odds with his age,[14] and he said he could not decide, because he did not consider it advisable, denying it, to disagree with Critias and those who affirm him temperate on the one hand; on the other hand, he did not desire, affirming his temperance, to praise himself and to appear disagreeable. Socrates then proposes that they investigate together whether or not the young man possesses this virtue, and thus the argumentative part of the dialogue begins.

Firstly, it is necessary to point that the field of meanings of the term σωφροσύνη is much broader than each of its current translations in English can express.[15] The reason is that the term covers in its range of meanings both a moral scope, in which the transpersonal dimension, or the positioning of an individual within a group is concerned, as well as an intellective one, which expresses one's way of thinking and understanding one's situation, acting thus according to this understanding.[16] From this wide range of meanings the

12 For a comparison of this passage with the affections portrayed in melic poetry, presenting their description in physiological terms, see Calame (1999), 13–39.

13 *Chrm.* 155d.

14 *Chrm.* 158c.

15 See Tuozzo (2011), 52.

16 See Tuozzo (2011), 53.

various definitions presented throughout the work follow.[17] And yet, this both ethical and dianoetic rooting seems to make σωφροσύνη a privileged term to approach virtue as such, in the way it seems to be sought by Platonic investigations, since it stresses the presence of a dimension of knowledge intertwined with the virtues which are commonly regarded as ethical.

The prologue scene brings out something peculiar: it exposes Socrates in the process of falling in love with Charmides, and it is shown from the beginning until its point of culmination, where the philosopher declares himself at the mercy of the youngster, and the subsequent seizure of this love – here understood as erotic desire – which allows Socrates to prepare the ground for investigation, generating in Charmides the desire to investigate what *sophrosyne* is, in order to find out whether or not he is indeed its possessor. In short, the prologue enacts the very realization of a virtue, that of control over desires and passions. It is necessary to note that this is the most common meaning, at least for us, of the term, when it is translated by 'temperance'. And yet it is not present among its various definitions presented in the dialogue.

In his book *Sophrosyne and the rhetoric of self-restraint*, Adriaan Rademaker makes a valuable gathering of the literary uses of this term – traversing epic, lyric, tragedy, historiography, comedy and oratory – in order to mark its current meanings for a literate Greek of the fourth century, and thus available to Plato and his readers. He also points to the way in which the philosopher dialogues with these diverse meanings in his works, giving special emphasis, in his study, to the *Charmides*. His research points out the control over wrath and desires in several of these literary genres as one of the most recurrent meanings of the term.

Rademaker's conclusion for such an absence among the dialogue's definitions is exactly what I seek to highlight here: this definition is not examined in the discussion, but it is rather *performed* in the prologue scene. Plato counts with the most current and immediate meaning of the term, which is at the disposal of the readers and listeners of his dialogue, in order to present Socrates in the full exercise of temperance. More than a supplementary definition, it would be the consensual doxastic basis for the other definitions, which

17 Rademaker (2005), 5: "My claim will be that what we have here is a number of quite distinct uses of the word that are connected by what is called, after Wittgenstein, family resemblance. In terms of cognitive semantics, these uses are 'nodes', so to speak, of a network of related, if clearly distinct, uses. And, as the wealth of associated terms that come up in the course of the dialogue shows, these uses interact with other terms within the realm of what we may call the 'valuation of human behavior'. The uses of *sọphosýnẹ* form a network in themselves, but within a larger network of terms used in the (positive or negative) evaluation of human behavior".

remains uninvestigated in the dialogue and which, when staged, presents Socrates as the most capable of conducting the research, once he is attested to participate in this fundamental sense of *sophrosyne*.

The scene in the proem thus plays an eminently exhortative role, through the exposition of the exemplarity of the philosopher. It shows an act of temperance and shows at the same time that the necessity of belonging to a virtue walks along with the necessity of its investigation by thought. And it also illustrates how any investigation must be prepared by the process of generating in the one who will be interrogated a desire, through the search of the object to be examined: in the case of Charmides, it is done through the investigation of what *sophrosyne* is in order to know whether he in fact owns it or not. This scene may be read as a rhetorical strategy, addressed not to Socrates' listeners but to Plato's readers, in order to present Socrates as the character who may lead the discussion once he is in advance distinguished by the possession of σωφροσύνη, at least in its more immediate and widespread meaning.

Understanding the role performed by the control over pleasures and desires present in the scene of the proem as the doxastic basis for the subsequent dialogue, I think it is possible to state that philosophical inquiry will proceed searching for a meaning of σωφροσύνη that, once secured at the level of an ἐγκράτεια, can go beyond this first and more prevalent meaning. Socrates seems to pursue a definition that transcends the uses of the term provided on the one hand by tradition, from which the first two Charmides' definitions seem to come, and on the other hand by the sophistic and political meanings which spread in his century, and which appear through both the definitions given by Critias and his behavior in the dialogue. However, this will not be an issue I intend to develop in this text.

The rhetorical dimension of discourse and its psychagogical effect is explicitly emphasized by Socrates in the proem through the introduction of the use of the charm (ἐπῳδή). This 'magic spell' that must be uttered along with the ingestion of the leaf is rejected as something that Charmides can write.[18] This charm, which seeks to heal the whole (ὅλον)[19] of body and soul through the healing of the soul as its leading part, consists of λόγοι of a certain type, from which σωφροσύνη is generated in the soul, and which ensures health for this directing part, and then for the whole body. The end of the dialogue attests

18 See Petre (2007), 51. The author refers to an unpublished article by J. Svenbro in which he treats this charm as an allegory of reading. I would like to point out only to the possibility of reading in this passage the fact that Socratic incantation, understood as the actual dialogue or actual dialogical operation, needs to be rejected as something that can be written.

19 *Chrm.* 156c-157b.

that the dialogue itself was this ἐπῳδή,[20] to whose treatment Charmides affirms willingly he will begin to submit to daily, until Socrates deems it sufficient.[21]

4 Socrates and Critias

The second moment of this predominant role of emotions present in the dialogue refers to the discussion between Socrates and Critias.[22] Charmides presents as his third attempt to define ἐπῳδή something he claims he has heard from another, and defines it as 'doing one's own business' (τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν), which Socrates readily attributes to Critias, although the politician denies it. I would like to emphasize the eminently rhetorical dimension of Socratic refutation, at this moment of dialogue.

Charmides asks Socrates what difference it makes from whom he has heard this statement. Socrates answer, that it makes no difference since what matters is to investigate whether it is true or not,[23] seems to be denied by the way Socrates himself conducts his refutation. Socrates accuses the definition of looking like a kind of enigma, and he proceeds to a derisory interpretation of the sentence,[24] where 'doing one's own business' is exemplified by the scribe who would therefore write only his own name. Taking this interpretation further on the absurd path, the philosopher lists many different arts, in order to identify their production (ἀπεργάζεσθαι) with doing something (πράττειν),[25] and to come to propose the definition as the model of a city in which each one would have to realize every art involved in its maintenance by itself and only

20 For the relation between philosophy and charm, see Belfiore (1980).

21 Petre (2007), 55–56: "Ainsi, l'*epodé* est par son essence même ambiguë. Elle peut être une imposture ou même un maléfice, mais aussi une variante du discours formatif, voire normatif: une variante chargée de séduction, bien adaptée à l'âme jeune, encore sauvage, et à ses forces naissantes. (…) Il est vrai, d'une certaine manière, que, comme l'écrivait jadis Jacqueline de Romilly, Platon oppose à l'envoutement trompeur des poètes, démagogues et sophistes la contre-magie socratique de la vérité. Mais cette contre-magie reste elle-même une magie, de rang supérieur, certes, mais comportant quand même une surcharge envoûtante et mystérieuse, et le fait que la catégorie d'incantation – toujours inscrite dans la sphère sémantique de la persuasion séductrice par le verbe et par le chant – garde dans toutes ses instances les connotations qui la rapprochent de l'ensorcellement, n'est sans doute pas indifférent".

22 *Chrm.* 162c-166d.

23 *Chrm.* 161c.

24 Stressing the 'counterintuitive' character of Socratic interpretation, see. Tuozzo (2011), 166.

25 *Chrm.* 161d-e.

for itself: the weavers would weave only their own clothes, the cobblers would make only their own shoes, and so on.[26]

The reason for this over-literal Socratic interpretation seems clear: it is a matter of provoking Critias, known as the author of the sentence, to join in the dialogue. The political sphere involved in Critias' sentence[27] is clearly addressed and mocked through the impossible city model proposed by Socrates as something arising from his definition, and in the sequence Socrates returns his comments from the sentence to its author, despite his reply to Charmides. He reinforces that its author had 'spoken by enigmas' (ᾐνίττετο),[28] however he says that who said it seemed to him not to be a simpleton (εὐήθης), asking Charmides if he had heard the definition from some fool (ἠλιθίου). The young man seems to understand this provocative tone, once he says that the author seemed to be very wise, and when the philosopher asked him to answer what after all the definition might mean, he dares to say that perhaps not even his author knew it, his comment being described as followed by a chuckle and a glance addressed to Critias. The narrator then presents an interpretation in which it was Charmides' desire to provoke Critias, so that the politician would start to answer Socrates in his place. However, Socrates the narrator does not state his own desire to bring Critias into the discussion, which seems to me evident here. However, what I want to emphasize in this passage is the rhetorical strategy employed by the philosopher, seeking to arouse Critias's anger and φιλοτιμία, to force him to join the discussion. In the sequence Socrates will present Critias as possessing as his main characteristic this love of honor and of distinguishing himself. The passage presented shows the philosopher spurring the pride of the politician in the discussion he is having with Charmides, so that through this feeling he is led to take part in the dialogue.

At that moment Critias enters the dialogue. He is presented as having restrained himself hitherto, by his desire to distinguish himself (φιλοτιμία) before Charmides and the others.[29] When Charmides addresses him provocatively, he

26 Although I will not develop this theme here, I would like to emphasize that this derisory model can be read as the symmetrical antipode of the polis built in the *Republic*, grounded on a radically different interpretation of the same sentence, τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

27 Cf. Rademaker (2005), 330: "There is a strong and repeated suggestion that this definition stems from Critias (161B8, 162C4-6), even though Critias himself denies it (161C2), and this brings the ideal of the quiet, *aprágmon* citizen in view (my use 10), an ideal that at the date of the dramatic setting of the dialogue reflects a conservative and elitist political ideology associated with *sophrosýne*".

28 *Chrm.* 162a.

29 *Chrm.* 162c: Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δῆλος μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρός τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων. It is important to emphasize that I will approach Critias the character predominantly through what the dialogue makes us know about his πάθη,

is described as looking angry 'as an author in the face of the bad actor who recites his verses' and turns to Charmides to confront him. Socrates apologizes Charmides for the ignorance due to his youth and compares it to the mature age and studies of Critias, which because of these seems to know what he says. Socrates suggests that he then assume the place of interlocutor, if he agrees with the definition.

The sequence presents several textual marks that the way Critias engages in the discussion is ruled by eristic.[30] Namely: (1) some of his replies to Socrates are clearly challenges;[31] (2) he attempts to escape refutation by marking a too precise terminological distinction – between ποιεῖν, πράττειν and ἐργάζεσθαι – which Socrates will promptly identify with the style of Prodicus the sophist; (3) he turns his answers into small oratory pieces – first (163b-c) he makes a short discourse on this difference of meaning through an interpretation of Hesiod, and then (164c-165b) he makes a laudatory speech about σωφροσύνη in order to change his definition, which will become 'knowing oneself'; (4), he criticizes Socratic line of research twice: in 165e … and finally (165b-c) Critias accuses Socrates of refuting him, even though he denies it, when seeking a resemblance between σωφροσύνη and other sciences which the philosopher knows that does not exist.

The way Socrates reacts to Critias' attempts is presented in two passages. Shortly after Critias' laudatory piece, Socrates tells him that the politician speaks as if the philosopher knew the things about which Critias speaks and therefore could, if he wished, agree with him. On the contrary, he says that he investigates *along with* him precisely because he does not know. And responding to Critias accusation (166c-e), he denies having any other purpose in refuting Critias than to investigate the meaning of what he himself says, for fear of supposing to know what he does not know. Socrates affirms to examine discourses mainly having in view his own advantage, but also of others: 'Or do you not think it is for the common good, almost, of all men, that the truth

without resorting to his historical references, much less to his rather biased portrait made by Xenophon in *Memorabilia* 12–16. See Brann (2011), 66-87 for a discussion about the balance between historical and hermeneutical interpretation of the dialogue. See Tuozzo (2011), 59–66 for a view of the many different portraits of Critias in Ancient tradition.

30 See Schmid (1998), 33–35. However, along with a presentation of the sophistical aspects of Critias the author inserts a moral evaluation of the politician that I consider excessive and little founded in the Platonic text. For a discordant position, see Tuozzo (2011), 66–70.

31 *Chrm.* 163a: Socrates: 'And are they (the craftsmen) temperate in not making their own things only? Critias: 'Yes: what reason is there against it?'; 163e: Socrates: 'Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?' Critias: 'And do not you, my excellent friend, think so?'; 164a: Socrates: 'A little while ago, were you not saying that there was no reason why craftsmen should not be temperate in making others' things as well?' Critias: 'Yes, I was, but what of it?' (trans. Lamb (1927)).

about everything there is should be discovered?'[32] He also asks the politician to continue to respond as things appear to him, without taking care whether it is Socrates or Critias who is being refuted, but to pay attention only to the argument, in order to see what becomes of it when it is refuted.

From what has been exposed, how is it possible to understand what Socrates is performing concerning emotions? In both moments of his discussion with Critias his strategy seems to be the same: in the first one, the philosopher affirms a subtle but fundamental difference from eristic refutation; he claims he is investigating *along with* Critias (ζητῶ φὰρ μετὰ σοῦ).[33] In the second one he reaffirms his ignorance and gathers to himself almost all men, in the quest for this common good, which is to elucidate what things are. And he reinforces the counterpoint between the polarity of the refutation of one or the other of the contenders and the common effort of attaining to the arguments. This redirection must be interpreted as a proposal of conversion: from eristic to φιλία, from polarity to gathering, and from φιλοτιμία to φιλοσοφία. In his appealing to commonality he is attempting to upgrade the emotion which sustains this possibility, φιλία, the friendship that brings together those who engage in the same enterprise, and he tries to make it prevail in the face of ἔρις, rivalry, which underlies the desire for distinction and the eristic refutation. Critias states he agrees with what the philosopher proposes, and the investigation proceeds without further incidents, the politician becoming a 'model interlocutor' to the Socratic dialogical proposal, once he becomes docile to the arguments presented and starts answering through short sentences, according to his opinions. At least as long as this investigation lasts, the conversion of Critias' desire seems to have been accomplished.

From the above we can then point to some consequences which come from this exposition of emotions in the dialogue:

1. The investigation of σωφροσύνη has a very concrete meaning, as well as an ethical purpose, since it is only carried out when Socrates is able to exercise this virtue in his own soul.
2. In the sense of an erotic desire aroused in the philosopher by Charmides, love is at one and the same time subjugated and redirected, since Socrates is able to generate in the youngster the desire to investigate, as well as a doubt concerning the possession or not of σωφροσύνη and the need to engage himself in it, both in research and in practice.
3. In the sense of φιλία, love is the affection which the philosopher seeks to oppose to *philotimia*, the emotion which characterizes Critias along the dialogue.

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32 *Chrm.* 166d.
33 *Chrm.* 165b.

Only by operating this conversion in πάθος can Socratic refutation redirect not only the discussion's focus, but also the respondent's soul, from the conqueror-vanquished polarity towards the investigated subject, and from eristic towards the practice of philosophy.

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PART 3

The Ethical and Political Value of Plato's Emotions

CHAPTER 10

The Notion of φθόνος in Plato

Luc Brisson

Abstract

For Plato in the *Philebus*, envious jealousy (φθόνος) is a state of mind or a disposition of the soul, in which pain is mixed with pleasure, because one affected by envious jealousy is rejoicing at the misfortunes of those around him and being sad at their happiness. For Plato, to reject the envious jealousy is to express his will to establish new relationships between the gods – including universe – and human beings on the one hand, and between human beings on the other, whether individuals or groups. In this context, competition (ἀγών), which played such an important role in the culture of ancient Greece, is evacuated, except, perhaps, from the field of virtue.

Keywords

jealousy – envy – competition – pain – pleasure – virtue

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Jealousy is the usual translation proposed of the Greek term φθόνος.[1] But oddly enough, the etymology of φθόνος does not help us in understanding its meaning as in English as in French. "Jealousy", or "jalousie" in French, derives from the vulgar Latin *zelosus,* formed from the late Latin *zelus*, which comes from the Greek ζῆλος. This last word, with its derivatives and compounds, can mean 'envy', and they are generally understood without negative connotations in Ancient Greece, since they manifest such values as 'emulation, rivalry, ambition, fervor, and zeal'. As far as the modern meaning is concerned, φθόνος involves, at least to some extent, the notion of 'envy', which can be defined as "the desire to

1 It may be disconcerting for those for whom envious jealousy manifests itself exclusively in the context of an amorous relationship, when two people enter into competition or conflict with regard to a third person, as in Shakespeare's masterpiece *Othello*.

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enjoy an advantage or pleasure equal to that of someone else". From this perspective, envy is that particular desire that provokes the feeling of grudge, which can grow into worry or even more or less aggressive hostility. This state of affairs allows us to understand why it is often hard to choose between two translations of φθόνος: envy or jealousy. Yet the extension of the semantic field of 'envious jealousy' is much larger, and this is what has led us to translate φθόνος as "envious jealousy". This is no mere problem of translation. The term φθόνος makes us enter another culture, in which motives for action were completely different from ours, where social organization, political context, and the system of values also differed. This difference, moreover, allows us to measure our originality, and to understand in what sense the culture in which we live is the consequence of a history that could have taken another direction, and that is subject to modification over time.

1 The Definition of Envious Jealousy

The state of mind or disposition of the soul[2] denoted by the term φθόνος has retained the attention of many Greek philosophers, particularly Plato, Aristotle, and Stoics.[3]

For Plato,[4] envious jealousy is a state of mind or a disposition of the soul, in which pain is mixed with pleasure. This is why it is in the *Philebus*, a dialogue traditionally classified as 'ethical' and given the subtitle *On Pleasure*, that the first attempt to define envious jealousy was proposed.[5]

In the *Philebus*, Plato refuses to consider pleasure as a becoming or a pure process (53c-55a). Pleasure is a very real affection (πάθος), which one should nevertheless try to reduce (44a-46a) to the cessation of pain. To recover one's health after an illness, or to drink when one is thirsty, do consist in the cessation of a pain, but these are merely two cases among others : "… I am not really

2 I translate ἕξις (*Phlb.* 40d5, 48c2) by 'state', and διάθεσις (*Phlb.* 48a8) by 'disposition'. Like Plato (*Phlb.* 11d4), I do not give either of these terms a definition as strict as the one proposed by Aristotle.

3 There is a study on φθόνος in the Greek philosophers by Milobenski (1964). This work consist of eight chapters, whose respective titles are as follows : I. Vorsokratiker ; II. Der Xenophontische Sokrates, Antisthenes und Aristipp ; III. Platon ; IV. Aristoteles und Peripatetiker; V. Epikur und Epikureer ; VI. Die (Ältere) Stoa ; VII. Die Kynische-stoische Popular-Philosophie; VIII. Plutarch. This book is inspired by Stevens (1948). The term φθόνος seems to be absent from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, cf. Myres (1937). More generally, see Konstan and Rutter (2003); and Sanders (2014).

4 For what follows, see Mills (1985).

5 On the *Philebus*, see Delcomminette (2006). And on φθόνος, see Bossi in this volume.

in agreement with those who hold that all pleasures are merely release from pain" (51a3-4, transl. by D. Frede). For one can perfectly well feel pleasure without having suffered beforehand, as is the case when one hears a beautiful piece of music or discovers a beautiful body, speech, or thought. This is why the search for this kind of pleasures can be used to characterize philosophy.

If one leaves aside the neutral state, which is the absence of pleasure and of pain (35d8-36c2) and can be explained either by a lack of sensation or by a detachment from sensation, as in sages and gods, we find a section in the *Philebus* that distinguishes between pure pleasure (50e5-53c2), in which no pain enters, and mixed pleasure (44a-53c), in which pleasure is inseparable from pain. Pure pleasure is that which is provided by sounds, smells, and knowledge. And mixed pleasure includes several kinds, according to whether it concerns the body alone (46b-47b), the body and the soul (33c-36b), or only the soul (47c-50e).

Among the mixed pleasures that concern only the soul, one finds envious jealousy (φθόνος) alongside with anger (ὀργή),[6] fear (φόβος),[7] regret (πόθος),[8] mourning (θρῆνος),[9] desire (ἔρως)[10] and envy (ζῆλος).[11] These states of mind or dispositions of the soul, in which pain and pleasure go together, constitute the motivations of tragedy (48a5-6) and comedy (48a8-9).

Although anger is mentioned in passing, envious jealousy (φθόνος) is the only affection to be the subject of an exposition in that list. What is more, the analysis proposed in this passage is focused on that mixture of pleasure and pain that is manifested in comedy, which takes us rather far from envious jealousy as such.

Let us analyze this exposition. Envious jealousy is a pain in the soul (48b8-9); but one does not know what kind of pain it is, and the rest of the passage

6 See the quotation from *Il.* 18.107-111 at *Phlb.* 47e5-48a2.

7 *Rh.* II.5, 1382a 21-25.

8 The painful recollection of past happiness.

9 Even mourning and lamentations are not without a certain pleasure, for one feels grief because the deceased no longer exists, but pleasure in remembering him and, in a way, seeing him, by imagining what he used to do and how he was. Hence, Homer was right to say: "Thus did he speak and his words set them all weeping and mourning" (*Il.* 23.108 ; *Od.* 4. 183 ; Ar, *Rh.* I.11, 1370b25-30, transl. by W. Rhys Roberts modified).

10 So it is with lovers: they takes pleasure in talking constantly about the beloved, drawing him or composing something about him, for when they revive their memory by all these recollections, they think they almost feel the presence of love. This is the starting-point of love: when one takes pleasure not only in the presence of the loved one, but also in his memory when he is absent. One is truly in love when the absence of the other entails grief (Ar. *Rh.* I.2, 1370b18-25, transl. by W. Rhys Roberts modified).

11 For this inventory, see *Phlb.* 47e1-3.

provides no information on the subject. This pain is associated with pleasure, for a jealous person rejoices in the misfortune of the people around him (48b11-12). If one reverses the reasoning, one comes to conclude that a jealous person is saddened by the happiness of the people around him. In both cases, however, one aspect is missing. What pleasure is felt by a person who is saddened by the people around him, and what pain is felt by a person who rejoices in the misfortunes that strike the people around him? It must be concluded, then, that envious jealousy can be considered as a pain or a pleasure, but in different circumstances, and above all as a function of different addressees. This conclusion seems to be confirmed by the fact that the argument shifts ground, and deals with the motivations of comedy.[12]

The paradigmatic misfortune in comedy is thoughtlessness[13] or foolishness (48c2), which is the source of what is ridiculous (48c4). This disposition, which contravenes the Delphic maxim "Know thyself" (48c6-d2) may concern three things: wealth, bodily qualities, and psychic qualities (48d4-49a9). One thinks he is richer or more handsome than one truly is, or even superior in virtue. Furthermore, this misfortune may be ridiculous, if it pertains to a weak being, or detestable if it pertains to a strong or powerful being (49a9-c3). The jealous man laughs at the misfortune of others, who are weaker than he. The same man should be scared of the misfortune of others, who are stronger than he. When we make fun of our friends' foolishness, which is still a misfortune (49d9-e8), we rejoice (49e9-50a1). But laughter is a pleasure, whereas envious jealousy is a pain (50a5-9, see 48b11-12). Socrates admits that his argumentation is partial, for it involves an analysis of envious jealousy focused exclusively on the context of comedy. Even here, moreover, the argument is defective. One does not know why envious jealousy is a pain (50a5), and it is laughter, not envious jealousy, that is associated with pleasure (49e9-50a1).

Socrates then moves from the comic envious jealousy (παιδικὸς φθόνος, 49a8) pertaining to the theater to that which is involved in daily life. To rejoice in the misfortunes of one's enemies is neither injustice nor envious jealousy (49d3-4). But this affirmation seems to go against Socrates' position in the first book of the *Republic*, where he protests against this definition of justice: "If we are to follow the previous answers, Socrates, it gives benefits to friends and does harm to enemies. Simonides means, then, that to treaty friends well and enemies badly is justice?" (1.332d4-8, transl. by G.M.A. Grube, rev. by C.D.C. Reeve). To rejoice in the misfortunes of one's friends, by contrast, is injustice (49d6-7), and consequently envious jealousy (50a2-3). We find this relation between injustice and envious jealousy once again in book nine of the *Laws*

12 Gavray (2010). For an analysis of the motivations of tragedy, see *Resp.* 10.603e-605c.

13 I maintain the reading ἄνοια, attested by the best manuscripts.

(9.863e7, 869); while in book nine of the *Republic* (579c, 580a, 586c) the tyrant who reaches the summit of injustice achieves the culmination of envious jealousy by this very fact. Quite naturally, envious jealousy is perceived as a tyrant in the human soul (*Leg.* 9.863e-864a).

Nevertheless, a definition of envious jealousy (φθόνος) is be found only in the *Definitions*, which are attributed to Plato but are in fact apocryphal, since many Aristotelian and Stoic elements coexist in it : "Envious jealousy : Being distressed by the goods of one's friends, either present of past." (416a 13, transl. by D.S. Hutchinson modified). Only this definition, which is not explicit in the *Philebus*, allows us to understand the various uses of the term φθόνος in the rest of Plato's works.

This viewpoint is confirmed by Aristotle, who proposes a psychological analysis of envious jealousy that is akin to Plato's, but is both clearer and more simple, and which, from an ethical viewpoint, is consistent with the doctrine of the "happy middle":

> Righteous indignation (νέμεσις) is a mean between envious jealousy (φθόνος) and spite (ἐπιχαιρεκακία), and these states are concerned with the pain and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes of our neighbours; the man who is characterized by righteous indignation (νεμεσητικός) is pained at undeserved good fortune, the jealous man (φθονερός), going beyond him, is pained at all good fortune, and the spiteful man (ἐπιχαιρέκακος) falls so far short of being pained that he even rejoices. (Ar. *Eth. Nic.* II.7, 1108a35-b6, transl. W.D. Ross modified).[14]

Aristotle is obviously alluding to Plato's analysis in the *Philebus*; yet he describes the fact of rejoicing at the misfortunes of those around one as "spite", and the fact of being sad at their happiness as "envious jealousy".

The Stoics' position on the subject was similar. Zeno defined envious jealousy as follows:

> Grief (λυπή) is an irrational contraction. Its species are pity, envious jealousy (φθόνος), envy (ζῆλος), rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish distraction. (…) Envious jealousy is grief at the possession by another of what one desires for oneself. Envy (ζῆλος), pain at the

14 Cf. also *Eth. Eud.* 1221a38-b1, 1233b18-26. We read in the *Topics* (II.2, 109b35) : "For if 'envious jealousy' is pain at the apparent success of some well-behaved person, clearly the good man is not jealous." (transl by W.A. Pickard-Cambridge). In the *Rhetoric* (II.9, 1386b13-15), envious jealousy is considered from the viewpoint of pity, or the feeling of pain experienced at the sight of the misfortune of others.

> possession by another of what one has oneself. (Diogenes Laertius VII.111, transl. by R.D. Hicks modified).

Cleanthes (DL VII.175) is even supposed to have written a book *On Envious jealousy* (Περὶ φθονερίας). It should be noted that the Cynics (DL VI.5), the Cyrenaics (DL II.91), and the Epicureans (DL X.117 ff.) condemned envious jealousy.

2 What Are the Objects of Envious Jealousy?

We find an inventory of such objects, in the *Phaedrus*, in Socrates' first speech, which tries to rival the paradoxical speech by Lysias which Phaedrus recites at the beginning of the dialogue named after him. The goal of this speech is to persuade a young man, by means of rhetorical arguments, to grant his favor to a person who does not love him, instead of a person who loves him, for the lover proves to be unbearable to the beloved. Yet none of these arguments deals with sexual pleasure as such, which remains in the background, since Socrates anchors his speech in the following principle, which corresponds nicely to the definition of envious jealousy as suffering from the good things enjoyed by the people around one:

> It is surely necessary that a man who is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure will turn his boy into whatever is most pleasing to himself. Now a sick man takes pleasure in anything that does not resist him, but sees anyone who is equal or superior to him as an enemy. That is why a lover will not willingly put up with a boyfriend who is his equal or superior, but is always working to make the boy he loves weaker and inferior to himself (*Phdr.* 238e2-239a1, transl. by A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff modified).

What are the consequences for the beloved of this state of mind in the person who claims to be his lover, but who is envious and jealous (φθονερῶς) of his beloved and does him harm (βλαβερῶς) (*Phdr.* 243c6), because he wants the boy to be weaker and inferior to himself?

Socrates first explains how such a lover cannot help preventing the person he loves from developing his intellectual abilities (*Phdr.* 239a-b). He then moves on to the body, to evoke, not the features that justify or discourage sexual attraction, but the vigor that gives it superiority in times of peace and of war (*Phdr.* 239c-d). He goes on to mention social and familial links that do not necessarily enter into the context of sexual competition (*Phdr.* 239d), and he

ends with wealth (*Phdr.* 239e-240a). This is a paradoxical speech, of course, yet the pleasure the lover derives in his relations with his beloved are not situated only in the sexual domain, but resides essentially in maintaining the beloved in a state of inferiority with regard to knowledge, physical vigor, social and familial relations, and wealth. This is the level on which envious jealousy is situated (cf. *Phdr.* 241c, 243c).

In the *Phaedrus*, envious jealousy does not appear as a relation between rivals seeking sexual satisfaction,[15] but as a search for superiority in various domains. In the *Symposium,* however, envious jealousy manifests itself on the sexual level:

> I beg you, Agathon, Socrates said, protect me from this man (Alcibiades)! You can't imagine what it's like to be in love with him; from the very first moment he realized how I felt about him, he hasn't allowed me to say two words to anybody else – what am I saying, I can't so much as look at an attractive man but he flied into a fit of jealous rage (ζηλοτυπῶν με καὶ φθονῶν). He yells; he threatens, he can hardly keep from slapping me around! Please, try to keep him under control. Could you perhaps make him forgive me? And if you can't, if he gets violent, will you defend me? The fierceness of his passion terrifies me! (*Symp.* 213c6-d6, transl. by A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff modified).

What follows – that is, Alcibiades' praise of Socrates – will make explicit this declaration, and the same holds true for Alcibiades' envious jealousy with regard to Agathon over Socrates (*Symp.* 223a6-9).

This inventory of good things that sadden the jealous person when they are possessed by others, and whose absence makes him rejoice, is also found elsewhere in Plato's work.

2.1 *Wealth*

Possessions or wealth trigger envious jealousy. However – and this is significant, as we shall see – in Plato, the term φθόνος is never found explicitly in such a context, except in the *Laws*, where one reads:

> Now the community in which neither wealth nor poverty exists will generally produce the finest characters because tendencies to violence and crime and feelings of envy and envious jealousy (ζῆλοι καὶ φθόνοι), simply do not arise. (*Leg.* 3.679b7-c2, transl by Trevor J. Saunders modified).

15 See the apocryphal dialogue *The Rival Lovers*.

This evocation in negative terms is valid for a state of humanity before the emergence of the city; in fact, it seems that wealth concerns envious jealousy only insofar as it is the sign of economic, social, and political superiority.

2.2 *Honors*

In fact, envious jealousy ultimately refers to τιμή; in this context, envious jealousy can be explained by the predominance of the spirited part of the soul, which escapes the control of reason:

> And what about the spirited part (τὸ θυμοειδές)? Mustn't similar things happen to someone who satisfies it? Doesn't his love of honor make him jealous (φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν), and his love of victory make him violent, so that he pursues the satisfaction of his anger and of his desires for honors (τιμῆς) and victories without calculation or understanding (ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ)? (*Resp.* 9.586c7-d2, transl. by G.M.A. Grube, rev. by C.D.C. Reeve).

The quest for τιμή is not an evil in itself, for all of Greek society was based on competition (ἀγών). It becomes an evil, that is envious jealousy, only when it escapes the control of reason. Yet what is τιμή? As Émile Benveniste explains, τιμή in its most primitive sense is "the share of honor and material advantages that is attributed to a person, by virtue of his dignity or his condition".[16] This definition presupposes a social context, in which a relation of reciprocity exists between advantages and personal value, with personal value justifying the demand for material advantages, and material advantages enabling personal value to be measured. In short, what inspires envious jealousy is not so much the advantages as such, but as signs of personal value.

2.3 *Knowledge and Virtue*

Nevertheless, there should be no envious jealousy if the object of competition is knowledge and virtue, including when it comes to the refusal to share (*Leg.* v.730e-731b). There must be emulation in virtue, then, but without envious jealousy or calumny. It is on this condition, and only on this condition, that the praise of good people can avoid giving rise to envious jealousy. This, moreover, is why in book seven of the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger formulates the law regulating the praise that poets will render to deserving citizens:

> And the next law, which should be adopted without occasion for envious jealousy (ἄνευ φθόνων), will run as follows: deceased citizens who by their

16 Benveniste (1969), 51.

> physical efforts or force of personality have conspicuous and strenuous achievements to their credit, and who have lived a life of obedience to the laws, should be regarded as proper subjects for our panegyrics. (*Leg.* VII.801e6-10, transl. by Trevor J. Saunders modified).

This passage is not easy to understand, but it probably contains an allusion to the funerals of the Scrutineers (εὔθυνοι),[17] those priests of Apollo and the Sun who inquire into the conduct of all the other magistrates in the city of the *Laws*.

One conclusion emerges as a result of this enumeration. All these good things – wealth, honors, knowledge, and virtue – are not sought for themselves, but insofar as they serve to indicate superiority in those who possess them. This conclusion entails an important consequence when we ask ourselves where the seat of envious jealousy is located.

3 The Seat of Envious Jealousy

Plato gives a simple answer to this question: in the soul. For him, however, the human soul contains three different species, which tend toward different objects and have distinct functions.[18] If one adopts another viewpoint, these three parts can be reduced to two : a rational part that seeks knowledge, and another, non-rational part that is itself made up of two sub-parts : an aggressive part, or spirit (θυμός) that seek honors, and a desiring part (ἐπιθυμία) that seeks material possessions.

The rational part must be eliminated right off the bat, for it cannot feel envious jealousy. Since, moreover, envious jealousy gives rise to a pleasure mixed with pain, one might be tempted to situate it in the desiring part. As far as wealth and love are concerned, however, it is not sexual pleasure that is involved, but superiority. The same holds true for knowledge and virtue: knowledge and virtue are of interest to the jealous person only as a function of the superiority they ensure in society. It is therefore in the θυμός that the seat of envious jealousy must be situated, as can be seen from the passage of the *Republic* (*Resp.* IX.586c7-d3) quoted above.[19]

In other words, envious jealousy can be explained by reason's lack of control over the spirited part, which is saddened by the happiness of others and

17 Brisson (2005).

18 For a general view of contemporary polemics on this subject, see Barney, Brennan, and Brittain (2012).

19 See Renaut (2014), 142–49.

rejoices in the misfortunes of its friends, with the desiring part experiencing pain and pleasure respectively. Envious jealousy must therefore be conceived as an injustice in the soul, for it destroys the predominance of the intellect, making life in common impossible under the rule of a tyrant. This enables us to answer the following question: who can be jealous?

4 Who Can Show Envious Jealousy?

Once the relation has been established between envious jealousy and injustice, which, in the city, manifests itself to the greatest degree in the tyrant, whose opposite in the philosopher, one must ask the question: who is susceptible of being jealous, and who is not?

4.1 *The Gods*

For Plato, the gods cannot be jealous (*Phdr.* 247a7). This is a consequence of the principle formulated in book III of the *Republic* (379a-380c): god is good, and therefore cannot commit evil. But since envious jealousy is an injustice and an evil, no god can be jealous either of another god or of a man.

The gods of the traditional Greek pantheon are jealous of each other,[20] and even of human beings, because they are unable to bear men's beauty, their happiness, or their wealth, which could endanger their own preeminence, despite the fact that human beings, unlike the gods, are still mortal. All the great tragedians evoke this theme.[21] Yet it is Herodotus who gives the subtlest analysis of

20 No god can display hostility toward another god whose advantages he covets. This is why, at the beginning of the *Critias*, when Plato evokes the distribution of the sensible world among the great gods, and in particular the attribution of Athens to Athena, he writes that this division took place in justice, without disputes (*Criti.* 109b). The term φθόνος does not occur in this passage, but it is indeed the absence of envious jealousy among the gods that Plato vigorously affirms here, against the tradition, for many testimonies report the struggle between Poseidon and Athena for the possession of Athens.

21 Aesch. *Pers.* 362 ; Soph. *Phil.* 776 ; Eur., *Alc.* 1135. See also Pind. *Isthm.* 7, 39. Once mortals had organized themselves in cities, the gods decided to choose separately one or several towns in which they would be especially honored. When it so happened that two or three divinities chose the same city, thus provoking conflicts between them, they submitted to adjudication by their peers, or even by mortals: this, for instance, was the case for Athens. Poseidon had set his sights on Athens, and had been first to take possession of the city, by making a "sea" gush forth on the Acropolis; according to the testimony of Pausanias, this sea was a well of salty water located in the precinct of the Erechtheion. The god was soon followed by Athena, who convoked Cecrops, the first king of Athens, making him a witness of her acts. She planted an olive tree, which was still pointed out in the Pandrosion in the second century of our era. She then claimed possession of the land. The debate was

this emotion. In Herodotus, there coexists with the notion of a just and vengeful god a much less lofty notion: that of a jealous god who cannot tolerate the prosperity of human beings. Doesn't Solon say to Croesus, the last king of Lydia, famous for the wealth of which he was so proud: "Croesus, gods are full of envious jealousy (τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν), and fond of troubling our lot ..." (1.32). Doesn't Amasis, the king of Egypt said to have received a visit from Solon, write to Polycrates, who had seized power on the island of Samos : "It is a pleasure to hear of a friend and ally prospering, but your great prosperity does not cause me joy, because I know that the gods are jealous. (τὸ θεῖον ... ἐστι φθονερόν)" (3.40). And doesn't wise Artabanes, Xerxes' aged uncle, say to the latter, who had begun to weep over the brevity of human life upon seeing the Hellespont covered with his ships and contemplating the shore and the plain of Abydus filled with his soldiers:

> Calamities fall upon us; sicknesses vex and harass us, and make life, short though it be, to appear long. So death, through the wretchedness of our life, is a most sweet refuge to our race: and God, who gives us the tastes that we enjoy of pleasant times, is seen, in his very gift, to be jealous, as in course of time are seen of all (ὁ δὲ θεὸς...φθονερός) (Hdt. 7.47).

If only human prosperity, necessarily ephemeral, could be stable. Yet Croesus loses his throne and his wealth; Polycrates is lured into a trap by the satrap Oroites, who puts an ignominious end to his life (Hdt. 3.122-126); and Xerxes' forces are defeated by the Greeks. For the average Greek, then, the society of gods, like that of men, is racked with envious jealousy: envious jealousy of each other, but also envious jealousy with regard to men.

Plato reacts against this traditional image. By so doing, he destroys mythology, and opens the door to what would later be called "theology", that is, the rational, systematic, and coherent study (in agreement with ethics) of everything connected to the divine. For envious jealousy is the motive force from which traditional myth is fed.

It is quite simply because they are good that no god can feel worry at the thought of sharing an advantage, or even losing that advantage in favor of

taken before Zeus, who named arbiters. One tradition has it that they were Cecrops and Cranaos, another that they were the gods of Olympus. In any case, the tribunal favored Athena, because Cecrops testified that she had been the first to plant the olive tree on the rock of the Acropolis. Angered, Poseidon flooded the plain of Eleusis. This, then, is the myth Plato rejects at the beginning of the *Critias*.

another being equal or inferior to him. This is how one must interpret what Timaeus says about the Demiurge who fashions the sensible world:

> Now why did he who framed this whole universe of becoming frame it? Let us state the reason why: He was good and one who is good can never become jealous (φθόνος) of anything. And so, being free of envious jealousy (τούτου ἐκτός), he wanted everything to become as much like himself as was possible. (*Ti.* 29d7-e2, transl. D.J. Zeyl modified).

In short, it is the lack of envious jealousy in its maker that explains why our world was generated, and why it is the best of all possible worlds, and will not be destroyed. This is also the reason why our world, which is not indestructible by nature, will not be destroyed (*Ti.* 41a-d). Likewise, Gaia (the Earth) distributes her benefits to all, without any envious jealousy (*Menex.* 238a). On this point, too, Plato departs radically from the tradition.

4.2 *Human Beings*

It emerges from the long analysis in the *Philebus* (47d-50e) that envious jealousy is a characteristic of the incarnate human soul. Plato thus shares the opinion of Herodotus "that human beings are naturally jealous from the beginning (φθόνος δὲ ἀρξῆθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ)"(3.80), and of Thucydides who thinks the same (3.43.1). For Plato, however, two kinds of human beings, situated above and beneath normal human condition, escape envious jealousy: philosophers, owing to their relation with the gods, and primitives, because of their proximity to animals, who can be neither subject to nor objects of envious jealousy.[22]

For Plato, moreover, the philosopher's ideal is assimilation to god (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, cf. *Ti.* 89d-90d). The philosopher must therefore, like the god whom he wishes to resemble, be rid of envious jealousy (*Resp.* VI.500b-c).

This has consequences for his relations with his disciples. Unlike the lover of the *Phaedrus*, the philosopher, who tends toward the madness dispensed by Eros, seeks not bodily beauty but the Beauty that is immutable. When he speaks of love in the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*, Plato[23] systematically evokes male homosexuality.[24] Placed under the banner of Eros, these homosexual relationships,

22 As Plutarch explains in an opuscule (which is missing in the catalogue of Lamprias, but bears the number 47 in the Planudian corpus), entitled *On Envious jealousy and On Hate* (Περὶ φθόνου καὶ μίσους), *Moralia* 536e-538e. Envious jealousy does not exist among animals, with regard to whom human beings do not experience this feeling.

23 I have in mind here the pages Claude Calame devoted to Plato in Calame (1996), 201–17. The entire background of this position is brought to light in the preceding pages.

24 On this question, see Brisson (2006).

which are characterized by their asymmetry (adult and young man, almost beardless) and their temporary nature, found a place, from the viewpoint of the institutions of ancient Greece, in the quite specific field of education. Here, by means of musical apprenticeship and gymnastic exercise, the older partner transmitted to the younger the knowledge and values that will enable him to progress from the status of child to that of adult. It seems to have been this role of initiatory guide, institutionally granted to Eros, that Plato takes over and transposes, attributing it no longer to musical and physical education, but to philosophical contemplation. Nevertheless, in addition to ensuring the cultural and social perpetuation of society by means of homosexuality Eros ensures, *via* marriage, the physical perpetuation of the community of citizens. This other role might, it seems to me, explain Plato's condemnation of homosexuality.

In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates likens philosophy to erotic madness, where the object of desire is no longer sensible beauty, but intelligible beauty, of which sensible beauty is a mere image. In fact, what Socrates describes in terms of the relationship between a lover and his beloved is the relationship that should be established between the person who aspires to knowledge and the person he wishes to turn into his disciple.[25]

Through the sensible beauty of the beloved, the lover is to perceive the beauty-in-itself that he has contemplated in the past (*Phdr.* 254b-255a). He is to seduce his beloved not by turning him toward himself, but by orienting the beloved, through dialogue, toward beauty-in-itself, which the beloved has also contemplated when his soul was not yet incarnate. This kind of relationship cannot tolerate any feelings of envious jealousy, since lover and beloved both share the same contemplation : "They show no envious jealousy (οὐ φθόνῳ), no mean-spirited lack of generosity (οὐδ᾽ ἀνελευθέρῳ δυσμενείᾳ), toward the boy, but make every possible effort to draw him into being totally like themselves and the god to whom they are devoted." (*Phdr.* 253b7-c2, transl by A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff).

Things have come full circle: the disciple must imitate his master, who must imitate god, who is bereft of envious jealousy. By transposing erotic madness from the sensible to the intelligible world, Plato destroys tragedy and comedy in favor of philosophy, conceived not as the enjoyment of sensible beauty, but as the contemplation of intelligible beauty, of which the sensible is a mere image (*Resp.* VI.500b-c). Bereft of envious jealousy as he is, the philosopher cannot inspire a movement of envious jealousy in others (*Resp.* VI.500a).

25 Dickie (1993).

In this context, the tyrant,[26] who is the exact opposite of the philosopher, must be considered the emblematic figure of envious jealousy:

> And we'll attribute to the man what we mentioned before, namely that he is inevitably jealous (φθονερῷ), untrustworthy (ἀπίστῷ), unjust (ἀδίκῳ), friendless (ἀφίλῳ), impious (ἀνοσίῳ), host and nurse to every kind of vice (πάσης κακίας), and that his ruling makes him even more so. And because of all these, he is extremely unfortunate and goes on to make those near him like himself. (*Resp.* IX.580a1-7, transl. by G.M.A. Grube, rev. by C.D.C. Reeve modified).

The entire section of book VIII and IX of the *Republic* might be read in the perspective of the rise in power of envious jealousy.[27] In this perspective, one can understand why the tyrant, who reaches the summits of injustice, is considered as a jealous man, and as the most unhappy of men (*Resp.* IX.579b-c and 586c). Alternatively, injustice, which results from envious jealousy, is held to be a tyrant within the human soul (*Leg.* IX.863e).

However, if human beings can escape envious jealousy from above, by practicing philosophy, they can also escape it from below. This refers to the primitive humanity that immediately followed the flood.[28] In short, if these primitive men are not jealous, it is, of course, because the society they live in lacks considerable gaps, especially as far as personal fortune is concerned.[29] Yet it is also because they are akin to beasts, who, paradoxically, may be closer to the gods than current human beings.

5 The Evils Entailed by Envious Jealousy

Although envious jealousy always exhibits the same essential features, despite the diversity of objects it concerns, its effects can be very different in accordance with the strength or weakness of the jealous person. If it characterizes a weak person, envious jealousy is ridiculous; this is kind of envious jealousy exploited by comedy (*Phlb.* 49d-e). If, by contrast, it characterizes a strong person, it is odious; it then becomes the motive force of tragedy (50a-b). Yet tragedy and comedy are mere images of reality; they simply reflect real life (50b),

26 Heintzeler (1927).
27 Ryffel [1949] (1973), commenting on *Republic* VIII and *Laws* III and IV.
28 See *Leg.* III.679b-c.
29 See *supra*, Sec. 1.

in which envious jealousy occupies a particularly important place. Quite obviously, it is above all when it is odious that envious jealousy is most stirring, for whatever the object it concerns may be (wealth, τιμή, or knowledge), it brings about catastrophes (theft or violence, murder or civil war, ignorance). In short, envious jealousy is a source of motivation[30] in the case of bad and unjust acts.

5.1 *Theft and Violence: Wealth*

The first form of envious jealousy accounts for theft and violence:

> When one man harms another by theft or violence and the damage is extensive, the indemnity he pays to the injured party should be large, but smaller if comparatively trivial. The cardinal rule should be that in every case the sum is to vary in proportion to the damage done, so that the loss is made good. And each offender is to pay an additional penalty appropriate to his crime, to encourage him to reform. Thus if a man has been led to do wrong by the folly of someone else, being over-persuaded because of his youth of some similar reason, his penalty should tend to be light; but it is to be heavier when his offence is due to his own folly and inability to control his feelings of pleasure and pain – as when he has fallen victim to cowardice and fear, or some deep-rooted envious jealousy or lust or fury. (*Leg.* XI.933e6-934a6, transl. by Trevor J. Saunders, modified)

This kind of envious jealousy is also at the origin of many a conflict between fellow citizens, particularly between neighbors (*Leg.* VIII.844c).

5.2 *Passionate Murders with Premeditation: Honors*

According to the Athenian Stranger, envious jealousy over τιμή explains passionate murders with premeditation:

> Second, an ambitious cast or mind (φιλοτίμου ψυχῆς ἕξις): this breeds feelings of envious jealousy (φθόνους ἐντίκτουσα), which are dangerous companions to live with, particularly for the person who actually feels jealous (τῷ κεκτημένῳ τὸν φθόνον), but potentially harmful to the best of his fellow citizens. (*Leg.* IX.870c5-7, transl. by Trevor J. Saunders modified).

The mention of the "the best of his fellow citizens" allows one to suppose that the Athenian Stranger is thinking not only of individual murder, but also of Socrates' condemnation to death.

30 On this subject, one may read Cooper [1984] (2001); and Pradeau (1998).

For Plato, however, it is the third form of φθόνος that is the most serious, for it concerns negatively[31] what is most important for human beings: virtue, and especially wisdom. In the *Apology*, Socrates explains his condemnation to death as the result of this kind of envious jealousy, incited against him by the Athenians (*Ap.* 18d, cf. 28a). Having wished to make them aware of their ignorance and their unworthiness in matters of virtue and wisdom, Socrates quickly found himself exposed to the hostility of his fellow citizens, who, unable to accept that anyone was superior to them in the field of virtue and wisdom, condemned him to death.

A passage from the *Euthyphro* (3c-d) gives a good description of the situation. Euthyphro is a diviner who seems to have enjoyed fairly broad popularity at Athens at the end of the fifth century (*Crat.* 400a1). Considered both as an inspired man and as someone learned in religious affairs, he claimed to possess the knowledge of things divine, and proposed, on every occasion, to interpret the will of the gods. He did not hesitate to predict the future to private persons and to the Assembly of the people, where he was not always believed, nor received with a great deal of deference. Euthyphro will explain the Athenians' mistrust of him by means of envious jealousy, and he takes advantage of the opportunity to attribute the same cause to the accusation of impiety with which Socrates has just been charged.

There is a notable difference between the situations of Euthyphro and Socrates. Euthyphro wants to transfer to the Athenians a positive knowledge, which, in his view, they refuse out of envious jealousy. Socrates wants to make the Athenians realize that they know nothing, whereas they claim to know a great deal. Hence the irony of the situation: the Athenians cannot abide Socrates' showing them that they, like he, do not know anything. A strange envious jealousy, when what is at stake is the knowledge of a lack of knowledge!

5.3 *The Retention of Information*

Among the virtues, it is knowledge that has the first rank. This is why envious jealousy (φθόνος) is often held responsible for the retention of real or alleged information in the Platonic corpus. The person in possession of information may refuse to transmit it for two reasons: (1) either because he is worried at the thought of sharing an advantage, and even making someone else wiser than he;[32] or (2) because he is afraid of arousing a feeling of envious jealousy in his interlocutor. It is this fear, in Socrates' view, that led the Sophists to hide their

31 For the positive emulation in virtue and knowledge, see *supra*.

32 *Resp.* I.338a, VIII.528a ; *Ap.* 33a ; *Men.* 71d ; *Grg.* 489a ; *Prt.* 320c (bis) ; *Ion* 530d ; *Tht.* 169c ; *Soph.* 217a et b ; *Lach.* 200b ; *Phd.* 61d ; *Ti.* 23a ; *Leg.* 1.641d.

art beneath various veils (*Prot.* 316d-e). And it was to palliate this feeling of wariness that, according to Socrates in book five of the *Republic*, he who wants to learn must approach the person who knows as follows:

> Consider, then, what we'll say to him. Won't we question him like this? First, we'll tell him that nobody begrudges him (οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ φθόνος) any knowledge he may have and that we'd be delighted to discover that he knows something. (*Resp.* v.476e4-6, G.M.A. Grube, rev. by C.D.C. Reeve modified).

In a dialogue, the interlocutor and his respondent must not show any sign of envious jealousy.

> Gorgias, I take it that you, like me (Socrates), have experiences many discussions and that you've observed this sort of thing about them: it's not easy for the participants to define jointly what they're undertaking to discuss, and so, having learned from and taught each other, to conclude their session. Instead, if they're disputing some point and one maintains that the other isn't right or isn't clear, they get irritated, each thinking the other is speaking out of envious jealousy. (*Gorg.* 457c4-d4, transl. by D.J. Zeyl modified)

And it must be the case, especially in the *elenchus.*[33] The interlocutor must accept that the respondent may adopt a critical position, without thinking that he does so out of envious jealousy (*Leg.* I.635b, II 664a-b). The respondent, for his part, must genuinely abstain from envious jealousy toward the interlocutor (*L. VII* 344b ff.).

Envious jealousy is therefore incompatible with education, insofar as it renders all transmission of information impossible. This is particularly serious, since in this field envious jealousy generates ignorance, which is the root of all evils. Only sharing knowledge can enable an effective fight against evil. More particularly, this belief explains the demand of the Platonic dialogue, borrowed from Socrates, that the person endowed with intellectual abilities must freely place them in the service of others, so that they may discover the truth (*Men.* 71d).

Plato thus carries out a complete reversal of traditional values in ancient Greece,[34] where the society of the gods is racked by envious jealousy, as is the

33 See Vlastos (1982).

34 This was the guiding idea of Joly [1974] (1994).

society of human beings. Considered as a natural, innate feeling, envious jealousy is the motivation of comedy or of tragedy, according to whether it is ridiculous or execrable. In everyday life, as reflected by comedy and tragedy, envious jealousy is the motive force of history in its darkest aspects: wars between States, civil wars, murders, violence, thefts and conflicts of every kind.

By denouncing envious jealousy, Plato kills mythology, to replace it by theology understood as a rational discourse on the divine. He eliminates comedy, and above all tragedy, in favor of philosophy, in which knowledge replaces an ignorance that gives rise to ridicule, and love is oriented exclusively toward knowledge. He rejects a history whose motive force is envious jealousy, a history in which the dramatic destiny of mankind is explained by the gods' envious jealousy, a history in which foreign and civil wars, murders, all kinds of conflicts, and thefts are explained by the envious jealousy human beings have for one another ; it even accounts for the existence of the universe, and its goodness and beauty. For Plato, to reject the envious jealousy is to express his will to establish new relationships between the gods – including universe – and human beings on the one hand, and between human beings on the other, whether individuals or groups. In this context, competition (ἀγών), which played such an important role in the culture of ancient Greece,[35] is evacuated, except, perhaps, from the field of virtue.

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CHAPTER 11

On Mild Envy and Self-deceit (*Phlb.* 47d-50e)

Beatriz Bossi

Abstract

Socrates argues that it is unjust to take pleasure in the ignorance of somebody and that envy is an evil on behalf of the spectator. One could object that it does not *necessarily* arise at ridiculous ignorance, but there must be something wrong in the *spectator* for this emotion to arise in his soul. However, Socrates apparently closes his analysis without referring to the deep roots of this passion in the observer. In this paper, I will attempt to offer a plausible account for Socrates' appealing to comedy to focus on 'mild' ordinary 'envy' among friends, and will give a few exploring suggestions on the question of how this passionate emotion is related to ignorance and self-deceit, based on false opinion, both on behalf of the ridiculous person and the envious spectator. Even though Plato does not seem to offer resources to eradicate it here, the general Platonic principle that knowledge should set measure to pleasure is a clue to understanding this 'envious' pleasant emotion mixed with pain. When aware of the ignorance at stake, one will be in the position to refrain unfair laughter and recalculate true pleasures and pains properly. If self-knowledge of personal skills and limitations is the source of self-esteem, I suggest, envy has no room in the soul.

Keywords

mild envy – self-deceit – mixed emotion – comedy – ridicule

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1 Introduction

Plato's account of 'envy' in the *Philebus* may seem complex and strange. There are several reasons for this first impression.

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On the one hand, confusion may arise because the Greek word φθόνος is ordinarily translated as 'envy' or 'jealousy'[1] while in this dialogue Socrates focuses on a different type of emotion that I have called '*mild*' envy or malice which he describes as that strange *mixture* of pleasure and pain one feels at a ridiculous vain attitude of someone else.

On the other hand, as it is currently acknowledged that ordinary envy causes pain, one would expect Socrates to treat envy as a dangerous destructive passion to be eradicated from the soul, in tune with Plato's views in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. However, though Socrates mentions in passing a type of affection that is described as 'odious fear at violent revenge on behalf of those who are ridiculed', he focuses on the *pleasant* aspect of the emotion experienced when one feels pleased about the misfortunes of a character on stage (in the context of comedy) or towards our friends and peers in disgrace in ordinary life. Thus, one may wonder why Socrates goes this strange way out of the beaten track.

The answer to this question could become clearer as soon as one takes into account that the whole discussion takes place in the context of Socrates' attempt to show that there can be 'false pleasures', not in the sense that once the agent acknowledges that he is feeling pleasure, anyone else could deny that he is having the pleasant sensation, for in this sense all the pleasures are true, but in the sense that they can stem from false beliefs, such as those pleasures that turn out to be disappointing with respect to the agent's previous expectations, or, as it is the case of envious malicious pleasures, those which are not in tune with what is fair and, being wrong, we should assume, Socrates would take them to be false.[2]

In addition, as Socrates claims that the vain person turns out to be ridiculous to the spectator as he can detect self-ignorance in his pretentious attitudes, he seems to focus his argument on the 'ridiculous' arrogant person

1 Before Plato, Pindar says that envy is better than pity (*Pyth*. 1.85); Herodotus claims that man is naturally envious (3.80) and that it is a characteristic of the Greeks to envy success and hate superiority (7.236) and Thucydides designates envy as a destructive force that prefers vengeance to religion and greed to restraint (3.82.8; 3.84.2). Envy is typical of the low class according to Euripides (*Supp*. 238–45) and Democritus and Xenophon claim that it is the source of dissension in a city (DK 245; 255; *Mem.* 3.5.6). In this regard, Plato himself believes that envy is not engendered in a state free from wealth and poverty (*Leg.* 679b). For a detailed analysis of envy in other ancient sources, see Stevens (1948).

2 This view, criticized by Protarchus, who thinks that in those cases only the beliefs are false (not the pleasures associated to them) is, however, consistent with Socrates' general thesis that evil is due to ignorance.

that causes the feeling in someone else, rather than on the agent who feels the passion himself. In my view, this perspective does not seem to be the adequate one in order to address this puzzling emotion, for though Socrates explains why and how the 'envious' reaction arises as *pleasure* when one detects exaggeration and ignorance in others, he does not seem to account why and how this reaction arises in *certain envious* subjects rather than in others, when both types can detect the same phenomenon. Therefore, though Socrates argues that it is unjust to take pleasure in the ignorance of somebody else and that envy is an evil on behalf of the spectator, one could object that envy does not *necessarily* arise at ridiculous ignorance. On the contrary, one should most naturally claim that there must be something wrong in the *spectator* for envy to arise in his soul. But Socrates apparently closes his analysis without referring to the deep roots of this passion in the observer.

Last but not least, the necessity of including *pain* at comedy remains unexplained in Socrates' argument.

In this paper, I will attempt to offer a plausible account for Socrates' appealing to comedy to focus on 'mild' ordinary 'envy' among friends, and will give a few exploring suggestions on the question of how Plato might believe that this passionate emotion is wrong because it relates to ignorance and self-deceit.

Nowadays, envy is regarded as a propensity to view the well-being of others with distress, even though it does not detract from one's own. It is a tendency to see our own well-being overshadowed by another's because the standard we use to see how well off we are is not the intrinsic worth of our own well-being but how it compares with that of others. Following this perspective and in light of some Platonic clues, I will suggest, envy could be interpreted as a case of self-deceit based on false opinion, not only on behalf of the ridiculous person who causes mild envy to arise in someone else, but also on behalf of the subject that is envious, which is a case that Socrates does not *seem* to acknowledge here explicitly.

Moreover, even when in his brief consideration of envy in the *Philebus*, Plato does not seem to offer resources to eradicate it, the general Platonic principle that knowledge should set measure to pleasure in this dialogue can also turn out to be a key to understanding the role it plays at dealing with this envious pleasure mixed with pain. The reader can deduce that only when one becomes aware of the ignorance at stake, one will be in the position to refrain unfair laughter and recalculate true pleasures and pains properly. For when self- knowledge of limits and powers is the source of self-esteem, I suggest, envy has no room in the soul.

2 On the Meanings of φθόνος in Different Contexts

We could grossly classify the meanings of φθόνος in Plato into two categories: (1) envious 'ill-will' or 'malice' and (2) envious 'jealousy'.

2.1 φθόνος *as Envious 'Ill-will' or 'Malice'*

In the *Apology* (18d2-3) Socrates refers to those who persuaded the judges by means of envy and slander, as the real causes of his accusation at 28a9. In the *Euthyphro* (3c-d) Socrates echoes the same idea as he claims that the Athenians do not mind anyone they think clever, as long as he does not teach his own wisdom, but if they think he makes others to be like himself, they get angry, whether through envy or for some other reason. Not only has envy consequences on the life or death of particular citizens but it can cause destruction and war among cities as well. In the *Menexenus* (242a) it is said that other cities inflicted jealousy (ζῆλον) upon successful Athens, which seems to be the first stage of ill-will (φθόνος) that provoked the war in the Peloponnesus. In the *Republic* (IX.586c-d) the tyrant is described as an envious person and his passion, related to violence and wrath, is due to an excessive desire for honor, without discernment. Also in the Laws (IX.870c5-7) φθόνος is related to envy, rather than to jealousy, for the character of the ambitious soul that desires (excessive) honor breeds envies that are difficult company for himself and also for the best citizens in the city. This type of malice provokes conflicts, violence and civil war among citizens (*Leg.* VIII.844 c and IX.933e-934b). But wisdom does not inspire 'envy' in those well disposed towards it (*Resp.* V.476e). Envy is incompatible with fair refutation (*Grg.* 457d). Pupil and teacher should proceed in good will and without envy (*L.* VII 344b ff.). These passages that display different contexts and subjects give us an idea of the variety of meanings and of the richness of the term.

2.2 φθόνος *as Envious 'Jealousy'*

In the *Phaedrus* (253b3-c2) the followers of the gods 'show no jealousy (Jowett) / envy (Nehamas-Woodruff) or meanness toward the boy but make every possible effort to draw him into being totally like themselves and the god to whom they are devoted' in contrast with the jealous possessive lover (criticized in the first part of the dialogue: 232c-e[3]). This fits with Plato's view, contrary to the

3 Only those 'who are not in love' are said to be free from jealousy according to Lysias (*Phdr.* 232d4-5). Socrates will defend the view that good passionate lovers are also free from jealousy.

tradition, that the gods (and the philosophers who imitate them) cannot be jealous (244a; Timaeus 29e-30a). Analogously, in the Symposium (222d-223a) Socrates is aware of the fact that Alcibiades expects to be loved exclusively by him, as he tries to separate him (physically and psychologically) from Agathon. So he asks him: 'don't be jealous; let me praise the boy: μὴ φθονήσῃς (223a1-2, Nehamas-Wooddruff).

3 Socrates' Argument in the *Philebus* (47d-50e)

In our passage of the *Philebus* φθόνος is translated as 'envy' (Fowler, Bury, Stevens, Davidson, Delcomminette, Mills, Miller, Durán, Boeri), as 'malice' (Hackforth, Taylor, Gosling, Waterfield, Frede, Migliori following Gadamer and Tuozzo) and also as 'jealousy' (Brisson). Some authors reserve 'jealousy' for ζῆλος and 'envy' for φθόνος while others render them the other way round (Brisson). Though Wood translates it as 'envy or malice' he observes that a better translation might be '*Schadenfreude*', literarily 'harm-joy': pleasure at the pain of another. I will translate φθόνος as 'envy' in my analysis of the passage because this emotion is assumed by Protarchus to be 'painful' which is a typical feature of envy, (the envious person suffers) and he finds it obscure and difficult to see in which sense it could be 'pleasant' (47e-48bc), while 'malice' could be taken as 'pleasant' in an ordinary popular sense, without objection. It seems to me that Delcomminette is right at indicating that the paradoxical feature of φθόνος as 'pleasant' cannot be accounted for if the term is translated as 'malice'.[4]

Indeed, though φθόνος is regarded by Protarchus as a kind of pain within the soul itself, together with other passions or affections such as anger, fear, longing, mourning, love and jealousy (ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἆρ᾽οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύπας τινάς; 47e1-3), Socrates remarks that these emotions are full of irresistible (ἀμηχάνων) pleasures (47e5).[5]

In order to find some ground for his view, Socrates quotes a couple of verses of the *Iliad* (18.108–09[6]). After having learnt about Patroclus 'death at the hands of Hector, Achilles tells his mother about 'the anger that makes a man wroth, even the wise one, when, much sweeter than soft-flowing honey', penetrates

4 For a full defense of this point, see Delcomminette (2006), 442–43.

5 The adjective can be translated as 'extraordinary' or 'marvellous' (Frede) but its primary sense is 'without means or resources' which implies that the agent is 'at a loss', as if nothing could be done against them (LSJ).

6 ὅς τ᾽ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι, ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο.

his breast and grows like smoke. His deepest pain is likely to be mixed with the pleasure of revenge.[7] Now that his beloved Patroclus is dead, Achilles wishes his consuming rage to cease.[8] In my view, Socrates' quotation contributes to support a phenomenological analysis of painful/pleasant passions, rather than a moral one.[9] Socrates adds that in the same way pleasures are present in mourning and longings (presumably along with the beautiful memories…).

At this stage Socrates turns from poetry to tragedy. He reminds Protarchus that 'spectators at tragedies weep while they enjoy' the dramas (48a5-6). It is not difficult to imagine how spectators feel sympathetic towards the hero's misfortunes as they also feel glad at the depth and beauty of the verses.[10] Indeed, the drama does not affect them straightforward. However, when Socrates moves on and observes that our condition of the soul or state of mind in comedy is again a mixture of pain and pleasure, Protarchus claims that he does not fully understand. Socrates admits that it is 'indeed not quite so easy to see' it so (48b1); Protarchus says that it is certainly not to him and Socrates replies that since it is 'such an obscure matter, they must be all the more careful' and he adds: 'For this will help us to recognize more easily when there is a mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases as well' (48b4-6). Thus, φθόνος plays a paradigmatic role.

Let us follow the steps of Socrates' argument:

1. Socrates picks the name φθόνος, confirms that Protarchus associates it to pain, and then asks him whether the envious person (ὁ φθονῶν) will not also display pleasure at his neighbours' misfortunes:

   τό τοι νυνδὴ ῥηθὲν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα λύπην τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς (…) ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται (*Phlb.* 48b8-9; 11–12).

2. Next he appeals to the old thesis that ignorance is evil, and so it is the habit of stupidity or mediocrity: ἀβελτέραν ἕξιν (48c2). The term ἀβέλτερος (lit. 'not better') describes the unjust man who thinks himself to be wise, as he appears to be *clever* among his likes but when it comes to mingle

7 "Anger is always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come" also for Aristotle (*Rh.* II.2, 1378a31-33).

8 As Benardete (1993) claims, 199.

9 Torres (2017), 65 observes that Achilles' pleasure is false and that he must be wicked, because those men 'rejoice in false pleasures, but the good among human beings rejoice in true' (*Phlb*. 40b1-c1).

10 *Resp.* 605d.

among the good and his elders he reveals to be fatuous or stupid (*Resp.* 409c-d).[11]

3. Then Socrates associates mediocrity, which is a kind of ignorance, to the nature of the ridiculous, a bad condition (πονηρία) that consists in an affection (πάθος) that stands in direct opposition to the famous inscription in Delphi, 'know thyself': τοὐναντίον πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων (…) 'γνῶθι σαυτὸν' (48c6-9; 10; 49a4-5). It should be noticed that at the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates himself toys with the idea that he can be regarded as 'a *ridiculous* man, dividing into kinds, and counting things together' (23d2) while he displays self-knowledge as the good protection from ridicule.[12]
4. Ignorance may concern different issues. A person can be ignorant with regard to her wealth, if someone thinks himself richer than he in fact is; with regard to the bodily condition, for instance, if someone believes more handsome than he really is; or concerning virtue, which is the most popular kind for, Socrates claims, an overwhelming number think they are superior in virtue, and among the virtues, it is especially to wisdom that the largest number of people lay claim, puffing themselves up with quarrels and false pretensions to would-be wisdom (49a2). When one believes richer, more beautiful or wiser than one really is, one turns out to be ridiculous.
5. These ridiculous people without understanding who have such a false opinion of themselves and provoke such a comic childish envy (παιδικὸς φθόνος: 49a8) (Benardete: 'resentment') have no strength to take revenge themselves when they are laughed at, but those who do have the power to do so can be regarded as dangerous for their ignorance is odious, ugly and harmful to their neighbors (49a7-b4). Socrates asks Protarchus whether rejoicing about evils that happen to our enemies is unjust or envious, and his interlocutor denies this possibility. Why doesn´t Socrates reject Protarchus' assumption? In general terms, according to Socrates, the good man would never make fun or rejoice at any evil, be it of a friend or of an enemy. Making fun of anyone would not make him better but it is likely to harm him and make him worse, and harming anyone is never just (*Resp.* 335c-e). Could this be understood as a concession to the popular view of justice as doing good to one's friends and bad to one's

11 The LSJ *Greek-English Lexicon* also reports a comic formation of this word from βέλτερος, so it is not surprising that Plato uses the word when he is about to refer to this passion in the spectators at comedy.

12 McCabe (2010), 200.

enemies?[13] Stevens[14] observes that the 'enemies' referred to are people of whom we do disapprove because they are powerful and hateful and shameless, then, 'if our enemies are the wicked, we ought to rejoice in the misfortune or punishment consequent upon their sin' which turns out to be righteous indignation, rather than envy. But righteous indignation cannot be a pleasure at all. So we should assume that Socrates does not attempt to refute Protarchus at this point but moves on to suggest that rejoicing at our friends' evils, rather than feeling pain, would be unjust: 'But is there any occasion when it is not unjust to be pleased rather than pained to see bad things happen to your friends?' (49d6-7, Frede).

6. Envy is a mixture of unjust pleasure at what is ridiculous (and harmless to others) about our friends,[15] and unjust pain, we are to assume, about their good fortunes. The upshot of the discussion is that in tragedies and comedies, on stage as well as in life, most passions combine pleasures with pains (50b-c). Protarchus agrees but he seems 'most eager to make the opposite position win the case' (50b5-6).

If passions are a mixture of pleasure and pain, no passion can be pursued as the pleasant end of life. Protarchus's unwilling answer shows that he is aware of the point Socrates is interested in making. Only the other candidate for happiness, namely knowledge, (and here it must be self-knowledge) seems to enable oneself to protect from adopting ridiculous attitudes and to moderate mixed passions as well.[16]

13 Miller (2008), 269 finds Socrates contradicts himself with his denial that it can ever be just to 'do bad things' to anyone, even an enemy who has wronged you first in *Crito* and *Republic.* However, taking pleasure is not the same as wrongdoing, and if the enemy's defeat means one's victory, and the war is defensive to restitute justice, it would not be either unjust or envious to rejoice at the triumph; Wood (2007), 86.

14 Stevens (1948), 81.

15 This kind of 'private' envy, unlike the root of class strife, Aristotle limits to relations between who are near to one another in time, locality, age and reputation, or who are rivals (*Rh.* II.10, 1388a5-7).

16 Aristotle follows Plato on envy as an unjust passion in *Top.* 109b35 ff. The good man cannot be envious and so it is restricted to the vicious man to take pain at the apparent success of the good. It is in the *Rhetoric* (1386b34-1387a3) where he distinguishes two bad characters: the envious, who takes pain at the good fortune of his peers, without discriminating whether it is deserved or otherwise, and those who take pleasure at the bad fortune of his equal peers. However, as Grant (1874), 1: 506 has observed, they are 'only different forms of the same state of mind' (quoted by Mills (1985), 5). Envy and malicious joy are different aspects of the same character and not morally discriminating; in his *Eudemian Ethics* (1221a38-1221b3; 1233b8-26) Aristotle describes two types: those who feel righteous indignation at undeserved good fortune and those who please at deserved good

4 What the Argument Does Not Prove

The reader may have the impression that there is something that does not fit in the argument, a kind of gap between its goal and the result obtained. Even when Socrates has given some clues about envy and has indicated in which sense it combines pleasure and pain, two points remain in the dark.

4.1 *Why Should the Spectator Feel Pain at Comedy?*

What Protarchus presumably finds hard to see is not the pleasant aspect in comedy, which the argument exploits, for he must be used to seeing spectators enjoying the plays as they laugh at the ignorance and boastfulness of the comic characters on stage; what he is likely to find difficult to reconcile with that pleasure is the painful aspect of envy on the spectators' side in comedy.[17] However, Socrates says nothing about the feeling of pain the envious man might take in comedy, presumably at watching the good fortune of certain arrogant characters. The reason for this silence is not easy to discover once they had agreed to explore the 'obscure' case of envy at comedy in order to clarify the other passions as well. Grote[18] in a note on the passage asks: 'how the laughter can be said to experience a mixture of pleasure and pain here?' Stevens[19] thinks that the envious spectator at comedy takes pleasure in a feeling which is painful. He observes that 'wrongdoing of any kind is in the nature of a disease of the soul and therefore may be regarded as painful, however little the wrongdoer is conscious of pain'. In my view, this interpretation cannot be right, for the account of wrongdoing as 'a disease' requires that the envious person should know that his former pleasure at laughing at the comedian is unjust, and that he should feel guilty about it. If this is so, he would not take pleasure in his pain, but would take pain in his former pleasure. On the other hand, according to Socrates, pleasure and pain must be felt, if they are not 'felt' they do not take place. And in addition, one should not confuse the psychological/emotional pain of envy when one suffers because one lacks what others enjoy (even when in Socrates' eyes it is presumably unjust to oneself in the first

fortune. The defective conditions of indifference at good and bad fortunes receives no name. See *Eth. Nic.* 1108a35-b6 and Mills (1985), 6–12.

17 As Wood (2007), 81 observes, 'the problem here is that neither composing nor enjoying a comic spectacle seems to depend necessarily upon envy, malice, or any negative emotion or feeling of pain towards the target of ridicule'.

18 Grote (1867).

19 Stevens (1948), 177–78. He observes that 'wrongdoing of any kind is in the nature of a disease of the soul and therefore may be regarded as painful, however little the wrongdoer is conscious of pain'.

place) with the moral pain of shame at envy.[20] Moreover, not any type of ignorance displayed on stage necessarily provokes envy.[21] Miller[22] and Delcomminette[23] interpret that the characteristic 'pain at comedy' consists in the awareness of our lacking the same goods which the actor believes he possesses. But it may be objected that one can laugh at the ridiculous delusion of the actors without necessarily feeling the pain of lacking what they think they possess, or the pain of having an unfair emotion towards them. A powerful male spectator would laugh at Lysistrata's expectations without envying her the power she wants to get, just because he would regard the plot as completely ridiculous on the 'sensible' belief that women simply cannot possibly have the power to stop a war.

Moreover, at comedy, the actors do expect to provoke laughing, so neither to them nor to the public the pleasure of laughing is generally regarded as an injustice but as success. For one reason, the actors' ignorance is only apparent, as they deliberately wish to convey the impression of being ignorant. Hackforth[24] has put it this way: in comic spectacles, 'both the envy and the malice are only half-real' because while the audience, out of envy, desires to see the pretensions of the comic character ridiculed, it also already knows that the pretensions are false and that they will be punctured. Aristotle seems to confirm this view when he denies the presence of envy in the amusement afforded by comedy (*Poet.* 1449a34-37). Migliori[25] observes that Plato avoids to establish the connection with comedy for, he suggests, if it were made explicit, it would destroy the parallel with tragedy; he concludes that Plato has stricken one of the pillars of Athenian culture, by including in an evil category, the attendance to comic spectacles.

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20 McCabe (2010), 197 relates both pains as she writes: 'But our laughter in comedy is itself the *source* of the pain, because it relies on malice'.

21 Tulli (2010), 241 defends the view that 'Plato takes his definition for the ridiculous from the *Clouds,* because the knowledge of Socrates in the scenes of the comedy offers the pattern of measure for ignorance, for the weak ignorance of Strepsiades, for the ignorance that prevents the young Pheidippides from discerning the genre of things'. Pain and dismay at comedy is what Plato might have suffered at the introduction of Socrates as a sophist in Aristophanes' *Clouds,* a play he regarded as a slander that contributed to the trial and subsequent condemning to death of Socrates, or at *The Assemby of Women* where the playwright makes fun of essential features of his own political project. But his righteous indignation cannot be compared to unjust envy and Aristophanes' attitude, being highly dangerous and influential, does not provoke envy but a sense of danger.

22 Miller (2008), 271.

23 Delcomminette (2006), 446–47.

24 Hackforth [1945] (1972), 92.

25 Migliori (1993), 253–54.

Be it as it may, it seems difficult to see how Protarchus could possibly understand in which sense there is real or conscious *pain* in the *laughing* audience at comedies and why they should feel envy or malice to take pleasure in them.

4.2 *Why Should Envy be Explained Better by Focusing on the Envied Person Rather than on the Envious Subject?*

As I have claimed in the introduction, Socrates' arguments are focused on the envied person rather than on the envious subject. It seems to me that this is not the best method to inquire about envy, for two reasons. In the first place, the ridiculous ignorant can provoke all kinds of reactions in the spectator, from sympathy to pity, from envy to cruelty, which means that he is not the clue to explore what envy is. However, when the good man detects ridiculous ignorance in a friend, it is likely to provoke distress and embarrassment to him. Socrates, the character, is placed in front of narcissistic interlocutors along Plato's dialogues. When he detects arrogance in Critias' arguments in the *Charmides* or narcissism in Protagoras in the homonymous dialogue, rather than laughing at them, he uses all his power to refute them. Naturally, his refutation may include irony and humor, and perhaps also a strong desire to win the case, but certainly it does not seem to include envy at all.[26]

Secondly, it is not necessary that the object of envy should be a ridiculous mild friend (or actor) who boasts about his talents, but anyone can become the object of envy, from the best man to the worst one.

This makes me conclude that mild ridiculous ignorance is neither enough nor even necessary to provoke envy. It is not the character of the object of envy what arises the passion in the spectator but something that goes wrong in the envious soul.

My hypothesis is that there must be some kind of ignorance involved, not only in the ridiculous actor or in the ridiculous friend, but certainly in the 'envious' person. And again that ignorance concerns herself. The spectator feels superior to the one he laughs at because he can see the distance between his pretensions and his real condition. He can detect his ignorance. But his pleasure also implies ignorance about the negative effects of ignorance in others, the likely negative effect of his laughter on them, and the reason why it is unjust and should be corrected. Laughing is unfair because it contributes nothing

26 Analogously, Wood (2007), 77 concludes his analysis saying that the comedy and ridicule indulged in by both Socrates and Plato is not equivalent to the behavior condemned as malicious in the comedy section. Malice laughs at self-ignorance in others but Socrates helps others overcome it (79).

to make the person better but can harm him. In this sense, it is worth noticing that envy is obstructive of pity according to Aristotle (*Rh.* II.8, 1386b9 ff.).

Therefore, setting aside for a moment Plato's view that ignorance may affect the 'ridiculous' friend, I would like to insist in its necessarily affecting the envious person somehow. Not only because he ignores his unfair behavior towards others, but mainly because he is likely to judge improperly his own condition, as safe and sound with regard to the risk of self-deceit about his own character and temperament. In addition, the envious person, I claim, must have a biased way of perceiving what he himself deserves and lacks, in comparison with the way he perceives what others possess and deserve.[27] He feels unjust pleasure and pain because he does not know how to calculate and enjoy true pleasures that genuinely derive from his own activity, goods and character. The envious man is likely to think he deserves more goods than he has while others do not deserve the goods they have. In a sense, his case is the reverse of those friends described by Plato here, who believe that they have more (wealth, beauty or wisdom) than what they in fact possess. We should conclude that the envious does not judge properly, feels superior to his peers[28] and ignores the real condition of his soul.[29]

Though this reading is not explicitly exhibited in our passage, I suggest, it can be somehow derived from it by *extending* Socrates' observation (in passing) about ridiculous ignorant vanity -as standing in direct opposition to the famous dictum 'know thyself'- to the unfair pleasure of the envious. One can find support for this view from other texts by Plato where, for instance, he compares the man who strives for excellence to the envious man. He says that the good man does not begrudge another man his success, but is grieved by his own lack of such success and tries to qualify himself for a like success. He would compete with others in excellence, in a generous spirit free from envy, and would never laugh at the wicked:

27 Tuozzo (1996, 511) is also persuaded that 'the malicious person himself lacks self-knowledge, for if that person in fact knew the goods he possessed, he would not allow his self-image to be influenced by a comparison with others'.

28 Delcomminette (2006), 447 finds that Plato places the origin of laughing in a feeling of inferiority rather than superiority. I cannot agree: the envious suffers because he feels he deserves more than what he has and that is because he feels superior. Maybe he knows that he is regarded as inferior or that in fact he is in an inferior position (envy is regarded as typical of the poor class in antiquity), but his envy arises out of a feeling of superiority. For a similar view see Tuozzo (1996), 310–12.

29 Democritus (DK 293) gives an interesting account of the specific ignorance that characterizes the envious: 'Those who derive pleasure from their neighbours' misfortune do not understand that the changes of fortune are common to all, and moreover they are at a loss for something of their own to be happy about'.

> Let every one of us be ambitious to gain excellence, but without envy. For a man of this character enlarges a city, since he strives hard himself and does not thwart the others by calumny; but the jealous/envious man, thinking that calumny of others is the best way *to secure his own superiority*, makes less effort himself to win true excellence, and disheartens his rivals by getting them unjustly blamed; whereby he causes the whole city to be ill-trained for competing in excellence, and renders it, for his part, less large in fair repute (*Leg.* 731a2-b3, trans. by Bury with minor changes).[30]

This fits with Plato's ascribing envy to the tyrannical nature in *Republic* (579c; 580a; 586c) and with his conviction that philosophers (500c) are deprived from envy. As it is well known, Plato opposes the traditional view that attributes envy to the gods (not because they lack anything but because they estimate humans do not deserve certain goods) for, in his view, the gods are wise. He claims that the Demiurge, being good, cannot be envious, and wished all things to be like to himself as nearly as possible (*Ti.* 29e-30a; *Phdr.* 247a). That the Demiurge is not envious means that he is generous and wishes his work to be the best possible one. As philosophers should make themselves similar to the gods as far as they can (*Ti.* 89d-90d; *Tht.* 176b) naturally, they must be deprived of envy, as it is attested in the *Republic.*

5 Some Final Remarks

Some questions arise after our analysis. Firstly, why does Socrates appeal to comedy to explain ordinary envy among friends? Secondly, why does he focus on the envied person rather than on the envious subject? And last, but not least, how should one correct unfair pleasures and pains? Can reflection correct wrong judgments about what one deserves, possesses or lacks? I will attempt to offer some exploring suggestions on these matters.

In the first place, I would like to claim that even when Socrates is interested in distinguishing pure pleasures from mixed pleasures in order to establish a hierarchy among them, and to privilege the role of intelligence and knowledge

30 φιλονικείτω δὲ ἡμῖν πᾶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀφθόνως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτος τὰς πόλεις αὔξει, ἁμιλλώμενος μὲν αὐτός, τοὺς ἄλλους δὲ οὐ κολούων διαβολαῖς: ὁ δὲ φθονερός, τῇ τῶν ἄλλων διαβολῇ δεῖν οἰόμενος ὑπερέχειν, αὐτός τε ἧττον συντείνει πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὴν ἀληθῆ, τούς τε ἀνθαμιλλωμένους εἰς ἀθυμίαν καθίστησι τῷ ἀδίκως ψέγεσθαι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀγύμναστον τὴν πόλιν ὅλην εἰς ἅμιλλαν ἀρετῆς ποιῶν, σμικροτέραν αὐτὴν πρὸς εὐδοξίαν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἀπεργάζεται.

at setting limits to the unlimited character of pleasure, he does not wish to get rid of passion as such. Most passions are a mixture of pleasure and pain but they are an essential ingredient of human beings, they come in the soul, and move the soul by generating desires and actions.

After the examination of Socrates' arguments, it seems clear that we can conclude that envy is a mixture of unfair pleasure and unfair pain because it arises at an evil, namely, ignorance dwelling in others. This ignorance is said to be present in gentle persons who are neither odious nor dangerous. When we laugh and make fun of our friends and neighbors who exaggerate their wealth, beauty or virtue, our spontaneous reaction exhibits 'mild' envy,[31] so to speak, or as Socrates calls it: 'comic' envy or 'childlike' envy (παιδικὸς φθόνος: 49a8), which is comparable to our laughing at the boasting attitudes of the characters on stage.

Naturally, one should consider the possible case of a person who may derive pleasure from the favorable view of herself at being able to detect delusion in others, be not self-deluded about his own good attributes[32] and yet not being envious. But that person will not take pleasure from the fact that others deceive themselves.

For envy to arise, the malicious pleasure of deceit in others must be mixed with a painful sting felt at the spectacle of other people -either really or apparently- possessing such goods as knowledge, virtue, beauty and wealth, together with the person representing himself as painfully lacking them.[33] It seems then that envy implies the pain at the self-image of lacking what others enjoy plus the pleasure at other's deceit about their goods.

However, there is a kind of envy that can be called 'mild' because it could be regarded as if it were not destructive. It can even be constructive, in certain contexts. Our laughing might turn out to be helpful to our friends to change their vain images about themselves, as well as their laughing at our ignorant deceit might help us. Some may take offense, others may disregard it, but the more intuitive and sensible may reflect on their own views about themselves… Such is the tragedy and comedy of life. The mild envious friend may turn out to be a positive influence on the gentle ignorant…

The situation could be comparable to the one experienced by Socrates' followers at enjoying hearing those questioned by him who think they are wise

31 I agree with Wood (2007), 80 about the fact that the destructive envious person must have some degree of personal intense hartred or resentment. But I would not claim that Socrates refers to that type of envy in this context, for he compares this envy among friends to what happens in comedy.

32 Tuozzo (1996), 511.

33 Tuozzo (1996), 510–11 and Gavray (2010), 161 share this view.

while they are not. Indeed, Socrates reports in the *Apology* (33c) that 'this is not unpleasant'. They laugh, we laugh, but we do not know the right answer either and the situation could be an opportunity to become aware of that. Those questioned are weak and cannot avenge against laughter: they are funny, the stuff of good comic theatre. Socrates' bystanders and spectators at comedy have two features in common: they are off the stage and they enjoy somebody else's arrogant ignorance being unmasked. But a few of them could also become aware of their own deficiencies.[34]

And yet, the ultimate answer to the question about the reason why Socrates focuses on the 'unfair pleasure' of envy, I suggest, is to be found in the general context of his conversation with Protarchus, in which Socrates is unwilling to subscribe the division of passions into the 'absolutely' pleasant ones to be sought (such as love, which Philebus defends in his devotion for Aphrodite) and the 'absolutely' painful ones to be avoided (such as fear). His argument on envy as a paradigmatic case of 'mixture of pleasure and pain', turns out to be essential to demonstrate that passions as such cannot be regarded as either pleasant or painful in themselves. Moreover, Socrates focuses on the *unjust* aspect of envious *pleasure* at our friends' misfortunes: if it is unfair, he claims, it cannot be good. If there is at least one type of unjust pleasure, the thesis that pleasure is to be interpreted as 'the' good does not hold. Therefore, the case of envy is introduced as a kind of pattern in order to understand the nature of passion in general terms: if it is shown to be mixed with pain and injustice, the implicit conclusion is, *pace* Protarchus, that passion as such cannot be pursued as the pleasant good end in itself, but requires certain adjustment to be imposed on it.

As the unfair aspect of pleasure is due to the ignorance of the person who is the *object* of envy, this is enough for Socrates to show why envy, like all the other passions mentioned, is a mixture of pleasure and pain. Obviously, this does not imply that all passions are mixtures of 'unfair' pleasure and pain. The pages on envy here seem to indicate that passion admits degrees. There is a 'comic' mild envy and a destructive serious one … but Plato does not develop this second type here.

Though Socrates' treatment of envy meets his goal in the dialogue, the difficulty remains in the case of the destructive passion that resents and hates another person's good together with the pleasure of witnessing the destruction

34 Gavray (2010), 162: 'Par son pouvoir élenctique, le comique possède donc une valeur positive, consistant à créer chez autrui la conscience de l'ignorance de soi'. See also McCabe (2010), 202: 'comedy can allow us to confront ourselves, to reflect on our own responses and make them consistent with our other moral attitudes' (…) 'but the self-knowledge that comes into all this is developed by the audience…'.

of that good. In this regard, I will limit myself to offer just a few indications, for this subject exceeds the goal of this paper.

In the *Republic* Plato is convinced that education basically consists in getting children used to feeling pleased about the right things. And he is also persuaded that the first duty of justice is to be oneself and to strive to give oneself the opportunities and chances one deserves in order to fulfill one's task. It is essential that children should have good intuitive teachers to help them in the process of getting to know themselves, talents and defects included, and at doing their best. Once they grow up they should be able to use their emotional intelligence to set limits to destructive passions and empower the positive ones towards the right goals. Intelligence should not give commands for herself but for the common good of the whole soul, including the parts that desire money, beauty and honor. If these other 'parts' of the soul agree about her capacity to see the whole and work for the totality, they will trust her the government and will not be disappointed. If moderation triumphs, every part gets the best satisfaction it can reach. But if the part that loves being honored at any price takes the lead, and judges that anything we get is not enough compared to what we deserve and to what others do have or get, then we are likely to suffer from envy. The error is to take our friends' or neighbors' riches, physical appearance and the like as normative for ourselves. Only self-knowledge of personal talents, lacks and chances can provide a critical calculus of what balance of wealth, honor and the like, serves the good of one's soul. This new perspective, which is detached from mere comparative and competitive concerns, is focused on the self. After this reassessment, limits are set. Thus, moderation turns out to be essential to help us avoid the unfair pains due to our misfortunes as well as the unfair pleasures of envy towards others' misfortunes.

I would like to conclude this paper by quoting a passage which, in my opinion, is key to our discussion, and one of the most beautiful pieces of the *Philebus.* Talking about erotic love and Philebus' favourite goddess, presumably Aphrodite, Socrates says:

> It is the goddess herself, fair Philebus, who seeing how excess and total wickedness allowed for no limit of pleasures and of their fulfillment, imposed law and order as a limit on them. And while you may complain that this ruins (ἀποκναῖσαι) them, I by contrast say that it saves (ἀποσῶσαι) them (26b7-c1, trans. by Frede with some slight changes).[35]

35 ὕβριν γάρ που καὶ σύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός, ὦ καλὲ Φίληβε, πέρας οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἔχοντ᾽ἔθετο: καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῂς αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω. For a detailed analysis of this passage see Bossi (2006).

The whole discussion of the *Philebus* is focused on the importance of limit to be imposed upon the unlimited, and the paradox that remains at the ground of it is that if one is to produce a happy life, limit, i.e. knowledge, should be imposed on that which admits degrees, namely passion, not in order to repress or destroy it but in order to save it.

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CHAPTER 12

Αἰσχύνη and the Λογιστικόν in Plato's *Republic*

Chiara Militello

Abstract

Αἰσχύνη was one of the most important emotions in the ancient Greek culture, and, more specifically, it had a significant role in Plato's philosophy. As a matter of fact, feeling shame for your false beliefs and misbehaving is, according to Plato, a powerful motivation for becoming wise and good. As a consequence, the relationship between αἰσχύνη and the tripartite soul of the *Republic* has been an object of interest for a few scholars. The researches published so far have focused on the problem of the location of shame in the λογιστικόν or in the θυμοειδές, and in this context a passage from Aristotle's *Topics* may seem a witness to Plato's view on the matter, so it is worthwhile to inquire the merit of this passage as a source. However, the role of αἰσχύνη in the tripartite soul is not limited to being caused by one part of the other, because in any case it integrates into the activities of the λογιστικόν. It is therefore advisable to study how shame helps reason to reach its end in the *Republic*. A close reading of the dialogue in parallel with the other works by Plato and with Aristotle's *Topics* and a survey of the relevant secondary literature allow to specify these hitherto understudied features of αἰσχύνη.

Keywords

shame (αἰσχύνη) – reason (λογιστικόν) – *Republic* – spirit (θυμοειδές) – philosophers-rulers – *Topics*

This chapter deals with the relationship between αἰσχύνη and the λογιστικόν in Plato's *Republic*.[1] This relationship has already been investigated by William W. Fortenbaugh and Douglas Cairns. While Fortenbaugh has stated that when Plato wrote the *Republic* he found acceptable to say that αἰσχύνη was located in

1 I thank Professor Loredana Cardullo for her insightful as usual suggestions.

the rational part of the soul,[2] Cairns has rejected this thesis, arguing that αἰσχύνη is a function of the spirited part alone.[3] I want to show that, whether αἰσχύνη is in the λογιστικόν or not, Socrates plans to use this emotion to reach the constitution reason calls for. More precisely, Socrates states that, after learning what the philosophers really are, people will accept them as rulers, at least because they will feel αἰσχύνη. Furthermore, I want to prove that, even though Aristotle is referring to the soul as divided by Plato in the *Republic* when he states in the *Topics* that αἰσχύνη is in the λογιστικόν and not in the θυμοειδές, this passage does not necessarily convey Plato's view on the place of αἰσχύνη in the soul when he wrote that dialogue. As a matter of fact, there is at least one passage from the *Topics* that surely contradicts the *Republic* about the location of a psychological state in the soul, as Aristotle says that pleasure is in the ἐπιθυμητικόν, while Plato states that each part of the soul has its own pleasures.

1 Αἰσχύνη, the λογιστικόν and the θυμοειδές

Αἰσχύνη is an important emotion for the ancient Greeks. Indeed the noun αἰσχύνη covers several different feelings, usually revolving around the fear of being reproached for one's actions.[4] Plato himself, in the *Laws*, defines αἰσχύνη as fear for the opinion that other people would have of us, if we acted wrongly.[5] However, it must be noted that in Plato the emotion of αἰσχύνη is not necessarily based on the others judging us, because, as Cairns has shown, the values on which such judgements are based are sometimes internalized.[6] Anyway, be it related to the opinion of the others or to one's own, this meaning of αἰσχύνη can be translated in English as "shame". Αἰσχύνη is related to the verb αἰσχύνομαι, which on its turn means "to be ashamed" when it takes no object, "to be ashamed before" and, as a consequence, "to respect" when it does.[7] At times

2 Fortenbaugh [1975] (2002), 32. Fortenbaugh talks about 'shame', but the passages he mentions (Plato, *Resp.* 9.571c9, 10.606c3-6) are about αἰσχύνη and αἰσχύνομαι, so it is fair to say that his thesis applies to αἰσχύνη.

3 Cairns (1993), 381–85. Cairns treats αἰσχύνη and αἰδώς as synonyms in this context, and generally when he analyzes Plato's thought; Cairns (1993), 374, 380, 382, 383, 385.

4 A good introduction to the concept of αἰσχύνη is Konstan (2003). On shame in Greek thought, also see Allen-Hornblower (2017), 78–79.

5 Plato, *Leg.* 1.646e10-647a2.

6 Cairns (1993), 377–81, 389–92. Again, Cairns refers to αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη together.

7 Examples of αἰσχύνομαι as being ashamed before someone or respecting: Plato, *Resp.* VIII.562e8, *Ti.* 49d3, *Leg.* V.729b5, 729b7, *L.* VII 328c4.

αἰσχύνη does not mean a feeling, but rather the disgraceful condition suffered by a person or a group of persons – another meaning of the English word "shame": for example, bringing αἰσχύνη on one's family means bringing disgrace on them.[8] So one can say that αἰσχύνη as a feeling is the fear of bringing αἰσχύνη as a condition on oneself. All in all, as a first approximation, one can translate the occurrences of αἰσχύνη in Plato with "shame", and αἰσχύνομαι with "to be ashamed" or "to respect" depending on the context.[9]

There is an emotion that is close to αἰσχύνη, but – at least in some eras and in some authors – does not overlap with it: it is the feeling of αἰδώς.[10] In Plato, αἰδώς is sometimes used interchangeably with αἰσχύνη, even though in other dialogues Plato focuses on either the former or the latter,[11] and elsewhere he seems to discriminate between the two feelings. The passage where αἰσχύνη and αἰδώς are most closely linked is in the second book of the *Laws*. Here the Athenian Stranger refers back to the definition of shame as fear of bad reputation, saying that he has already talked about the 'most beautiful' and 'divine' fear that allows one to beat overconfidence, and more precisely that he has called this fear 'αἰδῶ τε καὶ αἰσχύνην'.[12] As for the passages where αἰσχύνη and αἰδώς seem to be differentiated, one can cite a particularly interesting argument expressed in the *Charmides* by the eponymous character. Charmides says that if you have temperance (the word he uses is σωφροσύνη) you feel shame (αἰσχύνομαι), you are the kind of person that easily feels this way (αἰσχυντηλός), and concludes that σωφροσύνη is nothing else than αἰδώς.[13] Charmides' statement is interesting because he seemingly considers αἰδώς as the ability to feel αἰσχύνη.[14] Considering that it is not certain that αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη are synonyms,

8 Plato uses αἰσχύνη to mean a disgraceful condition in several passages: *Ap.* 35a8, *Menex.* 247a5, *Symp.* 184e6, *Leg.* I.647b7, II.671e2, IX.873c6, IX.919e7.

9 It seems to me that Cairns' interpretation of Plato's references to αἰσχύνη and αἰσχύνομαι are consistent with the view I express; Cairns (1993) 373, 374–76, 377 n.100, 378, 379–80, 382, 389 n.140.

10 On the relationship between αἰσχύνη and αἰδώς see, again, Konstan (2003), and Julia Pfefferkorn's chapter in this volume.

11 Among the dialogues where Plato focuses on αἰδώς, one has to mention at least the *Protagoras*, where Zeus is said to have given δίκη and αἰδώς (commonly interpreted as "respect" in this context) to human beings in order to help them form peaceful communities.

12 *Leg.* II.671c8-671d3.

13 *Chrm.* 160e3-5.

14 This would prefigure the theory that can be found in the twenty-first *Ethical Problem* attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, where αἰδώς is said to be a habit (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Ethical Problems*, 21, p. 142, ll. 14–16). On this passage see Militello (2017b). Indeed, according to Cairns, already in Aristotle αἰδώς has all the features of a ἕξις; Cairns (1993), 398–430. It can also be noted that in the mentioned passage from the *Charmides*, the

I prefer not to use the passages about αἰδώς as evidence of Plato's opinions on the relationship between αἰσχύνη and the rational part of the soul.

In the *Republic*, αἰσχύνη is linked to the λογιστικόν at the beginning of the ninth book, where Socrates states that often, when human beings slumber, the rational part of the soul is asleep, and, as a consequence, dreams stage the appetites of the lowest part of the soul, which in that time is free from shame and wisdom (αἰσχύνης καὶ φρονήσεως).[15] When the rational part of the soul is asleep, there is no shame.[16] One can also mention the passage in the tenth book where Socrates talks about the disposition to make people laugh with silly jokes, and says that, since you would be ashamed (αἰσχύνοιο) at behaving that way, you restrain that disposition using reason (τῷ λόγῳ).[17] However, other passages suggest that αἰσχύνη is felt not by the rational part of the soul, but by the spirited one. For example, in the third book it is said that musical education accustoms us to be repelled by what is shameful (αἰσχρά) even before reason sets in.[18] A passage from the *Phaedrus* can be mentioned, too, if one agree with the vastly, although not universally,[19] accepted hypothesis that the chariot allegory of this dialogue depicts the same three parts of the soul that are described in the *Republic*, and specifically that the noble horse coincides with the θυμοειδές. As a matter of fact, Socrates says that, when the beloved is seen, at first this horse does not run towards the beloved and resists the thrust of the other horse, but eventually, like the charioteer, it surrenders to the latter impulses. However, when the charioteer, having being reminded of beauty itself, pulls the reins, the noble horse does not oppose him, and then it sweats profusely over the whole soul out of shame and amazement (ὑπ' αἰσχύνης τε καὶ θάμβους).[20]

distinction between αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη seems similar to the one between *pudore* and *vergogna* in Italian or *pudeur* and *honte* in French (there is not a perfect parallel in English, where the closest pair is maybe modesty vs. shame).

15 Plato, *Resp.* IX.571c3-9.

16 Both William Fortenbaugh and Simo Knuuttila have interpreted this passage as a statement that shame belongs to the rational part of the soul (Fortenbaugh (1970), 69 n.60, Fortenbaugh [1975] (2002), 32, Knuuttila (2004), 12).

17 Plato, *Resp.* X.606c2-10. This passage is considered by Fortenbaugh as another statement about shame belonging to the rational part of the soul Fortenbaugh [1975] (2002), 32. Cairns (1993), 382–83 refutes Fortenbaugh's use of the two mentioned passages as evidence that Plato located αἰσχύνη in the λογιστικόν.

18 Plato, *Resp.* III.401d5-402a4. On the role of musical education on the shaping of αἰδώς, see Cairns (1993), 387–88.

19 Some of the authors who criticize the equivalence between the chariot allegory of the *Phaedrus* and the tripartite soul of the *Republic* are: White (1993), 89–93, Carelli (2015). Sheffield (2012), 222–24 has argued that there is too little evidence to definitely answer the question about the agreement between *Phaedrus* and *Republic* on the soul.

20 *Phdr.* 253c6-254d1; αἰσχύνη is mentioned at 254c4.

That is, after having been curbed by the charioteer, the good horse is ashamed for having succumbed to lower desires. This suggests that the spirited part of the soul feels αἰσχύνη.[21] Indeed, locating αἰσχύνη in the spirited part of the soul would make sense, because a person's θυμός is motivated by the desire of being esteemed by oneself and by one's peers. This is why many scholars have stated that one of the main features of the spirited part of the soul is the ability to feel shame.

2 The Role of αἰσχύνη in Establishing the Ideal State

Even if in the *Republic* the rational part of the soul is not the seat of αἰσχύνη, this would not mean that in this dialogue this emotion cannot ally with reason. Indeed, all thymoedic emotions can side with reason against desire.[22] A case where αἰσχύνη can help reason – whether the former is a product of the latter or not – is illustrated in the passage in the sixth book where Socrates tackles the problem of the multitude opposing the idea of philosophers as rulers.[23] As a matter of fact, at the end of this passage Socrates states that the crowd will ultimately accept the new constitution if they learn who a philosopher really is, for, after hearing that, people 'have become totally mild and have been persuaded (πεπεῖσθαι), so that they agree, if nothing else, they are ashamed

21 Fortenbaugh [1975] (2002), 32 n.1 states that this passage suggests a link between αἰσχύνη and the spirited part of the soul. Fortenbaugh (*ibid.*) and Cairns (1993), 383–85 cite more passages that, according to them, suggest that 'shame' (Fortenbaugh) or 'αἰδώς/αἰσχύνη' (Cairns) is located in the spirited part of the soul: *Resp.* IV.439e-440a (Cairns); IV.440c-d (Cairns); VIII.548c (Cairns); VIII.561a1 (Fortenbaugh); VIII.562e8-9 (Fortenbaugh); *Phdr.* 253d-e (Cairns); specifically 253d6 (Fortenbaugh); 254a2 (both); 254c (Cairns); 254e9 (Cairns); 256a6 (Fortenbaugh). Fortenbaugh explains the disagreement between the passages that link shame and reason and the ones where shame is related to spirit by arguing that, before writing the *Philebus*, Plato was not really interested in emotions, and as a consequence he did not have a strong theory about the place of each feeling. In other words, according to Fortenbaugh, the place of shame in the soul was different in different passages because Plato had not yet developed a systematic account of shame and, generally, emotions (Fortenbaugh [1975] (2002), 32 n.1).

22 Cairns has argued that, even though spirit's beliefs about what is honourable and what is dishonourable are not provided by reason, they can be made consistent with rational judgements by a proper education (Cairns (1993), 385–87). Cairns' analysis in these pages covers the relationship between reason and θυμός, the latter being the seat of αἰδώς (*ibid.* 385). However, as I have already said, Cairns treats αἰσχύνη as a synonym for αἰδώς in Plato. On the relationship between thymoedic emotions and reason, also see Renaut (2014), 182 ff.

23 *Resp.* VI.498c5-502a3.

(αἰσχυνθέντες)'.[24] Here the fact that people feel αἰσχύνη is the only sure way to make them accept the constitution reason calls for, so it is a crucial assistant to the λογιστικόν.

The shame Socrates refers to is probably the shame people will feel when they will realize that their opinion about the nature of philosophers was wrong. It is not a case of shame for being morally worse than the philosophers, because, even though the philosophical nature is described as better than all the other characters,[25] Socrates argues that most people will change their mind when they will realize that the philosophers are as free from envy (the adjective used here is ἄφθονος) and gentle (πρᾶος) as them.[26] The speech used to persuade the mass to accept the government of the philosophers is not aimed at making people think they usually behave reprehensibly, so the αἰσχύνη they will experience should not be shame for their conduct. Instead, it is shame for having held wrong views, as it is shown by the general context of the passage, rather than by the use of the verb πείθομαι. As a matter of fact, this verb means not just "to be persuaded", but also "to be prevailed on", so Socrates could mean that the philosophers just win on the multitude by shaming it in any way.[27] However, one can note against this hypothesis that what happens in the scenario described by Socrates is that people find out that the image they had of philosophers as skilled but malicious orators is wrong, so the αἰσχύνη they feel has to come from this realization.[28]

As for Socrates' remark that people will accept philosophers as rulers out of shame, 'if nothing else', the most likely interpretation is that another reason for them to agree with the new constitution could be that they understood why it is the best state. In other words, Socrates is saying that there are two reasons why the mass could agree with proponents of the government of philosophers: the first reason is that people will realize that their image of what such a government would be was wrong – a realization that will surely happen; the second reason is that the multitude could fully grasp the benefits the city would have if truth-seekers ruled it, even though it is far from certain that common

24 *Resp*. VI.502a1-2. Αἰσχύνομαι does not seem to mean 'to respect' here, both because the verb has no explicit object and because respect for the philosophers would seem too weak as a reason to accept them as rulers. Indeed, Socrates' words in this passage are usually interpreted as a reference to shame.

25 *Resp.* VI.501d7-9.

26 *Resp*. VI.500a4-7.

27 Kastely (2015), 129 interprets the shame people would feel as the opposite as an act of persuasion.

28 Erickson (2010), 89–90 and Weiss (2012), 32, too, interpret Socrates' words as a reference to the shame you feel when your position is confuted.

men will be able to reach such an understanding. It is the difference between being aware and ashamed that your previous beliefs were wrong and knowing the truth. The first state is a necessary step to reaching the second, but is surely not equivalent. This double relationship between the αἰσχύνη we feel when we realize that we were mistaken and the access to the truth that should be our ultimate aim is very clear in a passage from the *Sophist*. Here the Stranger states that we cannot benefit from even the best teachings unless our soul is cleansed of its wrong opinions. As a matter of fact, before such opinions are refuted, we will hold onto them, and they will keep us from accept any true theory. However, if someone disproves our beliefs, we will be brought into shame (εἰς αἰσχύνην), and as a result we will abandon our former opinions. Only then we will be ready to learn.[29] Therefore, shame plays a central role in the soul's journey from ignorance to knowledge. Feeling shame for our wrong beliefs is necessary in order to be able to accept the truth, not only because we will remove these beliefs, but also because – as the Stranger says – being ashamed will reverse our attitude: if before the refutation we felt superior to everybody else, after it we will be angry with ourselves, and gentle to other people, who will then have the chance to teach us.[30] Indeed, shame as a necessary step towards true knowledge has been detected in all Plato's Socratic dialogues. As Laura Candiotto has explained, in these dialogues feeling shame for our ignorance is an indispensable precondition for grasping the truth: if we are not ashamed of our wrong views, we will not discard them, that is, there will be no room in us for true knowledge.[31] The role Plato assigns to shame in the process of knowledge is an example of the more general benefits that come from αἰσχύνη according to the philosopher. In the *Symposium*, Phaedrus states that shame (αἰσχύνη) for wrong deeds and pride for the noblest actions is the only way for both individuals and cities to accomplish great things. More specifically, the kind of shame or pride that moves the most is the one a boy or a man feels when he is seen by his lover or by the boy he loves, respectively.[32] Generally, in works such as the *Apology*, the *Gorgias*, the *Symposium*, the *Republic*, the *Sophist* and the possibly spurious *First Alcibiades*, feeling ashamed for one's own bad behaviour is a necessary step in order to start living a good life, as Jessica Moss, Guillaume Pilote, Laura Candiotto, Maria Michela Sassi and others have shown.[33]

29 *Soph.* 230a5-230e4.
30 *Soph.* 230b8-9.
31 Candiotto (2015), Candiotto (2018).
32 *Symp.* 178c3-179a5.
33 Moss (2005) (*Gorgias*); Pilote (2010) (*Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Sophist*); Candiotto (2014) (*Gorgias*) ; Sassi (2015), Chap. 9 (*Apology*, *Symposium*, *First Alcibiades*). However, Futter (2009)

3 Aristotle's *Topics* as a Possible Source on Plato's Views about αἰσχύνη

There is one more passage that links αἰσχύνη with the λογιστικόν, but it is not in Plato's *Republic*, or even in another dialogue of the Athenian philosopher. As a matter of fact, in *Topics* IV.5. 126a8 Aristotle states that 'shame (ἡ … αἰσχύνη) <is> in the rational part of the soul (ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ)', not in the spirited part (ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ). This statement about the seat of αἰσχύνη is part of a syllogism Aristotle cites as an example of the τόπος that, if the opponent states that the genus of a given species is something that is not in the same thing as the species, his argument can be refuted. Now, if αἰσχύνη is in the rational part of the soul, but fear is in the spirited one, it follows that the predication of fear as genus of shame should not be accepted.[34] As it is usual in the examples mentioned in the *Topics*, there is one τόπος (genus and species are in the same thing), one or more ἔνδοξα (shame is in the reason, fear is in the spirit), and a thesis that is either proved or rejected (in this case rejected: shame is a kind of fear) by joining the τόπος and the ἔνδοξα. That αἰσχύνη is in the rational part of the soul is an ἔνδοξον, that is (at least in theory), a statement that most people or some wise men accept. Now, even though the *Topics* were written by Aristotle and not by Plato, this passage is relevant to the latter's view of αἰσχύνη, because at least the central books of the *Topics* (that is books II to VI, as well as the first two chapters of book VII) were written by Aristotle when he was still in the Academy and the examples that are used in them are strongly influenced by the discussions that took place in Plato's school, as Ingemar Düring pointed out.[35] As a consequence, the *Topics* can often be used as a source when one studies Plato's theories. In particular, the passage about the location of αἰσχύνη in the soul seems to report the opinion of Plato because in this passage the soul is divided in the same way as in the *Republic*: the possible seats of psychological states are the θυμοειδές, the λογιστικόν, and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (the latter is mentioned, together with the other two parts of the soul, in the two

thinks that in the *Gorgias* the crucial means that Socrates uses to make Callicles reveal the moral truths he really believes in is not shame, but rather inference.

34 *Top.* IV.5. 126a3-12.

35 Düring (1968), 202, 209. According to Düring, in the *Topics* Aristotle 'does not illustrate his logical rules with fictitious examples. He seems always to have in mind a concrete instance of argumentation pro and con and exemplifies his rules with propositions and definitions discussed in the Academy' (*ibid.* 209). Düring also thinks that most examples that can be found in the *Topics* agree with Aristotle's later theories, and generally reflect the author's ideas (*ibid.* 209–11). On the earliest writings by Aristotle as evidence of the debates in the Academy, see, among others, Cardullo (2002).

examples mentioned by Aristotle in the very next lines to explain the same τόπος).[36]

However, Aristotle's statement about αἰσχύνη's location in the soul is not necessarily an evidence of Plato's opinion on this matter. More generally, no ἔνδοξον about the location of a feeling in the tripartite soul can be automatically regarded as a witness to Plato,[37] because we are sure that in the central books of the *Topics* Aristotle mentions at least one ἔνδοξον about the place of a psychological state in the soul as divided in the *Republic* which does not reflects Plato's views.[38] The ἔνδοξον I am referring to is that pleasure is in the appetitive part of the soul, which contradicts the statements about all parts of soul having their own pleasures and pains that can be found in the *Republic*. As a matter of fact, in order to show that one can refute the attribution of a genus G to a species S if G and S are not in the same thing, Aristotle mentions not just the example about φόβος and αἰσχύνη, but also another dialectical argument, concerning anger and pain. The outline of the argument is as follows. Pleasure (ἡδονή) is in the appetitive part of the soul (ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ); but the opposite of something has the same location as that thing; therefore, the opposite of pleasure, i.e. pain (λύπη), is in the appetitive part of the soul, too. Now, anger (ὀργή) is in the spirited part of the soul (ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ); but genus and species must be in the same thing; therefore, pain cannot be the genus of anger.[39] As one can see, pleasure being in the appetitive part of the soul is treated as a premise of a dialectical argument, that is, as an ἔνδοξον. We should notice here how Aristotle is talking about pleasure, not about the desire for it, and that he

36 *Top.* IV.5. 126a6-13. The passage of the *Topics* about αἰσχύνη is mentioned by Fortenbaugh (1970), 69 n.60, [1975] (2002), 32, (2003), 249 and Knuuttila (2004), 12 when they study the tripartite soul in Plato and in the Academy.

37 On the treatment of Plato's psychology in the *Topics*, see Arnim (1927).

38 Cairns (1993), 385 n.123 rejects downright the usage of Aristotle's passage as conveying Plato's theory, on the basis of the following argument. Cairns, too, reminds us that not all the ἔνδοξα mentioned in the *Topics* reflects Plato's (or really any real philosopher's) opinion. However, he does not mention the specific kind of ἔνδοξα that revolve around the problem of assigning a seat to a given psychological state. Rather, he focuses on the single passage about αἰσχύνη, noticing that Aristotle's statements in this passage contradict not only those Platonic statements that hint at spirit being the seat of αἰδώς/αἰσχύνη, but also the assertions about fear being the genus of αἰδώς/αἰσχύνη that can be found in three texts written in the Academy: the *Euthyphro* (where αἰδώς is mentioned), the *Laws* (αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη) and the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* (αἰσχύνη). Of course that shame is not a kind of fear is the conclusion that Aristotle reaches dialectically, not an ἔνδοξον, so, as Cairns notes, the philosopher that is refuted accepts both that αἰσχύνη is in the spirited part of the soul and that it is a species of fear. However, according to Cairns, it does not show that this is a real philosopher, as opposed as a straw man.

39 *Top.* IV.5. 126a6-7, 126a9-12.

is talking about pleasure in general, not about a specific kind of pleasure, such as bodily pleasure. Now, in the ninth book of the *Republic*, at 580d-588a, Socrates states that each part of the soul has its own pleasures and desires.[40] However, in later works Plato locates pleasure in the irrational part or parts of the soul. As a matter of fact, in the *Timaeus* it is stated that pleasure and pains are in the mortal, irrational soul.[41] The same theory may be implied in a passage of the *Laws*, if in this work there is still a division of the soul in several parts (something that is the subject of a spirited debate). As a matter of fact, the Athenian states that pleasure and pain are irrational (ἄφρονε).[42] If in the *Laws* reason is still separated from one or more irrational parts of the soul, this passage suggests that pleasure and pain belong to the latter. It may be pointed out that there is no necessary contradiction between the dialogues in which pleasures and pains are ascribed only to the irrational parts of the soul and the *Republic*: for instance, Jessica Moss has tried to reconcile the two accounts.[43] Anyway, in the *Republic* Plato states that each of the three parts of the soul has its own pleasures,[44] while in the *Topics* Aristotle cites the ἔνδοξον that pleasure is in the appetitive part of the soul. So an ἔνδοξον about the place of feelings in the tripartite soul that we find in the *Topics* contradicts what Plato says in the *Republic*. As a consequence, no ἔνδοξον on the location of a psychological state in the tripartite soul can be automatically regarded as a witness to Plato's views. Rather, such an ἔνδοξον – for example, the one about αἰσχύνη – could express the belief of one of Plato's pupils, maybe the young Aristoteles himself. Cairns, in the wake of Rudolf Stark, has considered this hypothesis when analyzing the passage on αἰσχύνη, but he has also speculated that Aristotle may not be referring to a position that some philosopher *actually* held. The ἔνδοξον would then be only an opinion that someone *could* have.[45] More recently, Vivian Feldblyum, too, has argued that, in the cited passage, Aristotle is not interested in giving a real theory about the seat of emotions.[46]

40 In the fourth book Plato states that the appetitive part of the soul is 'companion to some sensual satisfactions and pleasures (πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν)' (*Resp*. IV.439d8), but, indeed, only some pleasures are related to the ἐπιθυμητικόν. Τινων clearly refers not just to πληρώσεων but to ἡδονῶν as well, because if the appetitive part of the soul is not related to all sensual gratifications, a fortiori it is not related to all pleasures, as it is more closely associated with fleshy satisfactions than with pleasures in general.

41 *Ti.* 69c5-69d4.

42 *Leg.* I.644c6-7.

43 Moss (2012), 278–79.

44 On pleasure and pain in Plato, see, among other studies, Napolitano Valditara (2013).

45 Cairns (1993), 385 n. 123.

46 Feldblyum (2016), 20.

Incidentally, one can notice that other statements about the tripartite soul that can be found in the *Topics* do not necessarily overlap with Plato's views. For example, an ἔνδοξον cited in the *Topics* is that φιλία is not in the spirited part of the soul, but rather in the appetitive one,[47] and, while some scholars thinks that this is Plato's view on the matter,[48] Olivier Renaut has argued that Plato probably thought of φιλία as caused by θυμός.[49] Another statement from the *Topics* that does not necessarily agree with Plato's views expressed in the *Republic* is that ignorance (the word Aristotle uses is ἄγνοια) should be placed in the rational part of the soul,[50] not in the irrational parts – namely, not in the ἐπιθυμητικόν.[51] As a matter of fact, in the *Republic* Plato states that both being led by bodily desires (that is, by the appetitive part of the soul) and acting according to θυμοειδές alone, without reasoning (ἄνευ λογισμοῦ), is acting 'because of ignorance of the truth' (ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς).[52] So it could be argued that in the *Republic*, in contrast to the *Topics*, ignorance marks the irrational parts of the soul. However, it would also make sense to say that in the *Republic*, like in the *Laws*, ignorance is the error of reason.[53] Finally, according to Pamela Huby, when Aristotle proves that σωφροσύνη can be said to be a kind of συμφωνία only metaphorically[54] and that it is in the ἐπιθυμητικόν,[55] he is going against what Plato says in the *Republic*.[56] However, one can interpret Aristotle's statements in such a way that they do not contradict Plato: Aristotle could mean that temperance is a kind of harmony, even though not literally, as literal harmony always involves sounds; and that temperance, albeit belonging to all parts of the soul, *primarily* belongs to the appetitive part, because being temperate means controlling one's own desires.[57]

47 *Top.* II.7. 113b2. Price (2009), 237 reads this passage as a proof that φιλία is in the spirited part of the soul. According to Price, Aristotle's argument is as follows: hatred, being an accident of anger, is in the spirit, so friendship, being the opposite of hatred, must be in the spirit, too. Actually, Aristotle introduces the argument in the opposite way, that is, as a refutation of the thesis that hatred is an accident of anger starting from the premise that friendship is in the spirited part of the soul (*Top.* II.7. 113a33-113b3).

48 For example, Pappas (1995), 67.

49 Renaut (2013).

50 *Top.* VI.8. 147b26-34.

51 *Ibid.* II.7. 113b3-6.

52 *Resp.* IX.586a1-586d3.

53 *Leg.* IX.863a7-863e4.

54 *Top.* IV.3. 123a33-37, VI.2. 139b32-140a2.

55 Huby (1962), 75 cites *Top.* III.2. 117a31-33, but the most relevant passages are *Top.* V.6. 136b10-14, V.8. 138b1-5.

56 *Resp.* IV.431e7-8. Huby (1962), 75.

57 See *Resp.* IV.430e6-7. All in all, some statements in the *Topics* contradict or may contradict the views (about the location of some psychological states in the tripartite soul) expressed

4 Conclusion

The relationship between the feeling of αἰσχύνη and reason is an important feature of Plato's theories expressed in the *Republic*. So far, the scholars have mostly focused on the problem whether shame was located by Plato in the rational soul. A passage from Aristotle's *Topics* has seemed to be relevant to this problem, but I have tried to prove that no Aristotelian ἔνδοξον about the seat of a given psychological state in the soul as divided in the *Republic* can be automatically treated as conveying Plato's opinion when he wrote said dialogue, because there is at least one such reputable opinion that contradicts what is written in the *Republic*. As a matter of fact, while Plato states that each part of the soul has its own pleasures, an ἔνδοξον mentioned in the *Topics* is that pleasure is only in the appetitive part. Anyway, the study of the relationship between αἰσχύνη and reason in the *Republic* cannot be confined to the question of whether shame is located by Plato in the rational part of the soul, because, whatever its seat is, αἰσχύνη helps reason reach its aims. Specifically, I have shown that Plato argues that the most likely way to have common people accept the rational form of government is to make them feel ashamed of their current opinion of the prospective rulers, that is, of philosophers.

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in the *Republic*. This means that one cannot automatically assume that any reference to the Platonic parts of the soul in the *Topics* is faithful to Plato's views; see Militello (2017a), 86.

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CHAPTER 13

Shame and Virtue in Plato's *Laws*: Two Kinds of Fear and the Drunken Puppet

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Abstract

In *Laws* 646e4, right after the puppet allegory, the Athenian introduces a distinction between 'two virtually opposite kinds of fear' (δύο φόβων εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐναντία). The first is described very generally as the expectation of evils, whereas the second refers, more specifically, to the fear of a bad reputation, also called 'shame' (αἰσχύνη; αἰδώς). Contrary to common fear, this second kind is to be *fostered* in the citizens' souls. Based on this positive account of the emotion of shame and the considerable emphasis it receives throughout the dialogue, this paper offers a close reading of the relevant context that precedes this passage, leading to the assumption that in the *Laws* certain emotions not only help to acquire virtue, but actually *partake* in virtue. Furthermore, an analysis of the connection between the introduction of the two kinds of fear and the puppet image reveals that the latter depicts a *reverse analogy* between courage and moderation, and moreover, of no less importance, strongly suggests that in the *Laws* the tripartition of the soul continues to be Plato's underlying thought pattern in regard to psychology.

Keywords

Plato – *Laws* (*Nomoi*) – shame (αἰδώς, αἰσχύνη) – fear – virtue – moderation (σωφροσύνη) – puppet – soul partition

1 Introduction

Right after the puppet allegory in *Laws* I, the Athenian introduces a distinction between "two virtually opposite kinds of fear (δύο φόβων εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐναντία)" (*Leg*. 646e4),[1] in order to point out the personal and public benefit of the

1 The translation of passages from the *Laws* follows Schofield (2016a), but is often modified. As to σχεδόν, the limitative adverb is added by the Athenian, because fear of upcoming evil and

symposia to his critical interlocutors, the Cretan Cleinias and the Spartan Megillus. The first kind of φόβος is identified as the characteristic emotion aroused by the expectation of evils, whereas the second kind refers more specifically to the fear of a bad reputation:

> And then there is the fear we often have of what people think – our belief that we will be badly thought of if we do or say something which is ignoble. This is the fear which we – and anybody else, I believe – call 'shame' (αἰσχύνην). (646e10–647a2)

The focus of the distinction clearly lies on this second kind, called αἰσχύνη or αἰδώς, which represents an eminently social concept of φόβος, and has meaning only within a social fabric. Furthermore, unlike the first kind, shame is marked as a 'positive' kind of fear, since it "is opposed to pain and other fears, but also opposed to the most numerous and powerful pleasures" (647a5–6). It is therefore to be *fostered* in the souls of the citizens. The stranger from Athens concludes: "So we do need to become fearless, each of us, but we also need to become fearful" (647b10–11).

Some scholars have pointed out the importance of shame in the *Laws*,[2] but few have analysed its function in the context of the first book and especially its relation to the puppet image. In my account, the passage quoted above is highly relevant for understanding the role of certain emotions in the acquisition of virtue: I will try to point out that in the *Laws*, shame not only helps to *acquire* virtue, but actually *partakes* in virtue. Based on this first assumption, I shall argue that the specific function of shame reveals in a very clear manner that in the *Laws* the tripartition of the soul continues to be Plato's underlying thought pattern. My argument is directed mainly against recent approaches which have, in the form either of a unitary soul or of the abolition of the spirited part,[3] diagnosed profound changes in the *Laws*' psychology.

In what follows, I offer a close reading of the relevant context in *Laws* I which precedes the introduction of the two kinds of fear and clearly reveals its purpose. Subsequently, on a more in-depth level of analysis, I first concentrate

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shame are not commonly conceived of as opposite. But they *are* opposite in the respect the Athenian wants to spotlight (see below, note 15). So the adverb does not indicate an actual limitation of the oppositeness of the two concepts, but is an expression of the Athenian's intention. Translations like "virtually" or "practically" might be more adequate than "roughly" (Saunders and Meyer), "nearly" (Pangle), or "more or less" (Griffith). See Bartels' interesting note on σχεδόν in Bartels (2017), 154 n. 4.

2 See, among others, Cairns (1993), 373–78, Renaut (2014), 315–18 and Föllinger (2018).

3 See Bobonich (2002), 194, 259, 280, 331 for the first option, Sassi (2008), 133, and Folch (2015), 52, 75 for the second. Cf. *contra* Bobonich esp. Gerson (2003) and Kahn (2004).

on the notions of σωφροσύνη, αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη, before substantiating my claims by analysing the relation between the puppet image and the two kinds of fear. In a final step, I try to strengthen my interpretation by defending it against two possible objections.

2 The Context

2.1 *The Starting Point: Strong Contrasts* (*625c6–631b2*)

The starting point of the argument relevant to our context is the sharp opposition between the general attitudes of Cleinias and Megillus on the one hand, and of the Athenian on the other, which becomes evident at a very early stage of the dialogue: according to Cleinias, the primary concern of the divine legislators of Sparta and Crete is *war and victory in war*, because war is the general condition of every city. Tracing this view back to its origin (ἐπ' ἀρχήν, 626d5), the main speaker guides his interlocutors to recognise the presence of an 'internal war' inside everyone against himself and the possibility of victory or defeat over oneself. But the notion of an 'internal war' requires the introduction of a new category in order to determine what 'victory' means: the 'better' (τὸ ἄμεινον).[4] And yet, even superior to the victory of the better, claims the Athenian stranger, now putting forward his own contrasting view, is the *reconciliation* of the different parties, in order to lead a city to peace and amity. Thus, the legislator's attention must be directed not towards victory in external war, but towards avoiding the threat of faction (στάσις, 628b2).

But our main character has a hard time convincing his war-loving interlocutors to share his peaceful views.[5] Therefore, he starts again from the previously distinguished 'two kinds of war' (εἴδη δύο πολέμου, 629c6) and calls in the two poets Tyrtaeus and Theognis[6] as representatives of the two contrasting

4 Victory (τὸ νικᾶν) or mastery (τὸ κρείττω εἶναι) in an internal war, at any level, within a person or within a city, can only be the victory of the 'better' part: otherwise, paradoxically it would be called 'defeat'.

5 Note Cleinias' and Megillus' resistance and their continuous complaints about the treatment of their legislators and the Athenian's appeals to accept criticism (630d2–3, 634c5–8, 636e4–637b6, 638a1–2 etc.).

6 The two poets are chosen carefully: Tyrtaeus' martial elegies are said to have been used to teach courage to the soldiers by Lycurgus (*Leocr.* 107). The reference to Theognis anticipates important elements of the following discussion: apart from the numerous emphatic mentions of αἰδώς (e.g. 409–10, 635–36, 1179 West) the most striking correspondence between the *Theognidea* and *Laws* I is the connection of drinking wine, shame(lessness), self-mastery and σωφροσύνη in 475–92 and 497–98, as well as the touchstone-function of wine for the moral strength of a man in 499–502 (ἀνδρὸς δ' οἶνος ἔδειξε νόον).

opinions. The first praises the virtue of courage (ἀνδρεία) in external war, the latter the trustworthy man (πιστὸς ἀνήρ, 630a5) in faction. In contrast with trustworthiness, rhetorically identified by the stranger from Athens with 'virtue in its entirety' (σύμπασα ἀρετή, 630b3), courage is vigorously downgraded to the 'least important' (φαυλότατον, 630e2) part of ἀρετή.[7]

The claims made and the terminology introduced in these opening pages of the *Laws* form the fundamental thought structure for the following discussion and must therefore be clearly highlighted as follows: the starting point of the whole conversation is the concept of *'war'*, which is, in its basic form, a *conflict between two parties*. Afterwards, the same concept of war serves to establish a *duality between the individual and the city*. Thirdly, on the basis of the idea of war within the individual, a general distinction between *two kinds of war*, external and internal, is introduced. The meaning of internal war is then retransferred to – and, at this point, only discussed with regard to – the city, i.e. civil war or faction, which uncontrovertibly is to be avoided in every way. In a final step, *virtue* is involved, and 'courage' and 'virtue in its entirety' are each assigned to one of the two kinds of war. 'Courage' and 'external war' are linked to the position of Cleinias/Megillus; 'virtue in its entirety' and 'faction' to the Athenian's view.

2.2 *Courage As a 'Model'* (*631b3–641a2*)

The following announcement of our main speaker, in my view, is decisive for understanding the whole course of argument of *Laws* 1:

> I think we should go back to the beginning, and do what we started doing originally, which was to explain the practices which are supposed to promote courage (τὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας πρῶτον ἐπιτηδεύματα). After that, we shall go through another and then yet another kind of virtue, if the two of you are willing. As soon as we've been through the first, we will try to use it as a model (αὐτὸ παράδειγμα θέμενοι) and discuss the others in the same way, and this will keep us entertained along the way. (632d9–e7)

Having previously introduced the four kinds of virtue, the Athenian stranger now suggests going through each of them and the practices or activities that help to foster them in the souls of the citizens. The first kind to be discussed is

7 Trustworthiness is identified with δικαιοσύνη τελέα (630c6) and μεγίστη ἀρετή (630c3–4) as well; courage is also called the σμικρότατον (631a5) part of virtue, and the τετάρτη ἀριθμῷ τε καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ τιμία (630c8–d1). The degradation of courage is referred to again in 667a3–4, 688a1–b4 and 963e1–8.

courage, which is then to be taken as a 'model' (παράδειγμα) for the remaining kinds. In what sense do courage and its practices serve as a 'model'?

Practices focusing on war and courage are identified, with the help of Cleinias and Megillus (the 'experts' on the matter): communal meals, physical training, hunting and exercise in the endurance of pain. But the Athenian is not satisfied with this enumeration and asks for a concrete definition of courage:

> But what do we take courage to be? Is it perfectly straightforward, simply a struggle against fear and pain, or do we include longings, pleasures, and those allurements, so terribly enticing, which turn to wax even the spirits (τοὺς θυμούς) of those who consider themselves highly dignified? (633c8–d1)

Surely, he adds, a good lawgiver would not enact "a crippled courage (…), able to resist only an attack from the left, and not able to resist blandishments and allurements from the right" (634a2–4). Both dialogue partners, falling back again on the already accepted notion of 'being defeated by oneself', agree, thus passing the ball to the stranger from Athens who points out the complete lack, in both Crete and Sparta, of practices to train the citizens in the mastery of pleasure.

By introducing this bidirectional concept of ἀνδρεία, which corresponds almost exactly to the *Republic*'s definition of courage (*Resp*. 429c7–d1) and in which the explicit mention of θυμός is by no means accidental, the main speaker intends to shift the focus to temperance or moderation (σωφροσύνη), as is clear when he says: "After courage, let's talk about moderation" (635e5–6). From this point, he draws the interlocutors' attention with emphasis to the importance of an in-depth analysis of pleasure and pain, in the cities and in the individual. The Cretan and the Spartan remain sceptical, since in their cities, every activity linked to the indulgence in extreme pleasures is forbidden, especially the symposia. But the main speaker exhorts them to examine the correctly conducted drinking party in a more accurate manner, reminding them of the fact that every kind of gathering, whether an army in wartime or a symposium in peacetime, needs an appropriate leader (ἄρχων, 639a9).[8]

External war vs. internal peace, the army vs. the symposium and courage vs. temperance are thus presented as strong contrasts which, however, in their

8 For an analysis of the characteristics which the appropriate leader of a symposium requires cf. the contribution of Myrthe L. Bartels in this volume.

interrelations are treated in an analogous manner: the 'model' function of courage begins to become evident.

2.3 *The Benefit of Drinking Parties* (*641a3–646e2*)

But 'what good' (τί ποτε ἀγαθόν, 641a4–5), Cleinias insists, does a correctly conducted symposium bring to the individual and to the city? Foreshadowing the argument of *Laws* II, the Athenian reveals that he attributes an important education role to the drinking parties and defines education as the guidance, from childhood, of a person to virtue, "producing a desire and passion to become a perfect citizen" (643e3–6). By 'virtue', in the given context, he seems to mean moderation.

It is against the same background – the explanation of the benefit of drinking parties for education and the analysis of σωφροσύνη – that the Athenian turns to an illustration of 'self-mastery' (previously treated only within the context of the city), which conceptually, as is known, proves to be quite close to the definition of moderation in the *Republic*.[9] He introduces the much-debated puppet allegory which depicts man as a 'divine puppet' (θαῦμα θεῖον, 644d7–8) that has 'cords or strings' (νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοι, 644e2) inside himself which tug at him. More precisely, they "pull against each other towards opposite actions, and in fact the demarcation line between virtue and vice lies here (οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία κεῖται)" (644e2–3). Against the iron cords of the emotions – pleasure, pain, confidence[10] and fear (ἡδονή, λύπη, θάρρος, φόβος, 644c6–d1)[11] – each of us is called to follow only the golden cord of

9 Cf. *Resp.* 430c8–432b1. Note especially the following expressions: συμφωνία (430e3; 432a8), ἁρμονία (430e4; 431e8), ἐγκράτεια (430e7), κρείττω αὑτοῦ (430e7, 11; 431a6), ἐγκρατές (431a6), τὸ βέλτιον/τὸ ἄμεινον vs. τὸ χεῖρον (430a5–6; 431b6–7, 432a7–8). Moreover – and this is an important objection against Bobonich's unitary conception – the concept of self-mastery is introduced with reference to the same paradox of the unity and multiplicity of a single person mentioned also in the *Laws*: ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν τούτοις προσαγορεύεται (*Resp.* 431a1); οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τιθῶμεν; (*Leg.* 644c4). On this parallel cf. also Gerson (2003), 151.

10 Meyer (2012), 355–56 rightly points out the difficulty to translate θάρρος in the allegory; she opts for 'daring' instead of confidence (cf. also Meyer (2015), 174–75). However, as we will see, it is important that at this point θάρρος remains open in its meaning and is not too closely associated with courage.

11 The complexity of the iron strings will be analysed below. The fact that shortly after τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἔρωτας (645d7) are mentioned as non-rational emotions and that there are two explicit references to the plurality of the iron cords (645a2–3, 645a7–b1) points to the conclusion that the emotional scheme of the puppet image is functional only in the present context. It is unclear to me why Stalley (1983), 60, Frede (2010), 118 and Bartels (2017), 90, 96 reduce the number of the iron cords to exactly two.

calculation (λογισμός, 644d2)[12] in order to be good (ἀγαθός, 644b6). In the puppet allegory, consequently, the concepts of 'temperance', 'self-mastery', 'virtue' itself as well as 'being good' are rhetorically brought to converge; temperance seems to take the place of 'virtue in its entirety' in the Athenian's reasoning.

Proceeding to the last step of his argumentation before the introduction of the two kinds of fear, the main character suggests "getting our puppet drunk" (645d1), thus causing its emotions to grow more intense and, contemporarily, the rational capacities to grow weaker and abandon it.[13] Like someone who willingly exposes his body to athletic training (646c7; one of the practices to acquire courage!), undergoing the weakening of psychic self-control during the practice of wine drinking, according to our main character, brings an important benefit. Wherein does this benefit consist?

2.4 *Two Kinds of Fear* (*646e3–650b10*)

Exactly at this point of the dialogue, the stranger from Athens introduces the two kinds of fear to demonstrate the benefit of the symposia for education. Let me first recall the distinction: the first kind refers generally to the feeling arising from the thought of upcoming evils; the second, titled αἰσχύνη or αἰδώς, means fear of a bad reputation. After having gone through the preceding text, it is now easily to recognise how each kind of fear belongs to one of the contrasting viewpoints that have been developed in the course of the argument: the first to Cleinias' and Megillus' view, based on external war and courage, the second to the Athenian's focus on inner peace and moderation. The main speaker does not hesitate to reveal this correlation:

> How about trying to make someone justly fearful (φοβερὸν ποιεῖν μετὰ δίκης)? Don't we have to bring him face to face with shamelessness (ἀναισχυντίᾳ), train him to fight against it, and in this way give him victory in his battle against his own pleasures? With the cowardice (δειλίᾳ)

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12 Within the given frame I cannot concentrate on λογισμός and its connection to νόμος in the allegory. In his recent analysis Schofield (2016b) interprets the function of law as a "common resource" to be "called in aid" (141) – which would correspond to shame as a *social* emotion – and sheds light on the dimension of responsibility inherent in the image (138–39), though I believe that he is mistaken about the role he attributes to courage (133, 150).

13 The phenomenon of *akrasia*/*akrateia* is not my concern in this paper. But I do agree with Wilburn (2012) that the *drunken* puppet is "not even a *candidate* for acting akratically" (39). For a relatively recent overview of the debate, see Müller (2013). Meyer (2015), 188 correctly highlights that the effect of wine might not be limited to the golden cord. While it is most important here that the golden cord is made powerless by wine, it affects shame as well (as is shown in 3.2 below).

> within him, it is only by fighting against it and defeating it that he can become perfect in courage (…). So will anyone become perfect in moderation without having fought and defeated the many pleasures and desires that urge him to act shamelessly and unjustly (…)? (647c7–d7)

What is sketched out here by the Athenian could be called a *reverse analogy* of courage and moderation:[14] in facing and fighting the first kind of φόβος, i.e. cowardice (δειλία), a person develops the opposite θάρρος (audacity) and becomes courageous. In exposing himself to situations of increased pleasure and passion, and fighting the resulting θάρρος, i.e. shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία, ἀναίδεια), a person cultivates the second kind of φόβος (shame) and temperance.[15] It is important to note that both kinds of virtue, along the lines of the previous attempts of the Athenian to persuade and convince his interlocutors, are based on the vocabulary of fight and war in the sense of a two-part relation. The mechanism of fostering courage is now used precisely, in a reverse way, as a 'model' for inculcating moderation. The resulting oppositeness of the two virtues, which reminds the reader of their 'hostility and faction' (ἔχθρα καὶ στάσις, *Plt.* 306b10) in the *Politicus*,[16] is clearly highlighted by our main character in a summarising remark:

> And since the place to practise courage and fearlessness is in the midst of fears, we ought to ask ourselves whether the place to cultivate the opposite condition would be in the opposite circumstances. (649c5–6)

The analogy gets even clearer in the final step of the argumentation, namely the confrontation of two potions (φάρμακον, 647e1), one generating fear in order to train courage, the other generating fearlessness, thus fostering moderation. While the first kind of potion does not exist, the second is identified with

14 My argument is partly indebted to the excellent explanations of Schöpsdau (1986) and Schöpsdau (1994), 242–43. See now also Giménez Salinas (2019).

15 So αἰδώς and δειλία *are* opposed logically and actively: (i) the first fosters virtue (moderation), the second fosters vice (the opposite of courage), and (ii) according to 647a5–6, shame actively opposes cowardice, too, revealing thus temperance to be the basic virtue of all others. Cf. Schöpsdau (1986), 104–06. Meyer (2015), 191–92 seems to identify only the second sense.

16 This statement, based on the connection of courage with quickness as well as acuteness and of temperance with gentleness as well as slowness, surely forms part of the background of the reverse analogy of courage and moderation in the *Laws*. The conclusion of the *Politicus*, also valid for the *Laws*, is that both virtues are to be fostered and balanced in the souls.

wine, thus proving to be the important contribution to the education to virtue – that is to temperance – that the Athenian promised it would be.

The purpose of the distinction of two kinds of fear is thus clearly that of establishing the reverse analogy between courage and moderation, which is motivated by the specific context (the war-loving convictions of the interlocutors) but at the same time recalls in a rather explicit way issues from earlier dialogues such as *Republic* and *Politicus*. Courage is, in quite an ingenious manner, simultaneously devaluated and used as a 'model'. Finally, the whole conversation has a highly performative character, insofar as conflict and the necessity to find an agreement are reflected in the lively discussion between the three characters.

3 Φόβος and θάρρος as *tertium comparationis*

Keeping this in mind, we can now pass on to the second level of analysis. It is important, for the present argument, to note how both courage and moderation are – rhetorically or not – identified with certain emotions: courage with θάρρος in the sense of audacity, and moderation with φόβος in the sense of shame. I shall first give a synthetic overview of the role of σωφροσύνη in the *Laws* and analyse its connection to αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη before I attempt to explain how these emotions fit into the pattern of the puppet image.

3.1 Σωφροσύνη

The concentration on moderation in the following summary is not intended to mean that courage is neglected completely in the *Laws*. Indeed, already the Athenian's claim that the citizens must become both fearless and afraid implies that courage is to be fostered as well.[17] But it is clear from the contrasting conversation of Book I that a good lawgiver as well as the Athenian himself will concentrate, in the first instance, on establishing σωφροσύνη.

As has been foreshadowed already in the Athenian's argumentation in *Laws* I, where moderation at some point takes the place of virtue itself in opposing courage, throughout the whole dialogue the role of σωφροσύνη is considerably emphasised. Fostering moderation in the citizens is not only the aim of the symposia (673e5), but of education (836a2) and legislation (693c2)

17 This is confirmed, apart from the numerous occurrences of the lexical field in the whole dialogue, by the subdivision of the dances to be practiced in a pacific and a warlike kind (814e6 ff.) as well as by the extensive explanations on athletic and military training as well as competition in Book VIII (830c7 ff.).

themselves. Its importance for the city and the individual is even magnified to the point that the temperate person is likened to God (716d1–2).[18] Temperance, defined as a συμφωνία between the feelings of pleasure and pain and rational opinion (689a7–8), is said to be the precondition for wisdom and justice (689d4–5; 696c5–6) and the necessary accompaniment of all the parts of virtue (696b3–4; 709e8–9; 697b2–4), though if found alone by itself in a soul, it is worth nothing but a 'speechless silence' (ἀλόγου σιγῆς, 696e1). Shortly thereafter, this basic virtue is called the 'instinctive' (δημώδης) temperance, which "is a natural flowering in children and animals, so that some are unmastered (ἀκρατῶς), others mastered (ἐγκρατῶς), in the face of pleasures" (710a5–8).[19] Already at the beginning of Book II (653a5–c4), the Athenian had outlined how in a child's first sensations (pleasure and pain) virtue and vice come (παραγίγνομαι) first to the soul and how, through education and training in accordance with law, these sensations are moderated and guided to consent to the rational capacities that develop later. There are thus different stages in the acquisition of σωφροσύνη: in the absence of a fully developed proper λόγος, law takes its place as an outward source of control.[20] Referring to the (albeit fragile[21]) balance and the correct orientation of pleasure and pain which are inevitably part of the human being and represent the largest part of the soul and the city (689a9–b2; 732e4–7), σωφροσύνη is not actually, in the strong sense of the word, 'inculcated' or 'instilled', but signifies the consolidation of an equable condition of the soul that, occasionally, can arise naturally in a soul. In its basic meaning, temperance in the souls of all inhabitants of the city is the precondition for unanimity, mutual friendship and peace.[22]

18 It is important to notice that in the passage quoted above, located shortly before the introduction of the preludes, the Athenian is speaking for the first time to the citizens of the imaginary colony, describing to them the right conduct for leading a happy life. Thus, the language he uses is rhetorically charged. As regards ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, cf. *Leg.* 766a3 and 818c3–4; furthermore, *Resp.* 500c9–d1, 613a7–b1 and *Tht.* 176b1.

19 This demotic kind of temperance must not be confused with a 'magnifying' (σεμνύνων; 710a5) way of speaking about temperance that identifies it with φρόνησις. I doubt that this second meaning of moderation is recalled anywhere in the *Laws*. Nowhere (not even in 631c7 or 688e3–689e2) is the word σώφρων used in the sense of 'wisdom'. The Athenian might rather allude to a socratic parlance, cf. Xen. *Mem.* III, 9,4,1 (Σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν).

20 Plato's belief in the limitedness of the rational capacities of ordinary people is highlighted in 653a7–8. 'Law' is defined as the 'distribution of reason' (ἡ τοῦ νοῦ διανομή) in 714a2. Cf. also *Resp*. 590c8–d6.

21 This fragility is the reason why the older generations also partake in education (cf. 653c7–9).

22 Cf. also Mesch's clarifying explanations on σωφροσύνη in Mesch (2005), 105.

3.2 Αἰδώς

Passing on to the concept of shame, in *Laws* I and II αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη are presented as synonyms and are indeed both titled 'divine fear' (θεῖος φόβος, 671d2). But whereas αἰσχύνη in some subsequent occurrences assumes the negative sense of 'disgrace',[23] αἰδώς, due to her personification as a divinity in Greek mythology, takes on the exclusively positive significance of 'shame', 'reverence' and 'respect' in front of a higher authority[24] and is repeatedly elevated in her role for the city, similarly to σωφροσύνη: she is once called the mother of Dike (943e2) and a queen (δεσπότις, 698b5) in Athens's former constitution. Most importantly, in the *Laws'* version of the Myth of Cronus, Aidos is, alongside the three Horai Eunomia, Dike and Eirene, a gift of the Daimons to the human beings.[25] But to what extent do αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη coincide with σωφροσύνη?[26]

Although the distinction of the two kinds of fear is recalled several times in the text and remains present throughout the dialogue,[27] the concepts of shame and temperance occur together on only three other occasions, where they do not exactly coincide but are strongly connected: besides the direct connection in the expression 'moderate shame' (αἰδὼς σώφρων, 772a3), in 837c7–8 we learn that the virtues are themselves to be "revered and worshipped (αἰδούμενος ἅμα καὶ σεβόμενος)". Reverence and worship are here presented as valuing attitudes or feelings towards the virtues, including moderation. Lastly, αἰσχύνη and σωφροσύνη appear together in the context of the discussion on the chorus of Dionysus (665d9–e3), which will lead us back to our central passage: the older and the more temperate the singers get, the more they are ashamed of singing and dancing in public. It is again wine, according to the same mechanism described in the puppet image, that loosens their souls and allows them to take pleasure in performing. While the educative function of wine consists in *stimulating* and *strengthening* the emotion of shame by testing and challenging it, wine also helps the singers of Dionysus momentarily to *weaken* their sense of shame in order to be able to perform.

23 Cf. 671e2, 873c6, 878c3, 919e7.

24 As higher authorities to revere are named: the elder (879c6), the better/stronger (919a5–7), an office to fulfil (813c9–d1), virtue (837c7–8), divine ancestors (921a1). Cf. Schöpsdau (1994), 244.

25 Cf. the *Politicus*' version of the same myth (*Plt.* 268d8–274e4), where only fire and the arts are referred to as gifts of the gods; and the myth of the *Protagoras* (*Prt.* 320c8–322d5). Here, αἰδώς and δίκη are Zeus' gifts to the human beings: being the *conditio sine qua non* for the foundation of a city, they are to be shared by everyone.

26 Cf. also *Chrm.* 160e3–5, *Phdr.* 253d6, *Plt.* 310d10 and Cairns (1993), 373.

27 Cf. the explicit references in 671d2 and 699c2–4, as well as the implicit readoptions in 840c6–9 and 886a6–7.

To conclude, the identification of the emotions of αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη with the virtue of moderation is based on their common character of opposing (excessive) pleasure. The convergence itself and the magnification of both, however, reveal that shame is an emotion which is, in some way, 'superior' to those of pleasure and pain. Shame helps to develop σωφροσύνη and it is always present in a soul that is temperate: the more temperate someone is, the greater is his sense of shame. In this sense, it seems correct to say that shame *partakes* in temperance.[28] The superiority of shame is highlighted in a definite way in 783a5–7, where the three greatest forces to quench the greatest desires are named: φόβος, νόμος, ἀληθὴς λόγος.

3.3 *The Two Kinds of Fear and the Puppet*

After these clarifications regarding the essential role and function of temperance and shame in the city of the *Laws*, let us now turn back to the passage in question and to its connection to the puppet image. This connection is of no little importance for understanding the exact significance of the allegory for the psychology of the *Laws*.

In order to understand the statement of the allegory, we must now take a closer look at the 'iron cords' of the emotions: on a first level, there are ἡδονή and λύπη as "opposed and mindless advisors (συμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε)" (644c6–7), which is a clear similarity to the ἄφρονε συμβούλω[29] (*Ti.* 69d2) in the *Timaeus*. Separated from but connected to these is a second pair of emotions, called "opinions about what is going to happen (δόξας μελλόντων)" (644c9): φόβος as the expectation of pain, and θάρρος as the expectation of pleasure. This close connection of the two pairs of emotions, in turn, evidently points to the *Philebus*, where a similar emotional structure is presented.[30]

The core question is now: in what sense do the cords pull against each other and towards opposing actions? Sassi has suggested that one is "driving the

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28 According to Bartels, αἰδώς not only partakes in virtue, but *is* itself a virtue in the *Laws*, see Bartels (2017), esp. 96. Although hers is certainly a very elaborate and context-sensible interpretation, I believe that the promotion of αἰδώς as a "novel conception of virtue" (77) and the 'equation' of αἰδώς and λογισμός (98) are misleading. One could add here that for Aristotle, whose account of αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη seems to be quite close to the *Laws* (cf. e.g. *Eth. Nic.* 1116a17–29, 1128b11–15; *Rh.* 1383b12–13, 1384a21–25; *Eth. Eud.* 1234a32), αἰδώς is not a virtue (*Eth. Nic.* 1108a31–32, 1128b10–11, cf. *Eth. Eud.* 1220b12–13).

29 In the *Timaeus* the expression refers to θάρρος and φόβος.

30 Cf. *Phlb.* 32b9–c2: the 'anticipations' (προσδοκήματα) of pleasure and pain are themselves "sweet and encouraging (ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον)" or "terrible and painful (φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν)". They are called 'kinds' (εἴδη) of pleasure and pain that belong only to the soul: contrary to present pleasure and pain, they are pure and not mixed up with their opposite (and thus: superior!).

individual towards pleasure and the other driving him away from pain".[31] But I wonder if 'towards pleasure' and 'away from pain' does not mean basically the same thing. In my account, referring the distinction of two kinds of fear back to the puppet image can help us find an answer, although doing so, at first glance, doubles the second level of emotions and leaves us with a far more complex scheme.

Three previously highlighted aspects have to be taken into account: firstly, each kind of fear has been assigned to σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία, respectively. Secondly, the puppet allegory itself is inserted in the context of the explanation of σωφροσύνη. And thirdly, ἀνδρεία was said to function as a 'model' for σωφροσύνη. If, for a moment, we concentrate on σωφροσύνη, then φόβος would have to be translated 'shame'. But as has been quoted initially, shame opposes, above all, "the most numerous and powerful pleasures" (647a6). So the main opposition in this pattern would be the one between φόβος and ἡδονή insofar as the pleasure of the present moment, for instance during a drinking party, tugs us towards an unrestrained way of acting and φόβος in respect of future disgrace – not present λύπη! – inhibits us.[32] A similar mechanism is at work concerning courage: θάρρος, in the sense of audacity, surely opposes fear of future awe, too, but first of all λύπη (present physical pain and grief, e.g. in a battle).

Within the puppet image, therefore, the coupled terms θάρρος and φόβος, though with different meanings, function as the *tertium comparationis* of the reverse analogy of courage and moderation. Being closely associated with pleasure and pain in the *Philebus*, but belonging clearly to θυμός in the *Timaeus*,[33] they qualify perfectly for this role. The man-puppet itself constitutes the 'theatrical stage', so to speak, for the analogy. Its concrete purpose consists in illustrating, on a psychological level, how drinking parties benefit the fostering of moderation.

31 Sassi (2008), 137; similarly Frede (2010), 117 and Folch (2015), 75. This view obviously refers to *Ti.* 69d1–2, but Plato's formulation here does not suggest that pleasure and pain pull in *opposite* directions.

32 This situation strongly reminds of the example of Leontius' inner conflict (*Resp.* 439e6–440a3) by which Socrates introduces θυμός as a third part of the soul. Cf. Mesch (2005), 100 and Meyer (2012), 359.

33 Cf. *Ti.* 42a7, 70c2, 87a6. Θυμός itself is not identified with the second part, but, together with ἀνδρεία, is said to "participate (μετέχον)" (70a2) in it. In the earlier dialogues, φόβος and θάρρος were usually associated with courage (cf. *Prt.* 349e1–351b2, 359b8; *Lach.* 194d4–199c2), and both are conceptualized quite early as expectations (*Lach.* 198b2–10, *Prt.* 358d5–7, *Phd.* 88b3–8).

Furthermore, the psychic conflict which emerges here happens entirely on the level of the 'iron cords',[34] but in each case, one of the secondary emotions – either φόβος or θάρρος – (and never one of the primary emotions!) turns out to be the ally of the golden cord in fostering either temperance or courage. The remaining one – again φόβος or θάρρος –, however, opposes the first, revealing the secondary emotions as profoundly ambivalent, but still, as has already been affirmed for shame, superior to pleasure and pain.[35]

3.4 *Two Possible Objections*

The characterization of the secondary emotions as ambivalent, but superior to pleasure and pain, clearly recalls the spirited part of the soul in the *Republic*, whose function concerns, roughly speaking, our sense of self and corresponding reactions within the frame of a community and its values.[36] And indeed: as has been indicated by Cairns and others,[37] the social emotion of shame does belong to the second part of the soul. Even though the Athenian does not explicitly advance a tripartitional account, such a view still affects the moral psychology of the *Laws* as an underlying thought pattern. If thus tripartition seems to be still traceable in the *Laws*,[38] there are, however, some possible objections to this conclusion. Before I close, I shall discuss the two strongest objections, in my view:

a) Sassi has rightly put great stress on two connected passages in *Laws* IX which seem to speak clearly in favour of a dichotomy: in 864b3, the Athenian explicitly mentions a pain "which we call anger and fear (ἥν θυμὸν καὶ φόβον ἐπονομάζομεν)" and he thus subordinates both to λύπη. But it should be clear by now how this affirmation corresponds to the puppet image. Θυμός and φόβος belong to λύπη insofar as they are all, generally speaking, 'negative' emotions – a perspective which we already know from the *Philebus*. But this perspective, as is illustrated precisely by the puppet image, is certainly not a proof for a new bipartite scheme that

34 And necessarily: the puppet is drunk!

35 Frede (2010), 118 asserts the contrary, namely that "there is no functional distinction between the two unreasoning strings (…) with the better part acting as an ally of reason", likewise Bartels (2017), 90 n.59. Müller (2013), 54 distinguishes only roughly between "appetitive Kräfte" and "aversive Strebungen"; just as Wilburn (2012), 25, 47. I believe that this is an error, not least because the secondary emotions are introduced separately by πρὸς δέ (644c9). Cf. for a similar view Meyer (2012), 352 n.4, 360; and Palumbo (2007), 316, 319–22. Along the same lines see now Giménez Salinas (2019), 149, 153–154.

36 Cf. Renaut (2014), 151, 181–82, 197–98, 284 and Wilburn (2013), 72.

37 See Cairns (1993), 382–84, 392; Renaut (2014), 180–81, 313 and Wilburn (2013), 74, 76. Cf. also *Phdr*. 253d6, 254a2, 256a6.

38 See also Meyer (2012), 353 who asserts that "tripartition is not far from the surface here."

excludes tripartition. Shortly before this passage, the Athenian refers to θυμός, saying "whether it be a passion or a part (εἴτε τι πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος)" (863b2–3), a formulation which has been discussed extensively.[39] To start with, it should be noted that εἴτε … εἴτε recurs frequently in the *Laws* and that it usually expresses indifference.[40] Neither Plato nor the Athenian 'worry' about soul partition here, but rather put the question aside. If anything, the formulation might express an awareness that θυμός as a particular emotion cannot represent the second part of the soul on its own, because it has not been sufficiently considered. Other emotions belonging to the spirited part, especially shame, have been put into focus. Thus, the passage could be read as an intentional back-reference to earlier dialogues, but we should be hesitant to draw from it any strong conclusions about soul partition in the *Laws*. In any case, it is a mistake to reduce the spirited part to the terms 'θυμός' and 'θυμοειδές', which in the *Laws* have less importance than in other dialogues, perhaps because courage in its restricted sense, as I have shown, is notably downgraded from the beginning.

b) Secondly, one of the 'warhorses' of those who see the abolition of the spirited part in the *Laws* is the link between the puppet image and the Myth of the Metals in the *Republic* (*Resp.* 415a1–c6), based on the mention of 'gold' and 'iron' in both.[41] The essential problem of the man-puppet has been put in a nutshell by Bobonich: "Plato makes no room here for silver cords".[42] But if we take a closer look at the Myth, we must first notice that it is located far before the introduction of the partition of the soul, and even before the definition of the virtues. Its purpose, at this point, is limited to justifying, by nature, the existence of the three classes (workers, auxiliaries, rulers). A proleptic reading which strictly identifies the 'silver' in the souls of the auxiliaries with the second part of the soul leads to the odd conclusion that the possession of θυμός is limited to the

39 Cf. the different readings of e.g. Saunders (1962), 38–39, Gerson (2003), 153 and Sassi (2008), 136.

40 There are 168 occurrences of εἴτε in the *Laws* (versus 73 in the *Republic*); this should be seen in the general light of the style of the later dialogues. Cf. as another example *Leg.* 632e2 (εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς) and 633a8–9 (περὶ τῶν τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς εἴτε μερῶν εἴτε ἅττ' αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεών ἐστι), where the Athenian speaks in a strikingly similar manner about virtue.

41 Cf. the back-reference to the myth at *Resp.* 546d8–547c4 where the Hesiodian origin of the myth is revealed. It refers to the same verses in *Works and Days* as the Cronus Myth (Hes. *Op.* 109 ff.).

42 Bobonich (2002), 264. Likewise, Sassi (2008), 133 and Müller (2013), 64.

auxiliaries. What distinguishes the auxiliaries from the other two classes, however, is not θυμός, which all human beings own as a part of the soul, but rather the corresponding virtue, courage (*Resp.* 429a1–2). The metals could therefore correspond to a natural predisposition to acquire one of the virtues. Thus, to search for a thymoeidetic 'silver cord' in the puppet image is misleading. This is ultimately supported by a detail which has been pointed out by Wilburn,[43] namely that according to *Resp.* 411a10, musical education 'softens' θυμοειδές 'like iron' (ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξεν). This expression is readopted twice in the *Laws*, in passages which are clearly linked to the puppet image (666c1–2; 671b8–10), and it also recalls the definition of courage quoted above ('turn the spirits to wax'). Lastly, introducing a third distinct psychic force in the puppet image would not only have been totally unmotivated in the immediate context – which is based on a two-part conflict – but would also contradict the definition of moderation in the *Republic* (*Resp.* 430d6 ff.) which lacks any reference to the second part of the soul.

4 Conclusion

An analysis of the connection between the puppet allegory and the two kinds of fear has revealed a reverse analogy between courage and moderation in which θάρρος and φόβος exercise the function of a *tertium comparationis*. The emotion of shame, considerably emphasised and magnified in the *Laws*, has been shown to be so closely linked to σωφροσύνη that it can be said to *partake* in virtue. The secondary emotions in the allegory have thus turned out to be deeply ambivalent, but generally superior to pleasure and pain, like the spirited part of the soul in the *Republic*. If my interpretation is correct, then in the *Laws* there are clear parallels to the earlier tripartition of the soul, whose precise conception is quite flexible and made explicit to varying degrees from the *Republic* onwards. The numerous positive and presumably intentional back-references to earlier dialogues which can be found in the analysed passages – including the two-kinds-of-fear-passage itself – speak in favour of this account.[44] Finally, when interpreting the *Laws*, readers must always be aware

43 Cf. Wilburn (2013), 78.

44 Most of the back-references have been mentioned above: *Euthphr.* 12a4–c9 (shame as part of fear), *Prt.* 320c8–322d4 (*Protagoras* myth), *Resp.* 351d4–352a4 (στάσις in the city and in the individual), *Resp.* 429c7–d1 (definition of courage), *Resp.* 430c8–432b1 (definition of moderation), *Resp.* 431a1 (unity of a person), *Resp.* 603c10–4d10 (evocation of the puppet image), *Plt.* 306b10 ff. (hostility and faction of moderation and courage), *Phlb.*

of the extensive period of composition:[45] if Plato worked contemporarily on some of the later dialogues, it seems unlikely that in the *Laws* he would have performed a philosophical about-turn involving a 'unitary' conception of the soul or the abolishment of θυμός.

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32b9–c2 (anticipations of pleasure and pain), *Ti.* 69d2 (θάρρος and φόβος as ἄφρονε συμβούλω).

45 Cf. Schöpsdau (1994), 137; Kahn (2004), 357 as well as Saunders (1962), 38.

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CHAPTER 14

Loving and Living Well: the Importance of Shame in Plato's *Phaedrus*

Simon Scott

Abstract

Although Plato uses the same concept of erotic love in both the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, his treatment of it differs strikingly in these dialogues. One of the main reasons for this is that whereas, in the *Symposium*, rational and non-rational erotic desires are considered to be incompatible, in the *Phaedrus* he attempts to integrate them in the belief that this will allow us to love and live well. This integration is articulated by means of a complex model of the psyche. Plato sets up the dialogue's three main speeches in such a way as to critique reductive, bipartite models of the psyche that fail to take into account the θυμός from which most emotions originate. He demonstrates that θυμός, and in particular the emotion shame, have important roles in the integration of erotic desires. This chapter will carry out a close reading of the *Phaedrus* to study how Plato effects this. Divided into three parts, it will: (1) establish the importance of θυμός; (2) carry out a close reading of the dialogue's third speech in which Socrates integrates rational and non-rational erotic desires; and (3) consider the importance of shame in the dialogue's lengthy discussion of rhetoric and the way it manipulates emotions.

Keywords

shame – *Phaedrus* – *thumos* – *erôs* – *psyche*

Plato's greatest achievement in the *Symposium* is to discover rational desire in terms of erotic love (ἔρως). Diotima's account of love establishes a continuum between the physical and the rational: a lover begins by being physically attracted to the body of an individual before he develops a general attraction to all bodies; he then learns that physical beauty is nothing compared to the beauty of the mind and a love of discourse; this leads him to realise there is more beauty in laws and institutions; and finally this love culminates in the

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best of all erotic objects, the Form of Beauty. It is an intellectual endeavour in which the beauty of each successive erotic object is greater because the object is more abstract and long-lasting. In this account, ἔρως is reconfigured from its ordinary meaning of physical attraction to become, more generally, the desire for beauty itself. However, it should be noted that the continuum between the physical and the rational also stresses their incompatibility.

In his other extensive study of erotic love, the *Phaedrus*, Plato does not alter his concept of ἔρως but attempts to integrate rational and non-rational erotic desires. The goal, as in the *Symposium*, is still to live the flourishing life (εὐδαιμονία), and we cannot live well if we do not love well. However, unlike in the *Symposium*, Plato organises the different erotic desires using his model of the divided psyche, each part of which has cognitive, desiderative, and emotive capabilities. The relations between these parts are developed most comprehensively in the dialogue's third speech, in a passage that recounts the psychic relations that occur in the seduction of the beloved. Each part of the psyche has different erotic goals and desires, which leads to conflicts between them, and it is only through the parts reaching an agreement (in which appetitive desires are suppressed) that the soul is revived and able to continue its journey in pursuit of being.

This chapter will consider the importance of shame in the integration of different erotic desires. It is an important emotion for Plato and has attracted recent attention, particularly his use of it in the *Gorgias*.[1] Christina Tarnopolsky has written on the importance of Plato in discourses on shame, which largely view the emotion as negative.[2] Whereas we feel guilty because of something we did or did not do, shame is a reflexive emotion that refers to the whole person. This is why shame can have a destabilising effect on a person's image of herself: it can, for example, be used to stigmatise people identifying as LGBTQ+, or people of different races, diminishing them in the opinion of others and causing them to withdraw from society; at its very worst, it can lead a person to commit suicide. Tarnopolsky argues that what makes Plato such an important contributor to the debate on shame is that, while he shows an awareness of its weaknesses, he also finds positive uses for the emotion. For example, shame can control the appetites and influence a person's deepest hedonistic beliefs in a way that reason often fails to do, and it can lead a person to

1 Recent examples include Futter (2009), Moss (2005) and Tarnopolsky (2010). Less recent, but still an unsurpassed study of shame in Ancient Greek literature, is Cairns (1993).

2 Tarnopolsky cites a number of examples including John Rawls, for whom shame "can instill apathy and cynicism in the person, either by making everything seem worthless or by weakening the will to strive for things one values" Tarnopolsky (2010), 3.

change his behaviour so that it becomes more socially acceptable. Surprisingly little has been written about shame in the *Phaedrus*, and I have chosen to do so partly because it complements Tarnopolsky's claim about Plato's relevance to the contemporary debate, although I will not go further into that debate here. The central concern of this chapter is the key role that shame occupies in the integration of different erotic desires.

This chapter will be divided into three parts: Part 1 will examine Plato's model of the psyche and the importance he places on the spirited part (θυμός)in the way that he constructs the dialogue's three main speeches; attention is usually given to the dialogue's third speech, but this misses the way in which Plato constructs an argument, across all three speeches, for the tripartite psychology, and the way in which he critiques how we think about desire. This argument stresses the importance of the θυμός, which is that part of the psyche from which most emotions, including shame, originate. Part 2 will give a close reading of the passage of the seduction of the beloved to show how Plato uses shame to facilitate the integration of conflicting erotic desires. Part 3 will consider the importance of shame to the rest of the *Phaedrus*, which entails a lengthy discussion on rhetoric, and in which it is agreed that rhetoric encompasses all forms of speech, but that it can abandon the truth and be used to manipulate the emotions. This is another example of the importance of shame in our moral education. Reading the *Phaedrus* as a study of emotions is a fruitful way of understanding the text's unity, despite the different content, form, and tone that appear to divide the dialogue in two.

1 The Psyche and the Organisation of Erotic Desires

In an earlier dialogue, the *Phaedo*, Socrates claims that the body contaminates the soul, or psyche, in its pursuit of reality: "the body fills us with loves and desires and fears and all sorts of fancies and a great deal of nonsense, with the result that we literally never get an opportunity to think at all about anything. Wars and revolutions and battles are due simply and solely to the body and its desires" (*Phd.* 66b-c). If we are ever to obtain pure knowledge of something, it will happen when we die and the soul is liberated from the body. Emotions and desires are part of the problem because they originate from the body, and they influence and distort the mind's ability to think clearly and rationally. Conversely, in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, all emotions and desires are located not in the body but the soul. In the *Phaedrus*, early on in Socrates' corrective second speech (or palinode), he argues that the soul is immortal and self-moving (245c-d). He claims that it is always moving, but this movement is not caused

by something external to it; it must, therefore, be self-moving and what moves itself never stops moving since it does not stop being itself (and it follows from this that neither was it born nor will it die). Because it is self-moving, it is also a first principle of motion for other things. The purpose of the soul is "to look after all that is inanimate" (246b),[3] and its most divine element is its wings, which allow it to travel the earth and control the cosmos (246c). The natural property of the wings is to carry heavy things upwards to the region of the gods; but if a soul sheds its wings then it falls to earth and animates a lifeless body. This conception of the soul explains how it is that living things are combinations of body and soul which means that, under the influence of ἔρως, the philosophical pursuit of truth is only possible by body and soul acting together.

This means that the main distinction for the pursuit of truth in the *Phaedrus* is not that between body and soul, but between the rational and non-rational. Plato critiques false notions of this division in the way that he sets up the three main speeches in the first half of the dialogue. In the dialogue's first speech, written by Lysias but delivered by Phaedrus, an older man attempts to seduce a good-looking boy, while claiming not to be in love with the boy. The speech contrasts the behaviour of the lover and the non-lover: the lover seeks only to satisfy his desires, and is slave to his immediate pleasures. He is unable to fulfil his promises, and acts deceptively because his secret agenda changes with the intensity and satisfaction of his desires. Whereas the lover is defined by his desires, the non-lover is defined by his self-control: he reasons clearly and shows good judgement; he achieves his aims because of his "excellent qualities" (232d), and he is capable of holding long-term interests that benefit both himself and the boy.

How is the non-lover able to offer a sexual relation without erotic love? In his version of the speech, Socrates shows this to be a false question; he offers a bipartite psychology of the non-lover, who he maintains is really a lover that has fooled himself into thinking he is a non-lover. He claims: "in each of us there are two ruling and guiding forces whose lead we follow: one is our innate desire for pleasures, and the other is an acquired mode of thought, which aims for what is best" (237d). Desire is opposed to judgement and sometimes these two work together harmoniously, but sometimes they conflict. When judgement dominates the relation, it leads by means of reason towards what is best and we have self-control. When desire dominates the relation, it drags us irrationally towards pleasures, and leads us to excess. These excesses take on many forms, such as gluttony, alcoholism, and also love, which is explained in terms of the dominance of irrational desires for pleasure in beauty, particularly

3 Unless specified, references are to the *Phaedrus* Waterfield (2009).

physical beauty. Love leads to jealousy and the lover does not care for what is best for the boy. He wants the boy to be vulnerable so that he can exploit him, and does not want the boy to be superior to him in any way, because any advantage the boy has will make him attractive to other suitors. He prefers his beloved to be effeminate; driven by compulsion, he stalks his beloved and pressures him, offering promises for favours the beloved has given him, but then reneging on those promises when he comes to his senses (that is, when the rational element in him is stronger).

Socrates delivers his version of Lysias' speech with his head covered, and later describes both speeches as 'shameless' (243c). There are two main problems with them, which are implied in his palinode: first, they have failed to understand erotic love, which they restrict to physical beauty, because they assume it emerges only from the irrational part of the psyche, which is the part that pursues pleasures and leads to indulgence and excess. Neither speech acknowledges that the rational part of the psyche has its own erotic goal. This failure to understand the complex nature of erotic love is explained by the second problem, which is that both speeches are based on a mistaken model of the psyche.[4] Although they describe the appetitive desires of the lover, and criticise his hubris, the distinction between the two is not well established.

In a careful analysis of Plato's methods of Collection and Division regarding this passage, R. Hackforth notes that Socrates begins by subsuming ἔρως under ἐπιθυμία, the appetitive desires. Socrates' purpose is not only to show what species of ἐπιθυμία constitutes love, but that this involves a discord in the psyche. This discord is "improperly resolved" by the victory of the non-rational part of the soul, and it is this victory that leads to hubris: "ὕβρις now takes the place of ἐπιθυμία as the genus to be divided" (Hackforth [1972] (1997), 40). Hackforth goes on to point out that Socrates does not claim that ὕβρις is a kind of ἐπιθυμία, but instead refers to the psychical state that follows the victory of irrational desire over rational belief. Hackforth continues: "nevertheless the connexion of ὕβρις with ἐπιθυμία is so close that the speaker treats the species of the one as species of the other, and in the end arrives at a definition of love which, as we were led to expect at the outset, makes it a kind of desire, and carefully

4 Later in the dialogue, Socrates will comment that "my two speeches took the irrational part of the mind as a single type of thing, with features in common, and just as a single body has parts that naturally come in pairs with the same names … so my two speeches regarded insanity [παρανοία] as a single natural type of thing in us" (265e-266a; shortly afterwards he uses μανία). However, this is not true. Socrates does not use παρανοία or μανία in his first speech and, despite his claim, neither of his speeches demonstrate the methods of Collection and Division that he introduces in the second half of the dialogue and which are used in his later works.

states its specific difference" (Hackforth [1972] (1997), 40–41). The speaker's treatment of these desires is univocal such that no important distinction is made between the two, and the unifying principle is that the lover "finds pleasant only things which offer him no resistance" (238e). The rational part of the lover's psyche arms him with the cunning needed to satisfy his desires, which is why he praises things about the boy that are morally wrong, out of fear of being disliked, and from jealousy and insecurity he thus prevents the boy from spending time with others. He puts himself first and makes decisions that are detrimental to the boy's well-being. Socrates ends his speech: "For him it is like food, just so that he can be filled up. Lovers love a young man like yourself as wolves love lambs" (241c-d).

Plato's earlier and later dialogues present, albeit differently, bipartite models of the psyche. However, in his middle period he works with a tripartite model, with the important qualification (in the *Republic*, 443d) that there may be other parts. Constructing the three speeches of the *Phaedrus* in this order, Plato critiques reductive bipartite models that overlook rational desire, and which fail to distinguish between the desires of the non-rational parts. Although the appetites are the part of the psyche that desire food, drink, sex etc., the θυμός has its own desires based on an ideal image of itself formed in agreement with what it believes to be fine and noble. It is the evaluative part of the psyche and the part from which most emotions originate. For example, if what we say and do fits with this ideal image we feel pride; but if we are inadequate to it then we feel anger and shame. It is the part of the psyche that cares what others think, particularly if they share our beliefs and values, and recognition is an important way of confirming this image.

The love that arises from the θυμός is the love of honour (φιλοτιμία). According to Phaedrus' idealised account of φιλοτιμία in the *Symposium*, it is the best kind of love and an army composed of lovers and beloveds would be the most fearsome because they would act heroically in front of each other in the pursuit of honour and the avoidance of shame (*Symp*. 178e).[5] In his treatment of the lover and non-lover, Lysias separates honour and shame: the lover acts shamefully whereas the non-lover, in whom the rational force dominates, acts honourably because he exercises self-control. However, this avoids the challenge we face: both φιλοτιμία and shame originate in the θυμός, and it is because we desire honour that we can feel shame. Eliding the differences between the non-rational parts of the psyche avoids the difficult task of understanding

5 Renaut (2013) has written on the importance of shame in the *Symposium*, arguing that while φιλοτιμία presents a challenge to philosophical love, it also acts as a stepping stone towards philosophical goals.

how the parts of the psyche relate. The challenge of integrating these parts is much greater with the revised psychology in the dialogue's third speech.

2 The Role of Shame in Loving Well

Part 1 paid particular attention to the first two speeches in order to establish the context for studying Plato's use of emotions. Part 2 will focus on the seduction of the beloved in the third speech, paying close attention to the psyche's inner conflict. I will argue that, for Plato in the *Phaedrus*, not only can emotions help us to love and live well, to pursue truth and reality, but that we cannot do these things without certain emotions. As in Pausanias' speech in the *Symposium*, Plato places importance on the passage of time that seduction takes, which allows both lover and beloved to overcome the intensity of short-term desires and reveal good intentions before they enter into a relationship. In the *Phaedrus*, the best erotic life is one that integrates the different divisions of the psyche, so that each must learn to work with the others and the psyche as a whole must strive towards the Good (which means that the rational part of the psyche must dominate the relations). This is consistent with the definition of justice in the *Republic*, in which a just psyche is possible when the three parts work together harmoniously under reason's rule. Temperance was crucial in enabling this, and likewise is critical under the influence of ἔρως: in order to live the philosophic life, the lover must gain control over his self, which means that he must integrate the intelligible and the sensible, the rational and the non-rational divisions of the psyche.

Although there are many similarities between the tripartite models of the psyche that Plato uses in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, we should be careful not to assume they are the same. Socrates acknowledges that it would take too long and would "require a god" (246a) to explain what the psyche is, and that the best he can do as a mortal is to describe its character by use of analogy: the rational soul is depicted as a charioteer; and the non-rational soul is composed of the spirited part, which is depicted as a white horse, and the appetitive part, which is depicted as a black horse. This allegory forms part of a mythical account of souls in their embodied and disembodied states, and is poetically inspired. Hackforth advises that "the reader must therefore allow his rational and critical faculty to be suspended as he reads, seeking to feel with the poet rather than 'understand' him and turn his poetry into prose" (Hackforth [1972] (1997), 72). While we should guard against conflating the two models of the tripartite psyche, Hackforth's caveat does not preclude the kind of analysis undertaken below, which pays attention to Plato's uses of emotion, particularly shame.

Neither does it prevent us from noting similarities between the two models and the same challenge of integration that they share. The allegory in the *Phaedrus* is reminiscent of the portrayal in the *Republic* of reason as a man, the θυμός as a lion, and the appetites as a many-headed beast: "Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together" (*Resp*. 588d). This challenge of integration is most vividly detailed in the lover's seduction of the beloved.

It is not surprising that the seduction begins with appetitive desire. It is the black horse that drags the charioteer and the white horse towards the beloved, without which there would be no seduction. He is described as being "hard of hearing, and scarcely to be controlled with a combination of whip and goad" (253d), his actions are violent and he is frequently described as shameless. And yet, despite this description, in all of Plato's works it is perhaps this erotic context that contains the most extensive study of the level of reasoning in the appetites: the desire for physical gratification and the risk of frustration and disappointment can make a person cunning. As G.R.F. Ferrari has observed (Ferrari (1987)), a striking feature in this passage is the black horse's reasoning with the other psychic parts. The black horse is not initially disposed to satisfy his lustful desires, but rather seeks to "bring up the *subject* of the pleasures of sex" (254a, emphasis added). It is odd that the black horse should seek discourse and not physical gratification, and when the charioteer and white horse have dragged him away from the beloved, he curses them for their cowardice and tries to force them against their wills to return to the beloved. A détente is agreed since none of them has the strength to dismiss each other's desires, and they agree to return to the beloved at a later time (254c-d). However, when this moment arrives and the black horse reminds them of their promise, they feign forgetfulness. The black horse is relentless and they submit as he drags them back to the beloved; but he has shown himself to attempt to be open to reasoning and has waited patiently for the agreed upon time.

One of the problems with Plato's tripartite psychology in the *Republic* is the homunculus theory: the fact that each part of the psyche has cognitive, desiderative and emotive capacities suggests that each is human-like and so duplicates what it is trying to explain. This is also the case in the *Phaedrus*, and the horses are evidently anthropomorphised, such that each has its own cognition, desire and emotions. In the seduction, the black horse's erotic desires are propositional and not indiscriminate: it desires *this* beloved, not just anyone. The emotions associated with the appetites – sexual excitement and sexual frustration – are the most basic, but they are also the most common because they accompany all erotic desires. Whether they are actual pleasures, or imagined ones (such as the anticipation of sexual gratification), without them this love would lack its intensity and would not be erotic. This is what the charioteer

and white horse are beginning to learn when they are forced to compromise and "passively submit to doing as they are told" (254b). It is the first step towards integration.

Although the black horse surprises us with his decision to discourse about the pleasures of sex instead of satisfying his physical desires, over time his intentions are revealed: when lying with the beloved he pleads with the charioteer to be rewarded for his pains. The black horse has conspired to talk to the beloved about the pleasures of sex in order to satisfy his lust, and therefore uses practical reasoning only to this end. As with any strong desire, it seeks to dominate the rational and spirited parts and bend them to its will. The difference between the three parts is refined further: it is less that between the rational and non-rational, and has more to do with the different kinds of reasoning used by each part.

The seduction of the beloved follows a mythical account of disembodied souls that circle the heavens and glimpse true beauty. When the black horse drags the others towards the beloved, the charioteer sees beauty in the beloved's eyes and is reminded of true Beauty beyond the heavens. The principal emotion associated with this rational erotic desire for Beauty is a reverential awe or fear; it is a cognitive state of perplexity that is not experienced as a delight in the vision of true Beauty, but as dread and anguish. The use of metaphor allows Plato to ascribe physiological symptoms to the psyche: this emotion is accompanied with physiological symptoms in which the whole soul heats up: "Following this sight, the kind of change comes over him that you would expect after a shivering fit, and he begins to sweat and to run an unusually high fever, because the reception through his eyes of the effusion of beauty causes him to get hot" (251a-b). The vision of true Beauty, and the reverential fear that accompanies it, is an overwhelming sensation and the charioteer loses control of himself. Ferrari notes that, in addition to describing the black horse's negotiating skills, Socrates presents the charioteer as having animal-like characteristics. Each time the charioteer is reminded of true Beauty he reacts violently and wrenches the horse's bit back in its mouth, causing it to bleed, and forcing the black horse to its knees. These are hardly actions that seek integration and the experience of remembering true Beauty seems, as in the *Symposium*, to be incompatible with the other erotic desires. It is one of the reasons why the rational part of the psyche needs a different set of desires with which it can be aligned.

In contrast to the unruly horse, the white horse has noble characteristics, is clean-limbed, and hook-nosed. He is an "ally of true glory; and he needs no whip, but is guided only by spoken commands" (253d). He is receptive to reason, hence he appears 'high-necked' and not stretched out, suggesting he

has no intention of running away. This is the θυμός at its very best: driven by considerations of Beauty it is determined to be successful, but this determination is moderated by self-control and respect for others. It is also outward-looking, as this is the part of the self that evaluates itself in the context of its environment. The white horse has the self-control that the Lysian non-lover professed to have.

For Plato, all emotions have cognitive content. Although Socrates introduces the white horse by commenting on the beliefs that structure its emotions, he does not develop its cognition more fully. In his presentation of the θυμός, there is little to distinguish the white horse from the charioteer. They seem to have the same desire, and the difference between them is sharpest emotionally. Most emotions originate in the θυμός, and those that do tend to be the most complex and are self-reflexive. In the *Phaedrus*, the emotion that defines the white horse and has an important role in the best erotic life is shame, and Plato's word for shame is αἰσχύνη, not αἰδώς with its connotations of reverential fear. This occurs at a distance from the beloved, and the white horse "drenches the whole soul in sweat brought on by its shame and horror" (254c). Shame weakens the appetites' desires; it is one of the most important facts of our well-being that the appetites are capable of feeling shame, for it is this emotion (and not rational argument) that curbs the pleasures of the appetites. The reverential fear that the rational part of the psyche felt, and which fills the soul, is a more primal emotion. It gives way to the self-reflexivity of shame, not simply because the white horse and charioteer allow themselves to be dragged towards the beloved with the sexual excitement of appetitive desires, but because the lover senses his own inadequacy and mortality in relation to the eternal and unchanging nature of true Beauty. Reverential fear accompanies the memory of true Beauty; shame accompanies the self-awareness before true Beauty.

Plato's position in the *Charmides* that shame is not a virtue would appear to be consistent with his use of it in the *Phaedrus*. In the former dialogue, Charmides attempts to define temperance (σωφροσύνη), and in his second attempt he argues that σωφροσύνη is shame or modesty (*Chrm.* 160e). Similarly, in the *Phaedrus*, the white horse is described as being "a lover of honour *when joined with restraint and a sense of shame*" (*Chrm.* 253d, emphasis added). In rejecting Charmides' second definition, Socrates persuades him to agree that σωφροσύνη is always good, whereas shame can be either good or not good. He quotes an example from Homer's *Odyssey* that "Shame is no good thing in a man that is in need" (*Od.* 17.347). To this we might add that it is possible to feel shame, inappropriately, for something that is actually good. For example, if we hold false beliefs about what is beautiful and are found out to be acting not in accordance

with those beliefs, we can feel a mortifying sense of shame. Similarly, the *effect* of shame on us is not always good. Depending on how the spirited part is trained, it can lead us to live honourable lives, but it can also make us competitive and ambitious to such an extent that we use people in a harmful way.[6] In this account of the seduction we have seen shame used for noble reasons, and this has facilitated the integration of different erotic desires by helping to curb the appetitive desires. Plato recognises both strengths and weaknesses of each part of the psyche. Even when it occurs for noble reasons shame poses a threat to integration because an excess of it conflicts with the desires of the black horse, which acts as an important counter to the restraint of the white horse.

3 Rhetoric and Shame

As we saw in Part 2, shame has an instrumental role in the control of appetitive desires, without which integration of the different erotic desires in the psyche would not be possible. There are numerous instances of the forcefulness of spirited desires affecting the appetites in Plato's dialogues, and it has been well documented how he opposes shame to pleasure in the *Gorgias* instead of relying on purely rational argument. When Polus claims that injustice is better than justice he bases this belief on what is pleasurable and he supports his view with emotional reasons and perceptions rather than rational beliefs (cf. *Grg*. 473b-e). Purely rational argument would be ineffective against this, and therefore Socrates needs another way of getting Polus to separate judgements about what is pleasurable from what is good. He aims, therefore, to convince Polus that if something "is pleasant but not beneficial [it] is downright shameful, *aischron*" (Moss (2005), 8), and that when we find something that is pleasant to be shameful, we can no longer think of it as good. Similarly, Socrates uses shame to separate Calicles' judgement about what is pleasurable from what is good. Callicles claims to be immune from shame because it inculcates conventional morality and is dependent on what others think of us. Again, rather than use purely rational arguments, Socrates targets Callicles' sense of manliness by forming arguments designed to get him to feel shame. As Jessica Moss observes, "shame can sometimes neutralize the appetites' destructive force where reason on its own has failed: it can make the agent recoil from the pleasures of vice and aspire even to the pains of virtue … shame is more effective against

6 Nor is φιλοτιμία a virtue because it can lead people to do irrational things. Cf. Phaedrus' praise, in the *Symposium*, of erotic relations in which individuals prefer a heroic death as a means of achieving immortality.

pleasure in a person who has a strong sense of honor, ambition and pride in manliness, and that shame is connected to how an agent sees himself" (Moss (2005), 17–18).

The central concern in the *Gorgias* is the danger of people seeking gratification and pleasure at the expense of truth. It is developed through a study of rhetoric, which Socrates describes as a "knack" because it affects the listener's soul cosmetically; it works by producing pleasure in the listener despite the fact that "it can produce no principle in virtue of which it offers what it does, nor explain the nature thereof, and consequently is unable to point to the cause of each thing it offers" (*Grg*. 465a). Because it lacks a λόγος, it is irrational and has no interest in what is good or right, hence Plato's concern about the increasing popularity of sophistic rhetoric in Athens (cf. *Grg*. 463d). This lays bare the danger of emotions: whether the rhetorician has sincere motives like Gorgias, or sinister ones like Polus, he plays on the ignorance of his audience and dazzles them with the form and delivery of his speech; he gets them to feel something strongly and it is on the basis of these feelings that his audience comes to hold certain beliefs.

It is a recurring concern in Plato's works that emotions can generate false beliefs and harm one's eudaimonia. Whereas the *Gorgias* positions rhetoric and the elenchus in opposition to each other, in the *Phaedrus* it is agreed that rhetoric encompasses all forms of speech (261e), including philosophy. Socrates leads Phaedrus in a speculative discussion about what a new art of rhetoric would be like, and although this new art is configured according to philosophical demands and advances the dialectic as the best form of rhetoric for self-knowledge, it is different to both sophistic rhetoric and philosophy. Socrates critiques sophistic rhetoric on its own terms and argues that it fails in its stated aim of composing speeches that produce conviction in others.[7]

What is pertinent for this chapter is that this discussion of rhetoric, which takes up more than half of the dialogue, is couched in terms of shame. Socrates begins the elenchus by observing that writing speeches is not shameful in itself, but "[w]hat's really shameful, though, is getting it wrong – speaking and writing shamefully badly" (258d). Shameful and bad are used synonymously. This apparent tautology is clarified within a moral context, for what makes speaking and writing shameful is remaining ignorant of the soul of the listener, which is the intended target of every speech: "So the soul is what he [the rhetorician] focuses all his efforts on, since it is the soul in which he is trying to produce conviction" (271a). It is incumbent on the rhetorician to understand the type of soul in the listener so that he knows how to persuade it.

7 See Yunis (2005) for an excellent analysis in support of this claim.

An art of rhetoric is not possible without psychology, and we have seen how Plato prioritises it in the way he constructs the three speeches, as well as in Socrates' compact account of the soul in the third speech. But it is not simply the psychology of the listener that matters, but the type of soul: "a would-be orator must know how many types of soul, with such-and-such qualities, which is why some people are like this and others are like that.' After dividing souls up in this way, 'There are so many types of speech, each of such-and-such a kind. People with such-and-such a nature are easy to persuade of such-and-such y speeches of such-and-such a type for reason *x*, while people of such-and-such a nature are hard to persuade for reason *y*" (271d). A rhetorician must know these things if he is to know when to speak, when to be silent, how to arouse pity or to shock his listener, and apply other rhetorical techniques, if he is to call himself an expert. Persuasion is "the creation of desire in the auditor's soul" (Yunis (2005), 115).

Socrates follows this by claiming that the "correct response" to a rhetorician who fails to understand the soul of his listener is "disbelief" (272b). While we might agree with him, we could also respond by saying that a sophistic rhetorician can be persuasive while remaining ignorant of the different types of soul in his audience, and that if Plato is to critique sophistic rhetoric on its own terms then he should factor in the importance of emotions, for it is sometimes on the basis of emotions that we come to believe something with conviction. For example, a good speaker can cause us to feel pleasure with the form and delivery of his speech such that we are dazzled and moved.

Although that discussion does not take place, Plato makes it clear that whether or not a speech is shameful depends not only on the attentiveness of the speaker to his audience, but also on the way we respond to it. When Phaedrus demands a positive response to Lysias' speech, Socrates is careful to refer to the experience of watching Phaedrus' enjoyment of it: "Yes, it's out of this world, my friend. I was amazed. And you were the reason I felt this way, Phaedrus, because I was looking at you while you were reading, and it seemed to me that the speech made you glow with pleasure. Assuming that your understanding of these matters is better than mine, I followed your lead, and so I came to share the ecstasy of your enthusiasm" (234d). His reaction frustrates Phaedrus, who loves speeches indiscriminately, but Socrates cannot countenance that it is possible to enjoy a speech uncritically.

Of course, the written word has no regard for the reader's type of soul. Towards the end of the dialogue, Plato reflects on the limitations of the written word, which at best can jog the memory of the listener but is always only an image (276a). Plato's analysis, though, expands to include the reader, claiming

that he would be foolish to believe that "anyone who inherits the work with the assumption that writing will give him something clear and reliable – would be behaving in a thoroughly foolish manner" (275c). It is a subtle appeal to his readers not to accept passively the truths that are written out for them but to challenge the text. Similarly, if we allow ourselves to be dazzled by a speech, then we enjoy the pleasurable sensation of being moved. In both cases, Plato warns us against the shameful behaviour of enjoying the aesthetics of a speech, its form and delivery, instead of inquiring into the truths it might contain.

4 Conclusion

Both of Plato's extended studies of ἔρως present many versions of the homoerotic relation, partly because the goal of this relation was not procreation but the good of both the lover and beloved. Most of the speakers hold it to be the idealised erotic relation in which the lover's patronage enables the boy to advance in social, and possibly political, life. The best version of this relation, which Plato advances in both dialogues, is driven by the philosophical pursuit of truth and reality. Whereas the beloved matters only at the start of the lover's ascent to the Form of Beauty in the *Symposium*, in the *Phaedrus* this pursuit of truth and reality cannot happen without both lover and beloved.

There are numerous examples of shame across Plato's works, and two striking examples in the *Symposium*: for Phaedrus, shame is a virtue because it compels us to act heroically and so (he argues) brings out the best in each of us; but Alcibiades complains that he feels ashamed before Socrates because of his failure to fulfil the promises he makes, and is so overwhelmed by the emotion that he wishes Socrates was "removed from the face of the earth" (216b). In the *Phaedrus*, shame has a more prominent role because of its importance in the integration of the different erotic desires in the psyche. It follows the reverential awe that has an effect on each part of the psyche, and similarly drenches the whole psyche in sweat, a key step in taming the appetites. Secondly, the basis of the lengthy discussion about rhetoric and what constitutes an art of rhetoric takes place on the basis of what is shameful. This discussion also shows Plato's concerns for the danger of emotions and the way they can influence our beliefs; but the dialogue as a whole finds a positive role for emotions, and an important one for shame.

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CHAPTER 15

Plato on the Role of Anger in Our Intellectual and Moral Development

Marta Jimenez

Abstract

In this paper I examine some of the positive epistemic and moral dimensions of anger in Plato's dialogues. My aim is to show that while Plato is clearly aware that *retaliatory* anger has negative effects on people's behavior, the strategy we find in his dialogues is not to eliminate anger altogether; instead, Plato aims to transform or rechannel destructive retaliatory anger into a different, more productive, *reformative* anger. I argue that this new form of anger plays a crucial positive role in our intellectual and moral development. In relation to our intellectual development, anger is often part of people's reactions to the Socratic interrogations and it often helps or hinders attempts to acknowledge one's ignorance and become motivated to learn. For anger to play a positive role in the context of philosophical conversations, Plato suggests its transformation from being an outward-looking and reactive emotion oriented towards retaliation (refutation), into a mostly inward-looking emotion aimed at ones' own moral and intellectual reform or self-betterment. In relation to our moral progress, anger is strategically linked both to the control of our appetites and to the virtue of courage, so anger is crucial to the psychology of the good citizen. Concretely, anger is needed both for the development of the right opposition to injustice and greed, and for the formation of an adequate sensitivity to justice.

Keywords

anger – retaliation – reformative anger – learning – moral development

1 Introduction: the Ambivalence of Anger in Plato

In Plato's psychology, anger (θυμός or ὀργή) is one of the emotions associated with the spirited part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές), i.e. the intermediate aspect of the soul that is non-rational in nature but can side with reason and restrain

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appetites. When the agent's spirited part of the soul is well trained, the thumoeidetic emotions and desires – such as anger, shame, admiration, disgust, or love of victory and honor – make appetites and fears follow the commands of reason and the person behaves with courage or temperance; however, when not properly trained, they may provoke grave misadjustments in the soul and inapropriate behavior. Spirit (θυμός) and the spirited emotions have received extensive attention recently, and in particular, Plato's views on shame's positive role in our moral development have been explored from various angles, with special attention to Socrates' employment of shame in his cross-examinations.[1] In this paper I add to this work on thumoeidetic emotions by examining some of the positive epistemic and moral dimensions of anger.[2]

Anger comes up often in Platonic dialogues, and it is characterized as a complex and ambivalent emotion. My aim in this paper is to show that while Plato is clearly aware that retaliatory anger has negative effects on people's behavior, often leading to error and excess, his goal is not to eliminate anger altogether and substitute it with other milder emotions; instead, Plato aims to transform destructive retaliatory anger into a different, more productive kind, which I shall call "reformative anger". This new form of anger plays a crucial positive role in our intellectual and moral development. In relation to our intellectual development, anger is often part of people's reactions to the Socratic interrogations and, just as shame, it is an emotion that can either help or hinder attempts to acknowledge one's ignorance and become motivated to learn. In relation to our moral progress, Plato connects anger both with the control of our appetites and with the virtue of courage, so anger is crucial both for the development of the right opposition to injustice and greed, and for the formation of an adequate sensitivity to justice.

The paper is divided in three main sections that deal with (1) Plato's rejection of *retaliatory* anger and his proposal of *reformative* anger as an alternative to it; (2) the crucial role of anger in Socratic cross-examinations; and (3) anger's general positive role in moral progress and the life of the good citizen.

1 Recent important studies of the positive function of θυμός in Plato's moral psychology are Hobbs (2000); Singpurwalla (2013); Wilburn (2013), (2015); and Renaut (2014). For discussions of Plato's views of the positive role of shame in moral development see e.g. Kahn (1983); McKim (1988); Cairns (2003); Moss (2005); Cain (2008); Futter (2009); Pilote (2010); Tarnopolsky (2010); Jenks (2012); Collobert (2013); and Candiotto (2014), (2018).

2 In comparison to shame, the positive role of anger has received significantly less attention. It is mentioned in Moss (2005), where is discussed together with shame as one of the thumoeidetic emotions, and it plays some role in the analysis of Socrates' strategy in Collobert (2013), where the author comments on the relevance of anger (colère) as one of the emotions that awakens the desire to philosophise, but the main focus of these authors' discussion is shame.

In Part 1, I offer an overview of the place of anger in Plato's dialogues and lay down some of the reasons why anger is often seen as a negative emotion. As several commentators have shown, Plato is concerned with the dangers involved in retaliatory anger and strongly rejects it.[3] The desire for retaliation is grounded on a fundamental ignorance about the sources of wrongdoing and a misaprehension of the sources of moral disagreement, and it is one of the biggest obstacles both against being open to learning (or to being corrected) about moral issues and to reforming those who are morally wrong.

In Part 2, I examine Plato's views on the role of anger in our intellectual development by looking at anger's place in situations of moral disagreement in general, and in Socratic cross-examinations in particular. One of the common reasons why people get angry regarding moral disagreements is because they think that those who hold views different from theirs are motivated by an intention to deceive or to take advantage. In Socrates' refutations, his interlocutors often get angry because they believe that Socrates is either not sincere or lacks good will towards them. Moved by this anger, those who are being refuted, and in general those who disagree about relevant moral issues, feel the need to attack those with whom they disagree instead of engaging in productive conversation. Plato is aware of how futile, even destructive, this retaliatory anger can be, and for this reason, as I argue, he proposes to rechannel it towards a reformative anger that aims at teaching and learning instead of aiming at winning the argument. In the context of philosophical conversations, thus, Plato suggests the transformation of anger from being an outward-looking and reactive emotion oriented towards retaliation (refutation), into a mostly inward-looking emotion aimed at ones' own moral and intellectual reform or self-betterment. For this reason, the philosopher's mission will be at least in part, to help people to rechannel their anger, so that those who do not know move from being irritated at others or at others' opinions for being in dissonance with theirs, to being concerned with their own internal harmony and the consistency between their own beliefs.

Part 3 deals with the role of anger in moral progress, with special attention to anger's connection to our sense of justice, and to the virtue of courage. Not only Plato does not eliminate anger from his emotional repertoire when he deals with our moral education, but he makes it central to the psychology of the good citizen. In the upbringing project of the *Republic,* Plato is clear about the centrality of the spirited part of the soul as a mediator between appetites and reason, and anger is one of the main thumoedetic emotions doing that

3 This point is extensively discussed in Allen (1999), (2000); Mackenzie (1981) and Saunders (1973).

mediating job; in addition, anger is at the core of the virtue of courage. Moreover, as his discussion of the art of weaving in the final section of the *Statesman* reveals, the role of the good ruler is to make sure that citizens have the right combination of anger and shame, of courage and moderation, so that they are not too wild or too mild. To avoid a population of citizens that are spineless in the face of injustice and excessively concerned with private matters, anger is essential, as it makes people sensitive to injustice and unafraid of making changes and intervening when society goes in the wrong direction.

2 The Dangers of Traditional Anger and Plato's Reformative Model

As Danielle Allen has persuasively argued, Plato consistently aims at correcting the traditional role that anger plays in Athenian justice as a motivator of the desire for retribution.[4] To this aim, Plato seeks to revise Athenian conceptions of punishment and substitute the retributive or retaliatory approach with a reformative one. In this new reformative model, Allen argues, punishment is separated from revenge, and is concerned instead with the betterment of the wrongdoer.[5] The ground for Plato's new model of punishment, as Allen notes, is Socrates' famous claim that no one does wrong knowingly. If wrongdoing is the result of ignorance, then "the aim of punishment is to deal with the problem of this ignorance through the education (μάθησις) of the wrongdoer about what is truly "good" to do" (Allen (2000), 247). As a consequence, there is no place for retribution or retaliation, only for transformation.

Socrates uses this approach in *Ap.* 26a, when he argues that if he indeed corrupts the youth he would be doing so involuntarily and out of ignorance, and for this reason he would need education (μαθήσεως) and not punishment (κολάσεως). With this move, Allen argues, Plato reverses "the whole of the standard Athenian approach to punishment" (Allen (2000), 247), and as a consequence, he rejects the traditional anger model: "Plato's rejection of a retributive punishment in favor of reformative punishment both entailed and was

4 See Allen (1999), Allen (2000) (especially Chapter 10: 'Plato's Paradigm Shifts'), and Allen (2003).

5 Allen summarizes Plato's position on punishment as follows: "Punishment should arise not from anger at the wrongdoer but from concern for the wrongdoer and the state of his or her soul" (Allen (2000), 247). Mackenzie (1981) and Saunders (1973) both find a reformative theory of punishment in Plato's *Protagoras, Gorgias* and *Laws* and, as Allen (2000) notes, they also think this view is grounded on "Plato's argument that punishment should aim to teach the unvirtuous wrongdoer how to be virtuous" (247).

itself central to *a general and comprehensive rejection of Athenian politics and its basis in anger*" (Allen (2000), 249, my emphasis).[6]

Now although Allen's conclusion that Plato rejects the old retributive model of punishment is accurate, this does not need to imply that Plato's new reformative model requires the rejection of anger altogether. Instead, as I contend, what Plato proposes is a new model of the role of anger in punishment, where anger's job is not that of seeking retaliation but instead that of reforming those who are morally wrong. In this new model, then, anger's goal is not to appease the revengeful impulse of the victim by inflicting some proportional harm on the wrongdoer, but instead it is a tool to reform (and thus benefit) the wrongdoer through education or moral conversion. This anger is often self-directed, as in the anger that wrongdoers feel at their own ignorance and moral failure once they become aware of them, and in those cases it aims at self-transformation.

In the following sub-sections I focus mainly on the two causes of anger most frequently brought up in the dialogues: moral disagreement and wrongdoing. In relation to moral disagreement, several dialogues insist on the uselessness of reactive anger and blame as a response to wrong claims, and instead suggest that educating the ignorant is the right response. Similarly, in relation to wrongdoing, Plato addresses the problems generated by the usual reactions of *retaliatory* anger; the proper response to wrongdoing instead is a *reformative* anger that aims at educating and remodeling the bad traits of the wrongdoer.

2.1 *Moral Disagreement, Wrongdoing, and Retaliatory Anger: the Example of Socrates' Accusers and Jury*

There are, of course, good reasons for why Plato wants to get rid of retaliatory anger. Plato knows better than anyone that excessive or wrongly directed anger can be dangerous – both at the personal and political levels – and that people slide very quickly from disagreeing with someone about moral issues to attributing to them some sort of wrongdoing. One of the most familiar examples of this kind of anger is the anger directed at Socrates by his accusers, old and new, which is crucial both in bringing him to trial and in prejudicing the jury against him. Concretely, this is the sort of anger that Anytus expresses against Socrates in the *Meno* (94e-95a), which finally leads him to bring Socrates to trial. It is also the type of anger long-held by what Socrates calls his 'old accusers' in the *Apology*, i.e. those prestigious people – politicians, orators, poets, etc. – whose pretensions to possession of wisdom were unmasked as empty by Socrates'

6 See also Allen (1999), 199.

cross-examinations. In fact, both sets of accusers took themselves to be reacting against Socrates' wrongdoings (corrupting the youth with dangerous beliefs), and they thought that the right reaction to those wrongdoings was to return some harm to him in the form of punishment.

In the *Apology* Socrates offers some reflections on the roots of this kind of anger and connects it to the common retaliatory reaction that people have against opinions that are perceived as offensive or morally repulsive. In general, Socrates observes, moral disagreement tends to lead people to retaliatory anger, just as wrongdoing does. First, at *Ap.* 31e1-32a3 Socrates begs his audience not to turn against him – "don't be angry at me" (μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε) – because of the things that he is about to say. He claims that people often get angry when they see others saying or doing things that clash with what they think or do. This is the reason why, as he explains, he has not led a public life: he was afraid that his life would be in danger and people would turn against him in anger if he had tried to say and do in public the kinds of things that he says and does in private – i.e. claims and actions in defense of justice and against injustice.

A second reference to the dangers of public anger appears at *Ap.* 34b6-d1, where Socrates confesses to fear that his speech and his attitude might be read as disdainful and provoke the anger of the members of the jury, because unlike most defendants, he will not be using emotional appeals, etc. He is afraid that many of the jurors will vote against him "in anger" (μετ᾽ὀργῆς),[7] not necessarily because they think he committed any wrong, but because they consider his views untenable, arrogant, or offensive. Trapped in the old model of anger, where disagreement leads to desire for retaliation, the public's reaction to Socrates' claims would be to desire to inflict some harm in return.

2.2 *Socrates' Non-retaliatory "Revenge"*

In response to the old model of retaliatory anger, in the *Apology*, Socrates criticizes his accusers' erroneous approach to punishment and presents an alternative: whenever someone has wrong moral opinions, or whenever someone commits moral error, people should try to cure that person instead of trying to hurt them. If he was indeed a wrongdoer, then the adequate response or "revenge" (τιμωρία), would be to reproach his erroneous views about morality and guide him towards caring more about virtue. Socrates offers an example of how to react to moral disagreement through his own reaction to the jury's final decision of conviction:

7 *Ap.* 34c8-d1. See a discussion of this example in Konstan (2006), 67–68.

> So I am certainly not angry (οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω) with those who convicted me, or with my accusers. Of course that was not their purpose when they accused and convicted me, but they thought they were hurting me, and for this they deserve blame. This much I ask from them: when my sons grow up, avenge yourselves (τιμωρήσασθε) by causing them the same kind of grief that I caused you, if you think they care for money or anything else more than they care for virtue, or if they think they are somebody when they are nobody. Reproach (ὀνειδίζετε) them as I reproach you, that they do not care for the right things and think they are worthy when they are not worthy of anything. If you do this, I shall have been justly treated by you, and my sons also. (*Ap.* 41d6-42a2, trans. G.M.A. Grube)

In this passage the message is that retaliatory anger is misguided, since it is unable to undo the wrong, and adds a second wrong to the first one. When people try to punish in a retaliatory way, the result is that while there are no positive changes effected in the wrongdoer, there is also a loss of opportunity for true reform. Reactive anger and revengeful punishment do not produce any good results. For this reason, Socrates has no desire for revenge against his accusers or the jury, or at least he is not interested in a traditional revenge – i.e. inflicting harm in return for harm.[8]

Instead, the "revenge" proposed by Socrates consists in provoking through verbal reproach the necessary changes in the wrongdoers so that they learn what is wrong about their actions and modify their false conceptions about what is good and bad. The purpose of this revenge, then, is not to hurt the wrongdoer, but to educate and reform them, as to prevent that they continue committing wrong actions or keep having erroneous beliefs. In line with this position, Socrates asks the jury to use this kind of revenge with his children, if they see that his children do not care about the important things in life, and to use reproaches to remind them about what is truly worth-pursuing and to redirect their behavior if they deviate from the right path.

2.3 *Retaliatory Anger and the Problem of Moral Disagreement in* **Euthyphro**

In the *Euthyphro* we find many interesting references to the dangers of retaliatory anger. First, Euthyphro's complicated situation is a consequence of a series of episodes of anger, and Euthyphro himself sees his plan of bringing his

8 Another example of Socrates' non retaliatory attitude occurs at *Phd.* 116c, where the officer explains why Socrates, unlike most other prisoners, is not angry at him, because Socrates properly understands his situation and who is responsible for it.

father to court for murder not only as the source of irritation among his relatives, but also as the motive of public rage against him.[9] In addition, as part of a discussion of the sources of moral disagreement, Socrates presents the beginning of an explanation for why people get angry when others defend opinions that clash with theirs, and a description of the issues in relation to which anger commonly arises.

In this dialogue, anger appears at several crucial moments. First, Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for the murder of one of their servants, who in turn killed one of their slaves "while drunk and angry" (παροινήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς, 4c5). Moreover, Euthyphro says that his father and other relatives "are irritated" or "displeased" (ἀγανακτεῖ) by the fact that he is prosecuting his father for the crime (4d5-6), and that people in general are angry (χαλεπαίνουσιν) with him for his decision (6a3-4). Euthyphro's explanation for why he is the victim of popular anger is that people are confused about how to assess his actions:

> These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that he bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn castrated his father for similar reasons. But they are angry with me (ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν) because I am prosecuting my father for his wrongdoing. They contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about me. (*Euthphr.* 5e5-6a5, trans. G.M.A Grube)

The angry reactions against Euthyphro's decision to bring his father to court described in this passage are very similar to the ones feared by Socrates in the *Apology*. People grow angry when they see someone defending a view or an opinion that they find too foreign or too incomprehensible, and their impulse is to want to punish (by somehow harming) the defender of such view. Why?

Throughout the dialogue, Socrates and Euthyphro make some progress towards revealing why people get angry at those with whom they disagree. In particular, they concur that there are certain sorts of matters upon which people not only disagree, but once engaged in disagreement, have no easy ways to settle, so that they typically get angry, fight and even hate each other.

> SOCRATES: What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger (ἔχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς)? Let us look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about numbers as to which is the greater, would this difference make us enemies and angry with each other (ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ

9 For a discussion of the relevance of anger in Plato's *Euthyphro* see Harris (2002) at 89–90.

> ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις), or would we proceed to count and soon resolve our difference about this?
>
> EUTHYPHRO: We would certainly do so. (*Euthphr.* 7b6-11, trans. G.M.A. Grube)

The kind of disagreement that causes anger and enmity is not disagreement about math or about measurements – not about numbers, or about "the large and the small" or about "the heavier and the lighter". In those cases, we just measure and solve our differences by measuring or calculating. However, there are some subjects about which measuring and calculating does not help.

What are these delicate topics? Socrates identifies mainly three: the just and the unjust; the noble and the base; the good and the bad.[10] People tend to have confused and conflicting opinions about these values, so it is very common that they disagree, and because they have no clear way of solving the disagreement, they quarrel:

> SOCRATES: What subject of difference would make us angry (ὀργιζοίμεθα) and hostile (ἐχθροί) to each other if we were unable to come to a decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, but examine as I tell you whether these subjects are the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad (τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν). Are these not the subjects of difference about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision (ἱκανὴν κρίσιν), you and I and other men become hostile (ἐχθροὶ) to each other whenever we do?
>
> EUTHYPHRO: That is the difference, Socrates, about those subjects. (*Euthphr.* 7c10-d7, trans. G.M.A. Grube)

Moral disagreement is, as the case of Euthyphro shows, one of the most common sources of anger (and even hatred), and the cause is that there seems to be no easy way to settle the disputes by appealing to explicit rules or experts. Whenever it seems impossible to reach a sufficiently clear judgement about moral issues concerning justice, beauty, or goodness, we mistrust others and make them our enemies. Socrates does not spell out here how moral disagreements lead to anger and hostility, but other dialogues offer some hints.

10 See also *Resp.* 476a-477b and *Cri.* 48c-d for the special status of these topics and the claim that people tend to have confused and conflicting opinions about them.

2.4 *Socrates and Protagoras against Retaliatory Anger in* Protagoras

One dialogue that presents a similar kind of concern with retaliatory anger in the context of moral disagreement is Plato's *Protagoras*. First, Protagoras sees the tendency to retaliate against those who defend views different from one's own as an obstacle for his professional activities and a risk for his own way of life, since he often has to handle the angry reactions of those whose cities he visits, where people can misinterpret his intentions and consider him to be a corruptor of the youth. More generally, Protagoras criticizes the retaliatory model of punishment and offers an alternative reformative view based on the education of the wrongdoer similar to that defended by Socrates in the *Apology*. Also for Protagoras the preferability of reform over retaliation is grounded on the assumption of the teachability of virtue.

Just as it is for Socrates, retaliatory anger presents a real danger for Protagoras. He admits that he is always cautious to avoid arousing the anger of citizens in places where he teaches and publicizes his wisdom, since he knows that by attracting promising young men who wish to acquire knowledge, he risks causing resentment and hostility on the part of their elder relatives or acquaintances:

> Caution is in order for a foreigner who goes into the great cities and tries to persuade the best of the young men in them to abandon their associations with others, relatives and acquaintances, young and old alike, and to associate with him instead on the grounds that they will be improved by this association. Jealousy, hostility, and intrigue on a large scale are aroused by such activity (οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί). (*Prt.* 316c-d, trans. S. Lombardo and K. Bell).

Protagoras suggests that the kind of jealousy (φθόνος) and hostility (δυσμένεια) that older people sometimes direct at teachers of virtue is based on their own ignorance. As Socrates' in the *Apology*, Protagoras locates the source of jealousy and hostility (and, I think, of anger in general) on people's suspicion that the views of the other are incorrect or offensive and are, consequently, a potential tool for corrupting the youth. Protagoras' view is, then, that the source of hostility is a kind of ignorance, and his response is to try to educate those who might be hostile against him by being open to respond to all their questions and concerns; concretely, one of the main tools that he uses to minimize their hostility is to argue in favor of the teachability of virtue.

Protagoras' opposition to retaliatory anger is manifest in his distinction between two approaches to punishment: "beastly" or retaliatory, and

future-oriented or reformative. Protagoras' view is that those who seek punishment as retaliation and not for the sake of education are "exercising the mindless vindictiveness of a beast" (*Prt.* 324b).[11] At 323d-324c, Protagoras contrasts this past-oriented retributive punishment, which he also calls revenge (τιμωρία), which assumes the unteachability of virtue, with κόλασις, the kind of punishment that is future-oriented, according to reason, and aims at teaching and reform:

> Reasonable punishment (κολάζειν) is not revenge (τιμωρεῖται) for a past wrong – for one cannot undo what has been done – but is undertaken with a view to the future, to deter both the wrong-doer and whoever sees him being punished from repeating the crime. This attitude towards punishment as deterrence implies that virtue is learned, and this is the attitude of all those who seek requital in public or in private. (*Prt.* 324b-c, trans. S. Lombardo and K. Bell)

Protagoras' view is that since virtue can be taught and learnt, whenever someone does something wrong or bad, the purpose of punishment should not be revenge, which is a foolish attempt to undo what has been done, but instead the goal should be to teach the wrongdoer so that they do not commit similar mistakes or crimes.

The *Protagoras* reveals, even more clearly than the *Apology*, that whether people assume the universality of moral knowledge or the teachability of virtue is central to their attitude in relation to punishment and anger in cases of moral disagreement. Protagoras points out that here there is an asymmetry between justice (or the virtues in general) and the crafts, since everyone is expected to have certain competence in moral issues, or at least pretend that they do. For this reason, while people get angry when another person lays claim to a competence which others do not think the claimant to possess, nobody gets angry with someone who claims knowledge or aptitude in matters of justice, as it would be ridiculous if they did not at least pretend to knowing.

> And so you won't think you've been deceived, consider this as further evidence for the universal belief that all humans have a share of justice and the rest of civic virtue. In the other arts, as you have said, if someone claims to be a good flute-player or whatever, but is not, people laugh at him or get angry with him, and his family comes round and remonstrates

11 For a detailed discussion of Protagoras' views on punishment see Allen (2000), 248ff.

> with him as if he were mad. But *when it comes to justice or any other social virtue, even if they know someone is unjust, if that person publicly confesses the truth about himself, they will call this truthfulness madness*, whereas in the previous case they would have called it a sense of decency. They will say that everyone ought to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that it is madness not to pretend to justice, since one must have some trace of it or not be human. (*Prt.* 323a7-c2, trans. S. Lombardo & K. Bell, my emphasis.)

People normally assume that everybody has some knowledge about moral issues, which is acquired as part of our socialization and upbringing, and they are confused when someone disavows that kind of knowledge. The assumption that moral knowledge is universal is, I think, also the reason why whenever people hear someone else making claims about the just, the noble, and the good that differ from their own, they tend to suspect that person is trying to deceive them or trick them. As a consequence, people respond to moral disagreement as if it were a kind of wrongdoing, with a desire to return some kind of harm against the person who makes claims that they take to be deceitful moral beliefs.

The acknowledgment of the teachability of virtue is, then, crucial for a transformation of the model of punishment from retaliatory to reformative. If virtue is teachable, then it follows that those who express erroneous views about moral issues, or those whose behavior is morally wrong, are not necessarily trying to deceive or take advantage of others; instead, it might be that they are simply ignorant about those issues. Once we realize that the reason for someone's moral errors is lack of teaching, and not deceptiveness or ill-will, then we become open to considering that the reform of the wrongdoer is a more adequate response than retaliation.

2.5 *Callicles' Irritation with Socrates' Clever Trick in* Gorgias

In the *Gorgias*, the conversation between Callicles and Socrates also suggests that the feeling of being tricked is an usual source for the kind of irritation and desire for revenge that makes conversations unproductive. Callicles grows frustrated with Socrates' claim that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it, and suspects that Socrates does not really mean what he says. Callicles' analysis of Socrates' strategy at *Grg.* 483a is that Socrates is not acting in good faith but he is, instead, using a "clever trick" (σοφὸν) and "wrongdoing in the discussions" (κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις). Socrates seems to be using equivocation to corner both Gorgias and Polus, with the purpose of making them say

things that conflict with what they really think. And because Callicles believes Socrates is acting in bad faith, he gets angry and intervenes in the conversation with the purpose of chastising him. His reaction is not unreasonable. If the other person seems to use tricks or make claims motivated by a desire to win the debate or to play, rather than to seek truth, then one might reasonably get irritated and aim at the rejection of the other's views at any cost.

In line with the distinction between retaliatory and restorative punishment that we find in *Apology* and *Protagoras*, also in the *Gorgias* (at 476dff.) Socrates argues against retaliation and in favor of a reform approach to anger. Socrates offers a redefinition of the notion of "suffering punishment", where punishment turns out to be good for the sufferer insofar as it is supposed to rid the wrongdoer from the bad character which is source of the bad action. Of course, this is the main reason for Callicles' incredulous reaction at 418bff. Socrates' view that suffering punishment when guilty is better than not suffering it is so opposed to the standard Athenian practices that Callicles questions whether Socrates is serious in his claims. But despite Callicles' suspicions, Socrates genuinely thinks that suffering punishment is beneficial for those who have committed a crime, and that it is in fact better than not suffering it. The reason is, also here, that he believes that when someone has done some wrong, the main goal of punishment is to repair the moral error of the wrong-doer and to make whatever changes are necessary so that the error does not occur again. Punishment benefits the person who does the wrong, since it has the effect of deterring future bad behavior.

Given the numerous examples in which anger goes wrong, we might be tempted to conclude that Plato is proposing to get rid of anger altogether. Anger can be provoked both by a perception of wrongdoing and by perceptions of moral ignorance or trickery, and it can have terrible consequences if not properly rechanneled. However, Plato does not think that we should get rid of anger. Instead, as I shall show in the next sections, he reserves room for positive contributions of anger and considers it an important emotion in our intellectual and moral development. Concretely, the kind of anger that aims at reparation is a promising tool for moral reform, and can be a source of both learning and of positively shaping people's character.

3 Socratic Cross-examinations, Anger, and Intellectual Development

Plato sometimes associates a tendency to feel anger in relation to disagreements about moral issues with the presence of the seeds of justice, and thus he

suggests one important reason to keep anger in our emotional repertoire. He thinks, however, that many of the episodes of anger are misdirected, and they tend to be obstacles against knowledge and virtue, instead of positive resources. In the context of Socratic cross-examinations, Plato seems to think that there is a bad way and a good way to experience this emotion. The bad way, with which we are familiar from many Socratic dialogues, is to blame others for our own inability to properly grasp things, to be irritated at them because they have tricked us and led us to confusion, or to resent them because they have been the cause of our ignorance being exposed. There are several moments in the dialogues where we see people growing frustrated and getting angry at Socrates; as a consequence of this anger, the conversations often are derailed and the participants adopt a defensive and improductive attitudes. The good way, is to be grateful to those who expose our ignorance and to see our reaction of anger as a symptom of our own confusion; in this case, the right response is to redirect that initial impulse to react against the other towards ourselves instead. This self-oriented anger is a good motivator for self-transformation and has the effect of encouraging us to learn.

We do not see Socrates successfully rechanneling the anger of his interlocutors very often, and Socratic conversations tend to offer examples of the bad effects of an anger that derails the conversation before Socrates can rechannel it. Socrates laments this fact in the *Apology*, where he remarks that those who suffer refutations in the hands of his followers "get angry" (ὀργίζονται) at him, instead of getting angry at themselves (*Ap.* 23c8). In *Republic* V and in the *Sophist*, however, we are presented with two good models of philosophical conversation, and we are shown that anger, in the hands of someone sufficently skilled, can be properly redirected and become a motivator for learning and self-reform.

First, in *Republic* V, Socrates suggests that the good philosopher knows how to handle cases where people get initially angry at those who show that the views they hold are problematic or inconsistent. In fact, the job of the philosopher is to redirect that initial anger and transform it into a positive force. Concretely, the philosopher should aim, through philosophical conversations and other methods, at turning the interlocutors towards their own ignorance and encouraging them to do something about it. In the hands of the philosopher, anger – even violent reactions like that of Thrasymachus – can turn out to be the beginning of learning.

At *Sophist* 230b-c we find a second example of the re-channelling of anger, when the Visitor suggests that, when done properly, those who are refuted are supposed to turn their irritation at themselves (and their own ignorance) and not at others. Realizing one's own ignorance and being irritated about it is essential to the process of learning that the Visitor proposes.

3.1 *The Calming Powers of Philosophy: How to Handle those Who Have Mere Opinion*

In *Republic* V Socrates provides a description of an ideal exchange between a philosopher cross-examiner and those who do not have knowledge, and he uses it to explain the potential calming powers of cross-examination. After distinguishing knowledge and mere opinion from each other, Socrates explains that people who hold mere opinion grow angry against those who claim the truth, since they mistakenly believe themselves to possess knowledge.

> What if the person who has opinion but not knowledge is angry (χαλεπαίνῃ) with us and disputes the truth of what we are saying? Is there some way to console him and persuade him gently, while hiding from him that he isn't in his right mind?
> There must be. (*Resp.* V.476d-e, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C Reeve)

Again, in conversations about moral matters, when people disagree and think that they have knowledge about the subjects of dispute, it is very possible that they become angry at each other. Socrates continues his explanation of how to best handle such conversations by considering how such a person might be rendered calm or gentle. The suggested method is to use, first, cross-examination to establish the distinction between knowledge and mere opinion and lead the interlocutor to acknowledge that distinction:

> Consider, then, what we'll say to him. Won't we question him like this? First, we'll tell him that nobody begrudges him any knowledge he may have and that we'd be delighted to discover that he knows something. Then we'll say: "Tell us, does the person who knows know something or nothing?" You answer for him.
> He knows something.
> Something that is or something that is not?
> Something that is, for how could something that is not be known? Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine it, what is completely is completely knowable and what is in no way is in every way unknowable?
> A most adequate one.
> Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be, won't it be intermediate between what purely is and what in no way is?
> Yes, it's intermediate.
> Then, as knowledge is set over what is, while ignorance is of necessity set over what is not, mustn't we find an intermediate between knowledge

> and ignorance to be set over what is intermediate between what is and what is not, if there is such a thing?
> Certainly.
> Do we say that opinion is something?
> Of course.
> A different power from knowledge or the same?
> A different one.
> Opinion, then, is set over one thing, and knowledge over another, according to the power of each. (*Resp.* V.476e-477b, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C Reeve)

Then, the next step is to show the interlocutor that she is not completely ignorant, but instead, that she is in an intermediate state between ignorance and knowledge. Although Socrates does not fully explain the purpose of leading one's interlocutor to that conclusion, the strategy seems to aim at moving the attention away from the refuter and turning it towards the ignorance. This has at least a humbling effect, and eliminates the initial irritation against the refuter, but it can also have the positive effect of making the person aware of the fact that, although they presently do not have knowledge, they can find a remedy by themselves.

The view that refutation (and punishment in general) can have a calming effect in some people is also suggested by Socrates's example at *Resp.* 440c-d, where he claims that whenever people think they have done something unjust, if they are noble and good, then they will not "be angry" (ὀργίζεσθαι, 440c2) at the one they think justly makes them suffer. It is only when someone thinks he is being wronged, that he "becomes angry" (χαλεπαίνει, 440c8) at the wrongdoer and fights for what he believes to be just.[12] As a consequence, whenever someone is refuted and comes to truly see that they were wrong, that person would welcome the refutation and not be angry at the refuter.

3.2 *Gentle Anger as Motivator to Learn and Be Better in the* Sophist

Plato's *Sophist* offers additional insights on the role of anger in learning and the corresponding pedagogical strategies. At *Soph.* 229e1ff. the Visitor distinguishes between two kinds of teaching, a rough one and a smooth one:

> VISITOR: One part of the kind of teaching that's done in words is a rough (τραχυτέρα) road, and the other part is smoother (λειότερον).
> THEAETETUS: What do you mean by these two parts?

12 See Blank (1993), 431, for a discussion of this passage with similar purposes.

> VISITOR: One of them is our forefathers' time-honored method of displaying anger (χαλεπαίνοντες) and sometimes gently encouraging (μαλθακωτέρως παραμυθούμενοι). They used to employ this method especially on their sons, and many still use it on them nowadays when they do something wrong. Admonition (νουθετητικήν) would be the right thing to call all of this.
> THEAETETUS: Yes.
> VISITOR: As for the other part, some people seem to have an argument to give to themselves that lack of learning is always involuntary, and that if someone thinks he's wise, he'll never be willing to learn anything about what he thinks he's clever at. These people think that though admonition is a lot of work, it doesn't do much good. (*Soph.* 229e-230a, trans. N.P. White)

The rough method involves scolding and nagging, which are annoying for everybody and usually not very effective. In contrast, the smooth method consists of reminding people that ignorance is involuntary and that we should be grateful when someone reveals our ignorance and take it as an opportunity to learn. The proposal is to reverse people's attitude about refutation and encourage them to be grateful towards those who reveal what they do not know.

The advantages of the smooth method of teaching are further explained a bit later in the dialogue, at *Soph.* 230b4-d, where the Visitor makes a defense of cross-examination and explains that one of its benefits is a reorientation of anger. The main point concerning anger is that when people are shown that they have inconsistent or contradictory beliefs, they "get angry at themselves and become calmer toward others" (230b9):

> They cross-examine someone when he thinks he's saying something though he's saying nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily scrutinize them. They collect his opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things and in the same respects. The people who are being examined see this, get angry at themselves, and become calmer toward others (οἱ δ' ὁρῶντες ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται). They lose their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has a more lasting effect on them. Doctors who work on the body think it can't benefit from any food that's offered to it until what's interfering with it from inside is removed. The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think the

> soul, too, won't get any advantage from any learning that's offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it, removes the opinions that interfere with learning, and exhibits it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things that it does know, and nothing more. (*Soph.* 230b-d, trans. N.P. White)

When cross-examinations go well, then, the refutation does not provoke retaliatory anger against the refuter, but instead, a gentler anger is felt towards oneself when the limits of one's knowledge are revealed by someone else and gratitude is felt towards the person who has led the refutation and shown how one's knowledge is insufficient or imperfect. In the final lines of our passage, the Visitor indicates that the adequate method to provoke this kind of gentle and positive anger towards oneself is shaming through refutation, as opposed to harsher admonitions.

Shame generates a self-directed anger and thus prepares us for learning by turning our attention towards our own imperfection, helping us remove false beliefs about our knowledge, and revealing our ignorance. Self-directed gentle anger is, then, the result of a successful process of refutation, in which the harsh reactive anger that people normally feel when they encounter someone who has different opinions about moral issues is rechanneled into a positive impulse towards self-betterment and learning. That impulse is the new reformative anger.

4 Anger's Role in Moral Progress

Beyond the sphere of learning and deliberating together, Plato has anger play also a positive role in our moral and political lives more generally. In the *Republic*, Plato establishes a complex interconnection between the spirited part of the soul, the emotional response of anger, and conceptions of justice and injustice.[13] On the one hand, anger is instrumental in keeping our appetites aligned with reason, and thus it promotes the internal harmony that is characteristic of virtue. On the other hand, anger is at the core of the virtue of courage and is crucial for making us engaged citizens.

For anger to perform these functions in our moral development and in our political interactions, the unproductive harsh retaliatory anger needs to also here be transformed into a gentler emotion oriented towards self-betterment

13 For a discussion of the connection between anger and the sense of justice in Plato's *Republic* see e.g. Renaut (2016), 139–40.

and social reform. Concretely, in the *Republic* and the *Statesman*, the transformation of anger involves mixing it with moderation and shame, or making it calmer through other means, so that it can be effective in a gentle way. In the *Republic*, Plato is careful not to exclude anger from the citizens' emotional repertoire and he directs much of the musical education towards shaping the citizens' disposition to anger. Here the purpose of education is to moderate anger, but not eliminate it, since good anger is recognized as the central motivator of the virtue of courage. Similarly, the final sections of the *Statesman*, where the transformation of wild retaliatory anger into good anger occurs by properly mixing it with shame and moderation, suggests a project of determing the proper place and right amount of anger in the citizens' soul. Here too, instead of eliminating anger, Plato indicates that once we balance anger with moderation, it becomes an effective force in our political interactions.

4.1 *Anger at Oneself and Shame in* Republic IV

The discussion of the spirited part of the soul in *Republic* IV is perhaps the most familiar text about Plato's views on the place of anger in our moral psychology. The central example in support of the independence of the θυμοειδές as a part of the soul is the example of Leontius, at 439eff., who becomes angry with himself, or rather with his eyes, which are motivated by desires to look at corpses. In this example, the spirited part reacts against the desiderative or appetitive part of the soul and tries to moderate it:

> Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some corpses lying at the executioner's feet. He had an appetite to look at them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face, but, finally, overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, "Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!"
>
> I've heard that story myself.
>
> It certainly proves that anger (τὴν ὀργὴν) sometimes makes war against the appetites, as one thing against another. Besides, don't we often notice in other cases that when appetite forces someone contrary to rational calculation, the person reproaches (λοιδοροῦντά) himself and gets angry (θυμούμενον) with that in him that's doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that are fighting a civil war, so to speak, spirit allies itself with reason?
>
> But I don't think you can say that you've ever seen spirit, either in yourself or anyone else, ally itself with an appetite to do what reason has

decided must not be done. (*Resp.* 439e-440b, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C Reeve)

This text is another testimony of the intimate relationship between shame and anger in Plato. Although the case of Leontius is often discussed mainly in terms of shame, in the passage there is a transition from an initial moment of shame's characteristic disgust and hiding one's face to a moment of admonition and self-directed anger. In this case, the anger is not directed towards one's ignorance, but instead it is focused on one's weakness in relation to one's appetites and has the role of siding with one's reason as to keep unruly appetites under control.

4.2 *Music, Tempered Anger, and Courage*

One of the ways in which the tempering of anger is effected in the *Republic* is through musical education. In *Republic* III, Socrates notes that those in whom the spirited part of the soul is strong or predominant need the tempering of music, as to become more moderate and gentle. Without this training, citizens will tend towards a kind of instability, becoming quickly angered and easily provoked (411c1). The θυμοειδές is the part of soul responsible for courage, but only when it is well-ordered and rid not only of fears but also of reactive impulses for revenge.

4.3 *The Philosopher's Art of Weaving: Tempering Anger with Calmness in the* **Statesman**

In the *Statesman,* Plato shows concern with the dangers of excessive anger in the citizenry if it is not appropriately tamed. The final sections of the dialogue suggest that anger is an indispensable emotion for good citizens, without which they become spineless and accommodated, or "cowardly and lethargic" (307c). Without anger, citizens become insensitive to injustice and excessively concerned with private matters. Anger is essential to make people passionate for justice and unafraid of making changes and intervening when society goes in the wrong direction.

However, just as in the *Republic*, anger needs to be tamed because otherwise it grows "excessive and manic" (307b) and has destructive effects. For this reason, Plato proposes the art of weaving, where anger is interweaved with moderation, as the main art in which the good politician is an expert (305eff.). The goal of the art of weaving is not to eliminate anger, or eliminate shame, but to weave them together in the souls of citizens so that a balance can be reached.

The *Statesman* offers evidence, then, that Plato thinks that it is important to preserve anger as a positive force that is needed for psychic balance and the

well-functioning of the community. Although untamed anger is dangerous, the kind of good anger that results from the mix with moderation or shame is crucial for social harmony and stability.

5 Conclusion: Plato's Transformation of Anger

I have shown that although Plato rejects retaliatory anger, he reserves a significant positive role for a transformed version of anger both in our intellectual development and in our moral formation. Retaliatory anger is typically grounded on an inflated assessment of our own knowledge, and on the assumption that wrongdoing and moral error are caused by bad intentions. If Socrates's claim that wrongdoing is the result of ignorance is right, then returning harm for harm will result futile. Moreover, if at least some of the knowledge that is relevant for virtue is teachable, then the education of the wrongdoer turns out to be the best strategy. In that framework, retaliatory anger is either useless or contraproductive, and for that reason Plato's goal is to rechannel it into a more self-aware and positive kind of anger that aims at learning and self-reform. The transformation of anger that Plato proposes includes, on the one hand, making anger less reactive and more self-oriented, and on the other, making anger gentler and more constructive.

As a result of this transformation, anger becomes crucial for self-betterment and for social transformation. Concretely, in the context of learning and knowledge, anger can take the role of keeping us alert against false beliefs and wrong assumptions, and particularly maintains us alert to our own ignorance, while it keeps us open-minded about the possibility of making progress through conversation. In addition, in the moral and political sphere, anger helps us tame our bad appetites and guards us against the greed and injustices committed by others, but it can do so while promoting respectively internal harmony and social harmony, instead of struggle, confrontation, and war. Once transformed, then, Plato considers anger to be crucial for learning, for properly dealing with ignorance in oneself and others, for having a well-regulated soul, and for being a good and engaged citizen.

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CHAPTER 16

Platonic Pity, or Why Compassion Is Not a Platonic Virtue

Rachana Kamtekar

Abstract

From Socrates' claim in the *Apology* that a good person cannot be harmed to Plato's characterizations of virtue as godlikeness in later dialogues like the *Theaetetus* and *Timaeus*, Platonic virtue seems to be an ideal of invulnerability. One might conclude that Plato would not count as virtues some of the qualities of character that we count as virtues, such as a compassionate disposition or disposition to pity, insofar as such qualities require their possessor to be vulnerable in ways that the gods are not, or insofar as Platonic justice excludes compassion. I argue that while compassion is indeed not a virtue for Plato, the reason is neither that pity is incompatible with godlikeness, for Plato's gods do pity human beings, nor that justice rules out compassion, for Platonic justice includes pity for the wrongdoer.

Keywords

pity – compassion – justice – gods

1 Introduction

In many traditions, compassion, the disposition to appropriate pity or sympathy for another person in a bad condition, is central to being a good person. Yet compassion is strikingly absent from the virtues recognized by ancient Greek philosophers. What explains this?

In 'The Virtues of Imperfection', Paul Woodruff (2015) identifies compassion as one of three virtues recognized in poetry as appropriate to creatures with our human limitations, virtues that 'no one assigns to the gods' (the others being reverence and good judgment),[1] and contrasts these with the Platonic

1 Woodruff (2015), 598.

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virtues of wisdom, courage, justice, soundness of mind (σωφροσύνη, often rendered 'moderation'), which are proper to the gods and which human beings must struggle to realize. Woodruff argues that one reason Plato does not recognize compassion as a virtue is that it requires the person who feels it to be vulnerable to the same sorts of ills as the person for whom she feels it, but the gods, who for Plato are our exemplars in virtue, are not vulnerable to the same misfortunes as humans. Painting with a broader brush, in *Pity Transformed*, David Konstan (2001) says that Aristotle's theorizing that the subject of pity must be vulnerable to the same misfortunes as the object of pity is supported by literature from Homer to the tragedians contemporary with Aristotle, and has the consequence that the gods, being invulnerable to the suffering of human beings and to pain, cannot feel the pain of pity.[2] Similarly, but without the emphasis on the gods, in 'Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion', Martha Nussbaum (1996) argues that because Socrates thinks a good person cannot be harmed, he 'opposes pity as a moral sentiment unworthy of the dignity of both pitier and recipient and … based on false beliefs about the value of external goods.'[3]

A secondary reason given for why Plato's virtuous person does not pity or have compassion has to do specifically with the relationship between justice and compassion: Woodruff argues that 'Platonic justice … trumps compassion',[4] and Konstan, that 'pity, in the classical conception … presupposed the innocence … of the accused party [in legal proceedings].'[5] Notice that on all these views, not only is compassion not a virtue, but pity is inconsistent with virtue, so the virtuous person does not pity.

In this paper I argue that while these commentators are right that compassion is not a virtue for Plato, the reason is neither that pity is incompatible with godlikeness, for Plato's gods do pity human beings (Section 2), nor that justice takes precedence over compassion, for Platonic justice entails pity for the wrongdoer: the just person, who knows what justice is, must also know what injustice is and how bad injustice and wrongdoing are for the unjust person (Section 3). If there are evils other than vice, such as death, illness or poverty, then it would seem that they should be the objects of appropriate pity, and I explore reasons for Plato's reticence on the topic (Section 4). The upshot of my account of Platonic pity is that the virtuous person does pity, even though

2 Konstan (2001), 107, 112.
3 Nussbaum (1996), 41.
4 Woodruff (2015), 604.
5 Konstan (2001), 43.

Plato does not recognize a dedicated virtue that is expressed in appropriate pitying.

2 Pity and Understanding, and Aristotle as a Source

Although my subject is Plato, it will be important to begin with Aristotle's account of pity (ἔλεος) in *Rhetoric* II, since this is historically the closest account we have to Plato, and since it has influenced the contemporary accounts of Platonic pity against which I'm arguing in this paper:

> ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται·
> Let pity be (i) a kind of pain at an apparent (or: manifest) evil, destructive or painful, (ii) which befalls one undeserving of it, and (iii) which one might expect oneself or some one of one's own to suffer, and this when it appears close by. (*Rh.* II.8, 1385b11-15, my translations, here and throughout)

I would like to comment on the three components of Aristotle's account. (i) Aristotle's definition does not require the person pitied to be aware of the evil that befalls her. And in fact we often pity those who are unaware of the badness of their condition. For example, at the start of Euripides' *Hecuba*, the audience knows from the opening speech by the ghost of Polydorus, the last of Hecuba's children and her only hope for rebuilding Troy, that he is already dead, and so the audience pities Hecuba even though she is ignorant of Polydorus' death. Further, when the person pitied is aware of the evil she is suffering, Aristotle does not require the pain of the pitying subject to be of the same kind. If you are angry upon being insulted and that makes me sad for you, then presumably my sadness could take the form of pity. Nevertheless, although the feeling of pity depends on the subject's judgment that the target is suffering some evil, one would expect convergence in the subject's and target's judgment about the badness of what the target is undergoing in most cases. On this understanding of pity as (i) pain at another's suffering some evil (in the subject's opinion) Aristotelian pity is an ancient Greek counterpart of what we call 'sympathy'.[6]

6 Contemporary philosophers and psychologists understand by sympathy, 'an other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need' (Batson (2011), 11 – although Batson himself calls this 'empathy'.) My terminology in this paper defers

Although we tend to think that sympathy motivates helping behavior, and Aristotle doesn't explicitly comment on pity's relation to helping behavior, the deliberative or forensic contexts for which Aristotle is writing in the *Rhetoric* suggest an expectation that pity could motivate an audience to be lenient or gentle towards the person pitied. But in other contexts it seems that pity might leave the one pitying feeling depressed and unmotivated to do anything, or else lead him to rejoice in how fortunate he is by contrast.

Aristotle's striking claim that pity is felt at (ii) *undeserved* misfortune is paralleled by his claim later that pity's opposite, indignation, is felt at undeserved good fortune, and is different from envy, which is felt at another's good fortune whether deserved or not (1386b10-29). He repeats the point about desert in the *Poetics*, to explain why the best tragic plot, which is supposed to arouse fear and pity, involves the passage of an intermediate character from good to bad fortune due to some fault, rather than to depravity or vice (1453a1-20): vice would make us feel the misfortune was deserved. Again, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle begins his account of voluntary action by restricting pity and understanding to involuntary actions, for which an agent would not deserve blame:

> …ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου…
> …in the case of voluntary [actions] praise and blame arise, but in the case of involuntary ones [due to compulsion or ignorance], understanding, and sometimes pity… (*Eth. Nic.* III.1 1109b31-32)

However, this restriction of pity to undeserved misfortune is qualified in Aristotle's claim that 'mixed actions', actions done under duress, are 'more like the voluntary' but are the appropriate object of understanding when

to the usage most common among contemporary philosophers and psychologists, who call the 'vicarious sharing of affect' 'empathy' (Nichols (2004), 32), and 'the feeling that arises in witnessing another's suffering and that motivates a subsequent desire to help' 'sympathy' or 'compassion' (Goetz et al. (2010)). Bloom's distinction between empathy, 'coming to experience the world as you think someone else does' (Bloom (2016), 16) and sympathy, 'your reaction to the feelings of others, not the mirroring of them' ((2016), 40), is pretty much the same except that sympathy on his account omits concern for the non-subjective welfare of another. The Good Samaritan's response to an unconscious person is an example of sympathy understood as an other-oriented emotion that does not involve 'catching and matching' the object of compassion's subjective state. Konstan (2006), 201–13 distinguishes pity from sympathy because he takes considerations of desert to be central to pity (see below), and suggests that closer to sympathy is φιλανθρωπία.

the circumstances 'overstrain human nature' (1110a22),[7] and is anyway belied by evidence of pity and understanding for wrongdoers in Plato and the tragedians.

For example, in Plato's *Republic*, Socrates describes how a person may be led to injustice by the incorrect practice of dialectic, and recommends care in how the rulers-to-be should be exposed to dialectic lest they be corrupted, remarking:

> Οὐκοῦν,ἔφην, εἰκὸς τὸ πάθος τῶν οὕτω λόγων ἁπτομένων καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, πολλῆς συγγνώμης ἄξιον; – Καὶ ἐλέου γ', ἔφη.- Οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι, εὐλαβουμένῳ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν λόγων ἁπτέον;
> Then, I said, isn't the experience which we just now spoke of [viz. of becoming lawless as a result of too-early exposure to definition-destroying dialectical arguments] likely for those who make contact with arguments in this way, also worthy of great understanding? – And pity too, he said. – Then, in order that there not be pity for your thirty year-olds, you should take great care how they are to make contact with arguments.' (*Resp.* 539a).

In this passage, both pity and understanding seem to be appropriately directed at those who have become lawless. Pity and understanding are paired in many other texts, but the two are not identical. Whereas pity needs only the judgment that its target is in a bad condition, understanding, often translated 'excuse' or 'pardon' or even 'forgiveness', seems to involve taking the perspective of its target, or seeing how one might end up acting badly like the target in the circumstances.

In another instance, from Euripides, Hippolytus' servant prays to Aphrodite on behalf of Hippolytus, who disdains to honour Aphrodite:

> χρὴ δὲ συγγνώμην ἔχειν. εἴ τίς σ' ὑφ' ἥβης σπλάγχνον ἔντονον φέρων μάταια βάζει, μὴ δόκει τούτου κλύειν·
> You should have understanding if, because of youth, someone having a hard heart speaks foolishly' (Eur. *Hipp.* 117)

And later, Artemis consoles Theseus after he has cursed his son to a death by torture:

7 Thanks to Terry Irwin for this point.

> δείν᾽ ἔπραξας, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως
> ἔτ᾽ ἔστι καί σοι τῶνδε συγγνώμης τυχεῖν·
> Κύπρις γὰρ ἤθελ᾽ ὥστε γίγνεσθαι τάδε, …
> You have done terrible things, but nevertheless/ it is still possible for you to obtain understanding / For Aphrodite wished this to come about in this way … (Eur. *Hipp.* 1325–27).

Again, in Sophocles' *Ajax*, Odysseus replies to Agamemnon's complaint about Ajax's abusing him,

> ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ συγγνώμην ἔχω
> κλυόντι φλαῦρα συμβαλεῖν ἔπη κακά.
> I have understanding for a man who, / hearing abuse, throws back evil words' (Soph. *Aj.* 1322–23).

These examples call into question the *Rhetoric*'s restriction of pity to undeserved suffering, but if we bear in mind its context, we can explain the disparity between the examples and Aristotle's report. The *Rhetoric* is a work concerned with giving an account of the means of persuasion (for fuller discussion, cf. Dow (2015)). According to Aristotle, these are arguments or speeches, the character of the speaker, and the feelings of the audience – the last since the audience's judgments (in the assembly, about a proposed plan of action and whether its advocate is a friend and benefactor or not; in the lawcourt, about someone's guilt or innocence, and about a guilty person's punishment) are liable to be affected by certain feelings (1355b25-26, 1356a21-25). In *Rhetoric* II, Aristotle undertakes to give an account of the feelings that an orator may arouse or quell in his audience (members of an assembly or jury), and of how he might do so given his goal of persuasion. Aristotle's goal of describing the means of persuasion explains the feelings he selects for discussion: anger and its species, as well as calmness, the opposite of anger; friendship or love and enmity; fear and confidence; shame and shamelessness; gratitude[8] and its opposite ingratitude; pity and indignation; envy and emulation. Given his goal, Aristotle needs to give an account of the typical or suitable conditions for the arousal or removal of these feelings, not an account of necessary and sufficient conditions to cover every case. So Aristotle's point would be that typically, pity and indignation are sensitive to judgments of (un)deservedness, but it does

8 For this translation of χάριν ἔχειν, see Konstan (2006) Chap. 7.

not follow that a judgment of undeservedness is a necessary condition for or component of pitying (ii) in every case. Since the orator wants to arouse the audience's emotions for instrumental purposes, the emotion-arousal ought to make minimal cognitive demands on the audience, and the thought 'although he deserves to suffer, his suffering is still bad' is far more demanding than 'he doesn't deserve this suffering'. This restriction to the typical and the suitable makes the *Rhetoric*'s treatment of the emotions a valuable resource for the judgments and feelings constitutive of Greek popular morality, but we should not assume that the *Rhetoric*'s account of any emotion constrains the exploration of the possibilities of the emotions that we find in ancient poetry and philosophy.

The mediating thought about desert in pity is presumably one reason that Aristotle denies (iii) that it is pity that we feel at apparent evils suffered by our close family and friends, for we are pained by their misfortunes whether these are deserved or not. Aristotle remarks that when it comes to those closest to us, we experience misfortune as terrible rather than pitiable, feeling fear rather than pity, as we would at the prospect of so suffering ourselves:

> ἐλεοῦσι δὲ τούς τε γνωρίμους, ἂν μὴ σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὦσιν οἰκειότητι, περὶ δὲ τούτους ὥσπερ περὶ αὑτοὺς μέλλοντας ἔχουσιν·
> [People] pity those they know, as long as they are not too close; but concerning the latter, they are as if they themselves are going to suffer. (*Rh.* II.8, 1386a18-19)

This closer and less mediated sharing of emotion is indicated by prefixing the emotion-term with συν- ('with').[9] In an earlier chapter of *Rhetoric* II Aristotle has described 'feeling-with' as characteristic of love or friendship:

> …ἀνάγκη φίλον εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς λυπηροῖς μὴ διά τι ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι᾽ἐκεῖνον·
> …he must be a friend who is a co-enjoyer of good things and is co-pained by painful things, on account of him, not something else (*Rh.* II.4, 1381a3-5).

Aristotle's remark echoes Plato's *Republic* description of how citizens in the ideal city will be like kin in that they all share in one person's pleasure or pain:

9 Noted also in Konstan (2006), 211–12. cf. Eur. *Herc.* 1202 (cited in Konstan (2001), 58): after Heracles' crazed assault on his own children which results in their death, Theseus says he has come to grieve/feel pain together with (συναλγῶν) Heracles.

Ἑνὸς δή, οἶμαι, πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὁτιοῦν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἡ τοιαύτη πόλις μάλιστά τε φήσει ἑαυτῆς εἶναι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ συνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ συλλυπήσετα.

I think that whenever any one of the citizens is affected by some good or evil, such a city most of all will say that the affected part is its own and will feel pleasure or pain together with it.'(*Resp.* 462d-e).

'Feeling-with' emotion terms prefaced with συν- seem to correspond to our contemporary 'empathy'.

It would seem that to be a virtue, compassion would have to be a developed disposition of pity rather than merely of 'feeling with', since pity involves the subject in having appearances or making judgments (He's undergoing misfortune! He doesn't deserve it!) that are sensitive to considerations of truth and appropriateness and so require more education and maturation than the atavistic "It's bad for me and mine!" of self-directed or 'feeling-with' emotions.

Finally, Aristotle says (iii) that the subject of pity or his close friends must be vulnerable to the same evils as the object of pity, so that the misfortune that occasions pity when someone else undergoes it would occasion fear for oneself (1386a27-28, 1382b26). He adds that neither those who are very secure in their good fortune, nor those who are so thoroughly ruined that they think they cannot suffer any further evil,[10] can be expected to feel pity (1385b20-24), suggesting that pity is parasitic on the thought, 'that could happen to me'. Although this is often taken to mean that the subject of pity himself must be vulnerable to the very same evils as the object of pity is suffering, Aristotle's claim (iii) is that the vulnerability needs to characterize the subject of pity *or someone who is his own* [*friend*]. So it seems that one could feel pity for someone suffering an evil that one couldn't suffer, personally, but that one's friend could. Without the 'or a friend' clause, one might think that Aristotle's vulnerability requirement is epistemic, running as follows: feeling pity for someone requires knowing what it's like (or thinking that one knows what it's like) to be in their condition, and that requires being such as to feel fear if one is oneself in that condition, so that not being such as to be in that condition renders one incapable of feeling fear if one is in it, and so incapable of feeling pity concerning it. But this is obviously too restrictive. The occasion for fear is not only danger to my body, but also danger to those I care about.

10 For example in Euripides' *Hecuba*, after Hecuba's discovery that Polydorus, the last of her children and only hope for Troy and herself has been killed by the guest-friend charged with his care, Polymnestor, she mercilessly blinds Polymnestor and then kills his two children in his presence (1030–55).

Still, perhaps I need to be afraid of *something* on my own account in order to be able to pity someone else. Since Aristotle does not simply distinguish feelings by whether we feel them for ourselves or the other, instead drawing another circle around our loved ones and finding our feelings for them to be very like our feelings for ourselves, his thought is probably that caring for anyone who is vulnerable (including oneself of course) makes us liable to fear for them (as for ourselves) and so capable of pitying others outside this very narrow circle.

So the 'or a friend' clause in component (iii) of Aristotle's definition allows for a virtuous person or god to feel pity: all that's required is that they love someone vulnerable. Of course, Aristotle's God does not love anyone, but then Aristotle's *Rhetoric* does not need to account for the pity of the gods, or of the exceptionally virtuous person, for neither makes up the mass audiences that the orator needs to persuade. So let's turn to the sorts of works that do explore the feelings of the gods.

3 The Compassion of the Gods

In *Pity Transformed*, David Konstan establishes that by contrast with the God of the Abrahamic religions,[11] pity is a relatively minor characteristic of the Greek gods. Nevertheless, as Konstan recognizes, Homer's gods do show pity. For example Zeus, observing Achilles' inconsolable grief at Patroclus' death, takes pity on him, and chides Athena for having abandoned her concern for Achilles, moving her to strengthen Achilles with nectar and ambrosia (*Il.* 19.340–49). When Achilles makes every attempt to desecrate Hector's body, Apollo pities Hector and covers his body with his golden aegis (24.19), and then, because most of the gods pity Hector, they have Argeiphontes steal away his body (23). Apollo's appeal to Hera, Poseidon and Athena, who have remained hardened against Hector (33–54), includes the charge that Achilles has lost pity (44). And of course a major theme of the *Iliad*, and of Book 24 in particular, is Achilles' change of heart from wrath to pity; what happens with the gods is parallel to that. In Book 24, the gods reflect on their treatment of Achilles and Hector and revise their attitudes, shifting from 'Achilles is ours, Hector but a mortal' to 'still, even though a mortal, Hector is loved by us'; in extending his pity out as far as his enemy Priam because like him, Priam has lost a loved

11 whose characteristics include *hesed*, delivering and protective action; and *rahamim*, parental love, deriving from *rahim*, womb, see Konstan (2001), 120 and 154–55 nn.37–39.

one to the war, Achilles is following the gods.[12] Again, all the gods save Poseidon are said to pity wandering Odysseus (*Od.* 1.19–20), and Athena sends sorrowing Penelope a dream that tells her Athena pities her grieving (4.828). At the sight of Odysseus drowning in a storm sent by Poseidon, the nereid Ino pities him (5.335) and throws him her veil to save him. In all these and many other cases, the gods pity mortals without being vulnerable to mortality or any of its evils themselves.

However, Konstan argues that while in Homer the gods are capable of pity – although they can't be counted on to show it – in classical literature, 'the gods are typically represented as being indifferent to human suffering and invulnerable to pity' (Konstan (2001), 110–11). Konstan's examples include the striking contrast in Sophocles' *Ajax* between Athena's and Odysseus' reactions to the plight of Ajax driven mad by humiliation – Odysseus pities Ajax while Athena enjoys laughing at him (*Aj.* 74–80, 118–32) – and Heracles' son's chant, as he carries his father's tortured body to the funeral pyre, his feeling-with (συγγνωμοσύνη) contrasting with the gods' lack of it (ἀγνωμοσύνη) (*Trach.* 1265–74). But this may be due less to a global change in the popular conception of the gods and of the attitudes they are capable of, than to Sophoclean tragedy's preoccupation with human beings' suffering undeservedly in a world devoid of justice. Although Konstan briefly mentions this consideration (2001, 109), he drops it in favour of the Aristotelian requirement that the subject who pities be vulnerable to the same sorts of misfortunes as the object pitied: the gods cannot show pity because they are invulnerable to the suffering of human beings, and because they cannot feel pain but pity is a kind of pain (2001, 112; cf. 'contemporary literature seems also to put in question the gods' capacity for pity, and thus lends support to Aristotle's theorizing', 2001, 107). On Konstan's interpretation, being vulnerable, and knowing that we are vulnerable, is necessary for pity, which requires the belief that we may suffer a misfortune like that now being experienced by the person we pity (2001, 130–31).

However, it seems to me that one can accept Konstan's impressive evidence that tragedy often contrasts human pity with the gods' unfeelingness without supposing that this is because the gods aren't *capable* of pity (or for that matter, pain). To apply to the gods the possibility described at the end of my discussion of pity in the *Rhetoric*, since some gods love some mortals who are vulnerable to death, injury, illness, and so on (as, for example, Aphrodite loved

12 On pity in the *Iliad*, I have learned from Kim (2000), McCurdy (1926), Macleod (1982), Oele (2010).

Anchises, father of Aeneas, and as Zeus loves his son Sarpedon), it would seem possible for them to fear for these mortals and for that reason also be able to experience pity. Further, if the evil suffered need not be apparent to the object of pity, the gods could pity mortals for the evils mortals undergo because the gods recognize the badness of these evils for the mortals. So my suggestion is that the gods are able to feel pity on the basis of the fear they feel for the loss, not of their life or their well-being, but of the life or well-being of those humans they particularly care for. On this view, the gods would not be entirely invulnerable. They would not have a first-order vulnerability to decay, disintegration, and death, but they would have a second-order vulnerability that is responsive to the first-order vulnerability of those they care for. There is a tension here: insofar as the gods can pity, or fear for their loved ones, they are liable to pain, which seems inconsistent with their blessedness. Aristotle and Epicurus resolve the tension by making their gods uncaring, but this resolution comes at a cost. I suggest that some poets and Plato resolve it in favour of allowing the gods some pain.

For example, when at the beginning of Euripides' *Trojan Women* Poseidon describes the ruin that is Troy, he not only describes a shared defeat (the city is smouldering, the shrines of the gods are abandoned; he too is vanquished) but also draws attention to Hecuba's misery and enumerates its causes. Since Poseidon has been a partisan of Troy it would seem natural to assume that he feels for Hecuba and the Trojans, and we would need a special reason to take him to be describing their plight without feeling. And when Athena appeals to him to cooperate with her for the sake of Troy, he asks whether she now has taken pity (οἶκτος) on the city (59–60). She hasn't, but his question indicates that it was possible that she had. We saw that in Euripides' *Hippolytus* Artemis says there is understanding for Theseus because he committed his dreadful deed in ignorance and because of Aphrodite's plans and Phaedra's deception; a few lines later she says there is pain or grief (λύπη) for her too, for the gods do not rejoice at the dying of the pious (1326–40).

Plato is explicit that the gods pity human beings: in the *Laws*, the Athenian describes our sensitivity to the orderly movement of choral dancing as a gift of the gods (654a) given to us because they pitied us.

> θεοὶ δὲ οἰκτίραντες τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπίπονον πεφυκὸς γένος, ἀναπαύλας τε αὐτοῖς τῶν πόνων ἐτάξαντο τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς…
> [Athenian:] The gods, pitying the labouring race of humans, arranged respites from their toils for them as days of festivals [and gave them music and dance so they might once again correct themselves] (*Leg.* 653d, cf. 665a ἐλεοῦντας)

The Athenian explains that the fact that we can take pleasure in the orderly movements of dance makes it possible for our feelings of pleasure and pain to be habituated to virtue, understood as the concord between reason and feeling. The back-story as to why the gods pity us is given in the *Timaeus:* the soul's embodiment at birth results in its being assaulted by the violent and irrational motions of appetition and perception, which bring with them pleasure and pain, and which need to be calmed and rationalized in order for the soul to become virtuous (41b-44c).

Do Plato's gods pity us because they love us or regard us as their own, or because (as I suggested on the Aristotelian account) because they love some humans, or regard some humans as their own, and fear for them? I do not think Plato's texts answer this question. In the *Laws*, when the Athenian argues against the impiety that the gods do not care for us, he characterizes the care of the gods as that of a competent craftsman who does not overlook the details that contribute to the excellence of his product (899d-905d), not as feeling inflected in any way. However, this doesn't mean that the gods cannot or do not pity us, but rather that the better answer to 'the gods are indifferent to human affairs, so why be moral?' is 'indifference to human affairs would show the gods to be incompetent, but such incompetence is inconsistent with divine nature.'

It may be objected to this talk of the gods' pity that divine passions are ruled out by the argument in *Republic* II (380c-381c) that change is inconsistent with god's goodness (because if it is a change for the worse, allowing it would be evidence of the god's weakness, and if it is a change for the better, the god was not perfectly good prior to the change). But that argument, I think, only pertains to change in form, for the gods do act, and we understand their actions as expressions of their virtuous characters – so acting (in character) does not count as change in the sense the *Republic* II argument shows to be inconsistent with their perfect goodness. So if the gods' passions too are expressions of their virtuous characters, their passions need not involve change in any sense inconsistent with their perfect goodness either.

But if the gods can pity, being godlike shouldn't involve the loss of pity. And indeed the philosopher who is out of the cave thinks of the prisoners still in the cave, counts himself happy, and pities them (*Resp.* 516c).[13] So why isn't compassion a virtue for Plato? Is it (as Woodruff argues) because justice trumps compassion or (as Konstan argues) because pity presupposes innocence?

13 Thanks to David Sedley for this reference.

4 Compassion and Justice

It may be thought that Platonic justice, according to which each does his or her own work, and each receives his or her due in accordance with law, competes with compassion, which might incline one to acts of mercy for offenders, but here I will argue that to the contrary, knowledge of justice and injustice brings with it compassion for the wrongdoer. Plato maintains, throughout the dialogues, that injustice and wrongdoing are involuntary, because they cause the agent to be in a bad condition contrary to her natural desire to be good, for which reason we should pity and have understanding for her.[14]

Aristotle disagrees.[15] On the basis of Aristotle's view that understanding and pity are appropriately directed at involuntary actions (Section 2), in *Before Forgiveness* (2010) David Konstan argues that an involuntary action cannot be a wrongdoing, and there is no question of forgiving an innocent (28–29, cf. Konstan (2001), 43). Konstan finds that in the ancient world, understanding and pity follow not acknowledgement of and repentance for a wrongdoing but rather, a transference of responsibility for the offending action to another party (μετάστασις), whether human or divine, which exonerates the agent in question (2010, 39–49). For example, in Herodotus, Adrastus accidentally kills the son of his guest-friend Croesus on a hunt, but Croesus pities (κατοικτίρει) him and says Adrastus is not responsible (οὐ … αἴτιος) for he did it unwillingly (ἀέκων ἐξεργάσαο); instead, the god who foretold the death of his son is responsible (*Histories* 1.35–45). According to Konstan συγγνώμη involves 'the sense that a harmful or inappropriate act that was performed involuntarily is excusable or understandable *and does not count as a case of wrongdoing for which the agent is responsible*' (2010, 29 my emphasis). He continues, commenting on the etymology of συγγνώμη ('know with'), 'Aristotle's point is that with truly involuntary acts, one can see the agent's point of view and not deem him or her culpable; that is why, in such cases, one does not assign blame, as one ordinarily would for a deliberate injustice' (2010, 30).

I agree that if forgiveness must be preceded by the wrongdoer's admission of and repentance for wrongdoing, then understanding (συγγνώμη) for the wrongdoer is not forgiveness. However, Plato extends understanding and pity to those at faults. Instead, he puts a wedge between punishing agents for intentional violation of the law where their actions are expressive of their bad character and in need of improvement (*Leg.* 860d-64a[16]), on the one hand, and

14 I defend this account of involuntariness in Kamtekar (2017), Chap. 3.

15 I outline Aristotle's arguments against Plato in Kamtekar (2019).

16 I have given a detailed treatment of this complicated passage in Plato in Kamtekar (2019).

blaming them for these actions, on the other. Instead of blaming them, one should pity them, for

> γιγνώσκειν χρὴ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ἄδικος οὐχ ἑκὼν ἄδικος· τῶν γὰρ μεγίστων κακῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν ἑκὼν κεκτῇτο ἄν ποτε, πολὺ δὲ ἥκιστα ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τιμιωτάτοις. ψυχὴ δ', ὡς εἴπομεν, ἀληθείᾳ γέ ἐστιν πᾶσιν τιμιώτατον· ... ἀλλὰ ἐλεεινὸς μὲν πάντως ὅ γε ἄδικος καὶ ὁ τὰ κακὰ ἔχων, ἐλεεῖν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἰάσιμα ἔχοντα ἐγχωρεῖ καὶ ἀνείργοντα τὸν θυμὸν πραΰνειν…
>
> One should know, first, that every unjust person is unjust not willingly, for no-one would ever willingly acquire the worst evils, least of all in those [parts] of himself that are most honourable, and the soul, as we said, is truly the most honourable of all… But the unjust person, and the one having evils, is completely pitiable, and it is permitted to pity the one who is curable and to be gentle, restraining one's anger… (*Leg.* 731c-d)

On Plato's view, it is possible to pity, or have understanding for, an agent even while recognizing their responsibility for an action. Or to put the point another way: blame does not automatically follow from an assessment of fault, and suspension of blame does not imply innocence. Rather, blame is a further, optional, attitude that an observer may take after having assessed fault. And it is a step that Plato thinks we should not take. In the *Republic* when Adeimantus asks Socrates to show that it is always better to be just than unjust, he adds,

> ὡς δή τοι εἴ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, πολλήν που συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀδίκοις
>
> [Adeimantus:] If anyone is able to say that the aforesaid things are false, and knows sufficiently that justice is best, he will have much understanding for and not be angry with the unjust. (*Resp.* 366c)

Plato rejects retributivism so thoroughly that in the *Laws* the Athenian objects to saying that just as virtue is its own reward, so vice is its own penalty:

> τὴν γὰρ λεγομένην δίκην τῆς κακουργίας τὴν μεγίστην οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λογίζεται, ἔστιν δ' ἡ μεγίστη τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὖσιν κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ... τοῦτο οὖν δὴ τὸ πάθος δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν – καλὸν γὰρ τό γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη – τιμωρία δέ.
>
> For no-one takes into account the so-called 'greatest penalty' for wrongdoing, and the greatest is the becoming like bad men ... [T]his experience is not a penalty – for the just and the penalty are fine – but retribution. (*Leg.* 728b)

Although the acquisition of a vicious character is the worst consequence of wrongdoing, we should not call it 'the greatest *penalty* for wrongdoing', for 'a penalty' must be something fine. Since the bad consequences of wrongdoing for one's character leave the person uncured; better to call these consequences 'retribution'.

In counting all injustice involuntary and the target of pity and understanding, Plato is not suspending justice: because according to Plato just punishment is reformative, it harmonizes pitying the wrongdoer as being in a bad condition, desiring to improve the wrongdoer's condition, and punishing the wrongdoer as a means to improving her.[17]

But, it may be objected, what about Socrates' refusal to invoke the jury's pity in his own defense (*Ap.* 34c-35d)? Doesn't that indicate that Plato saw some conflict between pity and justice? In fact, in the *Apology* Socrates gives two arguments for why he does not appeal to the jurors' pity, and neither supports this thought. First, Socrates argues that when men of reputation arouse the pity of the jury by bringing in their family etc., they indicate that they believe that the penalty they are trying to avoid is something terrible. But he does not believe that death is something terrible, and so, being a man of reputation, he should not behave as if he does.[18] He calls the invocation of pity to avoid death (and other such penalties) a disgrace (αἰσχρόν, *Ap.* 35a3) and pitiful dramatics (τὰ ἐλεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα, *Ap.* 35b7). Socrates does seem to adopt a stance of invulnerability here, for it would seem that vulnerability to death is a human being's greatest vulnerability, and Socrates has declared himself unafraid of it. But this doesn't show that he has a problem with pity, per se. It's just that on this occasion, the reason to appeal to the jurors' pity would be fear of death.

17 However, many of Plato's predecessors and contemporaries, like many of ours, treat pity and understanding as suspending justified punishment and blame. For example, many speakers in Plato's dialogues ask for understanding when they have gone astray in an argument, as if for a relaxation of standards or leniency. In the *Phaedo*, Echecrates, on hearing Phaedo's report about how distressed Socrates' companions were at Cebes' objections to Socrates' arguments for immortality, says to Phaedo: Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. "By the gods, Phaedo, I have understanding for you". (*Phd.* 88c, cf. *Tht.* 197a, *Soph.* 241c, *Euthyd.* 273e, 301d). And Plato records that a popular response to bad actions done under duress is understanding: ὃ δὲ δεινότατον, ὥς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὀμνύντι μόνῳ συγγνώμη παρὰ θεῶν ἐκβάντι τῶν ὅρκων. "The strangest, as at any rate the many say, is that there is understanding from the gods for the ones who break their sworn oaths [due to love]" (*Symp.* 183b). Finally, in the *Laws* the Athenian says that sometimes it's necessary to depart from the principle of distributing office on the basis of virtue, as is demanded by strict justice, because equity and understanding infringe upon strict justice (757e).

18 It's also in the context of removing the idea that death is a terrible thing from the stories the young guardians hear during their upbringing that the pitiful speeches and lamentations of heroes are to be deleted (*Resp.* 387a).

And he certainly has a problem with the fear of death, especially if it threatens to interfere with the course of justice.

Second, Socrates argues that in the pursuit of acquittal a defendant may teach and persuade, but should not supplicate, the jury, for the juror's office is to judge according to law (35c). This seems to indicate that supplication, an appeal to the jurors' pity, could distract them from what is relevant *to giving a just verdict on the question whether or not he is guilty* (of not believing in the city's gods and of corrupting its youth), and instead to think about the consequences of their verdict.[19]

Unfortunately Plato's account of justice, each part of the soul or city doing its own work (*Resp.* 428a-33b, 441c-42d) or the rule of one's soul by one's conception of the good (*Leg.* 863e-64a), doesn't say explicitly how the thought 'all wrongdoing is involuntary and to be pitied' belongs to justice. But it is not difficult to make out the connection between justice and this particular judgment: if we suppose that (1) the virtues all involve knowledge, which results in true judgments about goods and evils in a certain domain (e.g. courage, judgments about what is and is not terrible), and (2) knowledge of a virtue entails knowledge of its opposite vice, and (3) knowledge of a vice includes knowledge of its badness, then (4) the person who knows what justice is must know that injustice, the corresponding vice, is bad and therefore involuntary, and must pity the unjust person. Add to this (5) the (common) knowledge that our characters are shaped by our actions, and the just person must pity the wrongdoer.

I see no reason in principle to restrict this reasoning to the virtue of justice. Presumably in the same way that the just person knows the badness of injustice and wrongdoing, the courageous person knows the badness of cowardice and so pities the coward and acts of cowardice, and so on.[20] Perhaps Plato emphasizes pity for injustice because we are most motivated to blame in this case, especially when we or our loved ones are harmed, and so it's in response

19 Socrates makes this argument not when the jury is assessing his penalty but when they are deciding whether to convict or acquit him. He can consistently think that considerations that threaten to derail the course of justice during the conviction phase of a trial would be entirely appropriate during the sentencing phase – especially if during the sentencing phase we punish in order to correct the wrongdoer. And during the arguments for assessment of the penalty, he does bring up one consideration that would have undermined the justice of the verdict of his guilt or innocence: he has been a great benefactor to Athens (36b-d). Now that the issue is no longer of guilt or innocence but of appropriate punishment, his benefaction is relevant as evidence that he is not in need of a cure for vice.

20 Thanks to Suzanne Obdrzalek for raising this topic.

to injustice that the injunction to pity is most surprising and important to state.

5 Compassion for Misfortune

Plato's focus on pity for injustice reflects his ethical outlook, according to which vice is the greatest evil for the vicious person himself. He says remarkably little about pitying those who suffer from disease, poverty, the death of loved ones, and so on. Perhaps he thinks people are not to be pitied for such misfortunes because they are not evils at all, or because their badness for those who suffer from them is not independent of the sufferers' lack of virtue. On such a view, the non-virtuous person suffering from misfortune would be like a toddler terrified at the prospect of getting his hair cut. The virtuous person might pity such a toddler, not because a haircut is an evil, but because of the folly that makes a haircut seem so bad to him.

However, because I cannot establish a position on Plato's overall axiology in this paper, I will also explore positions he might take on pity for misfortune, on the assumption that he thinks that disease, poverty, the death of a loved one, etc., are indeed evils, albeit lesser evils than vice.

Plato says the most about pitying misfortune in the course of criticizing mimetic poetry in *Republic* x. Here, Socrates says that imitative poets are imitators of mere appearances of virtue (μιμητὰς εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς, 600e5): they lack knowledge or true belief about goodness and the virtues and only represent how these seem to an equally ignorant audience (602a-b, cf. 492b-93d). To make things worse, there is an irrational part of the soul that is vulnerable to appearances (602e-603a), and under its influence we follow appearances and ignore or reject reasoning in belief-formation and action. For example, while reasoning teaches that it is not appropriate to react to losses with extreme lamentation – the loss may not be worse overall; but even if it is, lamenting inhibits deliberation about the future (604b-c) – imitative poetry depicts agents lamenting as if the loss is so great that lamenting is the appropriate response, and when we are at the theatre we publicly praise and pity the lamenting agent without restraint and with pleasure (606a-c).[21] This attitude of enjoying pitying

21 Socrates doesn't say much about what this pleasure is, but in the case of tragedy it may be indulgence of the viewer's own painful empathetic feeling (πάθος) (cf. Gould (1990)), whereas in the case of comedy it would be pleasure in the suffering of the character, which the *Philebus* counts as 'malice' and 'injustice' (48b). Goetz et al. (2010) report that self-reports of compassion are correlated with greater activation of the dopaminergic

others suffering cannot be contained, and inevitably bleeds over into our attitude towards ourselves when we suffer: we take misfortunes hard, and we indulge our suffering ('hugging the hurt part', 604c), again finding some pleasure in doing so. Thus the institution of poetry supports the 'rule' of the irrational part of the soul and undermines that of the reasoning part.

Plato's position seems to be that when we do not have knowledge about good and bad as our guide, our response to tragic suffering on the stage is to give ourselves over to the sufferers; to follow, sympathize, and take them seriously (605d). This is a mistake because the tragic character is a poor judge of how bad his misfortune is, because the poet is a poor judge, because his audience are poor judges, but in pitying the hero, we temporarily take his judgment as our standard for how much lamentation and pity are appropriate.[22] Perhaps, if we possessed knowledge of good and bad to set a standard by which we could arrive at an independent and stable assessment of the badness of the hero's misfortune, we would pity him just the right amount for the misfortune, and also pity him for overreacting to it. But if we don't have that knowledge, then we lack sufficient resistance to the poet's outlook when we consume his poetry.[23]

It seems to me that Plato's claim about pity in imitative poetry also applies to pity in real life: although it is possible for me to pity a sufferer based on my independent judgment of his condition, in fact my own lack of knowledge of good and bad makes me susceptible to his judgment, and his judgment is likely to over-exaggerate the badness of his misfortune. I might be able to resist the judgment of the toddler who has skinned her knee and is howling, pitying her pain while knowing that it will all be fine in just a few minutes, but in many

parts of the brain; perhaps this is confirmation of Plato's point although it could be a correlation with the self-report rather than the compassion.

22 It may be objected that we only pretend to take up his standard, rather than actually taking it up, even temporarily, but since what is (actually or fictionally) taken up is a standard of feeling rather than action, and we may find ourselves weeping along with the lamenting hero, it's not clear how psychologically distinct the attitudes are, and we may be, unbeknownst to ourselves, training ourselves to respond to real-life losses with lamentation. In a relatively recent treatment of the issue, Harold (2005) uses a descendant of Plato's cognitive division of the soul, viz., of 'controlled' vs. 'automatic' psychological processes, to discuss some ill-effects of identifying with bad fictional characters on our automatic processes.

23 And the particular outlook provided by Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides indicates that misfortunes can ruin a good man, depriving him not only of wealth, family, or life, but also of virtue. Perhaps the truth, misrepresented by the poets, is that non-virtuous characters respond variably to good and bad fortune. So viewing the variable responses of our non-virtuous hero, the ignorant theatre-goer thinks, 'He was once so great; now he's completely reduced,' when the truth is that he was never so great.

cases the difference in knowledge between me and the one I pity will not be so great.

However, the consideration that without wisdom, pity is liable to go wrong, would not distinguish compassion for misfortune from other qualities of soul without wisdom: for example, courage requires wisdom, and without it is recklessness (*Men.* 88b). Yet, despite the fact of the quality being recklessness without wisdom, Plato counts courage as a virtue and explains that courage requires wisdom. So why should there be a virtue of courage but not a virtue of compassion for those suffering harm, informed by knowledge and expressed in appropriate pity?[24]

Might it be that compassion for suffering is too specialized to be a virtue of its own, and is included in other-regarding virtue in general? But Plato does not identify an other-regarding virtue as such. In the *Republic*, the virtue of justice is each part of the soul doing its own work (441d-e), the behavioural manifestations of which are refraining from such crimes as stealing from temples and dishonouring parents (442e-43a), and in the ideal city, obeying the law that instructs one to do one's own work in the city (e.g. if one is a philosopher, to rule, 520e). If this virtue is also expressed in caring that each has his or her own (433e), then perhaps the just person also pities the one who, as a result of misfortune, does not have her own.

Interestingly, in the ideal city the feelings of kinship or friendship that are supposed to obtain between citizens on the basis of their belief that they are benefited and harmed by the same things and share the same parents (412d, 414d-15d), which results in their being co-pleased and co-pained by the same things (462a-e), may make them (at least by Aristotle's lights) too close to one another for pity, for when evils afflict a co-citizen, other citizens feel as if they themselves are afflicted. But perhaps Plato does not draw Aristotle's distinction between pitying and being co-pained. In any case, it is striking that in the sharing in fellow-citizens' pleasure and pains, citizens of the ideal city increase their vulnerability to pains, not only their opportunities to be pleased.

I would like to conclude these speculations by considering whether Socrates' treatment of his companions in the *Phaedo* models compassion. Near the beginning of the *Phaedo*, Phaedo reports the surprising fact that he felt no pity for Socrates as he faced his execution, for Socrates seemed so happy and fearless, and seemed to have the blessing of the gods as he went to the underworld and so would likely fare well there (58d-59a); near the end, when Socrates drinks the hemlock, Phaedo says that it was for himself that he wept, for he

24 Thanks to Ursula Coope and Gail Fine for raising this question in a particularly forceful way.

was losing his friend (117c-d). Now Socrates might seem unfeeling because he remonstrates Phaedo and the others for weeping (117d-e). But earlier, when Socrates' companions are depressed upon hearing Cebes' objections to Socrates' arguments for the soul's immortality (Socrates argues that the soul is more like the immortal forms that it knows than like the mortal body which it inhabits, to which Cebes objects that this is consistent with the soul being longer-lived than the body, but nevertheless mortal), he strokes Phaedo's hair, remarking that although he will cut his hair after Socrates dies, as is the custom in mourning, they should both rather cut their hair now, if their argument dies (89a-c), for failure in arguments risks turning them into misologists, who no longer trust argument as a route to truth. They should, he concludes, give more thought to the truth than to Socrates (89d-91c). Phaedo remarks on how keenly Socrates perceived what they were experiencing as a result of Cebes' argument, how kindly he heard them, and how he cured them of their distress.[25] Socrates' gesture of stroking Phaedo's hair, while pointing out the difference in values expressed by cutting one's hair at the death of the body rather than the death of argument, both recognizes what his companions are suffering (the prospect of losing of Socrates) and gently reminds them of what the real evil they stand to suffer is (losing their hope of knowing the truth). Gesture and touch are ways in which we can communicate our recognition of suffering, and offer comfort, without endorsing the sufferer's judgment. Although Plato does not *say* that Socrates pities his companions, perhaps he models it.[26] Alternatively, his behavior may model, rather than compassion as the virtue of developed pity, some more familiar Platonic virtue, such as wisdom, or some less familiar quality, such as the love of people (φιλανθρωπία), which Socrates attributes to himself (*Euthyphro* 3d), but which Plato does not treat theoretically.

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25 I'm grateful to Emmanuelle Jouët-Pastré for this suggestion.

26 On the other hand, as Terry Irwin has impressed upon me, Phaedo says that what was admirable about Socrates was that he perceived their distress and responded kindly, by saying the right things to cure them – so it may be that pity was no part of his response. Yet it would seem appropriate for him to pity them if their loss of Socrates is genuinely bad for them.

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CHAPTER 17

Love and the City: *Eros* and *Philia* in Plato's *Laws*

Frisbee C.C. Sheffield

Abstract

This paper argues that the educational and social practices of Plato's *Laws* are deeply concerned with the citizens' affective relationship both to the ideals of the city and to other persons. Two kinds of love – *eros* (roughly, passionate love or desire) and *philia* (roughly, friendship) are central to this enterprise. We are familiar with the idea that virtue is not just a matter of doing the right thing, but doing it with the appropriate feelings and desires; so, too, for virtuous citizenship: what is required is both passionate devotion towards the ideals of the city (*eros*) and an orientation towards other persons (*philia*), in which citizens are recognized as equals and acknowledged as persons of worth and value, such that one is moved to treat them as deserving of goods and opportunity. Citizens learn this not, or not solely, through grasping principles of 'equality' and 'justice', but by communal experiences in which they take pleasure and which cultivate a certain kind of love.

Keywords

Plato's *Laws* – *eros* – *philia* – affective citizenship – Platonic love – political friendship

In Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, we learn of the sufferings of a man deprived of friends and a community: "Without friends or comrades, or city, a dead man among the living" (1018), the chorus wonder how such a human being can survive: "For my part", sing the chorus, "I pity him, how unhappy, how utterly alone, always he suffers the savagery of his illness with no one to care for him, with no friendly face near him. Bewildered and distraught at each need as it comes, god pity him, how has he kept a grip on life?" (169–77).[1] The young Neoptolemus, chosen to approach this diseased, estranged, individual to use him for the interests of the Greeks at Troy, and "ensnare [his] soul with words", learns to see rather more than this; he learns to appreciate a human being, one who should not be

1 Translations from Grene and Lattimore (1960), vol. 3.

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reduced to being of purely instrumental value to the protagonists, but as someone who requires their care. He has learnt this, in part, by "a kind of compassion, a terrible compassion" that comes upon him for the man (965–67). This encourages Neoptolemus to balance the needs of self-interest, with those of another, and with the larger community (in this case, the Greeks who need the bow of Philoctetes to sack Troy). This learning through affective responsiveness is fostered in the audience through the communal experience of shared emotional engagement.[2]

Though no friend to such democratic fora as fifth-century Athenian theatre, the value of shared emotional experience to the civic community was not lost on Plato. The role of affective components is central to the political programs of the *Republic* and the *Laws*; indeed, they are both, in different ways, affective communities. In the *Laws*, he explores a variety of ways in which pleasures, pains and desires can be cultivated in educational practices, symposia, and choral dance.[3] An ideal city is one in which "what is by nature private (τὰ φύσει ἴδια) somehow or other comes to be common (κοινά)", where everybody is at one in "what they approve and find fault with, getting enjoyment and pain from the same things" (*Leg.* v.739c8-d3; compare *Resp.* 463e-464a on pleasures and pains in common). This remains the model in the *Laws*, so much so that it is claimed that the inquiry into the laws (νόμων δὲ πέρι διασκοπουμένων ἀνθρώπων) is like an inquiry into the pleasures and pains of cities and individuals (ὀλίγου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις περί τε τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας ἔν τε πόλεσιν καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις ἤθεσιν, i.636d4-7). For these (pleasures, pains and desires) are "the strings from which every mortal creature dangles" (732e; cf. 788b) and legislation aims at a life "consistent with our nature" (733a).

The focus of this paper is not the cultivation of affect as such, but those desires and loves that concern the citizens' relationship both to the ideals of the

2 On which, see Nussbaum (2013), 258, who cites *Philoctetes* amongst other examples and writes that: "Tragic spectatorship cultivates emotional awareness of shared human possibilities, rooted in bodily vulnerability".

3 The *Laws* is itself presented as the "most beautiful" and the "truest tragedy" (817b3-5), which seems to refer not just to its representation of "the most beautiful and virtuous life", but also to participation of all citizens in the choral practices that cultivate shared emotional experience. This has been richly explored by Prauscello (2014); see esp. p. 75 on the "performative action" of Magnesian citizenship. On choral education as the medium to impart a correct physiology of pleasure and pain, i.e. virtue, see 656c5-6 καὶ τοὺς τῶν εὐνόμων παῖδας καὶ νέους ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς. As Prauscello argues (2014), 83: the vehicle through which the community is brought to express its shared identity in "songs, myths and discourses" (664a5-6 ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὅτι μάλιστα φθέγγοιτ' ἀεὶ διὰ βίου παντὸς ἔν τε ᾠδαῖς καὶ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις) is the persuasion enacted by continuous choral performances (ii.663e-664d).

city and to other persons. The educational and social practices of the *Laws* are deeply concerned with fostering bonds of connectedness and two kinds of love – *eros* (roughly, passionate love or desire) and *philia* (roughly, friendship) are central to this enterprise. Or so I shall argue in this paper. We are familiar with the idea that virtue is not just a matter of doing the right thing, but doing it with the appropriate feelings and desires; so, too, for virtuous citizenship: what is required is both passionate devotion towards the ideals of the city (*eros*) and an orientation towards other persons (*philia*), in which citizens are recognized as equals and acknowledged as persons of worth and value, such that one is moved to treat them as deserving of goods and opportunity. Citizens learn this not, or not solely, through grasping principles of 'equality' and 'justice', but by communal experiences in which they take pleasure and which cultivate a certain kind of love.[4] The civic deployment of *eros* and *philia* is possible, in part, because of how they are conceived; not primarily as emotions upon which one cannot exercise control and agency, but as phenomena that involve "affective appraisal" and as such are implicated in the perception of value.[5]

Section 1 rehabilitates *eros* for Plato's political agenda in the *Laws* and explains its value for the legislative program. Section 2 turns to *philia* and argues that, though Plato gave no separate, explicit, account of "political friendship", he does hold an account of "character-friendship" in the *Laws*, which provides new possibilities for the interpreter of civic friendship, beyond those given in the *Lysis* (employed by Vlastos), or those in the *Symposium* (employed by Price). Section 3 argues that some of the hallmarks of this friendship are operative in the civic community at large. Sections 4 explores the relationship between friendship and other legislative goals, such as freedom, equality, wisdom and community, and sharpens a sense of friendship as a political value. Section 5 argues that the account of *philia* that emerges from the *Laws* resists utilitarian and homogenizing readings of friendship (such as those supposedly grounded in the *Lysis* or the *Symposium*), which bolster objectionable views of Plato's politics.

4 Compare Gaita (1998), xxi, who argues that love makes the humanity of others "fully visible" and moral imperatives attend this visibility.

5 The phrase is taken from Jennifer Robinson (2005) and is designed, in part, to leave open the extent to which emotions have simple, or complex, cognitive content. A non-cognitive view of the emotions is a relatively modern idea that fails to do justice to ancient thinking on the emotions. See Nussbaum (2001) and Price (2009) for the view that emotions have evaluative and cognitive content.

1 *Eros* and Affective Commitment

Pericles set a defining tone for fifth century Athenian politics when he urged citizens to set their gaze on the power of Athens and become her lovers (ἐρασταί).

> ἀλλὰ (sc. χρὴ) μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς (Thuc. 2.43.1.6–8: "But you should do so rather by gazing day by day at the power of the city, becoming her lovers").[6]

According to some scholars, in Plato's great political work, the *Laws*, *eros* plays a "circumscribed" role. This is taken as evidence by Munn (2013), for example, that "Plato has almost turned his back on the fifth century".[7] A "vision of greatness borne of restraint, a vision articulated in Isocrates' *On the Peace*, began to supplant the vision of greatness borne of unrestrained ambition, a vision articulated in the funeral oration of Pericles and pursued most singularly in the life of Alcibiades. A shift in the rhetorical and artistic prominence of *eros* is the most potent sign of this transition".[8] This is taken to be a sign of an apparent shift in perspective from Plato's middle period dialogues, where *eros* is a recurrent feature.[9] Apart from Prauscello's (2014) study on the *Laws*, there has been little to correct this view.[10] And yet, not only does the symposium play a central role in Books I and II, an institution in which *eros* was central, but we are told on more than one occasion that the lawgiver should turn his attention to *eros.* "The key to education", the Athenian maintains, "is correct upbringing, which

6 For earlier political contexts in which *eros* plays a role, see also Aristophanes *Ach.* 141–44, *Eq.* 732–33, with Ludwig (2002) and Wohl (1999).

7 See Miller (2013), 11–31 and Munn (2013), 31–48. Compare Morgan (2013), 275–77 who claims that Magnesia "is emotionally disengaged … a city where passion has been disengaged".

8 Munn (2013), 40.

9 Compare Miller (2013), 11, who argues that in the *Laws* "Plato does not invoke almost any of the motifs and projects that in earlier dialogues we have been led to think of as defining the depths of philosophy"; *eros* is picked out as a candidate for such neglect.

10 Prauscello (2014), 13 argues that: "To the best of my knowledge, this specific aspect of the *Laws* (the use of erotic terminology to foster civic virtue) has passed unnoticed among scholars." She argues, p. 14, that Plato is reconnecting his politics to Periclean ideals by appropriating a democratic rhetoric of civic *eros*. Plato's strategy, she argues, is "to rehabilitate the *rhetoric* of the language of desire as the main springboard to civic excellence available to the 'ordinary' citizen of Magnesia" (55). Compare also Moore (2007) who sees some positive role for *eros* in the *Laws*.

will, more than anything else, lead the soul of the child at play to a passionate desire (ἔρως) for what will be needed to make him perfect in the practice of the activity at its best when he becomes a man" (I.643c8-d3; trans. Griffith: τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον ἄνδρ' αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς). Education is directed, from childhood, towards human goodness, "producing a desire and a passion to become a complete citizen" (I.643e; ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον). "Is it not clear", asks the Athenian, "that we should wish that the sort of *eros* which is *eros* of virtue and desires the young to be as good as possible should exist within our city?" (δῆλον ὅτι τὸν (sc. ἔρωτα) μὲν ἀρετῆς ὄντα καὶ τὸν νέον ἐπιθυμοῦντα ὡς ἄριστον γίγνεσθαι βουλοίμεθ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνεῖναι; VIII.837d5-8). Such passages indicate that becoming a "complete citizen" requires a certain kind of *eros,* which is deliberately and actively cultivated by the lawgiver; it is the orientation one should have towards the ideals of Magnesia, in much the same way that *eros* is the orientation towards the objects of knowledge in the *Phaedo, Republic, Symposium* and *Phaedrus*.[11]

Appreciating why that is requires clarifying the object towards which it is directed here, how it is cultivated, and a sense of its distinctive features. It is focused on the idea of becoming a perfect citizen (τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, I.643e4-5) or virtue itself (643d8-e3), and cultivated, as it is for the philosophers in the *Republic,* by an education in poetry, music and dance whose standard is beauty (668b9-669b4 with 815b); for the fundamental experience of *eros* is of beauty.[12] The relationship between *eros* and the *kalon* was axiomatic for the Greeks, and a repeated feature of Plato's accounts of *eros* (for the claim that what is most beautiful is most lovable, see *Resp.* 402d6: κάλλιστον ἐρασμιώτατον, and *Ti.* 87d7-8: κάλλιστον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον; cf. *Phdr.* 250e1 and *Symp.* 204b2-3). *Eros* involves an appraisal of its object as *kalon* or *agathon* in some respect, and the object in question is desired under that description (*Symp.* 201a8–10, b6–7, c4–5, 202d1–3, 203d4). This is important when appreciating how *eros* can be a resource capable of being employed by the legislator, and cultivated in the education of children. The beauty of the ideals of citizenship are manifest in vocal and dance performances, which are "representations of character" (II.655d), and are beautiful to the extent that they represent *kalon* characters and actions (659c).[13] Songs (ᾠδαί) and "enchantments (ἐπῳδαί) for

11 Compare the "divine *eros*" for wise and just practices (711d6). For the pursuit of knowledge in terms of *eros,* see *Phd.* 66e2-4, 67e5-68a2, 68a7-b6; *Symp.* 204b-c; *Resp.* 485b, 490b, 501d2; *Phdr.* 252c-253b.

12 For the claim that *eros* for beauty is the *telos* of musical education in the *Republic,* see 403c5-6: δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά.

13 On the mimetic beauty of music and songs in the *Laws*, see Schofield (2010a).

the soul" (659e), insofar as they are beautiful, attract and draw children towards a love of what they are to embody as adults. Everybody, grouped into choruses, "must be involved in singing enchantments to children's souls, telling them the fine/beautiful things we have just described" (664b).[14] Eulogies of the "perfect citizen" (VII.822e4-823a6) and "beautiful and laudable phrases to persuade" are also used by the legislator (II.660a5-6). The educational program is designed to make citizens see the *beauty* of ideal citizenship, not just its goodness, or its centrality to the good life; this is how it cultivates an orientation in the citizens that is, properly speaking, *erotikos;* for it is the attachment to beauty that clings fast to *eros* (e.g. *Symp.* 206e).[15]

The legislative program might have restricted itself to arguments for the claim that virtue is the highest good and bypassed beauty and *eros* altogether. The fact that it does not requires attention to the characteristic features of this desire. *Eros* is explored here as a distinct species of *philia*: ὅταν δὲ … γίγνηται σφοδρόν, ἔρωτα ἐπονομάζομεν (VIII.837a8-9). Though both *eros* and *philia* have a proper object in the *Laws*, the ideals of citizenship in the former case, and the good character of others in the latter case, as we shall see, this is not what marks the difference between the two in the first instance; rather, it is the characteristic intensity of *eros*-derived feelings over *philia*-inspired emotional attachments. This is a familiar thought from those dialogues that make it clear that *eros* directs attention to what is most significant to us.[16] In the *Symposium*, for a state of ἐπιθυμία to count as *eros* it must be a desire for good things and for happiness (205d2: πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν). This explains its characteristic intensity and enthusiasm. Someone with *eros* towards something does not just *desire* that thing; they hold the object in question to be something that, *above all else*, makes life worth living. This explains the respective objects of *eros* and *philia* in the *Laws*. For once it is understood that *eros* is a specific form of desire which involves not just an appraisal of its object as *kalon*, but a sense of the *supreme* value of its object, then the task for the legislator is to find a *kalon* object appropriate for that love. For these reasons, *eros* is

14 See also 671a and 812c-d on the use of "enchantments".

15 See also *Charm.* 167e where ἐπιθυμία has pleasure as its proper object, whilst *eros* is directed towards the *kalon*. Konstan (2014), 62 has argued that "the classical Greek notion of beauty is closely related to *eros*, that is, passionate desire. Indeed, I would say that the fundamental response that was excited by beauty in ancient Greece was understood to be precisely desire".

16 Ludwig (2002), 13: "Eros occurs in cases in which the desire, whether sexual or not, becomes obsessional and the subject of desire becomes willing to devote nearly all his or her life, time, or resources to achieving the goal. Eros tends to engage the whole self or to throw every other concern into the shade".

marginalized on the interpersonal level in favour of a more stable and settled state of *philia*, and its characteristic intensity and strength of focus is employed civically.[17] Directing – specifically – *eros* towards the ideals of the city supports the teachings of the lawgiver, who instructs all citizens about what is fine, good, and just, and the relationship between these values and happiness (IX.858d-859a with X.907c-d).[18] Indeed, in light of these teachings, it will not be enough to have just *any* desire for those ideals; that would not indicate that one values them in the proper way, as what is most beautiful and most lovable, which, above all else, make life worth living.

This distinctive mode of valuing involved in *eros* explains its accompanying dispositional features, as well as the ethical upshot of its cultivation. The intensity and enthusiasm of *eros*: ὅταν δὲ … γίγνηται σφοδρόν, ἔρωτα ἐπονομάζομεν (VIII.837a8-9) provides a strength of focus that marginalizes other desires and concerns, a familiar thought from the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*. Those who wish to transform a youth into a tyrant implant an *eros* in his soul, to act "as a leader" of his desires (*Resp.* 572b-576c). The single overriding aim (519c), what Scott (2007), 140 has termed "tunnel vision", emerges in the soul with *eros*, that specific form of desire which has devoted itself to an object as part of its perception that the objection in question is of supreme significance to its wellbeing.[19] As such, *eros* subordinates other desires under its rule; it manifests a degree of commitment to, and identification with, a set of desires and concerns and, as such, functions as a "leader" in the soul.[20] Indeed, as both the *Symposium* and the *Republic* make clear, once set upon psychic goods, such as wisdom, *eros* ensures that one will disdain the body and its pursuits (*Symp.* 210b5), thus promoting moderation and courage; for these are virtues that concern the agent's relationship to pleasure and pain – the body – which is of little

17 Any interpersonal *eros* is regulated in accordance with civic aims (VIII.837d5-8) such that there will be no conflict between private *eros* and civic *eros*. The Athenian is concerned to regulate <u>all</u> *eros*, and the proposals have one question in mind: "which of our proposals make some contribution to moral goodness" (836d). Moore (2007), 133.

18 See also the preface to the legal code at V.726a-734e. The laws claim that virtue is unconditionally good for its possessor, and that it is necessary and sufficient for happiness (660e-661e and 847d with Bobonich (1991), 383, n.70).

19 Cf. *Phaedrus*, where the lover: "forgets completely about mother, brothers and companions, and isn't concerned in the slightest if it loses its property through neglect. As for social norms, and seemly behavior, in which it used to take pride, now it despises them all" (*Phdr.* 252a).

20 The notion that *eros* involves identification with the object is gleaned from the *Symposium*, where the characteristic action of *eros* (reproduction in beauty) is a desire to capture the value of the beautiful object for the agent herself and thereby to achieve *eudaimonia*. See Sheffield (2017).

interest to someone who pursues wisdom as something that, *above all else*, makes life worth living. Such a person will have no investment in bodily pursuits that interfere with virtue, but engage in them, if at all, in a way that is consonant with the demands of their central goal.[21]

The importance of the fact that *eros* "tends to engage the whole self", in Ludwig's phrase (2002, n.18), can explain the appearance of *eros* in the historical reflections of Book III, concerned with the foundations of a well-balanced constitution. When designing laws, the legislator needs to focus not on goodness of one kind but on virtue *as a whole*:

> μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πρὸς πρώτην τὴν τῆς συμπάσης ἡγεμόνα ἀρετῆς, φρόνησις δ' εἴη τοῦτο καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἑπομένης (III.688b1-4)
>
> but especially and in the first place to what constitutes the guide to virtue in its entirety, that is, wisdom, intelligence and opinion, together with *eros* and desire that accompany them.

An education for virtue as a whole involves not only intelligence and opinion, but also *eros*, which is not just regulated but actively employed in the development of virtue, as the earlier passages from Book I indicated (643c8-d3; 643e4-5).[22] Its civic upshot is seen in the consequences for those cities that did not

21 See Scott (2000), 31 on the *Symposium*. Compare *Resp.* 485d6-8: "When someone's desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for others… When someone's desires flow towards learning and everything of that sort, he'd be concerned, I suppose, with the pleasures of the soul itself by itself, and he'd abandon those pleasures that come through the body, if, that is, he's a true *philosophos*", with Lane (2007), 50 who argues that this gives rise to "natural virtue". Cf. *Phd.* 83e where the genuine love of learning is moderate and brave. The *Charmides* is a good example: Socrates' desire for Charmides, though physically manifested in the first instance perhaps, falls under the command of reason in the sense that its expression towards the body is weakened in favour of an investigation of Charmides' soul.

22 Alternatively, Brisson (2012), 284 translates ἕπομαι as 'obey' so that the import is that the lawgiver must bear in mind "especially and pre-eminently the virtue that heads the list, judgment (*doxa*), and intelligence (*nous*), and wisdom (*phronesis*), such that sexual passion (*eros*) and appetite (*epithumia*) *are kept under control"* (italics mine). This is preferable for Brisson because he argues for the presence of tri-partition in the *Laws* and thinks that *eros* and appetite both belong in the appetitive part. Even leaving aside the difficulties of squaring the psychology of the *Laws* with that of the *Republic*, though, the role of *eros* in the *Laws* suggests a positive characterization in many passages; it is not reducible to appetite. As Prauscello (2014), 79ff. has argued, it is not clear that ἕπομαι means obey in this context, rather than something more positive like 'accompany'. Much here depends on the kind of *eros* one thinks is operative here. If (with Brisson) one is thinking of an

aviour" (688d). They experienced the greatest form of ignorance that can befall a state or a single individual, which is the disharmony (διαφωνία) between the perception of pain and pleasure and the opinion following reason (III.689a7-8 πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν), by which one does not love what is believed to be good but hates it and vice versa (689a5-8). That is why, the Athenian urges, we should not wish for everything to follow one's desires (687e6-7 ἕπεσθαι πάντα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ βουλήσει) "unless at the same time one prays that his desires should be in accordance with his own wisdom" (τὴν βούλησιν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φρονήσει). It is at this stage that the Athenian states that not only intelligence and opinion but also desire and *eros* must be enlisted into the service of civic virtue by the legislator. This recalls the Athenian's remarks about education in Book II, where we were told that: "if pleasure, friendship, pain and hatred arise in the proper way in the souls of those who cannot as yet grasp the reason for them, and if, when they do grasp the reason, their feelings are consonant with that reason because they have been correctly trained by the appropriate habits, then this consonance is in general called human goodness" (653 b-c; trans. Griffith). The educational program, above all, in musical and choral dance (654a), encourages children to "hate what they should hate, and love what they should love" (653b-c), such that their feelings are consonant with right reason, when they are able to grasp it (653b). And there is no better engine to power this enterprise than that *eros* which "engage[s] the whole self", *if* it is turned, as the Athenian urges, towards becoming "a complete citizen" (643e). This ensures that any potentially disruptive inclinations will be eclipsed by the intensity and enthusiasm that accompanies, specifically, *eros*.

The civic deployment of *eros* foregrounds a number of features of the legislative program. First, it is evidently not seen to be sufficient to ground political rule in reason and thus provide it with a universal (and in Book X, a theological) basis; citizens are to be bound to the ideals of the city by coming to love them, in a way that ensures their continued identification, sustained commitment, and psychic 'consonance' (συμφωνία), which supports the legislative aim of virtue as a whole (πᾶσαν sc. ἀρετήν, 688b1). The legislator engenders *eros* for the ideals of the city by encouraging citizens to see their *beauty* in stories, songs and dance taught to the young. This is one way in which the ideological agenda of Plato's political program is deployed, which has been richly

appetitive *eros* then one will opt for a stronger sense of ἕπομαι as obey, but if one considers the regular connection between *eros* and desire for beauty, there is no need to construe the passage this way.

documented by Schofield.[23] Second, the use of *eros* speaks to that concern to explore a legislative agenda which, though formative, is not coercive. This concern is central to the *Laws* (687c1-7).[24] Educating *eros* is part of developing the *motivation* to do willingly what is required by law. It moves the citizens to embody those ideals of which they are to be persuaded, ensuring that they are eager to achieve its aims. As Prauscello (2014), 14 has argued, Plato here echoes Pericles, who use of such language has been explored by Ludwig (2002), 332: "*eros* makes people willingly enter bonds that would otherwise look like slavery. In seeking to motivate a free, democratic citizen toward civic sacrifice and duty, Pericles here discovers a passion that is at once perfectly free and perfectly committed". Cultivating *eros* supports the aim of willing acceptance of the law.[25] Third, the political use to which *eros* is put fosters widespread commitment to Magnesian ideals, from emigrants who have come from various Greek cities (702b4-c9) and show some affinity to their practices (as reflected in the choice of interlocutors in this dialogue).[26] Due to the inclusive nature of both its grounds and object, *eros* can bind all in equal measure to ideals above individuals, family ties, or attachment to those other communities from which many have emigrated. In Magnesia, *eros* is not left to private individuals to manage, where such an intense emotion might pose a threat to social cohesion and political unity given that there would be other objects, above the ideals of

23 See Schofield (2006), Chap. 7, esp. 283, where he argues that the moral and religious rhetoric of the *Laws* fosters ideology which sustains devotion to the community. I am arguing that *eros* is the specific way in which that devotion is manifested.

24 There is "one desire commonly shared by all human beings" (πάντων ἀνθρώπων … κοινὸν ἐπιθύμημα ἕν τι): that events may happen according to the dictates of one's soul (κατὰ τὴν τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐπίταξιν, 687c1-7). Compare the discussion of seven titles (ἀξιώματα) to authority: "the most important claim [being the] (…) spontaneous and willing acceptance of the rule of law" (III.690b-c). Compare the criticisms of democracy, oligarchy and tyranny in Book VIII which is not, as Magnesia aims to be, government "of the willing, by the willing" (832c). Cohen (1993) and Bobonich (2002) emphasize how submission to law is voluntary. Compare Laks (2001), 111: "to strip the law of its intrinsic violence … is the most important aspect of the whole project [of the *Laws*]" and Brisson (2005), 118: who notes a concern "to mould the citizen's behaviour and morals in advance so that he conforms to the law automatically, as it were".

25 Prauscello (2014), 4, 96 argues that "the language of *eros* allows Plato to emphasize in the *Laws* the notion (and feeling) of citizenship as a mode of belonging by choice".

26 "The emigrants, you see, haven't the unity of a swarm of bees: they are not a single people from a single territory settling down to form a colony with mutual goodwill between themselves and those they have left behind" (IV.708b).

Magnesia, to which individuals would be devoted. Nor is civic *eros* based on the household (οἶκος), kinship, or *genos*, which would attach citizens to different objects, independent of the *polis*. Its civic focus ensures that there is nothing divisive about its cultivation and allows *eros* to play an inclusive role in fostering a political identity, at least as far as the citizen body is concerned.[27] The unity of the city is not grounded in a racial, or ethnic, identity, but a shared love of its ideals. As such, *eros* can help to neutralise the threat that dominates so much of Plato's political thinking: *stasis*.[28]

In this way the egalitarianism of civic *eros* bypasses recent concerns with putting affect on the political agenda. Critics of liberalism, such as Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Roger Scruton have bemoaned the absence of strong passions of belonging, loyalty, and allegiance, without which, it is argued, the state cannot inspire civic engagement.[29] A standard liberal concern is that such passions can be divisive, since they are often grounded in pre-political attachments, to family, kin, or tribes, which might give rise to ethnic nationalism and antagonistic tribal identities.[30] Platonic *eros* floats free of those concerns, given the distinctive nature of both its object and its grounds, widely accessible to all.[31] One might object that civic *eros* can be inclusive of all citizens, only because unsuitable participants have already been excluded from membership in the city. Ancient Greek citizen bodies were of the same ethnic stock, sharing the same language and the same religion, in which case, Plato's proposals will have no traction with concerns that arise from within a modern, liberal, pluralistic society. The sheer scale of the modern nation state bears no comparison to the Magnesian *polis*. This is home to a civic religion

27 There is a large population of slaves, which frees up the citizens to cultivate virtue; for discussion, see Leg. VI.777a-b.

28 On which see Schofield (2006), 282.

29 See Sandel (1982), 323; Taylor (1995); Scruton (1990), 65 who argues that "the public sphere cannot stand so serenely above the loyalties that feed it". Compare Geuss (2005), 11: "Liberalism has for a long time seemed to lack much inspirational potential". See also Nussbaum (2013), 4, 24.

30 On such issues, see Markell (2000), 38. For the Platonic philosopher's disdain for land and family connections, see *Tht.* 174d1-b6: "When he hears ten thousand plethora or still more than that being spoken of as an astonishing amount of land to own, it seems to him quite a tiny amount to speak of, used as he is, to gazing upon the whole earth. When people hymn family connections, counting someone as noble if he has seven generations of wealthy ancestors to boast of, it seems to the type we're describing to be what only thoroughly dim and short-sighted people would praise; he puts it down to a lack of education and an inability on their part to keep their gaze fixed always on the whole…". Compare *Symp.* 216e3-5.

31 Compare Prauscello (2014), 233 on the inclusive nature of *eros*.

and civic activities, through which collective experiences of great affective power take place, and which are shared between many people, many of whom will know each other personally. Such features have no analogue in the modern nation state.[32] Even if the cultivation of civic *eros* could, in principle, wield its unifying power in a society more pluralistic than Plato envisages here, the conditions under which it is fostered no longer seem to be a realistic possibility. No matter how patriotic one is, it is difficult to imagine an *erotikos* attachment to an entity on the scale of the modern nation state.[33]

2 *Philia*: In Search of a Model

Though all citizens in Magnesia are urged to cultivate *eros*, this is for the ideals of the state and not, primarily at least, for one another. Any interpersonal *eros* is regulated in accordance with those ideals (VIII.837d5-8). But Plato is also concerned with the interpersonal dimension of citizenship, shown by the importance of *philia* to the legislative program of the *Laws*. It is specified as one of three goals that should guide legislation (I.639b-e), and claimed that "the hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις) that underlies our laws aims at making the citizens as happy and as friendly to one another as possible" (ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ τῶν νόμων ὑπόθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἔβλεπεν, ὅπως ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατοι ἔσονται καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις φίλοι, V.743c5-6). As Schofield argues: "In none of Plato's contributions to political philosophy is the need for a lawgiver to devise the constitution with regard to friendship stressed more emphatically, or by more explicit insistence on the value of *philia*, than in the *Laws*".[34] This feature of Plato's political communities is sometimes neglected, however; the sense of *philia* is eclipsed by translations (such as Jowett's) that speak of being "harmonious" or "at unity with itself" in place of friendship, where *philia* appears in a civic context.[35] A deflationary construal of the term is suggested by dialogues in which *philia* appears

32 As Bobonich (2002), 432 argues: "The political structure of Magnesia makes possible an essentially political form of shared activity, that is sharing in the business of running the city, supporting its constitutions and furthering its political goals".

33 Thanks to Stephen Hailey for help in clarifying this paragraph.

34 Schofield (2013), 284. See also Prauscello (2014), 23 who highlights the "sustained ideological promotion of mutual concord (*homonoia*) and love/friendship (*philia*) between all its members". And El Murr (2014).

35 This problem is noted in Vlastos [1981](1999), n28. In his classic paper, "The Individual as an Object of Love" [1981](1999) Vlastos bemoaned the fact that more attention is not paid to political *philia* in Plato. See especially p. 144, n.28.

to be treated as roughly equivalent to *homonoia*, for example, in the *Clitophon* and the *Alcibiades*.[36] A further problem is that scholars do not agree about what sense *can* be given to political *philia* since Plato offers no distinct account of political *philia* and (it is often argued) failed to develop a positive account of *philia* of *any* kind to clarify the significance of this term in political contexts.[37] Compare the discussion of political *philia* in Aristotle, which seems grounded in the threefold classification of *philia* in Books VIII and IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[38]

There are significant ramifications to this impasse. Vlastos [1981](1999), 145 opts to use what he argues (now controversially after the appearance of Penner and Rowe's (2005) study) is the dominant sense of *philia* in Plato as emerges from the aporetic *Lysis* to explore political friendship – though in the *Republic*: "Since we are given no formal definition of *philia* and *philos* in the *Republic*", he writes, "let us try out what we heard from Socrates in the *Lysis*: 'You will be loved'. Socrates told Lysis there, 'if and only if you are useful'. Does this fit the *Republic*? It fits perfectly". Whatever claim we have to affection from others, Vlastos argues, is dependent upon our utility, in particular in this political context, our ability to produce some good for the state. An individual's own good is subsumed under that of the state, to which the individual is of some "use"; his own good is not a genuine end for the legislator.[39] *Philia* is "morally disquieting" insofar as it supports larger constraints on personal freedom. Plato, he argues, "could not have reached this result if he had thought of love as wishing another person's good for just that person's sake, looking upon the loved one's individual being as something precious in and of itself".[40]

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36 *Homonoia* is a defining characteristic of *philia* in the *Clitophon* (409c3-8) and *Alcibiades* 1 where *philia* is identified with *homonoia* (*Alc. 1* 126b8-c5, cf. *Pol.* 311b-c, *Resp.* 351d).

37 Vlastos [1981] (1999) is the classic statement of this problem; cf. Kahn (1996), 261. Though for a more positive, rather than merely aporetic, account of *philia* in the *Lysis*, see Penner and Rowe (2005).

38 See *Eth. Nic.* VIII.9.1-6 and compare *Eth. Eud.* 1242b22-23, where it is said that political friendship is according to advantage: ἡ δὲ πολιτική (sc. *philia*) ἐστι μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον. Cooper (1990), 230, however, argues that political friendship is a variant of "virtue-friendship", since it is "a general concern on the part of those living under the constitution of a city and participating in its civic life for the moral characters of all similarly engaged". See also Price (1989), 197, (1999), 542.

39 Though Vlastos [1981] (1999), 146 sees a tension with the supreme aim of the state being the moral improvement of its citizens, which comes to the fore in the *Laws*, his reconciliation of these ideas is that the good of each is promoted *insofar as it supports the larger good of the state*.

40 Vlastos [1981] (1999), 150.

Another approach to political friendship is taken by Price (1999) 527, again with reference to the *Republic*: where "the *Republic* is inexplicit....we find a supplementation of the kind we need within the *Symposium*". *Eros* involves "passing on one's life, mental or physical", in a way that elides the distinction between self and other, so that "each citizen takes a vicarious interest in the well-being of the others" (*id.* 531). *Eros* provides a model for civic relations in which "maximal mutual identification" is fostered, with citizens applying the term "mine" together (e.g. 463e3-5).[41] This, he argues, gives rise to a unity that invites fascism; "Plato's mistake is to model civic upon personal relations" (*id.* 534). Aristotle, by contrast, appreciates that unity must not be overplayed and here we find a personalized politics, which is communitarian without being totalitarian. As he rightly notes: "It can make all the difference how we conceive of friendship and its varieties". For Price, it is not until we have Aristotle's threefold classification of different kinds of *philia* that we can enter the political fray with more sophisticated tools to hand.

We need not wait for Aristotle, however; nor is the *Republic* the only text in which to explore this notion. In *Laws* VIII, Plato provides an account of *philia*, strikingly similar to that in the *Phaedrus,* in which, in the best case, the nature of the other is seen as "something precious in and of itself", in Vlastos' phrase, as something to be "revered and worshipped" in the language of the *Laws* (VIII.837a). This conception is promoted by the legislator (837d).[42] The most plausible strategy, then, is to explore this notion and determine whether any of its hallmarks can be seen in relations between citizens and, if so, whether this contributes to an understanding of political friendship (in the *Laws*, at least). To that I shall now turn.

Within a discussion of the regulation of desires (ἐπιθυμίαι), the Athenian states the following (VIII.836e5-837d8, trans. Griffith):

> ATHENIAN: A close look at the nature of friendship (φιλίας), desire (ἐπιθυμίας) and what we call passionate desire (ἐρώτων) is essential if we want to distinguish accurately between them. There are two separate species, plus a third category formed from those two – but one single

41 Aristotle also suggests this reading of the unity of the city at *Politics* 1262a40-b22, citing Aristophanes' speech in the *Symposium*.

42 For friendship in the *Phaedrus*, see Sheffield (2011), 258, n.12 where the similarity with the threefold classification of friendship in *Laws* VIII is noted, thanks to Zena Hitz. On the significance of the *Laws* VIII passage, see Bobonich (2002), 427–36, esp. 427, Moore (2007), 114–17, Prauscello (2014), 47, with detailed discussion by El Murr (2014), 13–16 who explores parallels between *Laws* VIII and the *Phaedrus*.

> name embracing all of them, which creates a lot of confusion and obscurity.
>
> CLEINIAS: In what way?
>
> ATHENIAN – Well, we use the term 'friend' (φίλον), I take it, to indicate a relationship, of a virtuous kind, between like and like, or of an equal with an equal. But we also say that what is in need is the friend of what is wealthy, despite being quite different in kind. In either case, when the feeling becomes very strong, we call it 'love' (ἔρωτα).
>
> CLEINIAS: Rightly so.
>
> ATHENIAN: Very well. Now the friendship (φιλία) between opposites, in our societies, is dangerous, violent, and rarely returned; whereas the friendship of those who are alike is gentle and *is* returned, all their life through. As for the friendship which is a mixture of the two – well, for a start, it is hard to know what exactly the person feeling this third kind of love (ἔρωτα) wants for himself; on top of which, he is torn between two conflicting impulses, and doesn't know what to do. One tells him the fruit is ripe, and he should pick it; the other tells him he shouldn't. The lover of the body (ὁ ἐρῶν) is hungry; as he eyes the ripe peach in front of him, he tells himself to eat his fill, without a thought for the moral character of the one he desires (τοῦ ἐρωμένου); whereas the one who regards love (ἐπιθυμίαν) of the body as incidental, more admiring than desiring, whose desire is spiritual, and its object spiritual – for him, when body gets its fill of body, this is excess. What he reveres, yes and worships, is what has self-control, what is brave and great-hearted, what is wise, and his aim would be to live, forever chaste, with the chaste object of his passion. The love (ἔρως) which is a mixture of the two is the one we have just described as a third type. With so many kinds of love, does the law need to say no to all of them, banning their existence among us? Isn't it obvious that the one which is love of goodness, which desires the young person to become as good as possible, is the one we would want in our city, and that we would ban the other two, if it were possible? (trans. Griffith, with modifications)

Three kinds of friendship can be identified here. The first is "a virtuous kind", between "like and like", those who are similar in respect of virtue (837a). It attends to the good character of the other (c2), treats this with reverence (c5) and tries to promote that good character (d4). It is characterized by equality (a4), reciprocity (b3), and stability (b3). The second is between those who want to be "filled up" by the other, enjoyed by "lovers of the body", who use the other as an instrument of their own pleasure, without showing consideration for the

other's character (c2). This is "violent and unrestrained" and "rarely reciprocated" (τὸ κοινόν, 837b2-3). The third is a combination of these two, though it is difficult to clarify what this type wants; the agent is conflicted, which suggests at least two opposing desires are in play. On the one hand, this character privileges "the desire of soul for soul" and respects self-control and intelligence; on the other, he is subject to occasional pulls of appetite, which urge him to enjoy the other's body as if it were a ripe fruit (c1). Love of soul for soul, where consideration for, and benefit of, the other's character is central, is the feature whose presence or absence seems responsible for the ranking of these kinds. The best kind of friendship, what I will call "character- friendship" ("friendship is the name we give to the love of those who are like each other in respect of virtue", 837a6-7) is explicitly contrasted with a concern for the other "for the purposes of filling up", that is, using another for one's own ends.

Many details recall the *Phaedrus*, where Plato also operates with a threefold account of friendship, with each type distinguished by a love that informs the friendship. The desire for pleasure, the desire for some kind of advantage, or honor, and the love of the goods of the soul, especially wisdom and virtue, create different conditions under which the goodwill characteristic of friendship is expressed, or inhibited.[43] Those who seek pleasure use others to serve their own ends ("for the purpose of filling up", *Phdr.* 241d1; *Leg.* 837c2) and the goodwill (*eunoia*) characteristic of friendship is stunted by desire for the subject's own gain (*Phdr.* 232c5-e2). Goodwill is shown insofar as the other provides pleasure; the other's good is not promoted if it is inconsistent with that (241c6-d1). Once sated, this person is "compelled to default", so the association is fleeting (232e6). And since this is a relationship of inequality, where one needs something from the other, this is a non-reciprocal relationship (cf. *Leg.* 837b-c). A second kind holds between those who love honor and whose relationship is based on an exchange of pledges (*Phdr.* 256c-d), which suggests some mutual advantage for both.[44] Such types are conflicted and their *philia* is not as great as it could be (256a6-d3).[45] Plato makes it plain here, too, that love based on

43 Whereas the *Laws* operates with a distinction between body and soul, the *Phaedrus'* analysis is in terms of three distinct desires which inform the friendship. These are compatible distinctions because the *Phaedrus* makes it plain that those who desire pleasure desire the body; those who desire honor are drawn to both body and soul; only the philosopher is interested in soul alone.

44 In the *Symposium*, the advantage for the beloved is education, whilst the lover receives honor from his edifying speeches (209b7-8 with 208c3).

45 Compare *Leg.* 837c: the third type of friendship is mixed because the agent is interested in soul (and self-control and intelligence) but also desires "to be filled" (c1). Neither honor,

pleasure, or advantage, is not the only kind of love; a third kind holds between those who are alike and both of a good, wisdom-loving character (*Phdr.* 252e3, 255b; cf. *Leg.* 837c2). In this case, the other is loved not for some pleasure, or advantage, for the one loving, but for something independent of him – a good nature (*Phdr.* 252e-253b; cf. *Leg.* 837a4-b3, c2), which is revered and worshipped (*Phdr.* 255a; *Leg.* 837c). This suggests a non-instrumental mode of valuing: the other is an end of care and concern.[46]

Taken together these passages from the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws* provide evidence that Plato does, in fact, provide a positive account of *philia*. Friendship is, at best, a relationship of equality, based on the mutual recognition of good character, characterized by reciprocal goodwill towards the other, actively trying to promote the good of the other, and an absence of φθόνος.[47] In both texts, such love is contrasted with those who use another to serve their own ends ("for the purpose of filling up", 241d1 with *Leg.* 837c6), so we have good reason to think that Vlastos' "utility love" is *denigrated* in favour of friendship between those of good character, who treat the other with *reverence*, and not, in the first instance at least, for some benefit or use for the one loving. This should be sufficient to reject the claim that Plato did not have a positive account of *philia*, and the claim that the account of "utility love" Vlastos extracts from the *Lysis* is the only general model of friendship Plato has, or that it is *the* relevant model

nor advantage is explicitly mentioned, but there is clearly something the other wants from the other which eclipses the all-important consideration – for the other's character (837c2).

46 I say 'suggests' because an objection to any stronger formulation at this point is that in the *Laws* passage above what the lover is said to revere and worship is τὸ σώφρον etc. where all these qualities appear in the neuter, when they could have been masculine. If they had been masculine, then it would have been clear that the lover loves the temperate, brave and wise *person*, but as it is, the object of his reverence is presented as impersonal, a list of abstract qualities. If all the passage states is that the object of the best kind of love is virtue, wherever it is found, then it would not follow from this that the person who is virtuous is an end of care and concern. That would remain to be shown, as I hope to do below. I thank Stephen Hailey for this objection.

47 Though all features are present in both texts (equality, reciprocity, consideration for character, no φθόνος; on the importance of this last feature, see *Leg.* V.730e), εὔνοια is more strongly present in the *Phaedrus*. The word occurs five times in the *Laws*, where it is used to characterize the friendly dialogue between the interlocutors (635b1, 642b5, c5, e5), the army's sentiments towards its leaders when freedom and friendship ruled (695d5) and it is linked to an attitude of worship towards ancestors (931a), which bears comparison to the reverential attitude of the character-friend (837c). See below for why this feature is not more prominent in the *Laws*.

for exploring *philia* in Plato's political works.[48] I want now to continue the task begun by Schofield (2013) and El Murr (2014) and explore the application of this friendship to the relationship between citizens in the *Laws* itself.[49]

Here we face an objection. Even if a positive account of *philia* can be identified in the *Phaedrus* and Book VIII of the *Laws*, it is a further question what relationship, if any, character-friendship has to *civic philia*. The *Laws* VIII passage is concerned to regulate desire in general terms, and sexual desire in particular, to which the Athenian returns (838bff). This might be taken to suggest that this account of *philia* is not the one that should guide the legislator in establishing relationships between citizens *in general*, but rather, a framework within which we should see and regulate erotic passions in particular. In this context the state will encourage "the love that aims to make a young man perfect", but there may be all sorts of other contexts (e.g. civic ones) in which *philia* arises that have nothing to do with *philia* in this sense. Here it is important to notice that the account of desire and love in the *Laws* is contextualized within an account of *philia*: *philia* is the overarching category within which different kinds of relationship can develop, a particularly intense species of which is *eros*.[50] If so, the account may have broad application to *philia* – relationships of various kinds. Though a relationship with a "young person" will be one example of character-friendship, it need not be the only kind. This helps with a second objection. In both the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*, the relationship holds with a young person whom one desires to become as good as possible (837d). Though the ideal relationship in both texts is characterized by an absence of asymmetry – they are treated as equals (837a), we are looking for a model for bonds between citizens of *all* ages; *philia* is spread throughout the civic community in the *Laws*. We will need a specification of the equality involved in friendship which can accommodate its range (on which, more below). But, given the absence of asymmetry in relations between lovers who are, in fact, not age-mates, there is, in fact, no reason why this model could not be

48 Price's use of *eros* in the *Symposium* to provide a model of maximal mutual identification is not, however, derailed by any observations made so far. For if a good nature is had in common with similar others, this might *support* Price's reading. See further below.

49 See Bobonich (2002), 428 who uses the Book VIII passage to some extent in his account of friendship in the *Laws,* with Prauscello (2014), 57. Schofield (2013) is more centrally concerned with friendship as a legislative ideal and how it structures the appropriate relations between the different *classes* of the city; El Murr (2014) has his focus on citizen relations in the *Republic*.

50 As Moore (2007), 115 and El Murr (2014) note. This need not be a difference from the *Phaedrus*. *Philia* might also be the overarching category there, especially since the focus is on what kind of friend the lover will be (e.g. after sexual passions have cooled).

extended to citizens of all ages for precisely that reason. At any rate, all we need to find is evidence of a concern with *philia*-relationships beyond the *Lysis* to expand the options available in the interpretation of civic friendship, for Plato. The usefulness of this enterprise can only be determined by clarifying whether any of the hallmarks of character-friendship can be identified in the political community of the *Laws*. To that I shall now turn.

3 Friendship between Citizens

Is there evidence that relations between citizens satisfy the condition of being "between like and like, or of equal with equal" (VIII.837a)? First, many material conditions support the equality of citizens: land is distributed into lots of equal productive capacity (737c, 745c), with each plot divided into two portions so at least one of these portions is roughly equidistant from the centre of the city.[51] There is a cap on wealth and poverty (744d, 745a, 744e), which eliminates extremes of wealth and poverty, as well as the contribution of all to the common meals, which as Bobonich argues, is "one important way in which economic inequality is muted in Magnesia".[52] Most significant, given the focus in the Book VIII passage on equality between those who are alike *with regard to virtue* (837a), their equality obtains with respect to the worth and value of each.[53] All citizens are subjected to the same formative educational program; both "in their education and in other things", men and women are in "equal partnership" (805d-e). Citizens are "as alike one another as possible" (816d; cf. 965a), where this means, not just that they enjoy the same pleasures, pains and desires (732e; 788b), which results in that shared *erotikos* orientation towards the ideals of the city and a measure of virtue as fostered in their education (643e3-5); it also means that in virtue of whatever measure of excellence such members of a virtuous community have, they each have something to contribute and so can engage in reciprocated, co-operative activities together. This likeness and equality does not eradicate differences between citizens in respect of

51 Samaras (2010), 174.

52 Bobonich (2002), 376. Compare the spatial arrangement of the city which fosters equality, and which has been explored by Betegh (forthcoming). Comparing the *Laws* with the *Republic* in this respect, Betegh argues that: "As soon as Plato gives up on the idea of strictly separated classes in the *Laws*, and stresses rather the overarching force of *philia*, he also moves to a spatial arrangement which fosters *philia*, rather than separation. This is why, as we shall see shortly, he puts the emphasis on the equal distribution of real estate".

53 On the importance of this characterisation of their likeness, see El Murr (2014).

virtue. In Books V and VI, the privileged notion of equality (ἰσότης) is proportional equality, which is distinguished from strict arithmetical equality (V.744c, VI.757a). This "truest and best" equality is achieved by "allocating more to what is greater and less to what is less, and by giving each of them a measure related to its nature" (VI.757c-d). Friendship exemplifies that proportional equality where citizens are recognized as equal partners in the sense that each has *something* of value to contribute and they co-operate together on that basis. This allows us to integrate models of friendship based on some superiority and hierarchy, such as those between parties, one of whom is superior in virtue (VIII.837d) and, as we shall see later, even that between ruler and ruled (III.697c).[54] So, this preserves a symmetry in the relationship, and the equality characteristic of *philia*.

For such relationships to flourish citizens must know about each other's characters. If citizens do not know each other, they cannot acknowledge each other's value, or manifest this proportionate equality; people will not be awarded the respect they deserve, the most deserving will not be appointed to office, and just shares will not be distributed correctly (V. 738e2-5).[55] There are many ways in which this familiarity is achieved. First, the whole population is relatively small, five thousand and forty households, which are sub-divided into twelves tribes, each of four hundred and twenty households (738a). Second, numerous festivals and meetings in the central area of the city encourage intimacy and familiarity. Citizens will recognize and greet each other at sacrifices in mutual friendship; they "may use the sacrifices as a way of strengthening their ties of friendship, kinship, and familiarity"; for "there is no greater good for a city than for them to be on terms of familiarity with one another" and to know each other's characters (V.738d6-e1 φιλοφρονῶνταί τε ἀλλήλους μετὰ θυσιῶν καὶ οἰκειῶνται καὶ γνωρίζωσιν, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι).[56] Festivals are important occasions for cultivating familiarity and friendship; the organization of ἑορταί aims both to please the gods

54 For the notion of proportional equality in the *Republic* compare the equality characteristic of democratic distribution (VIII.558C) with the proportionate principles of distribution which operate in the ideal city (IV.433e-434b), as noted by Sedley (2007), 271 n.24. For friendship as an instantiation of proportional equality see *Ti.* 32b with El Murr (2014).

55 This will result in social unrest if those more deserving experience resentment, and bad administration if worse people are elected to office. Compare Aristotle: "if the citizens of the good life are to judge and distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other's characters" *Pol.* 1326b15-16.

56 Compare 650b6-9, where the Athenian states that "this, that is, to know the nature and dispositions of soul, would rank as one of the most useful aids for that art *which is concerned to take care of these*. And we say that this is the art of statesmanship".

(θεῶν μὲν δὴ πρῶτον χάριτος ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν περὶ θεούς) and to foster familiarity and companionship (δεύτερον δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἰκειότητός τε πέρι καὶ γνωρίσεως ἀλλήλων, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν, καὶ ὁμιλίας ἕνεκα πάσης, VI.771d5-e1).[57] The symposium is described as "a gathering of friends who in time of peace share goodwill and friendship towards each other" (ὁμιλία ... φίλων δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ πρὸς φίλους κοινωνησόντων φιλοφροσύνης, 640b7-8), a description which mirrors the language used to describe relationships in the city: the greatest good is peace and goodwill among men (τό γε μὴν ἄριστον ... εἰρήνη δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἅμα καὶ φιλοφροσύνη, 628c10-11).[58] The legislator is urged to protect and "promote an increase in friendship" in these gatherings (I.640d). Such arrangements enable us to appreciate *how* friendship which acknowledges the equal value of others can be the model for civic friendship. Citizens may not know each other with the same degree of intimacy as the character-friends of Book VIII, but insofar as these gatherings are designed not only to increase familiarity, but to enable recognition of each other specifically *as members of a virtuous community*, whose good characters are expressed in shared practices, they will generate the desired awareness of each. Such proposals mitigate the concern raised by Aristotle that friendship in the proper sense requires an intimacy (συνήθεια) which cannot be cultivated so widely (*Eth. Nic.* VIII.1156b24-9).

Citizens socialize together in a way that fosters not just recognition of each's good character, but co-operative activity to support and promote it. They provide support and assistance to one another in times of need, for example, by defending those who are wronged, 'as they would a brother, a father, or a still older progenitor' (IX.880b1-6), in other words, as *philoi* are inclined to do. They are urged to become implicated in the punishment of wrongdoers (V.730d), which can be an expression of friendship if giving someone a well-deserved reprimand stems from the benevolent wish to improve the other's character.[59] This support for each other's endeavours extends to cooperative participation in a wide range of religious festivals and athletic contests. An agonistic spirit is curtailed by the injunction not to guard virtue jealously (without φθόνος); each is urged to share out virtue, "because of friendship" (730e6 διὰ φιλίας), and to compete in goodness with *generosity* (731a).[60] The encouragement to

57 See Prauscello (2014), 131 with n.76.
58 On civic φιλοφροσύνη see also V.740e4.
59 I thank Myrthe Bartels for this point.
60 The "jealous man (φθονοῦντα)" who does not want to share his virtue with others (καὶ ἄλλοις μεταδιδόναι) is blamed (ψέγειν), while his virtuous counterpart is praised (ἔπαινον) (V.730e-731a). "We want everyone to compete in the struggle for virtue in a generous spirit, because this is the way a man will be a credit to his state – by competing on his own account but refraining from fouling the chances of others by slander. The jealous man, who

be "passionate, yet as gentle as may be" (V.731b) recalls the "gentleness" of character-friendship in Book VIII (837b). Further, participating in choral practices is a way in which citizens learn a receptivity and responsiveness towards their peers and appreciate how their own success is related to, and dependent upon, the success of others. One's own performance requires others to play their role well, and performing one's own part excellently supports the flourishing of others; one does not shine at the expense of others in a chorus. A sense of reciprocity and interdependence is nurtured in the collective experience of singing and dancing together, as Prauscello (2014), 102 has shown. To adapt a phrase from Laks (1988), 220, choral practices embody the "kinetics of *philia*".[61] This interdependence and reciprocity is also fostered in the support of each for the common meals for men and women (συσσιτία), where private wealth is employed for public benefit.[62] This promotes friendship between the participants by enabling each to see themselves as part of a larger community which supports them and which they, in turn, support.

Given this focus on common pursuits and activities, one might suppose that camaraderie, or solidarity, captures the sense of civic *philia*.[63] Though active

thinks he has to get the better of others by being rude about them, makes less effort himself to attain true virtue and discourages his competitors by unfair criticism. In this way he hinders the whole state's struggle to achieve virtue and diminishes its reputation, in so far as it depends on him" (V.731a-b). The passage, along with 829c, 831a, 834c, may seem to suggest a striving for victory (φιλονικείτω), together with θυμός, which goes hand in hand with φιλοτιμία in 744e3: ὅστις φιλότιμος ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῃ. One might read these passages as urging a redirection of personal striving in order to make it useful for the community. My reading, however, suggests a kind of benevolence (not just an 'absence of envy') which emphasizes the verbs μεταδιδόναι and κοινωνεῖν and the insistence of διὰ φιλίας, which leads me to construe this as something like a "generosity". This suggests that generosity is an effect of *philia* (διὰ φιλίας).

61 Laks talks here of the "kinetics of virtue". See also Prauscello (2014), 137 "rhythmic bodily agreement creates affective bonds and hence a shared perception of life".

62 On which see Samaras (2010), 83 and Bobonich (2002), 376. For the role of συσσιτία in promoting civic friendship, see Ar. *Pol.* 1313a39.

63 As Konstan (1997), 9 argues: "the form *philia* does in fact cover relationships far wider than friendship, including the love between kin and the affection or solidarity between relatively distant associates such as members of the same fraternity or city". Aristotle states that soldiers and sailors address each other as *philoi*, *Eth. Nic.* VIII.1159b27-9. Such a sense might be bolstered by the negligible role played by εὔνοια, which was central to the *Phaedrus'* account of friendship (εὔνοια is opposed to φθόνος at 635b1 to characterise the desired tone of the interlocutors' conversation and occurs as a feature of civic friendship at 695d5). This may be because the *Laws* is concerned with community building, which requires focusing on aspects of *philia* that promote that *practical* end. Wishing well to each other, whilst important, falls short of those features of *philia* that are central to community building (compare Aristotle on εὔνοια as 'idle friendship', *Eth. Nic.* IX.5

engagement in the co-operative activities that help to constitute friendship doubtless shows that *philia* is not reducible to a *pathos,* i.e. something that one undergoes or suffers, this must not eclipse the bonds of affection forged through such activities, nor the affective responses which will be their continued accompaniments.[64] These help to support that legislative focus on virtue as a whole (III.688b1-4) by encouraging that συμφωνία between the perception of pain and pleasure and opinion following reason (III.689a7-8 πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν). Furthermore, this community of friends exemplifies many of the hallmarks of the best kind of friendship, which is a further indication that civic 'solidarity' does not exhaust the sense of friendship here. The familiarity nurtured in various social practices fosters: (i) the recognition of each other as equals (in a specific sense of that term, for difference, as well as likeness, in the degree of virtue attained is apparent in competitions), (ii) awareness of each other's *good* characters as these are manifested in their communal activities, (iii) which citizens actively support and promote in those common pursuits, (iv) with gentleness and generosity (without φθόνος). So, when the Athenian claims in Book V (743c) that "our people should be as happy as possible, and as far as possible friends with each other" he is urging them to adopt an orientation towards their fellows that carries many of the hallmarks of friendship of the best kind. The claim is not that civic friendship is identical to that private or intimate character-friendship described in Book VIII; rather, the presence of many features of character-friendship, as opposed those of the other two kinds discussed in this work, suggests that this is the ideal model towards which civic relations will aspire. At least within the framework given in Book VIII (which, admittedly, may not be the only one), this is the *only* model of the kinds given in this text whose values support that towards which the legislator looks in this exercise of community building: virtue (688b1-4; cf. 630c1-4, 963a1). This is presumably why there are striking parallels in language and tone between the Book VIII passage and the social practices of the civic community.

This raises a concern, however. For it would seem that friendship demands too much of the citizens. It requires not only a degree of intimacy that might be thought unsustainable in a political community (though the limited scale

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1166b32-1167a12). The practical dimension of *philia* among citizens is manifested in their reciprocal relationships and their sharing in common activities and pursuits.

64 As LSJ has it: a *pathos* is 'that which happens to a person or thing' (Liddell and Scott: 1940) with Price (2009), 122, who opts for 'affection', rather than 'emotion' to capture the sense in which Greek views of emotion give a central role to cognitions in a broad sense.

of the city and the social practices of the *Laws* are designed to encourage this); it *also* requires a sense of the value of those qualities central to the good character of each. In some dialogues, this is the mark of the privileged few. This sense of value need not involve a fully rational understanding, though; such is ruled out by II.653b where friendship, along with pleasures and pains, arise "in the souls of those who cannot as yet grasp the reason for them". Citizens have acquired the values required for the desired treatment of others not, or not solely, through learning abstract principles of 'beauty', 'equality', and 'justice', but by a training in their affective responses (653b-c; 689a) – pleasures, pains and desires, through songs (ᾠδαι) and "enchantments (ἐπῳδαί) for the soul" (659e). This delivers that *erotikos* orientation towards the ideals of the state which enables them to appreciate the value of those qualities (such as self-control, courage, and wisdom: 837c) exhibited in the good characters of others, as well as providing the basis for their common activities.[65] This training supports the teachings of the legislator about what is fine, good, and just, and the relationship between these values and happiness (858d-859a Bobonich (1991), 383). As Bobonich (2002) has argued, all citizens seem capable, to some extent, and by whatever means, of appreciating genuine value in the *Laws*: "People in general (*hoi polloi*) don't fall so far short of real goodness that they can't judge (*krinein*) virtue and vice when they see it in others" (XII.950b).[66] This ability has been fostered in early education and is reinforced during the educational program.[67] Furthermore, constitutional features, such as preludes to the laws, "support this enterprise" (see, e.g. 720c3-5 with 857d-e, 858d-859a).[68] Not only do all citizens have the opportunity to develop a sense of the value of virtue, but the communal experiences in which they take pleasure encourage that sense to be acknowledged and expressed, along with other hallmarks of

65 One might be more precise here and see this as operating through θυμός and the love of victory (for example, in the passages quoted above, n.60). This is to say that the θυμός is trained affectively, which at least Aristotle supposes is the "place" where *philia* is felt (when you are betrayed), as Ar. *Pol.* VII.7, 1327b39-1328a16. ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν·αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ᾗ φιλοῦμεν

66 Compare (768a-c) on the role of the many in the courts of justice.

67 This includes arithmetic, 'everything to do with number', measurement, and astronomy (817e-820d). The population *in general* must have a grasp of the necessary elements of these subjects, though a few will study them in detail (818a).

68 See Bobonich (1991), 379, though there is some debate about precisely *how* this is achieved. On which, see Annas (2010), 84 who has argued that it is not always rational persuasion that is employed, but rhetorical devices and stories, which embody 'ideals of living' to be achieved in following the laws, so that the agent in question is rightly disposed towards those laws.

friendship, in their shared activities. The fact that *philia* demands so much of the citizens explains why its cultivation in the citizen body must be worked out in such detail in the constitutional provisions of the legislator.[69]

4 Friendship as a Political Value

Friendship is intertwined with other legislative goals, such as freedom and wisdom, which sharpens a sense of its *political* value.

> A city should be free and wise and a friend to itself and the lawgiver should give his laws with a view to these things (ὅτι πόλιν ἐλευθέραν τε εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἔμφρονα καὶ ἑαυτῇ φίλην, καὶ τὸν νομοθετοῦντα πρὸς ταῦτα βλέποντα δεῖ νομοθετεῖν). (*Leg.* III.693b2-5)[70]

Since the city is a "friend to itself", it might seem that we have a new model here, that of self-love. This does little to derail the importance of the salient features employed thus far, however, though we are concerned in the case of the city, with relations between its component parts. For the grounds of self-love do not differ from the grounds of *philia* between citizens. In his great prelude to the laws, the Athenian reworks the notion of self-love as follows:

> The truth of the matter is that for anyone, in any given situation, excessive love of self is the cause of all his faults… What the would-be great man should be in love with is not himself or his own possessions, but what is just, whether this in fact manifests itself in his own actions, or in somebody else's (*Leg.* V.731d6-732a3; trans. Griffith).

Love of self, like *all* kinds of love, should be grounded in an appreciation of excellence *as such*, and not because it is my excellence, or that of my friend, nor, then, because it is the excellence of that of any one component part of the city. The question becomes how the value of each component (e.g. the common people and the rulers and the laws) is recognized and acknowledged, such that the city expresses friendship. Central here is that the *aim* of each of

69 With Bobonich (2002), 432 "[Magnesia's] political organization provides the constitutive structuring of these activities", i.e. those activities characteristic of friendship.

70 Compare (701d7-9): "The lawgiver must in laying down his laws aim at three [goals], namely that the city for which he legislates be free, that it be a friend to itself, and that it possesses reason" with the reiteration of this threefold goal of legislation at 701d7-9.

the component parts of the city does not differ from the model of friendship that obtains between citizens, any more than do its *grounds*. The individual citizens aim at excellence, both individually and in their relations with each other, and this ensures that their worth and value to the community can be expressed and acknowledged as they can co-operate together in common activities. This is also the aim of each of the component parts of the city, which ensures that their worth and value can be acknowledged as they co-operate together without discord (III.689a-c).

The intertwining of friendship with freedom and wisdom in this legislative triad also recalls characteristics of friendship present elsewhere. The reverence for wisdom in the Book VIII account (837c) was a defining characteristic of the highest kind of friendship, and this is mirrored in the celebration of this value by the citizens in their civic practices. Freedom, too, though not mentioned as an ideal in the Book VIII account is explored here in Book III in terms of the recognition of each component of the city as equal in some sense, and equality is a key feature of the Book VIII account (III.694a with VIII.837a4), no less than for relations between citizens. This interplay of values is very close: it is said that the three goals (freedom, wisdom, and friendship) amount to the same thing (693c2). What this means, and how it works, on the level of the component parts of the city is explored via an account of the different political systems of monarchy and democracy (III.693d).[71] As Schofield (2013) argues, the presence, or absence, of friendship acts as a litmus test for determining whether the desired balance between the differing political systems of monarchy and democracy has been achieved, with Persia and Athens as respective examples. Friendship obtains when citizens are recognised as free (as in a democracy) and those with greater wisdom and virtue are respected (a monarchical element).

Though it is not clear what notion of freedom is in play in the *Laws*, remarks on the Persians that follow are instructive here.[72] Apparently, the Athenians embraced too much freedom, whilst the Persians embraced too much monarchy. Under Cyrus, however, there was a balance between freedom and slavery:

> The rulers gave a share of freedom to those under their rule, putting them on an equal footing. This made the soldiers well disposed towards their generals, and they showed themselves eager to face danger. And further, if there was any among them with brains enough to offer good advice, the

71 This is repeated in Book VI where, again friendship comes to the fore (756e).

72 Whether or not they bear much relation to historical facts, on which see Schofield (2013), 292. For an informative account of freedom in Plato and Aristotle, see Hansen (2010).

> king was not the one to resent this [N.B. the absence of φθόνος]. He allowed freedom of speech, and promoted those whose advice was of some value. So someone like this could regard the benefit of his wisdom as belonging to everybody, and put it forward openly (694a-b; trans. Griffith).

At this time, everything flourished because of freedom, friendship and community (694b5-6 αἰ πάντα δὴ τότε ἐπέδωκεν αὐτοῖς διʼ ἐλευθερίαν τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ νοῦ κοινωνίαν). The same held for the Athenians at the time of the Persian Wars (699c2: φιλία). The Persians degenerated after Cyrus, for "by taking away the freedom of the common people too completely, and by placing undue emphasis on the authoritarian element, they destroyed the principle of friendship and cooperation in the community. Once that has been lost, the policy of the rulers no longer has *the good of its subjects and the common people in view*. Their own rule becomes an end in itself; and they lay waste cities, lay waste friendly nations and destroy them with fire, at the merest hint, in any particular situation of some advantage to themselves" (697c8-d3; trans. Griffith).

Sharing in freedom with the rulers is a way that the *equal* (in the relevant sense) worth and value of each is acknowledged ("putting them on an equal footing", III.694a with VIII.837a). This feature allows us to appreciate the relationship between freedom and friendship. The privileged kind of equality, as Book VI explains, is proportionate equality (757c-d), which gives each a "measure related to its nature"; so each is free in the sense that the worth and value of both ruler and ruled is acknowledged, and the recognition of each as equal in this sense is an expression of friendship, that is, that relationship between "like and like, or of an equal with an equal" (VIII.837a with VI.757a). This equality fosters goodwill (εὔνοια, 695d5), and active support and assistance ("eager to face danger"). Moreover, allowing others to share in freedom involves not begrudging those with "sound advice" (694b3; an absence of φθόνος is a mark of friendship, V.730e6), by encouraging freedom of speech (694b4). In other words, it involves the recognition that others might have something of value to contribute and the celebration of any such wisdom by promotion. In these conditions reason can flourish ("sharing in νοῦς", 694a-b). This is a way in which relationships between component parts of the city promote wisdom, a feature that can be tracked in the legislative agenda more broadly.[73] And insofar as this

73 Note the Athenian's remarks about current legislation (857c2-e5), which now proceeds as if "for slaves being doctored by slaves" is opposed to a free doctor who proceeds by "dialogue" using arguments that "come close to philosophizing" and which "educate". Earlier this was contrasted with those who do not listen to anyone, and offer no explanation "with all the arrogance of a tyrant" (720c). On the importance of the preludes to the laws, see Bobonich (1991); Laks (2001), 272, 289: "Under ideal circumstances [the preambles] – take the form of quasi-philosophical discussions carried out by means of rational argu-

feature enables each citizen toeel that their advice will be heeded, such freedom also respects that single desire common to all humanity: "that what happens should happen in obedience to the dictates of one's own will" (687c; trans. Griffith). Finally, notice that defining characteristic of the privileged kind of friendship in Book VIII surfacing here in the attention given to having the good of others as an end in view and not using them for some advantage to oneself (III.697d1-3 with VIII.837c). Once the principle of friendship and cooperation has been lost (by which is meant "the freedom of the common people"), "the policy of the rulers no longer has *the good of its subjects and the common people in view*. Their own rule becomes an end in itself" (697d1-3). Non-instrumental interest in the good of others (not one's own advantage) is a mark of the friendship of the good ruler, no less than of the ideal friend.[74] Friendship is a non-coercive association which exemplifies that proportional equality (VI.757c-d) where each of the components in the city is given the recognition it deserves and willingly co-operates on that basis. Under these conditions, then, there will be that co-operation and concord between various elements that "constitutes a form of friendship".[75]

Though an element of freedom is clearly central to fostering this concord, it is a freedom moderated by wisdom (the monarchical element), whose role is not just to be an element in the desired balance, but to help to constitute it, like the idealised ruler under Cyrus. This concord generating feature of wisdom's deployment is suggested by the analogy between city and soul. The common people and population at large (δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς) stand to the city as the part which experiences pleasures and pains stand to the soul (III.689b). Wisdom in the soul (by analogy, the dictates of law, or the ruler in the city) is not reducible to knowing what is fine and good, but is closely aligned with

ment"; though see Brisson (2005) for criticism of this view. Bobonich (2002), 448 argues that "the value of political activity consists in its being an expression of one's capacity to be a self-governing agent". If so, then the notion of freedom in the *Laws* might come closer to the view that "actions performed issue from reasoned choice" (Moravcsik (1983), 7), showing the interplay of freedom and wisdom more closely. This might seem anachronistic since the most basic sense of freedom for the Greeks seems to be in contrast to the position of the slave. But an extended sense occurs by considering the passages discussed below where freedom seems to shade into 'liberality', just as slavery for Plato can sometimes shade into 'slavishness' or 'servility'; see, for example, the description of 'slavish music' in VII.802d.

74 As Bobonich (2002), 427–34, 454–59 has argued. See also Price (1989), 192–93; Morrow (1960), 562.
Bobonich (2002), 454–59, 427–34.

75 As Schofield (2013), 297, argues, "a just society that is equal in the right sense will deliver more reliably the rational harmony between its different elements that constitutes a form of friendship that Plato particularly values (e.g. *Gorg.* 508a, *Resp.* 443c-d)".

concord (συμφωνία), the finest and greatest of which is "properly *called* the greatest wisdom" (689d). Wisdom in the soul is manifested when the whole soul is moved to act in accord with the values reason affirms. By contrast, "when someone does not love what he has decided is fine and good" (689a), and the soul opposes "knowledge, opinion and rational argument – the things which should direct it – this I call folly" (689b), which is a kind of 'discord' (διαφωνία). This is not the "folly of the uneducated" (689c2), but the folly of those whose pleasures and pains (by analogy, the citizens) oppose rational opinion (the rulers and the laws). By analogy, then, the successful manifestation of wisdom in the community ensures that the population at large is moved to act willingly in accordance with the law, or ruler.[76] And this is precisely because of its interplay with the values explored thus far: allocating a share of *freedom* which acknowledges the equal value of other citizens, who are deserving of goods and opportunity (694b; 697d), such that they eagerly co-operate for common purpose (695d5). If this is what the operation of wisdom amounts to, then just as its operation is called a kind of συμφωνία (689d) on the level of the soul, so will its operation exemplify a kind of *friendship* between component parts of the city, where different elements act in consonance. This is how the desired unity of the city is expressed.[77]

The interplay of freedom, wisdom and friendship is also exemplified on the level of the dialogue's form, as well as its content. The interlocutors are from diverse Greek states, bringing together a number of different elements in this discursive exchange, under the auspices of friendship (φιλία, 642e). They are acknowledged as equal participants in the discussion, each with something of value "to contribute to the common stock" and each of whom enjoys the

76 By contrast, folly, a kind of discord, is manifested when the population does not act in accord with the knowledge enshrined in law, or embodied in the ruler. Compare the discussion of the 'discord' between the kings of the Dorian states, where they would not follow what the enacted laws prescribed, or agree with one another *about the thing they had consented to*. It was "discord between them, looking like wisdom, perhaps, but actually stupidity of the highest order" that led to their ruin (691a).

77 This allows us to appreciate the *kind* of unity involved in Magnesia : a συμφωνία of different components, with a shared aim in view. Compare *Resp.* 590c-d: "so that we may all be alike and *philoi* as far as possible, *all governed by the same principle*". See the distinction Proclus draws in his rejection of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's *Republic* (Festugiere, J., (trans.) *Proclus: Commentaire sur la* Republique (1976), 317–23). Unity, he argues, can be understood either as numerical unity, or as a unifying principle (what he terms "final unity", τελικόν). In the latter case, there is a bond of feeling among all its parts, since "one life and one form holds all together" (p. 364: 27–29), by which he means that it "directs the city as a whole and everyone in it towards one good" and as such turns the city into a community. This latter is "most one" (τὸ μάλιστα ἕν) and compared to the Good itself, which is the cause of all unification (ἕνωσις). On this view, unity is understood in terms of wholeness and perfection (τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τελείου). I am indebted to Alessio Santoro for discussion of Proclus.

freedom to say as much as they like (642d). This generates an almost uncharacteristic degree of goodwill in this work (εὔνοια: 635b1, 642b5, c5, e5) and much agreement and community between the participants. As so often in Plato, λόγος and ἔργον come together beautifully as he exemplifies the significance of friendship as a pervasive theme of the *Laws*.

In this use of *philia* as part of the language of the legislator Plato both draws on and departs from his contemporaries.[78] More prominent in political discourse of this period was a call for citizens to get along in a spirit of concord (ὁμόνοια), as Christ (2012), 8 and Konstan (2010), 242 have argued.[79] It is a surprising feature of the *Laws* that ὁμόνοια, which Plato elsewhere associates with friendship (*Clitophon* 409c3-8; *Alc.* I 126b8-c5, cf. *Pol.* 311b-c, *Resp.* 351d), makes *no* explicit appearance at all.[80] This sense of surprise is bolstered by comparison with Aristotle, who not only had a distinct account of "political *philia*", but aligns this closely to ὁμόνοια: "to promote ὁμόνοια, which seems similar to *philia*" is the chief aim of the lawgiver (*Eth. Nic.* 1155a22-6; compare 1167a22-9); "ὁμόνοια appears to mean political *philia*, which indeed is the ordinary use of the term; for it refers to the interests and concerns of life" (1167b2-4). Ὁμόνοια clearly does not capture quite what Plato has in mind here.

Indeed, as Schofield (2013), 292 has argued, the triad of freedom, wisdom and friendship can be seen as a revaluation of the Spartan values encoded in Lycurgus' oracle on freedom, where courage and ὁμόνοια were central: "But in the Athenian's version, friendship and wisdom take the place of concord and, more importantly, courage or manliness. In other words, we get precisely the substitution of what the Athenian Stranger calls the leading virtue – wisdom – for

78 There is evidence that politicians drew on the language of *philia* as part of a rhetorical strategy claiming to benefit the people as a whole, rather than a limited kinship group (Connor (1971), 43). "These developments of language mark the emergence of a new hierarchy of values in the Greek city, one that emphasizes civic virtues and devotion to the well-being of the whole city. They form the natural culmination of a progression towards popular rule and the essential preconditions for a successfully functioning democratic system" (Connor (1971), 106). Plutarch's *Moralia* (806f.) offers a good example in citing how Cleon publicly gathered together his *philoi* and renounced his *philia* for them, claiming instead to be a *philos* of the *demos* as a whole.

79 For civic friendship as ὁμόνοια, see Thuc. 8.93; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.16; Lys. *On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias*, 17–18; *Defense Against the Charge of Subverting Democracy*, 20–22, 27; Dem. *De Cor.* 164–67, 246; Iso. *Paneg.* 103–04, *Panath.* 42, 258, *Nicocles* 41, *Phillipus* 16, 40, 141; Plat. *Clitophon* 409c; *Alc.* I, 126c-127d; Ar. *Eth. Nic.* IX.6 1167a22-b3; *Eth. Eud.* VII.1241a1-35. I thank Tony Leyh for these references.

80 Nor do any of its obvious synonyms, such as ὁμολογία, which occurs four times, each of which concerns a particular case, such as agreements between husband and wife (840e), reaching agreement in the courts (768a8), contracts and agreements between workman (921c2) and the breaking of agreed contracts which will be brought before the courts (920d2, d5). In none of these cases is it mentioned alongside friendship.

the courage the Spartans and Cretans mistakenly suppose to be what virtue consists in". Just as we get wisdom in place of Spartan courage, so we get *philia* in place of ὁμόνοια. What explains this substitution? There is more built into *philia*, as we have seen. Friendship exemplifies proportional equality (VI.757c-d) where each of the components in the city is given the recognition it deserves (a share of freedom) and co-operates together *on that basis*. The basis seems important; for friendship speaks to the *willing* co-operation of all these parts, which is important to the legislative enterprise as it is conceived in the *Laws* (687c1-7; 690b-c). Its analogue in the soul is that συμφωνία (689d), where affective components – pleasures, pains and desires – willingly accord with what they have consented to. This is part of that legislative focus on virtue as a whole (III.688b1-4). Just as virtue "as a whole" requires certain motivations to be developed in the individual, so the virtuous community as a whole will need to foster orientations towards each other, through shared and reciprocated affective responses, which generate *goodwill* and *eagerness* to act together (694d5). No doubt *homonoia* will be implicated in this process insofar as the goals for the sake of which they act are held in common, but the conditions that give rise to their co-operative behaviour, and which ensure that all are *moved* to do what is agreed by law, require orientations and motivations both towards one another, and between rulers and ruled, to engage in that mutually benefitting co-operative activity. This is perhaps better served with the more affective *philia*, than the affectively neutral ὁμόνοια.[81]

The prominence of friendship may also explain the curious absence of justice, eclipsed from view in the triad of legislative values.[82] For as Aristotle explains: "of the forms of justice the most important is thought to be that bound up with friendship" (*Eth. Nic.* 1155a28).[83] If friendship expresses that proportional equality between citizens, ensuring that each is acknowledged as a free and equal partner and given their due, it is not clear what consideration of justice would add in this particular context. For the truest and best equality – geometrical equality (757b) – is the source of justice itself (757c6).[84] Back in

81 See Tony Leyh, "A Symphony of Citizens: A New Strategy of Civic Friendship in the Laws" (unpublished) who argues that: "The Laws account of civic friendship pays due respect to how emotional consonance serves as a pillar upon which friendships can both originate and be sustained."

82 As Bartels (2017), 33–36 argues, who notes that it appears 11 times compared to 140 in the *Republic*.

83 Compare *Eth. Eud.* VII.10, 1242a20-1: "All just behaviour is relative to a friend"; VII.1 1234b25-6: "We all say that justice and injustice are found especially in relations between friends". See also *Clitophon* (409e) where the production of friendship is the ἴδιον ἔργον of justice.

84 Compare Socrates in the *Gorgias* (507e-508a): "The wise say that what holds together heaven and earth and gods and men is κοινωνία (community), friendship, orderliness,

Book I, the priority of friendship to other legislative aims was marked: the ideal scenario is one in which justice arises organically, so to speak, and not through the legislative impositions of the legislator wielding principles of justice: for, "you might just as well suppose that the sick body which has been purged by the doctor was therefore in the pink of condition, and disregard the body that never had any such need" (628d-e).[85] Friendship is the organic root of justice, hence the greatest good for the legislator is "peace and goodwill among men" (628c), whose presence ensures no "doctoring" will be required. The context here is important, though; the claim is not that justice is explanatorily redundant once armed with an account of friendship. Comparison with Aristotle's rich, though complex, discussion of justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, alongside his extended account of friendship, shows how much can be gained from such consideration. The issue is one of emphasis. The thought is that it is not clear what it would add *to the Laws*. The principal concern in the *Laws* is to create a virtuous state from the bottom up (and not to "doctor" one already in existence), hence the importance of the moral psychology of Books I and II and the emphasis on those interpersonal relationships wherein those affective components can find proper expression and reinforcement. One may object that the *Republic* is also concerned with the virtuous state from the bottom up, so to speak, and justice, as well as friendship, is central. The thought is that the distinct perspective of much of the discussion in the *Laws* (with the exception of Book X) works better, perhaps, with a project that conceives of justice in familiar terms – in terms of relations between each other in which we are all, to some extent, already implicated – and not in terms of a value more abstractly conceived.[86] For we are not framing laws for heroes and sons of gods, but "we are human beings, legislating in the world today for the children of human beings" (IX. 853c-d). Such, perhaps, helps to make the *Laws* persuasive "to a population at large, not to just an intellectual elite".[87]

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moderation and justice", where the extent to which these latter notions are distinct is not clear, especially given that it is Callicles' neglect of geometry which is responsible for his failure to appreciate all five values. Geometry would have given him that sense of proportional equality central to all five. For friendship and proportional equality, see *Ti.* 32b with El Murr (2014).

85 Compare IX.853b on penal legislation where it is said that: "in a way it is something of a disgrace to be making laws at all for any of the things we are now about to make laws for – in a city like ours which will be well run, we maintain, and which will realise all the right conditions for the practice of human goodness".

86 Here it is relevant that the family arrangements of the *Laws* are less restrictive than those of the *Republic*.

87 See Schofield (2010b), 23: "The *Laws* envisages itself as trying to cope with human beings as they actually are". Bobonich (2002), 110; cf. 385, 451: "The *Laws* is highly sensitive to the fact that human nature sets limits on the attainment of what would be ideally best". See,

5 Friendship and Plato's Politics

> "There is a scene in War and Peace I sometimes think about," said Sammler. "The French General Davout, who was very cruel, who was said, I think, to have torn out a man's whisker's by the roots, was sending people to the firing squad in Moscow, but when Pierre Bezhukov came up to him, they looked into each other's eyes. A human look was exchanged and Pierre was spared. Tolstoy says that you don't kill another human being with whom you have exchanged such a look."[88]

The social practices of the *Laws* foster a kind of face-to-face interaction from which ethical and legislative imperatives also seem to follow. The cultivation of *philia* makes the humanity of others "fully visible", as Gaita puts it (1998) xxi, such that we see them as worthy of care and concern, deserving of goods and opportunity, and promote their interests, with generosity, gentleness, and justice. This brings citizens relationships close to the characteristic features of character-friendship in Book VIII, and suggests that this is the normative model for citizenship. It will no doubt be to the mutual advantage of citizens that all are so valued and their interests promoted, but Plato does not explicitly discuss a distinct kind of "political *philia*", nor then is it placed under the auspices of mutual advantage (*Eth. Nic.* IX.6, 1167b3-4), as it seems to be for Aristotle.[89] Plato's conception is more closely aligned to the moral ends of the city.

Much here may be a matter of emphasis, which depends on their respective starting points. As Schofield (1998), 44, has argued with reference to Aristotle: "The idea that political friendship is a form of advantage friendship is supported (*Eth. Eud.* vii.10, 1242a6-9) by appeal to the mutual advantage the very existence of the *polis* is designed to secure".[90] Plato is less concerned in the

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also Bartels' general view of the *Laws* in Bartels (2017). Schofield (2003), 13, argues as follows: "Plato wanted two things above all of the discourse he was to develop in the *Laws*: first, that it should reflect and embody a sense of a transcendent moral framework for political and social existence; second, that it should be capable of being persuasive – because *inter alia* generally intelligible – to a population at large, not to just an intellectual elite". Bartels (2017), by contrast, argues that *Laws* drops the transcendent moral framework.

88 Saul Bellow, *Mr Sammler's Planet*, (1970/2007 Penguin Modern Classics) p. 155.

89 Though there is debate about whether advantage friendship or character friendship best captures Aristotle's notion of political friendship; on which, see Schofield (1998), 40–43 and Cooper (1977), (1990), 235.

90 Plato's *Republic* seems to offer an account of political friendship as advantage friendship precisely in the context of the origins of the city in *Republic* II. A city is created because "partners and helpers" are collected, creating a network of giving and receiving, on the

Laws with "the very existence of the *polis*" and begins with existing states – Athens, Crete and Sparta, whose practices he attempts to revise.[91] Indeed, the prominence of virtue "as a whole" as a legislative ideal arises dialectically through critical examination of Sparta (Books I and II).[92] The opening lines speak to this focus on the origin of *law*, not, principally, the origin of the *polis*, where the advantages of living together and exchanging services might be more prominent.[93] The focus on law leads to that pervasive concern with *paideia*, now broadly conceived, concerned to foster virtue as a whole. With the emphasis on virtue from the start, any 'advantage' to be had from friendship will be explored as promoting that value.

This also suggests that strict utility friendship, where the value of others is reduced to their 'use' to the city, fails to capture its central features. This model can be resisted, along with the objectionable politics it suggests (Vlastos [1981] 1999, 150), where the interests of the individual are eclipsed and subordinated to those of the state. Doubtless, friendship supports the larger community and it is to the mutual advantage of all, and to the advantage of the city, that each is valued and supported.[94] This need not reduce the citizens' experience of

grounds that *each supposes this to be better for himself* (μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει, οἰόμενος αὑτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι, *Resp.* II.369c6-7).

91 I do not mean to deny that Plato is also concerned with aspects of founding such as Magnesia's natural resources (IV.704a-705c), climate (V.747d-e), population size (V.737e; V.740b-741a), and land distribution (V.737c-d; V.739e-740a), but such is not the principal focus of the *Laws*. Book III begins with an inquiry into the origins of constitutions (πολιτείαι, 676a2) rather than the origin of the city itself.

92 Plato's choice of an Athenian Stranger to be the interlocutor with the two Dorians', Morrow (1960), 74 notes, "indicates clearly his intention to confront the Dorian way with the traditions of his native city".

93 "Tell me, gentlemen, to whom do you give the credit for establishing your codes of law? It is a god, or a man (Θεὸς ἤ τις ἀνθρώπων ὑμῖν, ὦ ξένοι, εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως;)?" (I.624a). Compare Book III where the history of constitutions is in view (676a7-b8), which is concerned with the origin (*arche*) of constitutions and their transformations.

94 For passages which speak to larger community interests, see the remarks on marriage: "we should seek to contract the alliance that will benefit the city, not the one that we personally find most alluring" (VI.773b). Compare: "If public interest is well served, rather than private, then the individual and the community alike are benefited (καὶ ὅτι συμφέρει τῷ κοινῷ τε καὶ ἰδίῳ, τοῖν ἀμφοῖν, ἢν τὸ κοινὸν τιθῆται καλῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἴδιον)" (IX.875a7-b1). And in Book X we view the aims of the community from the perspective of the cosmos as a whole. Each component of a whole strives for what is best in common, because what is best for each part is also best for the whole (πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συντεῖνον βέλτιστον μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται, 903c6-d1). To foster virtue in its every form is "sharing in god's plan for the universe as a whole" (Bobonich (2002), 433). It is possible that one might want happiness for others without wishing this for *their* own sake,

philia to merely instrumental considerations, from which the privileged kind is explicitly distanced on more than one occasion (III.697d1-3; VIII.837a-c). Acknowledging each person's worth and value and seeing it as contributing to some larger whole (the choral community, or city) of which one is a part, are not mutually exclusive alternatives.

Nor is the model one of maximal mutual identification, as Price (1999) argues with reference to the *Republic*. Citizens value others as equal to themselves, which does *not* mean that differences in type are stamped out, so that they form some homogenous totality.[95] The fact that the salient notion of equality is proportionate equality, not numerical equality, is designed to capture that point. The very first book of the *Laws* ends with the idea that one of the most useful tools for the science of politics is the ability to know the nature and disposition of people's souls in order to care for them (θεραπεύειν, 650b). These dispositions are seen in the types of lives discussed in Book V (733d-e), in which four distinct virtues are more or less prominent in different characters, as well as four corresponding vices. Other qualities are also mentioned such as good looks, uprightness, and good reputation (734d-e), against which people can be distinguished. Appropriate tests need to be applied to particular cases to determine who should hold high office (735a). In Book VIII we are told of ceremonial battles where there is a "need to award prizes for victory and outstanding performance, and make one another speeches of praise and criticism for the kind of individual each turns out to be, both in these competitions, and for that matter in the whole of life".[96] Competitions in virtue would make little sense if all citizens were alike and the same. The differences may be one of degree, not kind, but they speak to a civic celebration of such distinctness.

This may diffuse a persistent concern with Plato's accounts of love, which rears its head here, too. This is that the kind of valuing of others that the legislator encourages is not particularly individual, given the virtuous character in view. The issue is not that the account fails to accommodate love for who each

that is out of any concern for *them*. The perspective of the universe need not involve any wishing of happiness for the individual's own sake (on which, see Sidgwick (1967), 382), but that is *not* the perspective relevant to the cultivation of *philia* amongst citizens.

95 Compare Aristotle, who accused Plato of creating a *polis* of ὅμοιοι which looks more like an alliance than a proper city, and "the *polis* consists not merely of a plurality of persons, but of persons who differ in type; for a *polis* does not come from people who are alike" (*Pol.* 1261a22-7).

96 νικητήρια δὲ καὶ ἀριστεῖα ἑκάστοισι τούτων δεῖ διανέμειν ἐγκώμιά τε καὶ ψόγους ποιεῖν ἀλλήλοις, ὁποῖός τις ἂν ἕκαστος γίγνηται κατά τε τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐν παντί τε αὖ τῷ βίῳ (*Leg.* VIII.829c2-4).

person is, in favour of a focus on abstractions, for the *Laws* is clear on the relationship that holds between the virtue of each and the whole person: "of the things that most belong to one, the most divine – after the gods – is the soul, the thing that is most one's own" (v.726a6-8). Since virtue is the excellence of the soul, it is the excellence of the thing that is most one's own and attending to this just is to attend to what belongs most of all to others. If there is nothing more fundamental to a person than their good character, this is not a failure on Plato's part to appreciate the value of individuals; it is a radical re-evaluation of what is salient to that appreciation.[97]

It might be objected that if Plato operates with an impersonal conception of the soul, this argumentative move has little traction, but the legislator is concerned with the *different* dispositions of soul (I.650b), and *distinctness* is celebrated in the civic competitions; soul considered from a larger theological perspective (as in Book X) is not the object of civic *philia*; rather, it is other *persons* who manifest virtue in distinct ways, given their particular dispositions, and to a greater or lesser extent.[98] Though *philia* is an emotion that contains appraisal of another's character, the evaluative content of which is tethered to a specific set of normative goals, virtue is not a straightjacket under which individual difference is objectionably constrained. The many and rich ways in which human excellence can be manifested will be the subjects of stories, songs and eulogies; these representations of good character will doubtless deliver a rich sense of the embeddedness of virtue in characters and individual lives.[99]

Competitions in virtue celebrate distinctness and provide incentives for individual striving, albeit ones constrained by the gentleness and generosity one is urged to show towards others (730e6-731a). The social activities of the *Laws* encourage the intimacy and familiarity with individuals that comes about through repeatedly eating, dancing and singing together, and acting in common. The appreciation each citizen has for others, in other words, is not

97 This strand of Plato's thinking can be seen in the *Symposium* where Socrates explains that since we are willing to cut off our own arms and legs if we are diseased it is not what is akin to ourselves that we love, but what is good (205e). See Kosman [1976] (2014) on the *Symposium* and Waterlow (1972) on the *Republic*. Compare Aristotle: 'The good man is a lover of the good (φιλάγαθος) not a lover of self (φίλαυτος); for he loves himself, if at all, because he is good' (*Mag. Mor.* II.14 1212b18-20) with Whiting (1991).

98 This is even a feature of the eschatology of Book X (903b4-905a1) where the desires and characters of individual souls determine what they will become.

99 On the sense of "embeddedness" transmitted in stories, see Nussbaum (2013), 10: "The human mind is quirky and particularistic, more easily able to conceive a strong attachment if these high principles are connected to a particular set of perceptions, memories, and symbols, that have deep roots in the personality and in people's sense of their own history".

fostered by attendance to abstract principles (compare the Highest mysteries of the *Symposium's* ascent), but by attendance to *persons*. So though the *grounds* of *philia* may be broad, this does not deliver a depersonalised conception of friendship; the *objects* of that love are, and remain, persons, whose characters are appreciated for the good qualities they manifest.[100]

True enough, the objection might continue, any expression of difference will be one of degree, not kind; this is not a problem for the legislator, though, but an *opportunity*. For, if orientated towards the good character of others (however distinctly that is manifested), we have equal reason to love others sharing in that virtue: "…whether this in fact manifests itself in his own actions, or in somebody else's" (*Leg.* V.731d6-732a3; trans. Griffith). The friendship cultivated in the *Laws* extends partiality: by cultivating an orientation towards anybody and everybody who manifests these values, in whatever distinct way that is. This inclusive reworking of *philia* is based on the fact that a lover is partial to what he loves and so if grounded in attachments to self, or kin it will eclipse the values that are most fundamental to human flourishing (732a1-2).[101] The valuation one is urged to adopt gives one equal reason to value virtuous action wherever it occurs, which is to say that all citizens will be *equally worthy of love*. For this reason, *philia* is not something whose intimacy threatens the public sphere; its grounds enables citizens to widen and direct concern towards others in their community and to bring each citizen into a common mode of living – without recourse to ties such as family, ethnicity, or any other particularized traits. The very reasons which provide the basis for Vlastos' disappointment are the very *same* reasons why *philia can* be employed to widen one's circle of concern – to extend partiality – beyond any one individual such that one acknowledges all citizens as equally worthy. The so-called "fungible import" of Platonic love is precisely why it can be deployed towards ends that are, in a sense, egalitarian.[102] In recent political theorizing, by contrast,

100 For the importance of this distinction between the grounds and object of love in modern philosophy of love, see Delaney (1996).

101 Since excessive love of self is the cause of all ills (731e), this thesis is central to the cultivation of virtue. A variety of practices are designed to counteract "this excessive love of ourselves (τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν) [which] … makes us bad judges of goodness and beauty and justice (ὥστε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κακῶς κρίνει)" (V.731e4-732a1); Compare Aristotle, *Pol.* VII.16, 1335b5-11

102 The fact that all citizens, to the extent that they are capable of virtue and orientated towards it, are equally worthy might seem to limit the scope of *philia* to those inside a community of this kind. For similar concerns, see Irwin (1995), 316. This may only be a contingent matter, however. The grounds of *philia* are broad enough to include all persons,

friendship is often seen as too partial and preferential to ground the kinds of universalizing claims of ethics, or provide any basis for legislation; love has been marginalized in favour of respect, or dignity.[103] This supposedly objectionable feature of Platonic love, though, is that key move which allows for its political deployment.[104] Leaving aside our obsession with the particularities of the individual, of which the reading of Plato and Aristotle is always a sobering reminder, what remains that is "morally disquieting", perhaps, is not that Plato fails to recognize the value of citizens as ends of care and concern, but that what is required to develop this orientation towards each other requires so much regulation and socialization of what we would now consider to be the "private" realm (739b-d).[105]

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though there may be contingent reasons why we are exposed to some human beings and not others. The Athenian is concerned with the proper treatment of foreigners (729e-730a), claiming that "they deserve greater sympathy from mankind and the gods" and it is "of the greatest concern to get to the end of life without committing any misdeed against foreigners". Sympathy falls short of *philia*, though, which involves common pursuits and activities, but this is still evidence of a broad concern for other persons in this text.

103 Though see Rawls (1971), 190 on the relationship between love and other-directed concern and Dworkin (1986), 186–224, 410–13 who speaks of "fraternal concern" rather than friendship, in which we express equal concern for the well-being of others. Cf. Sandel (1982), 179–83.

104 Evidence for this partiality problem pre-Plato can be seen in the way *philia* was deployed by politicians, as noted by Connor (1971), 43, who argues that by claiming to be a *philos to the people* a politician would be claiming to benefit the people as a whole, rather than a limited kinship group.

105 Elements belonging to what we would consider the private realm – such as pleasure, pain, and desires – are regulated (732e; 788b), including private households (790b) as well as regulations that govern the way citizens spend *all* of their time (807e). According to Klosko (2006), 225: "The end result of Plato's prescriptions is an all-embracing public opinion, intruding into every aspect of people's lives". Compare Laks (2001), 286: "the whole of human life can become the object of legislative attention". Morgan (2013), 288: "If no area of life in the city remains private, each act, and speech act, is public, performed for one's own benefit and that of one's fellow citizens". For a critique of the widespread use of a robust distinction between the private and the public realms, see Geuss (2003).

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AFTERWORD

The Invention of Emotion?

David Konstan

Abstract

We are now accustomed to the idea that emotions are at least in some measure socially constructed and so have a history; but what of "emotion" itself? Is it a universal category? If not, how did the modern idea of emotion arise? I suggest that the category of emotion, as it is understood in the social sciences today, can be traced back to Aristotle, who first collected sentiments such as anger, love, pity, and shame under the heading of *pathê* (plural of *pathos*). In so doing, however, Aristotle did not simply identify a transhistorical faculty of emotion. Rather he selected a set of sentiments on which orators could play in order to manipulate the judgments of jurors or of citizens in the Assembly. This is why the *pathê* he discusses have a notably cognitive and moral dimension, and anticipate, for example, the orientation of the appraisal school today. Different conceptions of emotion were already emerging soon after Aristotle wrote, but the broad lineaments of his classification have remained influential to the present day.

Keywords

history of emotions – rhetoric – universal – transhistorical

As the essays in this volume abundantly demonstrate, Plato thought deeply about a wide variety of emotions, including envy, shame, pity, anger, love, and more. He discussed these sentiments from various perspectives and in multiple contexts across the extensive body of his writings. But just because his treatments are dispersed over several dialogues, and sometimes seem to offer different evaluations of any one in particular, it remains unclear whether Plato regarded all these sentiments as constituting a single category corresponding to what we would call "emotion." It may be that we pick out these several analyses and collect them under a single heading because the class of emotions seems natural to us. If we are now accustomed to the idea that emotions are at least in some measure socially constructed and so have a history, it is still not uncommon that the concept of "emotion" is taken to be universal and

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transhistorical. By what right, however, do we assign such a concept to Plato, if he nowhere specifically identified or defined such a class?

Greek literature at the time of Plato gives little indication that the emotions were grouped together in the way we conceive of them today. The rhetorician Gorgias affirmed that "speech is a great prince. With tiny body and strength unseen, he performs marvelous works. He can make fear cease, take away pain, instill joy, increase pity.… For just as various drugs expel various humours from the body…, so some speeches give pain, some pleasure, some fear, some confidence" (Gorg. *Hel.* 8.14).[1] This description of the effects of rhetoric mixes up the sensations of pleasure and pain with emotions like fear and pity, and lumps all the effects of speech together. The *Rhetoric to Alexander*, nowadays attributed to Anaximenes and very likely composed a couple of decades prior to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, treats together sensations such as pleasure and pain, as well as desires (1428a36-b5).[2] As Manfred Kraus observes, "Anaximenes does address the issue of πάθος, but he only does so in the section on arrangement of speeches, in the context of the construction of epilogues. But his concept is much less broad than Aristotle's, and he does not even use the word πάθος in that context (although he uses it occasionally elsewhere, such as in the chapter on εἰκός). In fact, his entire arsenal consists of three positive and three negative emotions only.… Anaximenes does have a certain sense of emotion and πάθος, but he yet fails to see them as parts of a holistic concept of means of persuasion." Kraus discreetly passes over one of the passages in which Anaximenes uses the term *pathos* in what might seem to be a relevant, but still unusual, way. In a recent article published in the Slovenian journal, *Solsko Polje*, Janja Žmavc observes: "As Anaximenes says, emotions are irresistible and distract humans from pondering over more or less probable arguments: 'If you are unable to prove this [sc. by usual arguments], you must take refuge in pleas of misfortune or error, and try to gain pardon by bringing in the passions to which all mankind are liable, that divert us from rational calculation – namely love, anger, intoxication, ambition and the like. This is the most skillful way of developing the argument from probability' (*Rh. Al.* 1429a15-20)."[3] Love and anger sound familiar as emotions, ambition less so; but drunkenness seems wholly out of line. What was Anaximenes thinking? The answer is that *pathos* for him meant anything that had a strong impact on the way we think, and hence could serve as an excuse if you were accused of a crime. If you say that you committed a wrong in a fit

1 Trans. D.A. Russell in D.A. Russell and Winterbottom (1972), 7–8.

2 Kraus (2011), 278.

3 Žmavc (2015), 135; translation of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* by H. Rackham (1957). Translation quoted from the article.

of anger, it serves to extenuate the fault; ambition too is a natural enough motive. But still better are passionate love (ἔρως) and drunkenness, to which young men in Menandrean comedy regularly appeal as a way of explaining their misbehavior. All four are πάθη as Anaximines and his contemporaries would have understood the term, but they hardly constitute a set of what we would call emotions.

There is one passage, however, in which Plato seems to capture something like the set of reactions that we call emotion, although he does not employ the word πάθος in this connection. In the late dialogue *Philebus* 47e, Socrates observes that anger, fear, longing, mourning, passionate love, competitiveness, envy, and all such things, are pains peculiar to the soul [ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύπας τινάς;], and he adds that they are also productive of pleasures. This looks like a catalogue of emotions, if we take "mourning" in the sense of grief, and ἔρως as something like love. It is remarkable, though little remarked, that Aristotle, in his treatise on rhetoric, offers a definition of the πάθη that, while rather odd in itself, bears in certain respects a resemblance to that of Plato; he writes: "Let the πάθη be all those things on account of which people change and differ in regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their opposites" (*Rh*. 2.1, 1378a20-23). We may note that Aristotle, like Plato, associates the πάθη with both pain and pleasure. What is more, he, again like Plato, provides a list of the items that are to count as πάθη, although his inventory is briefer, no doubt because he is about to embark on an analysis of a dozen or so πάθη and so need not be exhaustive here. Finally, Aristotle, once more like Plato, concludes his list with a kind of "et cetera," employing practically the identical formula: where Plato writes ὅσα τοιαῦτα, Aristotle has ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, adding simply the term for "other" (ἄλλα). Although it will turn out that Aristotle's full list of πάθη differs from Plato's itemization – he omits mourning and ἔρως or passionate love, treating φιλία in its place – he does include a paragraph on competitiveness or ζῆλος, which might strike the modern reader as surprising in a tabulation of emotions. It is entirely plausible to suppose that Aristotle was conscious of Plato's formulation in arriving at his own, even as he attempted to provide a definition and detailed discussion of the sort that was lacking in Plato's account.

Aristotle's survey of what he identifies as πάθη in the second book of his *Rhetoric* includes anger and the remission of anger, love, hatred, fear, confidence (treated as the opposite of fear), shame, envy, gratitude, pity, indignation, and a competitive passion that he calls ζῆλος (the ancestor of the English words "zeal" and "jealousy"), along with passing mentions of a few others, for

example contempt. Taken together, his inventory of πάθη certainly resembles the set of what we would call emotions, although there are some noticeable oddities. Today, for example, we rarely find pity included among the emotions, and still more rarely anything like ζῆλος, not to mention calming down as the reverse of anger. Gratitude and self-confidence are also uncommon, and indignation is not always distinguished from anger, at least in lists of what are taken to be basic emotions. Missing in Aristotle's catalogue, in turn, are sympathy (as distinct from pity), jealousy, and grief, which are common in modern classifications (as we have seen, it figures in Plato's list). But we may observe that modern sets too differ among themselves, perhaps no more than any one of them differs from Aristotle's.

Not only is there a certain disparity between the πάθη that Aristotle singles out and modern lists, but there are discrepancies also between Aristotle's definitions of individual emotions and their corresponding number today. To take an example, Aristotle defines anger, or more precisely the Greek word ὀργή. as follows: "Let anger be a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one's own" (*Rh.* 2.2, 1378a31-33). Aristotle's definition seems to come fairly close to English "anger" (we may leave aside for now whether all modern languages have equivalent notions), we may note too some peculiar characteristics of ὀργή, as Aristotle understands it. First, there is the intimate association between anger and revenge. Second, Aristotle neglects such crucial aspects of anger as bodily states or facial expressions: he focuses entirely on the intentional aspect, which is the desire for vengeance. Third, and most remarkably, Aristotle acknowledges no stimuli to anger apart from belittlement or derision. This limitation squares with the emphasis on revenge: much as we may be mad upon stubbing our toe or being bitten by an animal, we are not angry at the chair or the dog, in Aristotle's view, because neither has insulted us or put us down; it is impossible in any case to avenge oneself on a piece of furniture. Finally, there is the odd detail that not every insult is a stimulus to anger, but only those by people who are not fit to disparage us. These latter are our inferiors, for example slaves. Taking this social discrimination into account, we may understand why Aristotle can make the strange claim that we cannot be both angry and afraid of the same person. The reason, as Aristotle observes, is that we do not imagine taking revenge on those we fear. Similarly, we do not get angry at those who fear us, since their fear proves that they respect us and so are not likely to insult us in the first place. This kind of reasoning reflects a great stress on one's sense of honor, with which anger is closely related. In a society like ours, where honor counts for much less than in ancient Greece, anger itself assumes different contours.

But for all that Greek perceptions of the several πάθη may vary from our own (assuming that there is a uniform idea of anger or other emotions among speakers of English, at least, today), Aristotle delimits the candidates for the status of *pathos* in a familiar way. He excludes mere appetites, for instance, such as hunger or thirst or sexual desire. He also disregards moods, such as happiness or sadness, which have a controversial status in modern theories but seem distinct from what are called occurrent emotions. Nor does Aristotle admit such physical responses as laughter and tears, which are signs of emotion but not emotions themselves. Since these discriminations are not evident in any treatment of the πάθη prior to Aristotle, it may seem evident that he has a plausible claim to having been the discoverer of just those responses that constitute the field of emotion. As Olivier Renaut has remarked in a recent paper (rightly in my view), "Aristotle is undoubtedly the first 'theoretician' of the 'emotions.' As opposed to Plato, Aristotle indicates more precisely what kinds of judgments may inflect, cause, or result from various emotive affects."[4]

But the word "discovered" in this connection is controversial. It sounds as though there is a pre-existing and universal concept of emotion, which Aristotle was the first to map out and organize in accord with its natural lineaments. This view accords with evolutionary psychology, of the sort promoted by Paul Ekman, which posits the cross-cultural uniformity of the emotions. But the variation in how emotions are described in different societies suggests that social construction plays at least as great a role as elementary affects rooted in human biology.[5] As Pierre Macherey has argued: "In theoretical practice, as the history of the sciences has demonstrated, the object is never given but is progressively discovered.… A science has a real domain and it also has an object.… The objects of any rational investigation have no prior existence but are thought into being.… Knowledge is not the discovery or reconstruction of a latent meaning. It is something newly raised up, an addition to the reality from which it begins."[6] .

As we have seen, Aristotle introduces his discussion of the πάθη with a rather odd definition, followed by some examples of the kind of thing he has in

4 Olivier Renaut, « Les pathe/emotions chez Aristote: Une catégorie nouvelle? À propos de *Rh.* II » talk delivered at the seminar, « Prendre les anciens au mot: ce que l'Antiquité fait à la modernité, » held on 19 April 2017, at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris: « Aristote est sans doute, c'est vrai, le premier 'théoricien' des 'émotions.' Contrairement à Platon, Aristote nous indique plus exactement quels types de jugements sont susceptibles d'infléchir, de causer, ou d'être la conséquence de certaines affections émotives. »

5 See, for example, Ekman (1998); and cf. Buss (2000) for a similar evolutionary analysis of jealousy, a passion that is notably absent from Aristotle's list.

6 Macherey (1978), 5–6.

mind; to repeat: "Let the emotions be all those things on account of which people change and differ in regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their opposites" (*Rh.* 2.1, 1378a20-23). That the πάθη are identified by way of their effect on judgments is perhaps natural in a treatise on rhetoric, where the objective of rousing or allaying the emotions is to influence the way jurors or members of the assembly cast their vote.[7] Of course, arguments too affect how people judge, and so Aristotle specifies that the kinds of πάθη he has in mind are accompanied by pleasure and pain. But he evidently felt that even this qualification was not enough to indicate clearly what kinds of items he was selecting as constitutive of the πάθη, and so he added some examples, namely in anger, pity and fear and feelings similar to these, along with their opposites. His readers could now have a fairly clear idea of what Aristotle meant by emotion, since, as we have noted, the word πάθος in ordinary Greek signified a wide variety of effects, including illness or sensory stimulation. Although Plato may have preceded Aristotle, and indeed exerted an influence on his theory, Aristotle was the first, I believe, to use the word πάθος specifically of the class of things that look to us like emotions. He was creating a category, not simply appealing to a well-defined concept. Elsewhere in his writings, indeed, Aristotle himself includes among the πάθη desires, indicating, I believe, that he had not yet quite arrived at a clear idea of emotion – as he would come to define it.[8]

In his descriptions of the individual πάθη, Aristotle places great emphasis on the stimulus, ignoring such manifestations of emotion as facial expression, which has loomed large in modern evolutionary theories. Here again, we may see an effect of his focus on rhetoric: to manipulate the emotions of his audience, the orator is limited to verbal catalysts to elicit the desired judgment. This focus bears a resemblance to modern appraisal theory, of which Richard Lazarus, one of the founders of this approach, writes: "cognition is both a necessary and sufficient condition of emotion." So too, Robert Solomon states flatly that "*emotions are judgments*."[9] Lazarus further observes that "those who

7 Cf. Konstan (2007).

8 See, for example, *Eth. Nic.* 1105b21-23; "I call πάθη desire [ἐπιθυμία], anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy [χαρά], love, hatred, longing, competitiveness, pity, and in general those things upon which attend pleasure and pain"; cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1147a14-15. For πάθος complemented by ἐπιθυμία, see *Eth. Nic.* 1151b8-9, and cf. *Eth. Eud.* 1220b12-13, also *De An.* 1.403a16-19. The inclusion of desire (ἐπιθυμία) among the πάθη, as well as a sense of longing (πόθος) and joy, distinguishes this series from the more restricted array of feelings that Aristotle discusses in Book II of the *Rhetoric*.

9 Solomon (1993), viii (italics in the original). Contrast, for example, the still lively conviction that emotions are the very opposite of reason, or at least of what we might call propositional

favor a cognitive-mediational approach must also recognize that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* more than two thousand years ago applied this kind of approach to a number of emotions in terms that seem remarkably modern."[10]

There is, however, a further characteristic of the πάθη, as described by Aristotle, that is not normally an element in modern accounts, and that is their moral and social aspect. Anger, as we have seen, responds to a slight on the part of our inferiors: it presupposes a judgment concerning status and propriety. This is the case too with the other πάθη analyzed by Aristotle. Hatred (τὸ μισεῖν), for example, is a response to perceived vice in others, whereas affection is induced primarily by the perception of another's virtue. Shame, rivalry (ζῆλος), gratitude, fear, and even envy are morally inflected reactions, even if Aristotle avows that envy (φθόνος) is not characteristic of a virtuous person; for envious people judge that their equals are prospering more than they are and that this is somehow unfair. It would appear, then, that that Aristotle may have collected the various sentiments he did under the category of πάθη in the *Rhetoric* insofar as they were both rationally induced and involved a sense of fairness. This is just what one might expect of a theory of emotions inspired by the needs of courtroom pleaders and public speakers.

In a way, this is to reverse the view that the πάθη, for Aristotle, had a moral dimension. Rather, Aristotle identified as πάθη just those responses that had an ethical character. It is true that the πάθη that Aristotle chose to describe resemble the kinds of affects that are today recognized as emotions. But if so, it may not necessarily be because there exists an abstract and transhistorical category of "emotion," which Aristotle, like his modern counterparts, correctly perceived and theorized. Indeed, it may be by virtue of a sublime coincidence

knowledge. See, for example, Böhme (1997), 525, who states that the connection between feelings and scientific knowledge would seem ironic, "since where the latter is, the former is not." Nor is this surprising, Böhme adds: "Where the virtue of a person who has knowledge is to neutralize affect, feelings will withdraw from him no matter how much he may wish to recognize them" ("Wo Affektneutralisierung die Tugend des Wissenden ist, werden sich ihm die Gefühle entziehen, so sehr er sie erkennen möchte"). Böhme concludes by citing Heine's famous verse: "Ich weiß nicht, was soll es bedeuten, dass ich so traurig bin," and remarks: "Feelings mean nothing. They intend nothing. And they are not intended" ("Gefühle bedeuten nichts. Sie intendieren nichts. Und sie werden nicht intendiert," 543).

10 Lazarus (2001), 40. As is well known, Aristotle entertained doubts about whether an analysis of the emotions or πάθη ought to have a place in a treatise on rhetoric. In the very first chapter of Book 1, he affirmed that "it is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity – one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it." Yet by the second chapter, he had evidently changed his mind. One possible reason is that he had come to realize that the emotions are deeply cognitive in nature and so can be manipulated by argument and reasoning, if only in the form of enthymemes rather than necessarily derived from true propositions.

that Aristotle, working from very different considerations, such as forensic and political persuasiveness, concerning the kinds of affects to include in his advice to orators, arrived at a selection that we now perceive as corresponding reasonably well to the modern concept of an emotion, even if the moral factor may seem to some to be an unmotivated or superfluous constraint.

At the same time, the convergence of Aristotle's classification and later lists of basic emotions was not entirely a matter of chance, insofar as his selection of the sentiments that would count as πάθη indirectly influenced subsequent taxonomies of the passions, even when they were largely assumed to be non-cognitive and indeed the very opposite of rationality. The Stoics, for example, more or less adopted Aristotle's assortment, even though they condemned the πάθη for rebelling against reason or *logos*.[11] The Stoic classification, in turn, was transmitted to the Latin-speaking world by Cicero and Seneca and later by Christians such as Lactantius, and had an impact on the views of Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Adam Smith, and others, even though Aristotle's original basis for his selection was no longer recognized or accepted. We are thus inclined to see a continuity rather than a rupture, which feeds the tendency to regard the concept of emotion as a natural category, not subject to historical determination.

Just what emotions are continues to be a matter of controversy. James Russell, one of the leading psychologists of emotion today, writing in *Emotions Researcher*, the journal of the International Society for Research on Emotion, affirms: "Emotion researchers face a scandal: We have no agreed upon definition for the term – emotion – that defines our field. We therefore do not know what events count as examples of emotion and what events theories of emotion must explain."[12] Even the nature of anger remains deeply contested. Whereas some investigators maintain that "Anger is associated with justice concerns, or the protection of individual rights, fairness, and autonomy,"[13] in this respect agreeing with Aristotle on the moral dimension of emotions, others insist that "Neither personal anger nor empathic anger is a truly moral emotion or source of truly moral motivation."[14] But this very range of opinions may reflect not so much a failure of science as the fact that emotions are not simply objective phenomena waiting to be properly defined, like genes, for example, but are constituted by the theories we hold, which reflect in turn the social needs and uses to which such theories respond. Seen this way, neither Aristotle

11 For the Stoic view in relation to Aristotle's, see Konstan (2006).
12 J.A. Russell (2012).
13 Horberg, Oveis, and Keltner (2011).
14 Batson (2011).

nor modern investigators can be said to have discovered what emotion is; rather, Aristotle, and scientists today, construct the category, which is conditioned to a greater or lesser degree by their own values and expectations. In this sense we can rightly say that Aristotle invented emotion, adding only that, within broad limits, every theorist does the same, not because he hit upon the enduring truth of the matter but because he self-consciously and systematically assembled under one heading a class of sentiments that were not mere sensations, like pleasure and pain, or appetites, like hunger, thirst, and sexual desire. To all appearances, moreover, he was the first to do so, at least in ancient Greece. The remarkable fact is that his conception holds up as well as it does even today, and continues to offer fertile perspectives to modern psychological theory.

And what about Plato? It is fair to say, I think, that Plato led the way, and that Aristotle, in his definition of the πάθη, paid implicit homage to his teacher. Perhaps it was Plato's hostility to rhetoric that prevented him from developing his insights more methodically, since that is where the manipulation of emotions was most visibly promoted in his time. As we have seen, Aristotle too at one point shared his master's doubts about whether to discuss the emotions at all, and that in a tract on rhetoric itself. We can be grateful that he overcame them.

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Index of Modern Authors

Index of Relevant Passages

This index mentions the passages under discussion in the chapters, lefting out simple references and lists. In order to reduce the number of entries, overlapping passages have sometimes been grouped into one.

Index of Subjects

This index lists emotions and πάθη under discussion, though there is no exact matching between English and Greek words. It also comprises related "subjects" which appeared to be fundamental for the understanding of the Greek emotions.